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A. M. D. G. 


• r 

LESSONS 


— IN — 


Scholastic Philosophy 

— BY — 


MICHAEL W. SHALLO, S. J. 

Former Professor of Philosophy, University of Santa Clara 


SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA 


Published by the University Press 




Copyrighted, 1912 

BY 

University of Santa Clara 


&CU310984 
"Ho-I . 






/ 


!3Y 


INTRODUCTION 




DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 


I. A philosopher is literally a lover of wisdom, a seeker 
after wisdom. Wisdom (sapientia) means relishable knowi- 
___edge—in our case, that knowledge which gives the highest and 
fullest natural satisfaction to the human mind. Now the hu¬ 
man mind, by its very nature, thirsts after knowledge—knowl¬ 
edge not of a few things or a few classes of things, but of all 
things, of all classes of things. Nor is it satisfied with any sort 
of information about its far-reaching subject-matter; it seeks 
to know the ultimate causes and reasons of things—what they 
are, whence they are, why they are, etc. Nor yet again is it 
satisfied with any obscure or doubtful view; it wants clear, cer¬ 
tain, evident knowledge. Hence wisdom or philosophy, the 
object of the philosopher’s quest, is defined, Clear, certain, evi¬ 
dent knowledge of the ultimate reasons and causes, internal 
and external, of things, as far as this can be reached by the 
natural powers of the human mind. 

The formal object, then, of philosophy, or that which, for 
its own sake, it investigates, are absolutely ultimate reasons 
and causes, as far as these are knowable with certainty and 
evidence by man’s natural reason. 




4 


As its material object or that in which it seeks its formal 
object, it embraces all things, all Being. 

Note.— Supernatural knowledge is that which is had 
through revelation. Natural knowledge is acquired by the 
unaided natural faculties. Knowledge of the mere existence 
of facts or phenamena is called experimental or historical 
knowledge. Knowledge of the natures of things and of their 
more or less proximate causes, is called scientific knowledge. 
Knowledge of ultimate causes and reasons is philosophical 
knowledge. 

II. Things may be considered either as they are in them¬ 
selves, or as they are in our thoughts, or as they stand in rela¬ 
tion to our will; and thus philosophy divides itself into 
Metaphysics or the science of real Toeing , Logic, or the science 
of right thinhing, Moral Philosophy or the science of right 
willing or moral action. 

Metaphysics, again, is divided into:— 

Ontology, whose object is real Being as such, considered 
in itself and in its highest genera or most general classifica¬ 
tions. 

Cosmology, whose object is the irrational world around 
us; 

Anthropology, whose object is Man; 

Theology, whose object is God. 

Understanding, then, that we speak of natural knowledge 
we may say that Logic gives us the ultimate in regard to right 
mental action; Ontology, in regard to real Being and its pri¬ 
mary determinations; Cosmology, in regard to the irrational 
world; Anthropology, in regard to Man; Theology, in regard 
to God; Moral Philosophy, in regard to right moral action. 
Apart, therefore, from its excellence as an instrument of men¬ 
tal discipline and its necessity as a guide in speculative and 
practical science, no subject can be worthier of earnest mental 
effort than this study 

“Of God, of Nature, and of Human Life.” 




PART I 


LOGIC 


DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF LOGIC. 


1. Logic is the science of the laws by which reason must 
be governed in order to act conformably to its nature, and so 
to form correct and true judgments. 

2. There are, then, two sets of laws to be considered: 
the one set, that our thought may be correct and consistent or 
conformed to the necessary laws of thinking; the other, that 
our thought may be true or conformed to the objective reality 
of things. Hence the division of Logic into Dialectics or For¬ 
mal Logic, and Critics or Material Logic. 

Note.— Logic may be called an art, inasmuch as it gives us 
the practical rules by which we must be guided in order to 
reason correctly ourselves, and to judge correctly about the 
reasoning of others. It is a science inasmuch as it gives us the 
fundamental reasons of the laws it propounds. 

The importance of the study of Logic is evident from its 
purpose, which is to secure exact, correct, true thought, and to 
avoid deception by fallacy or error. 





Book I 


DIALECTICS. 


3. Dialectics or Formal Logic treats of the laws by which 
our mental acts must be governed in order that our thinking 
may be correct and consistent or conformed to the necessary 
laws of thought. 

4. The principal acts of the human mind are Simple 
Apprehension, Judgment and Reasoning; these are the pri¬ 
mary subject-matter of Dialectics. But as speech is so closely 
connected with the exercise and expression of thought, the 
forms of speech by which these mental acts are expressed will 
also need to be considered here. 

5. This Book, therefore, will comprise three chapters, 

viz.: 

1st. Simple Apprehension, and its verbal expres¬ 
sion, the Verbal term. 

2d. Judgment, and its verbal expression, the 
•Proposition. 

3d. Reasoning, and its verbal expression, the 
Syllogism, etc. 

CHAPTER I. 

Article I. —Simple Apprehension. 

6. A Simple Apprehension or Notion or Idea or Concept 
or Mental Term, for all mean the same thing, is a simple intel¬ 
lectual representation of an object. 

Explanation.— Simple because it merely represents the 
object without affirming or denying anything of it. Intellectual 
to distinguish this representation from those of the senses or 




7 


imagination. Representation, that is, a physical entity exist¬ 
ing in the intellect whose essential function it is to cause the 
mind immediately to perceive the object of which it is a repre¬ 
sentation ; or, technically speaking, a natural formal sign which 
leads to the immediate perception of itself, but of the object - 
signified. 

7. The object of an idea is that which it represents. 
Every object has certain attributes or characters peculiar to 
itself, by which it is what it is and is knowable or capable of 
manifesting itself to the mind. These characters we may call 
the notes of the object. When, then, the mind represents an 
object, it does so by representing some or all of these notes. 

8. The object, as it really is, with all its notes, is called 
the material object of the idea. The same object considered 
only in those notes, which are here and now represented in 
the thought, is called the formal object of the idea. 

9. The Comprehension of an idea is the sum of the notes 
represented in that idea. 

The Extension of an idea is its capacity of representing 
more or fewer objects. 

The greater the Comprehension of an idea, the less its 
Extension and vice versa. 

Note.— Attention is a special application of the mind to\ 
one object among many simultaneously presented to it. It 
may be involuntary, in which case its direction and intensity 
are determined by the interest or attractiveness of the object; 
or voluntary, and then it is determined chiefly by motives 
which influence the will. 

Abstraction is an act of simple apprehension in which the 
mind represents one note or character or aspect of an object, 
prescinded from other notes of the same object, with which 
it is actually united or even identified. 

Reflection is an apprehensive act whose object is the 
mind’s own acts or states. 

The act of simple apprehension is often called an intention. 




8 


A first (or direct) intention is the apprehension of an object 
as it is in itself. A second (or reflex ) intention is the appre¬ 
hension of an object as it exists in the thinking mind—a con¬ 
cept of our direct concept of an object. 

Article II. —Classification of Ideas. 

Ideas or concepts may be classified according (a) to 
their origin, (b) the objects represented by them, (c) the 
perfection with which they represent their objects, (d) their 
relations to one another. 

10. According to their origin, ideas are either intuitive 
or derivative. Intuitive, if they are directly and immediately 
determined by the objects they represent or are such as if 
they had been so derived from their objects. 

Derivative, when they are not determined by the objects 
which they represent, but are formed by synthesis or analysis 
or other modifications of intuitive concepts. Thus our concept 
of a man is intuitive, while our concept of an angel or of 
God is derivative. 

Intuitive■ concepts are direct or reflex according as their 
objects are without or within the thinking mind. 

Det'ivative concepts are arbitrary or discursive, according 
as the synthesis of intuitive ideas by which they are formed, 
is arbitrary, or the result of strict logical reasoning. 

11. In regard to the objects represented, ideas may be 
classified according to their comprehension and extension. 

(i) According to their comprehension, ideas are simple 
or complex according as they represent one or several 
notes. Concrete or abstract according as they represent 
a subject as affected by a form or determination; or a 
form or determination apart from its subject. 

Note.— An abstract idea is said to be positively abstract 
when the subject of the form or determination is positively 
excluded from the concept; negatively abstract when the 




9 


subject is neither excluded nor included but simply pre¬ 
scinded from. 

(ii) According to their extension, ideas are singular, 
universal, particular, teame mdentah - o - 

(a) A singular idea represents one definite individual 
object, i. e., a sum of notes, so defined and determined that 
all taken together can only be realized in and predicated 
of the individual thing, e. g., ‘Cleveland,’ ‘California,’ 
‘this family.’ 

Note.— The peculiar incommunicable characters of 
such an individual being are called individuating notes. 

(b) A universal idea represents a note or sum of notes 
which may be realized in and predicated of many dis¬ 
tinct objects \(which are called its inferiors or subordi¬ 
nates), e. g., ‘man,’ ‘state,’ ‘family/ 0 

(c) A particular idea is a universal idea restricted to 
an indeterminate portion of its extension, e. g., ‘some 
men,’ ‘most families,’ ‘many states.’ 

Classification of Universal Ideas. 

If I draw a circle on the blackboard and explain to you 
how it is formed, you will have first, a concept of that 
particular circle, then, a concept of what constitutes a 
circle (a direct universal idea); lastly, you can conceive 
that sum of notes (represented in your direct universal 
idea) as realized in or capable of being realized in and 
predicated of innumerable individuals (a reflex universal 
idea). 

Hence a direct universal idea represents its object as 
negatively abstract or prescinded from individuation. 
What it represents really exists independently of the 
thinking mind, though it does not and cannot exist in the 
manner in which it is represented, i. e., as prescinded from 
individuation; individuation is neither included nor ex¬ 
cluded in the contents of the concept, it is simply neglected. 




- 10 - 

A reflex universal idea, on the contrary, represents its 
object as positively abstract, as positively excluding indi¬ 
viduation. Such an object does not and cannot exist out¬ 
side the thinking mind; it is a logical enity with a 
foundation in reality. 

What is common to many and predicable of each and all 
of them distributively must be referred to its subordinates 
in one or other of the five following ways, viz.: as species, 
genus, difference, property, or accident. 

For what is thus conceived as common to and predicable 
of many, either belongs to each and all of them necessarily 
and constantly, or not; in the latter case, it is an accident. 
If it belongs to all its subordinates necessarily and con¬ 
stantly, it must be either a constituent, or a necessary con¬ 
comitant of their essence; if the latter is a property. If 
the common predicate is a constituent of the common 
essence, it either expresses the whole of that essence, and 
then we have a species; or it expresses that element of the 
essence which is common to several different species, and 
we have a genus; or finally, it expresses that essential ele¬ 
ment which distinguishes different species of the same 
genus from one another, in which case we have a specific 
difference. 

A species is that sum of notes which constitutes a com¬ 
plete essence or nature conceived as common to and pre¬ 
dicable of many distinct individuals. 

A genus is that note or sum of notes which constitutes 
an essential element common to and predicable of many 
different species. 

A specific difference is that peculiar essential note or 
character by which each species of the same proximate 
genus is distinguished from other species of the same 
genus. It is common to and predicable of each individual 
of the given species. 




11 


A property is a note which, though not an essential con¬ 
stituent of a given species, is yet a necessary concomitant 
of that species and is found in every individual of that 
species and of that species only. 

An accident (logical) is a note which is neither an essen¬ 
tial constituent of a given species, nor a necessary con¬ 
comitant of its essence, but may be absent or present in 
individuals without affecting their essence. 

(d) A transcendental idea represents a note which is 
common to and predicable of all beings. 

12. In regard to the various degrees of perfection with 
which they represent their objects, ideas may be classified as 
clear,' obscure, distinct, confused, complete, incomplete, com¬ 
prehensive, proper, analogous. 

(a) A clear idea represents its object so as to distin¬ 
guish it from all other objects, e. g., ‘our idea of man.’ 

(b) An obscure idea does not so represent its object, 
e. g., ‘an ignorant man’s idea of bismuth.’ 

(c) A distinct idea is a clear idea in which, moreover, 
some at least of the characteristic notes of the object 
represented are distinguished from one another. 

(d) A confused idea is one in which the notes are not 
so distinguished. 

(e) A complete idea is a distinct idea in which all the 
characteristic notes are distinguished from each other. 

(f) An incomplete idea, if not all the notes, are so 
distinguished. . 

(f) An idea is comprehensive when the mind so rep¬ 
resents an object as to conceive not only all its notes dis¬ 
tinctly and completely, but also all that is knowable about it. 

(h) A proper idea represents its object according to 
the latter’s own proper nature and character. 

(i) An analogous idea represents its object, not ac¬ 
cording to the latter’s own proper nature, but by a modi- 




12 


fication of the proper concepts of other less perfect ob¬ 
jects, in some way similar to it or otherwise related to it. 
It is only in this way that we can form onr idea of God. 

Note.— The word proper is sometimes applied to ideas 
in the sense of singular (12-11-a). In this sense a proper con¬ 
cept is opposed to a common one (universal or transcendental). 
In this sense of the word, we have undoubtedly a proper con¬ 
cept of God, i. e., one whose contents can only be verified in 
and predicated of the one infinitely perfect God. 

13. Considered in regard to their relation to one 
another, ideas are classified as identical or different, congru¬ 
ent or repugnant, associated. 

(a) Ideas are intrinsically identical, when their con¬ 
tents or comprehension is the same (the same formal 
object). 

Intrinsically different, when their conprehension is 
different (different formal objects). 

Objectively identical, when they represent the same ma¬ 
terial object, i. e., when their contents are verified in the 
same material object. 

Objectively different, when they represent different ma¬ 
terial objects. 

(b) Ideas are congruent, when they represent notes 
which can be united to form one complex idea. 

Repugnant, if the notes represented cannot be united 
in one and the same material object, i. e., if they mu¬ 
tually exclude one another. 

Note.— The objects of repugnant ideas are called oppo¬ 
sites. There are four classes of opposites, viz.: 

Contradictories, when one is a positive note, and the 
other its simple negation, e. g., ‘man, not man’; ‘black, 
not black.’ Here there is no mean. Everything that is 
or is thinkable, is either man, or not-man, etc. 




13 


Primatives, when one is a positive note, and the other 
its privative negative, e. g., ‘sight and blindness in man.’ 

Contraries, when both are the positive notes farthest 
apart under the same genus, e. g., ‘simple, compound’; 
‘virtue, vice’; ‘beauty, ugliness.’ Here there is a mean. 

Correlative opposites, when each necessarily implies the 
other—‘father, son’; ‘Creator, creature.’ 

(c) Ideas are said to be associated, when, on account 
of some intrinsic or extrinsic connection between them, 
one recalls the other, e. g., ‘the ideas of whole and part’; 
‘of home and the persons living there.’ 

Article III. —Verbal Terms. 

14. A sign is that which conveys to a cognitive faculty 
the knowledge of something besides itself, e. g., ‘smoke is a 
sign of fire. ’ Two relations may be considered in a sign: one 
to the thing signified, the other to the faculty to which it 
conveys the knowledge of the thing signified. 

(a) When the relation to the thing signified is founded 
in the nature of things, the sign is natural, e. g., ‘smoke is a 
natural sign of fire.’ 

(b) When this relation arises, not from the nature of 
things, but from the will of man, the sign is arbitrary or 
conventional, e. g., ‘a barber’s pole.’ 

In regard to its relation to the faculty to which it repre¬ 
sents the thing signified, a sign is:— 

(a) Instrumental, if it leads to the knowledge of the 
thing signified only mediately, i. e., through the previous 
knowledge of itself. It is itself the immediate object of 
cognition; and, once known, it leads to the knowledge of the 
object it signifies. 

(b) A formal sign, on the contrary, immediately and 
without being perceived itself as a sign, represents the thing 
signified. 



-14- 

15. Words are articulate sounds of the human voice, 
having a signification fixed by convention, or arbitrary in¬ 
strumental signs manifesting ideas and standing for the 
objects which those ideas represent. 

The chief words considered in logic are nouns (substantive 
and adjective), pronouns and verbs. They are called verbal 
terms because the logical analysis of speech terminates in them. 

Note. —In logic every grammatical verb is equivalent to 
the present tense of the verb to be and an attribute, e. g., ‘I 
have written a letter’ is equivalent to ‘I am one-who-has- 
written-a-letter. ’ Hence the verbal terms to be considered are 
chiefly the subject (that of which something is affirmed or 
denied), and predicate (that which is affirmed or denied of 
something). 

Article IV. —Classification of Verbal Terms. 

Verbal terms may be classified in the same way as con¬ 
cepts, viz.: according to their perfection as signs; and accord¬ 
ing to the comprehension, extension, and mutual relations of 
the ideas they signify. 

16. According to their perfection as signs, terms are 

(a) Fixed or Definite, if their sense is constant. f 

Vague, if their sense is variable, e. g., ‘nature.’ 

(b) Univocal, if the note signified is verified completely 
and independently in all the objects to which the term is 
applied. 

Equivocal, when the same term is used to signify objects 
altogether different apd in no way related to each other, e. g., 
‘bank.’ ' ip Or ' \ t><> A 

Analogical, (1) when the note signified by the term is 
found in all the objects to which the term is applied, but not 
equally and independently in all; (2) when the note signified 
belongs in reality to but one of the objects, while the term is 
applied to other objects on account of some relation they bear 
to it, e. g., the word ‘healthy’ as applied to man, food, color, 




15 


etc.; the word ‘foot’ as used of a man, a mountain, etc. The 
various objects to which the common name is applied, are 
called analogates. That object to which the note signified 
belongs absolutely, completely and independently, is called 
the primary analogate. 

17. If we consider the comprehension of the idea signi¬ 
fied, a term is 

(a) Positive, if it expresses a positive note. 

Negative, if it expresses the negation of some posi¬ 
tive note. 

Privative. ' 




16 


(e) Of first intention (real ), or of second intention ( log¬ 
ical ). 

18. According to the extension of the idea signified, a 

term is 

(a) Proper, when it signifies the object of a singular 

idea. 

Common, when it signifies a note common to many dis¬ 
tinct individuals, i. e., all that the word expresses is found 
in each of the individuals to which the word is applied. 

Note.— A common term may become singular by the ad- 




17 


Common, when the term expresses a note or character 
common to many individuals, e. g., ‘a President.’ 

(d) Common supposition is 

Absolute, when the term signifies the common note found 
in different individuals prescinded from individuation, i. e., 
neither including nor excluding individuation, but simply not 
considering it. It simply expresses the contents or compre¬ 
hension of a direct universal idea. 

Relative or personal, when the term signifies the indi¬ 
viduals included under the extension of the universal idea, 
e. g., ‘Presidents are fallible.’ 

(e) Common personal supposition is 

Collective, when the word stands for all the individuals 
to which it applies, taken together, e. g ., ‘The President of 
the United States has had certain rights for over a hundred 
years. ’ 

Distributive, when the word stands for the individuals to 
which it applies taken severally. 

Note. —Distributive supposition is complete, when a ge¬ 
neric or specific term is used for each and every individual 
under its extension; incomplete, when a generic term is used 
to express some individuals of every species under its ex¬ 
tension, e. g., ‘all terrestrial animals were in the Ark’; i. e., 
some of each species. 

Particidar, when the common name expresses but some of 
the objects to which it can be applied, e. g., ‘Saints have 
erred’; and this either indeterminately, e. g., ‘ships are neces¬ 
sary to cross the ocean’; or deter minutely, e. g., ‘ships carried 
Columbus to America.’ 

Article YI.—Logical Division. 

Logical definition and division are the test of, and the 
means of acquiring, clear and distinct ideas. 

Logical division is the mental analysis or resolution of a 




-18- 

whole as represented by one idea, into its parts as represented 
by many ideas. 

20. (a) An actual whole really contains in itself the 

parts which are distinguished and enumerated in it, i. e., the 
notes of its comprehension. It is 

Metaphysical, if the parts distinguished in it, though 
real, are not really, but only in concept, distinct and sep¬ 
arable, e. g., the notes of substance, life, animality and ration¬ 
ality in man. Such parts are called metaphysical parts. 
They are said to be virtually distinct from one another. 

Physical, if the parts are not only real, but also really 
distinct and separable. These parts are either: (1) essential, 
e. g., body and soul in man; (2) or integral, i. e., those into 
which a body is divisible, with respect to its quantity, e. g., 
‘hand,’ ‘foot,’ ‘head,’ etc. These again may be either homo¬ 
geneous or heterogeneous. 

Note. —Under the head of physical whole, we may place 
the moral whole, e. g., ‘ an organized community; the artificial 
whole, e. g., ‘ a watch, ’ ‘ a house, ’ etc.; the accidental whole, 
e. g., the composite of a substance and its various accidental 
modifications. 

(b) A logical or potential whole is a reflex universal in 
regard to its inferiors, i. e., in regard to all that is covered 
by its extension: these are called subjective parts. 

Note.— An actual whole may be affirmed of all its parts 
united together. 

A potential whole may be affirmed of each of its parts 
taken separately. 

An actual whole may be called a Whole of Comprehen¬ 
sion; a potential, a Whole of Extension. The two are in 
inverse ratio—the larger the potential whole the smaller the 
actual, and vice versa. 

Hence an actual whole is divided by mentally separating 
the various parts or notes of its comprehension; a logical 




19 


whole, by adding to the notes of its comprehension. Hence 
division by analysis, or by synthesis. 

21. Logical division is either 

Division of a verbal term. This is called distinction. It 
consists in assigning the different senses of an ambiguous 
word, phrase or sentence; or 

Division of the object signified by a verbal term. It is 
the resolution of the thing signified into its parts, and varies 
according to the character of the whole to be divided, e. g.: 

An actual whole may be divided into its metaphysical, 
essential or integral parts; 

A potential whole, e. g., ‘a genus, may be divided into 
its species’; a ‘species, into its individuals’; 

A subject may be divided according to its different ac¬ 
cidents, an accident according to its different subjects, or 
according to the accidents with which it is found united. 

22. The division should be adequate, i. e., all the parts 
taken together should be equal to the whole, neither more nor 
less. 

(a) No part should be equal to the whole. 

(b) One part should not include another. 

(e) Division should be, first into proximate and im¬ 
mediate parts; and then, if need be, each of these should 
be subdivided into its approximate parts; else we shall have 
confusion, and not clearness and distinctness of ideas. 

Note.— See Clarke, p. 225, seqq. 

Article VII.— Definition. 

A definition declares briefly and distinctly what a thing 
is. It is either Verbal or Real. 

23. (a) A verbal or nominal definition gives the mean¬ 
ing of a word. It is formed either: 

According to the etymology of the word, e. g., ‘President 
is one who sits at the head. ’ 




- 20 - 

Or, according to common usage, ‘President is the head of 
the executive in a Republic.’ 

Or arbitrarily, i. e., when a word is ambiguous, and one 
settles the particular sense in which he uses it, e. g., ‘By 
President we mean the one whom the class chooses to repre¬ 
sent it in regard to class matters with the authorities of the 
College.’ 

(b) A real definition declares what the thing, signified 
by a word, is, by giving a clear and distinct account of it. 
It is either: 

Causal, if it assigns the extrinsic causes of the object, 
i. e., its efficient, final, exemplary cause; or 

Essential, if it gives the essential or constitutive parts of 
the object, regarded as a physical or metaphysical whole, 
e. g., ‘Man is composed of a spiritual soul and an organic 
body ’; ‘ Man is a rational animal ’; or 

Descriptive , if it gives the properties of the object, or 
such of its accidents as serve to distinguish it from all other 
objects; or finally 

Genetic, if it gives the manner in which a thing is pro¬ 
duced. 

24. A Definition should be clearer and more distinct 
than the object defined. 

It should embrace neither more nor less than the object 
defined, and apply to none but it. 

It should not be tautological, i. e., it should not contain 
the name of the object to be defined , or any of its derivatives, 
or of such correlatives of the thing to be defined as cannot 
be explained unless the thing itself is already known. This 
is called Defining in a Circle. 

It should not be negative, for the purpose of a definition 
is to declare what a thing is, not what it is not. However, 
an exception to this law is allowed in the case of contra¬ 
dictory opposites. When one has been positively defined, the 
other may be defined negatively, e. g ., ‘knowing what parts 




21 


are and that a compound consists of parts, we may define a 
simple being as one which does not consist of parts.’ 

Note. —See Clarke, p. 193. 

25. All things known to us can be more or less accu¬ 
rately described; but not all need or can he defined, partly 
on account of their simplicity or obviousness, partly owing 
to the imperfection of our knowledge. 

26. We may form a strict definition either by 

(a) The method of synthesis, i. e., by starting with a 
notion more universal than the object to be defined, and 
gradually descending to it by the addition of different notes; 
or 

(b) The method of analysis , i. e., by starting with the 
individual, and gradually ascending by the elimination of 
individual or accidental characters to a specific or generic 
concept. 


CHAPTER II. 


Article I.— Judgment. 


27. A Judgment is an intellectual act which affirms or 
denies the objective identity of two ideas upon comparing 
them with each other. The material object of a judgment 
are the two objective ideas, inasmuch as they are simultan¬ 
eously present and compared with a view to discover their 
identity or non-identity. The formal object is the objective 
identity of those ideas, mentally affirmed or denied. 

Note. —(a) A judgment is elicited by the intellect, not 
by the will; though the judgment may be determined by the 
command or influence of the will. 

(b) A judgment considered in regard to its material 
object may be called a compound or composite act, for it rep¬ 
resents two simple concepts in regard to their objective iden¬ 
tity or diversity. Considered, however, formally, i. e., in re¬ 
gard to its formal object, it is necessarily a simple act, being 


a} 




22 


the simple affirmation or denial of objective identity between 
two ideas. 

(c) To perceive this relation of identity or diversity it 
is necessary to have compared the ideas with each other. 
Therefore, all judgments are comparative, and there is no 7 ^. 
such thing as merely instinctive judgment. 

(d) The comparison of ideas required in a judgment 
regards not their intrinsic but their objective identity. 

(e) The relation between subject and predicate in a 
judgment may be considered in three ways, viz.: In an af¬ 
firmative proposition, for instance. 

A. The predicate contains the subject under its extension. 

B. The subject contains the predicate in its compre¬ 
hension. 

C. The subject and the predicate are objectively iden¬ 
tical, that is, are verified of one and the same material object. 


28. Judgments are:— 

(a) Analytical , if the mere consideration of the ideas 
compared, suffices to make it clear that they are objectively 
identified or different, e. g., 1 The whole is greater than any of 
its parts.’ Such judgments are also called pure, rational, ab¬ 
solute , necessary, metaphysical. 

(b) Synthical, if we gather the objective identity or 
diversity of the ideas compared, from internal or external ex¬ 
perience. Such judgments are also called empirical or ex¬ 
perimental, physical, contingent. 


Note. —Hence a judgment is analytical when the pred¬ 
icate represents something which is either the essence, or of 
the essence, or necessarily required by the essence of the sub¬ 
ject ; otherwise it is synthical. Sometimes, however, the predi¬ 
cate is the essence or of the essence, etc., of the subject, yet 
owing to the relative or absolute imperfection of our mental 




23 


grasp, this is not perceived by ns. In such cases the proposi¬ 
tion is said to be analytical in itself, but not so with regard 
to us. 

A judgment is synthetical, when the predicate is not ap¬ 
prehended as an essential note or property of the subject, i. e., 
as not necessarily, but only accidentally or contingently re¬ 
quired by it. Hence as the relation of predicate to subject is 
either necessary or not-necessary, the so-called synthetic a 
priori judgment of Kant can have no place among our mental 
operations. 

(e) True or False, according as the mental affirmation 
or negation corresponds or conflicts with the objective reality. 
Other divisions of judgments will be noticed when we speak of 
Propositions. 

Note. —See Clarke, p. 245, seqq., also p. 58, seqq. 

Article II.— Propositions. 

29. A proposition is an indicative sentence, or enuncia¬ 
tion in which something is affirmed or denied of something 
else. The subject is that of which something is enunciated; 
the predicate, that which is enunciated of the subject; that 
which it unites (which would be its verbal sense) ; but merely 
objective identity is called the copula. The subject and pred¬ 
icate are the matter of the proposition, the copula is the form. 
Every proposition therefore may be reduced to the formula 
‘S is P’; or ‘S is not P’;—whether it be expressed in three, or 
more, or fewer verbal terms. 

Note (1)—The copula is always the present indicative of 
the verb ‘ to be. ’ It does not signify the existence of the terms 
which it unites (which would be its verbal sense) : but merely 
affirms their objective identity (which is called its substantive 
sense). 

(2)—The subject is so called either because it is conceived 
as the possessor or sustainer of the note expressed by the pred- 




-24- 

ieate, or because it is conceived as coming under the extension 
of the latter. Hence the natural order of the terms is subject- 
popida-predicate. When the predicate is placed first, the prop¬ 
osition is said to be inverted. 

Article III. —Classification of Propositions. 

30. If we consider the matter of a proposition, i. e., sub¬ 
ject and predicate, it will be either simple or compound, accord¬ 
ing as it contains one or many statements or enunciations. 

If we consider the form or copula or quality of the propo¬ 
sition, it is either negative or affirmative. 

If we consider the quantity, i. e., the extension of the sub¬ 
ject, it is either universal, particular, singular or indefinite. 

Lastly, if we consider the relations between propositions 
we shall find that they may be opposed, equivalent, etc. In 
the following article we shall consider only the division of 
propositions according to their quality and quantity. 

Article IV. —Division of Propositions According to Their 
Quality and Quantity. 

31. With regard to its quality or form, a proposition is 
either affirmative or negative. S is P; S is not P. 

(a) In an affirmative proposition, 

The predicate in the whole of its comprehension, distrib- 
utively or collectively taken, is affirmed of the subject—in other 
words, it is affirmed that the subject has all and each of the 
notes that make up the predicate; thus when I say, ‘ ‘ man is an 
animal,” I mean that “man is a sentient, living, corporeal sub¬ 
stance. ’ ’ 

The Use of the predicate is, generally speaking, partic¬ 
ular; in other words, no more is affirmed than that the subject 
is one or some of the things contained under the extension of 




-25- 

the predicate, e. g., ‘man is an animal,’ i. e., man is one of the 
objects to which the term animal applies. We said above, 
‘generally speaking,’ for in cases where the predicate is a 
singular term, or a strict definition, or a property in the strict 
sense of the word, it is taken in the whole of its extension. 

Hence, if we call the subject S and the predicate P, the 
formula of an affirmative proposition is ‘S is P’; and it sig¬ 
nifies that if we consider the extension of the ideas expressed 
by both terms, S is contained under the extension of P; while, 
if we consider the comprehension of the ideas, P is contained 
in the comprehension of S. 

(b) In a negative proposition, 

The predicate, in the whole of its comprehension taken 
collectively is denied of the subject, though not necessarily in 
regard to each of its notes, e. g., when I say ‘a stone is not an 
animal,’ I mean that a stone has not that sum of notes which 
constitutes the essence of animal. It lacks the notes of life and 
sensibility, though it has those of body and substance in com¬ 
mon with an animal. 

The Use of the predicate, except in cases where the pred¬ 
icate is a singular term, is distributively common or universal. 
In other words, it is denied that the subject is any of the things 
contained under the extension of the predicate, e. g., ‘man is 
not a stone,’ i. e., man is not one of those objects to which the 
term stone is applied. Hence the formula of a negative propo¬ 
sition is, ‘S is not P,’ i. e., S is not contained under the exten¬ 
sion of P; all the notes of P, collectively taken, are not con¬ 
tained in the comprehension of S. 

32. The quantity of a proposition depends upon the ex¬ 
tension of the subject.. Hence, according as the subject is 
singular, or particular, or universal, or indefinite, the propo¬ 
sition is (a) singular, e. g., ‘Washington was President of the 
United States’; (b) or particular, e. g., ‘Some Presidents were 
great scholars’; (c) or universal, e. g., ‘All Presidents are 




- .26 - 

heads of the executive’; or indefinitely , e. g., ‘Presidents are 
men of executive ability.’ 

As, in a singular proposition, the subject is taken in the 
whole of its extension, it may be treated in practice just as a 
universal. 

Note.— With regard to universal propositions, we may 
observe here that there are three kinds of universality, viz.: 

(a) Metaphysical universality , when the predicate neces¬ 
sarily agrees or disagrees with all and each of the inferiors of 
the subject, so that an exception is absolutely impossible, e. g., 
‘Man is a rational animal’; ‘A circle is not a square.’ 

(b) Physical universality, when, according to the ordi¬ 
nary laws of nature, the predicate agrees or disagrees with all 
and each of the inferiors of the subject, e. g., ‘A man who tries 
to walk on water will sink. ’ 

(c) Moral universality, when, according to the ordinary 
laws and motives by which human action is governed, the pred¬ 
icate agrees with each and all of the inferiors of the subject, 
e. g., ‘All parents love their children.’ 

In an indefinite proposition the subject is taken, at least, in 
a morally universal sense; for this is the ordinary sense in 
which men understand such propositions, e. g., no one would 
admit as true the proposition, ‘ The Chinese are Christians. ’ 

Thus, omitting the singular and the indefinite proposition 
as being, at least for all practical purposes of reasoning, re¬ 
ducible to the universal, we may consider all propositions in 
regard to their quantity as either universal or particular. Each 
of these classes, again, may be either affirmative or negative. 
Hence, considering loth quantity and quality, we have four 
kinds of propositions. 

Universal affirmative (designated by A), ‘All men are 
mortal. ’ 

Universal negative (designated by E), ‘No man is a stone.’ 




27 


Particular affirmative (designated by I), ‘Some men are 
virtuous. ’ 

Particular negative (designated by 0), ‘Some men are not 
industrious. ’ 

These distinctions are expressed in the lines: 

A affirms of each and all, 

And E denies of any; 

I affirms, while 0 denies, 

Of one, or few, or many. 

Article V.—Division of Propositions According to Matter. 

33. (a) A proposition is Categorical if it affirms or 
denies absolutely the objective identity of two ideas, e. g., ‘a 
is b.’ 

A proposition is Hypothetical if it affirms or denies the 
objective dependence or sequence of one judgment upon an¬ 
other, e. g., ‘ if a is b, x is y. ’ This may be reduced to the Cate¬ 
gorical Form, thus, ‘All cases of a being b, are cases of x being 
y. ’ The negative form denies the connexion between the prop¬ 
ositions, in some way equivalent to this: ‘ Not even if a is & is 
x therefore y’; ‘Not all cases of a being b are cases of x be¬ 
ing y.’ 

(b) A proposition is Simple if it consists of one subject 
and predicate, i. e., if it expresses a single judgment. 

A proposition is Compound if it consists of many subjects 
or many predicates, i. e., if it expresses many distinct judg¬ 
ments. A compound proposition may be either explicitly or 
implicitly compound. For clearness’ sake, then, we will speak 
in three distinct paragraphs of simple , explicitly compound 
and implicitly compound propositions. 

(i). Simple Propositions. 

34. They may take different forms, provided they only 
express a single judgment, e. g., ‘Man is mortal’; ‘Well-organ¬ 
ized and skilfully-administered governments are capable of pro. 




28 


curing the happiness of their subjects’; ‘As a man lives, so will 
he die’; ‘One admires a man who is not afraid to acknowledge 
he has been wrong.’ In all these propositions it is clear there 
is but one affirmative or negation. 

Note.— A phrase which modifies the subject or predicate 
is called “an Incident.” Such incidents are notes of one of the 
terms of the main proposition here and now enunciated. They 
may be either explicative or restrictive (16 c. note). 

(ii). Explicitly Compound Propositions. 

35. These are, chiefly, either copulative, adversative, or 
causal. 

(a) Copidative, when many subjects or predicates are 
connected by copulative conjunctions expressed or understood, 
e. g., ‘John and James and Paul were there’; ‘Neither John 
nor James nor Paul was there. ’ 

Note. —That such a proposition be true, each of the simple 
propositions into which it is resolvable must be true. If one of 
these be false, the compound proposition may be denied. It is 
better, however, in practice, to distinguish what is true and 
false in the proposition and to concede the true and deny the 
false. 

(b) Adversative, when many subjects or predicates are 
connected by adversative conjunctions, such as but, however, 
etc., e. g., ‘Not St. Pault but St. Peter was first Bishop of 
Pome’; ‘Robinson is not a genius, but he has a good share of 
common sense. ’ 

Note.— That it be true, each of the simple propositions 
it contains must be true, as in the preceding case. 

(c) Causal, if it consists of many simple propositions 
connected by causal particles, such as for, because, since, e. g., 
‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for (because) they shall see 
God.’ 




29 


Note— That it be true, all the simple propositions con¬ 
tained must be true, and, moreover, that which is assigned as 
the cause or reason why the others are true, must be really the 
cause or reason why they are so, e. g., ‘The three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right angles, because Paris is the cap¬ 
ital of France!’ Here, though each single proposition is true, 
yet the whole compound proposition is false. 

(iii). Implicitly Compound Propositions. 

36. Exclusive, Exceptive, Restrictive, Disjunctive, 
Modal. 

(a) Exclusive, when the subject or predicate is modified 
by an exclusive particle, as only, alone, etc., e. g., ‘ God alone is 
eternal’; ‘The senses perceive only material objects.’ 

Note.— Here two things are asserted (a) that God is eter¬ 
nal, and (b) that nothing else is eternal; (a) that the senses 
perceive material objects, (b) and that they perceive nothing 
else. 

(b) Exceptive, when it states the subject universally, 
yet with a specified exception, to which it is implied, that the 
predicate as affirmed or denied does not belong, e. g., ‘ All but 
one have disappeared.’ 

(c) Restrictive, when the signification of subject or 
predicate is determined more narrowly by an incidental clause, 
e. g., ‘as a judge he ought not to receive these presents’; ‘He 
was murdered maliciously.’ 

(d) Disjunctive, when disjunctive particles, either, or, 
connect many enunciations which are such that one and only 
one can be true, e. g., ‘All bodies are either in motion or at 
rest.’ Such a proposition affirms or denies two things, (a) 
that bodies cannot at once be in motion and at rest, and (b) 
that they must be either. 

Hence, that such a proposition be true, it is required, 
first, that the enumeration of alternatives be complete; second, 
that the various alternatives enumerated cannot be simulta- 




30 


neously true of the same thing, under the same circumstances; 
third, or be simultaneously false. 

(e) In a modal proposition, the copula is modified by an 
adverb which declares in what manner the predicate is in¬ 
cluded in or excluded from the subject. These adverbs are 
four, viz.: necessarily, contingently, impossibly, possibly. All 
other words which may seem to indicate the manner in which 
the predicate is related to the subject are either reducible to 
one or other of the above, or are modifications of the predicate. 

Note. —Possibly indicates that A can be B. 

Impossibly “ “ A cannot be B. 

Necessarily “ “ A must be B. 

Contingently “ “ A may, or may not be B. 

It is well to remember that each of these words may be 

taken in either a metaphysical, a physical or a moral sense. 

When we say that the relation between S and P is impos¬ 
sible or necessary or contingent, we assert two propositions, 
viz.: (a) the existence of a relation between S and P and (b) 
the manner of this relation; not so, however, when we say that 
the relation is possible; and, hence, in this latter case, our 
modal proposition is really a simple proposition. 

Article VI.— Opposition, Equivalence and Conversion of 
Propositions. 

37. Two propositions are said to be opposed, when, hav¬ 
ing the same object and predicate, they differ in quantity or 
in quality, or in both. 

Opposition is two-fold, 

(a) Perfect , when one denies what the other affirms; 
this again is, either, (1) of contradiction, i. e., when one af¬ 
firms or denies just enough to destroy the negation or affirma¬ 
tion of the other, e. g., ‘All A is B’; ‘Some A is not B’; ‘All 




31 


men are mortal’; ‘Some men are not mortal’; ‘No man is an 
animal’; ‘Some men are animals.’ These propositions, it will 
be noticed, differ from each other both in quantity and qual¬ 
ity;— (2) or of contrariety, when one affirms or denies more 
than enough to destroy the negation or affirmation of the 
other, e. g., ‘All A is B’; ‘No A is B’; ‘All men are mortal’; 
‘No man is mortal.’ Here the propositions are alike in quan¬ 
tity but differ in quality. 

(b) Imperfect, when the opposition is only apparent; 
and this again is two-fold, (1) either of sub-contrariety, which 
exists between propositions differing in quality but alike in 
quantity, e. g., ‘ Some men are learned ’; ‘ Some men are not 
learned’; (2) or of sub alternation, when both propositions are 
alike in quality but differ in quantity, e. g., ‘All men are 
learned’; ‘Some men are learned.’ 

38. Recalling what we have said above, the following 
scheme will represent the whole doctrine of opposition: 

A Contraries E 

All x is y. No x is y. 


ui 

£ 

o' 






cr 




a* 


\p 






' 0 / 

c o. 




CO 

p 

o' 

S» 


Some x is y. 


Some x is not y. 


I 


Sub-contraries 


0 


39. Laws of Opposition:— 

(a) Contradictories can neither be both true nor both 
false. Therefore, if A is true, 0 is false; if E is true, I is 
false, and vice versa . 




-- 32- 

(b) Contraries cannot both be true, but both may be 
false; therefore, if A is true, E is false, and vice versa; but if 
E be false it does not follow that A is true. 

Note. —Observe that two propositions properly contradict 
each other only when what is affirmed by the one is denied by 
the other, (a) in the same degree, (b) in the same respect, (c) 
at the same time. 

(c) Subalternates may both be true or both false; but if 
the universal (A or E) is true the particular of the same 
quality (I or 0) is also true; if the particular (I or 0) is 
false, the corresponding universal (A or E) is also false; if the 
particular is true the corresponding universal may be true or 
false; if the universal is false the particular may be false or 
true. 

(d) Sub-contraries cannot both be false; both may be 
true, i. e., in contingent matters, but not in necessary. 

40. Two propositions are said to be equivalent when 
they express the same judgment but in a different logical form. 

41. A proposition is converted when its terms are trans¬ 
posed, so that subject becomes predicate; and predicate sub¬ 
ject, without changing the sense of the proposition. The prop¬ 
osition, as it stands before conversion, is called the convertend; 
after conversion, the converse. 

There are three sorts of conversion, viz.: simple con¬ 
version, limited or accidental conversion, conversion by con¬ 
tra-position. 

(a) Simple conversion is had when the subject becomes 
the predicate and the predicate the subject, without changing 
either the quantity or the quality of the proposition. This is 
possible in the propositions E and I, e. g., ‘No man is a stone’; 
‘ No stone is a man ’; ‘ Some men are white ’; ‘ Some white things 
are men.’ 

(b) Conversion by limitation has place when subject and 




- 33 - 

predicate are transposed, and the quality of the proposition 
remains the same; but the quantity is changed from universal 
to particular. In this way A may be converted, e. g., 4 All men 
are animals’; ‘Some animals are men.’ 

(c) Conversion by contra-position. This has place in 
0, i. e., Transfer the negative particle from the copula to the 
predicate, and then convert simply, e. g., ‘Some men are not 
industrious; Some not-industrious creatures are men. ’ 

42. Inference in general is the derivation of a judgment 
from another or others. If the new judgment is derived from 
a comparison of two previous judgments, the process by which 
it is derived is called Reasoning, in the proper sense of the 
word. If the new judgment is derived from one previous judg¬ 
ment, the process is called Immediate Inference. 

Reasoning will be the subject of the following chapter. 
Immediate Inference is based on the properties of proposi¬ 
tions, which we have just been considering, viz., opposition, 
equivalence and conversion. 


CHAPTER III. 

Article I.— Reasoning in General. 

43. It may happen that on comparing two ideas to¬ 
gether we are unable to judge whether they are objectively 
identical or not. In such cases the obvious way to free our¬ 
selves from suspense is to compare both ideas with a third. If 
both are identical with the third we can conclude that they are 
so far both identical with each other; while, if one be identical 
with the third and the other different from it, we conclude that 
they are different from each other. The mental act which af¬ 
firms or denies the objective identity of two ideas on account 
of their relation to a third is called Reasoning. 




34 


44. Hence, reasoning comprises three judgments, one 

of which affirms or denies the objective identity of two ideas 
as the necessary consequence of two other judgments, in which 
a common third idea is affirmed to be objectively identical with 
both or with one only of these ideas. The main judgment is 
called the conclusion; the two subsidiary judgments on which 
it depends are called the premises. The necessary connexion 
between the premises and the conclusion, i. e., that which 
entitles us to infer the one from the other, is the consequence. 

The common third term with which each of the terms 
united or separated in the conclusion was compared in the pre¬ 
ceding judgments is called the middle term. The predicate of 
the conclusion is called the major term, as having the greater 
extension; the subject the minor term. Of the two preceding 
judgments, that in which the major term occurs is called the 
major premise or sumption; that in which the minor term 
occurs the minor premise or subsumption. 

Article II. —The Fundamental Principles of Reasoning. 

45. All reasoning may be reduced either to the prin¬ 
ciple of identity , i. e., Two things which are both identical with 
a third are identical with each other; or to the principle of dis¬ 
crepancy, i. e., Two things, one of which is identical with and 
the other different from a third, are different from each other; 
or, to the more readily applicable Aristotelian “ Dictum de 
Omni et de Nidlo,” which may be enunciated thus: Whatever 
may be affirmed of a potential or logical whole may be affirmed 
of each and all of its subjective parts. Whatever may be denied 
of a potential whole may be denied of each and all of its po¬ 
tential parts. And conversely: Whatever may be affirmed or 
denied of all and each of the subjective parts may be affirmed 
or denied of the whole. Thus: ‘All morally responsible agents 
are free agents. But man is a morally responsible agent. 
Therefore, man is a free agent.’ Or, in general: ‘All M is P. 
But all S is M. Therefore, all S is P. ’ 




—- 35 - 

Reasoning is pure, mixed or empirical, according as 
the two judgments from which the conclusion proceeds are 
either both analytical, or one analytical and the other synthet¬ 
ical, or both synthetical. 

Reasoning is deductive or inductive, according as it con¬ 
cludes from the potential whole to the subjective parts, or from 
the subjective parts to the whole. 


Article III.— Verbal Expression of Reasoning. 

46. The verbal expression of reasoning is called 
argumentation. The simplest and most perfect form of argu¬ 
mentation, to which all others, if legitimate, may be directly or 
indirectly reduced, is the syllogism. 

47. A syllogism is an argumentation consisting of three 
explicit propositions so connected with each other that one of 
them necessarily follows from the other two. 

48. The correctness of the conclusion depends on the 
consequence, i. e., the conclusion is correct,, if it necessarily fol¬ 
lows from the premises. The truth of the conclusion regards 
the proposition as it stands, i. e., according as it affirms or 
denies of a subject a predicate which really is objectively 
identical or not identical with it. Hence a conclusion might be 
correct and yet not true, and vice versa. 

When the conclusion is both correct and true the syllogism 
is said to be both materially and formally true. 

49. If the reasoning is correct , i. e., if the conclusion is 
the necessary consequence of the premises, then 

(a) From a true antecedent you can never have a false 
conclusion. For, if the middle term is really identical with 
the two extremes, these are necessarily identical with each 
other; or, if the minor term is contained under the extension of 
the middle and this under the extension of the major, the 




-36- 

minor, too, is necessarily contained under the extension of the 
major. 

(b) If the conclusion be false, one at least of the pre¬ 
mises is false. 

(c) If the antecedent be false, the conclusion may be 
either true or false. It may not be true to say all M is P, or 
that all S is M, and yet S may be P for other reasons. 

Hence, even if the conclusion be true, it does not follow 
that the antecedent is true. 

Dialectics is not so much concerned with the truth of 
thought as with its correctness. It is, therefore, with this that 
we are chiefly concerned in the present chapter. 

Article IV. —Laws of the Syllogism. 

50. The laws which regulate the correctness of the 
conclusion are all deduced from the fundamental principles of 
reasoning. These laws are eight. Four of them regard the 
terms of the syllogism; four, the propositions. 

(i) A syllogism must contain three terms, neither more 
nor less; and the Use of each term must be the same through¬ 
out the argument. This is clear from the nature of the syllo¬ 
gism. 

(ii) No term should have a greater extension in the con¬ 
clusion than it had in the premises; else we should have in 
reality more than three terms. A violation of this rule is called 
Illicit Process (of major or minor as the case may be). 

(iii) The middle term must not appear in the conclusion. 
This is clear from the function of the middle term. 

(iv) The middle term must be distributed, i. e., taken 
universally in at least one of the premises; else we may com¬ 
pare the minor term with one portion of the extension of the 
middle, the major term with one portion of the extension of the 
middle, the minor term with another portion, and, thus, we 
should have four terms. This mistake is called an Undistrib¬ 
uted Middle. 




37 


(v) To have a negative conclusion, one of the premises 
must be a negative. 

(vi) From two negative premises no conclusion follows. 

(vii) Two particular premises can give no conclusion. 
For if they are I I, we have no place for a distributed middle. 
If they are I 0, then the conclusion is negative and conse¬ 
quently the major term universal. But as the middle term 
must be distributed at least once, we shall therefore need to 
have two universal terms in the antecedent. But obviously 
there is place only for one. Hence to draw any conclusion 
from I 0 would involve either an illicit process or an undis¬ 
tributed middle. 

(viii) The conclusion follows the weaker premise. If 
either premise be negative , the conclusion clearly must be nega¬ 
tive. If either premise is particular, the conclusion must be 
particular. For, suppose the premises are A I and a universal 
conclusion is drawn, we should need place for two universal 
terms in the antecedent (the middle and minor terms), wh-'e 
there is in fact place only for one. Suppose the premises are 
E I and AO. In each case we have two universal terms in the 
antecedent; but to justify a universal (negative) conclusion all 
three should be universal in the premises (major, minor and 
middle). 

These laws are summed up in the following verses to aid 
the memory: 

Limit both in word and meaning all the terms you use to three. 
In Conclusion terms must never broader than in Premise be. 
From intrusion of the Middle always your Conclusion save. 
Once at least distribute Middle, else no argument you have. 
Two Particulars can never any safe Conclusion prove, 

Nor from two Negations can a logical Conclusion move. 

Should you twice make Affirmation, no Negation thence can 
start. 

See that your Conclusion ever follows the inferior part. 




38 


Article V. —Figures of the Syllogism. 

51. As we have seen, there are in every syllogism three 
terms and three propositions. Hence syllogisms may differ 
(a) according to the positions which the terms occupy in the 
Antecedent; and (b) according to the quantity and quality 
of the propositions of which they are composed. The posi¬ 
tion of the terms gives us the Figures of the syllogism; 
the quantity and quality of the propositions, give us the Moods. 

52. The position of the middle term with reference to the 
two extremes in the premises constitutes what is called the 
figure of the syllogism. Now the middle can have only four 
variations of position, and hence there are four figures. 

(a) It may be the subject of the major premise and the 
predicate of the minor; (b) or it may be the predicate of both 
premises; (c) or it may be the subject of both premises; (d) or 
it may be the predicate of the major and the subject of the 
minor premise, thus, 


I 

II 

III 

IY 

M-P 

P-M 

M-P 

P-M 

S-M 

S-M 

M-S 

M-S 

S-P 

S-P 

S-P 

S-P 


The four figures are expressed in the hexameter: (M is) 

“Sub-pred; then pred-pred; then sub-sub; finally pred- 
sub.” 

53. The rules for the validity of these figures, easily de- 
ducible from the general laws of the syllogism, are as follows: 

I Fig. Minor should always affirm, and the major should 
be universal. 

II Fig. One premise always denies, and the major must 
be universal. 








- 39 -- 

III Fig. Minor should never deny, nor the consequent 
be universal. 

IV. Fig. Whenever the major affirms, the minor must be 
universal; 

Whenever the minor affirms, the conclusion is 

not universal; 

Whenever the minor denies, the major must be 

universal. 


Article VI.— Moods of the Syllogism. 


53. The mood of the syllogism is the arrangement of 
its propositions with reference to their quantity and quality. 
Now, as on the one hand there are three propositions in a syl¬ 
logism, while on the other there are four kinds of proposi¬ 
tions—A. E. I, 0, to ascertain the number of conceivable syl¬ 
logistic moods we have simply to arrange the letters A, E, 0, I 
in all possible combinations of three at a time. Thus, taking A 
as major premise, we have sixteen moods. But we may also 
take E, or 0, or I, for major premise. Hence, the total number 
of moods possible is 64. Applying to these, however, the gen¬ 
eral laws of the syllogism, we find that of the 64 moods only 11 
are valid, viz.: Four affirmatives, AAA, AAI, All, IAI; and 
seven negatives, EAE, AEE, EAO, AOO, OAO, EIO, IEO. 

55. If, now, we take these moods in each of the four fig¬ 
ures, we have 44 moods in all. But again applying the laws 
of the different figures we find that many moods which are 
valid in one figure are not so in others. 

Examining, thus, each of the 44 moods, we find that only 
24 are valid, viz.: 




40 


1st F. 

2d F. 

3d F. 

4th F. 

AAA 

EAE 

AAI 

AAI 

EAE 

AEE 

IAI 

AEE 

All 

EIO 

All 

IAI 

EIO 

AOO 

EAO 

EAO 

(AAI) 

(EAO) 

OAO 

EIO 

(EAO) 

(AEO) 

EIO 

(AEO) 

56. Of the 

above 24 valid moods those in 

brackets 


said to minimize their conclusion, making it particular when 
it might be universal. Omitting, therefore, those minimizing 
moods, we have 19 moods left which are valid and useful. 

These are expressed in the mnemonic hexameters of Peter 
Julian (afterward Pope John XXI) : 

“ Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio are the First Fig. 

Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko, the Second. 

Third Figure: Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, 

Bokardo, Ferison. To these, Fourth Figure finally addeth 
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. ” 

Note. —Of these verses De Morgan says: ‘ ‘ They are 

magic words, more full of meaning than any that were ever 
made.” The vowels express the order, quantity and quality of 
the propositions of the valid moods of the four figures. The 
consonants indicate to what mood of the first figure each mood 
of the other figures may be reduced, and the process by which 
this reduction is to be made. 

Article VII.— Reduction of the Less Perfect Figures to 
the First. 

57. Each of the 19 syllogistic forms enumerated above 
is a valid form of reasoning. Yet those of the first figure are 
the most perfect, as being immediately reducible to the prin¬ 
ciple, “De Omni et de Nullo. ,> Hence, logicians give rules 




-.41- 

for reducing the syllogisms of the three less perfect figures 
to those of the first. These rules are all indicated by certain 
consonants of the verses above. 

(a) The initial consonants—B, C, D, F—indicate the 
moods of the first figure, to which the moods of the other fig¬ 
ures are to be reduced, e. g., ‘Cesare and Camestres of the 
second figure are reducible to Celarent ’; ‘Darapti, etc., to 
Darii’; ‘Fresison to Ferio.’ 

(b) m indicates that the premises are to be transposed. 

(c) s indicates that the proposition denoted by the pre¬ 
ceding vowel is to be converted simply. 

(d) p indicates that the proposition preceding is to be 
converted by limitation. 

(e) k denotes that the mood must be reduced by a dis¬ 
tinct process called indirect reduction , of which we shall speak 
presently. 

We will now take an instance of the application of these 
rules: ‘All stars are self-luminous bodies. No planets are 
self-luminous bodies. Therefore, no planets are stars.’ This 
is a syllogism in Camestres; it is reducible to Celarent. The 
first s indicates that the minor is to be simply converted; the m 
that this new minor is to change places with the former major; 
the last s that the conclusion is to be simply converted, thus, 
‘No self-luminous bodies are planets. All stars are self-lumi¬ 
nous bodies. Therefore, no stars are planets. ’ 

58. Indirect reduction is like the indirect proof often 
employed in geometry. It consists in supposing the conclusion 
false, and, therefore, its contradictory true; and thence forcing 
the one who denies the conclusion to deny one of the premises, 
which he had granted, e. g., ‘All virtue is rational. Some zeal 
is not rational. Therefore, some zeal is not virtue. ’ This is in 
Baroko. The contradictory of the conclusion is, ‘All zeal is 
virtue ’ Now, letting the previous major stand, put this new 




-- 42- 

proposition in place of the minor, and we have, ‘All virtue is 
rational. All zeal is virtue. Therefore, all zeal is rational.’ 
Here the conclusion is the contradictory of the minor before 
conceded. 

In like manner with Bokardo: Take the contradictory of 
the conclusion, put it in place of the major premise, keep the 
minor and deduce the contradictory of the previous major. 

Article VIII. —Classification of Syllogisms According to 

the Propositions of Which They Are Composed. 

59. A syllogism is hypothetical when the major premise 
is a hypothetical proposition, and the minor either (a) the 
affirmation of the condition, in which case the conclusion will 
be the affirmation of the conditioned, and the syllogism is 
called constructive; or (b) the denial of the conditioned, in 
which case the conclusion will be the negation of the condition, 
and the syllogism is said to be destructive, e. g., m 

Constructive, ‘If man is an animal, he is sensitive. But 
he is an animal. Therefore, he is sensitive.’ 

Destructive, ‘If man is an animal, he is sensitive. But 
he is not sensitive. Therefore, he is not an animal. ’ 

Note.— You cannot conclude from the denial of the con¬ 
dition to the denial of the conditioned, nor from the affirma¬ 
tion of the conditioned to the affirmation of the condition; 
unless the condition is the only one on which the conditioned 
proposition can be true, e. g., ‘ If a man dies in mortal sin he 
goes to hell. But X did not die in mortal sin. Therefore, he 
did not go to hell’; or ‘X went to hell. Therefore, he died in 
mortal sin.’ 

60. A syllogism is disjunctive when the major premise 
is a disjunctive proposition, and the minor, either (a) denies 
all the alternatives but one, in which case the conclusion affirms 




-43- 

that one; or (b) affirms one of the alternatives, in which case 
the conclusion denies all the others. 

Note.— The major must be really disjunctive, i. e., such 
that one, and only one, of the alternatives is true, e. g ., ‘The 
time of the year is either spring, summer, autumn or winter. 
But it is neither spring, summer nor wdnter. Therefore, it is 
autumn. ’ 

‘The time of the year, etc. But it is autumn. Therefore, 
it is neither spring, nor summer, nor winter. ’ 

61. Reduction of hypothetical and disjunctive syllo¬ 
gisms to categorical. 

(a) It is plain that the disjunctive may be reduced to 
the hypothetical, e. g., ‘If the angle A is neither greater nor less 
than B, it is equal to B. But it is neither greater nor less than 
B. Therefore, it is equal to B.’ 

(b) The hypothetical may be reduced to the categorical, 
thus, ‘All angles which are neither greater nor less than B are 
equal to B. But the angle A is neither greater nor less than B. 
Therefore, it is equal to B.’ Or, in general, ‘All the cases of x 
being y are cases of z being m. But the present case is the case 
of x being y. Therefore, the present case is the case of z be¬ 
ing m.’ 

Note.— If it be affirmed that the present case is a case of 
z being m, it will not follow that in a case of x being y; nor, 
again, if it be denied that the present is a case of x being y, can 
it be concluded that it is not a case of 2 being m. 

Article IX. —Other Forms of Argumentation Reducible to 
the Syllogism. 

62. The Enthymeme is a syllogism in which one of the 
propositions is suppressed. 

(a) It is said to be of the first order, and this is the com- 




44 


monest form, when the major premise is suppressed, e . g ., 
‘Air has weight, because it is a corporeal substance.’ Here 
the missing premise is ‘ All corporeal substances have weight, ’ 
and the complete syllogism runs thus, ‘ All corporeal substances 
have weight. Atmospheric air is a corporeal substance. There¬ 
fore, it has weight.’ 

(b) It is said to be of the second order if the minor 
premise is suppressed, e . g ., ‘Robinson is mortal, for all men 
are mortal.’ 

Note (1.)—If the subject of the conclusion is found in 
the expressed premise, the major premise is suppressed; if the 
predicate of the conclusion is found in the expressed premise, 
then the minor premise is suppressed . 

(2.)—If neither term of the conclusion is found in the 
antecedent, the whole syllogism is hypothetical , e . g ., ‘ The men 
are at dinner, therefore it is mid-day.’ 

63. The Epicheireme is a syllogism in which one or 
both propositions are causal , and, consequently, each implies a 
suppressed syllogism, e . g ., ‘ Every simple being is of itself in¬ 
corruptible ; because it does not consist of parts into which it is 
resolvable. But the human soul is simple. Therefore, it is 
of itself incorruptible.’ 

Here the major is equivalent to 

‘That which does not consist of parts into which it is 
resolvable is of itself incorruptible. A simple being does not 
consist of parts into which, etc. Therefore, a simple being is 
of itself incorruptible.’ 

Note. —To test the validity of such arguments it is enough 
to express them in full syllogistic form. 

64. The Sorites is a syllogism, consisting of many 
propositions so arranged that the predicate of the preceding 
proposition of the series is the subject of the following, until 
the conclusion, in which the subject of the first premise is com- 


i 



45 


bined with the predicate of the last, ‘The human soul is a 
thinking substance. A thinking substance is a simple spiritual 
substance. A simple spiritual substance is independent of 
matter. That which is independent of matter is indestructible 
except by annihilation. That which is indestructible, except 
by annihilation, is immortal. Therefore, the human soul is 
immortal.’ Or, generally, A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E. 
Therefore, A is E. 

Note (1.)—The Sorites really contains a series of syllo¬ 
gisms incompletely expressed, the predicate of each proposition 
being a middle term. The safest way to be sure of its validity 
is to resolve it into its component syllogisms. 

(2.)—No premise can be negative, except the last, i. e., 
the one immediately preceding the conclusion. 

No premise can be particular except the first. 

65. The Dilemma is a syllogism in which each of the 
alternatives of a disjunctive proposition is shown to prove or 
refute the same conclusion, e. g., (St. Augustine’s Argument) 

‘ The Catholic Church was either propagated by miracles or it 
was not. If it was, then it is divine; if it was not, then its 
propagation without miracles, in the face of so much opposi¬ 
tion, was the greatest of all miracles; and therefore, it is 
divine. ’ 

Note (1.)—The enumeration of alternatives should be 
complete. See, too, that your dilemma cannot be retorted by 
showing that whichever alternative is chosen the conclusion 
opposite to yours can be deduced, e. g., ‘You will administer 
your office either well or ill. If well, you will displease your 
enemies. If ill, you will displease your friends. Therefore, 
you should not accept the office. ’ This may be retorted thus, 
‘ I shall administer my office either well or ill. If well, I shall 
please my friends. If ill, I shall please my enemies. There¬ 
fore, in either case, I may accept the office. ’ 




-46- 

(2).—Many apparent dilemmas are fallacious. To detect 
the fallacy, reduce the dilemma to syllogistic form, thus, 

If A is x, M is n; 

If A is y, M is n; 

If A is z, M is n. 

But A is either, x, y, or z. 

Therefore, in any case, M is n. 

66. Induction is an argument in which a universal is 
inferred from an enumeration of inferiors. It is 

(a) Complete, if it infers the universal from a complete 
enumeration of the inferiors contained under it. Such an in¬ 
duction is thus reduced to syllogistic form: 

In all right-angled, obtuse-angled, acute-a^ngled plane 
triangles the three angles are equal to two right angles. But 
all plane triangles are either right-angled, obtuse-angled or 
acute-angled. Therefore, in all plane triangles, the three an¬ 
gles are equal to two right angles. This is rather an imme¬ 
diate inference than a syllogism. 

(b) Incomplete, if from an incomplete enumeration of 
the inferiors, it infers the universal. That the consequence be 
legitimate the argument must be capable of reduction to some 
such formula as this: 

(1) . An effort which is constant and uniform amid all 
manner of different circumstances has a constant and uniform 
cause. But the effect A, which we observe in the individual x , 
is constant and uniform in all manner of different circum¬ 
stances. Therefore, this effect comes from a constant and 
uniform cause. 

(2) . What is constant and uniform in different individ¬ 
uals differently circumstanced pertains to the nature of those 
individuals. But to cause the effect A is something which is 
constant and uniform in the individuals x. Therefore, to cause 
the effect A, pertains to the nature of the individuals x. 




47 


(3). What pertains to the nature of an individual is 
common to all who have that nature. But to cause the effect 
A, pertains to fhe nature of the individuals x. Therefore, to 
cause the effect A, is common to all the individuals of the 
nature or species x. 

Note (1).— Hence the incomplete enumeration of in¬ 
feriors, which logically justifies the inference of a universal, 
does so only in virtue of analytical principles, e. g., ‘the prin¬ 
ciple of sufficient reason’ or ‘causality,’ etc., which render it 
really equivalent to a complete enumeration. Hence, induc¬ 
tion is of value as an argument, only inasmuch as it is re¬ 
ducible to a syllogism of the third figure where M is the 
enumerated parts, S the logical whole of which they are in¬ 
feriors, and P the predicate common and constant in each and 
all of them, in all circumstances. 

(2) . To be able to say that a certain phenomenon is in 
some way necessarily connected with the nature of a given 
antecedent, often requires much careful observation and ex¬ 
periment. As a general rule we may say that there is such a 
connection when, wherever the antecedent is, the phenomenon 
is; wherever the antecedent increases, the phenomenon in¬ 
creases; wherever the antecedent decreases or ceases, the phe¬ 
nomenon decreases or ceases. This simple rule seems to sum 
up all that concerns us here about the various methods of in¬ 
duction, viz., the method of agreement, the method of differ¬ 
ence, the method of residues , concomitant variations, etc. (See 
Clarke, Logic, p. 389 seqq.) 

(3) . The necessary connection between antecedent and 
consequent may be normal, physical or metaphysical (32, N. B.) 

67. Analogy is a form of argument which denies or 
affirms something of an individual or class because it is denied 
or affirmed of other similar individuals or classes. It is re¬ 
ducible to a syllogism thus, e. g., Similar things have similar 
properties; causes, effects, ends, are ruled by similar laws, etc.: 




48 


But A and B are similar things; therefore they have similar 
properties, etc. But A has the property, etc., x. Therefore, 
B has the property, etc., x. 

Note. (1).— If A and B are shown to have perfectly simi¬ 
lar natures , and x is shown to be a constant and uniform con¬ 
comitant of that nature in A, of course it will be so in B. 
Otherwise the argument can only serve to render the conclusion 
more or less probable. 

(2). From what has been said of the last two forms of 
argumentation, it is clear that great caution is needed in accept¬ 
ing conclusions based upon them. It is very easy to mistake 
an accidental for a necessary connexion, between antecedent 
and consequent; an occasion or condition for a cause, etc. 


Article X —Classification of Arguments According to 
Their Validity. 

68. Supposing the laws of reasoning so far considered to 
be strictly observed, our argumentation will be demonstrative 
if both premises are certainly true; probable , if either premise 
or both are probably true; fallacious or sophistical, if either 
premise or both are only apparently true ; and our conclusion 
will be, respectively, a certainty, an opinion, an error. 

(i). Demonstrative Reasoning. 

69. It is the deduction or induction of a legitimate con¬ 
clusion from evident premises. It is 

(a) Direct, when it is shown that S is, or is not, P, on 
account of their relation with M. 

Indirect, when the truth of a conclusion is shown by prov¬ 
ing the falsity of its contradictory. 

Note.— A negative argument shows that no valid reason 
can be assigned for a given proposition. Of itself, it does not 




-49- 

prove the proposition false, but it puts the ‘Burden of Proof’ 
on the one who asserts it. But when the reasons which would 
justify the given proposition are such that they would be 
apparent if they existed, then their absence disproves the prop¬ 
osition, e. g., the proposition ‘plants feel’ is disproved by show¬ 
ing that they exhibit no signs of sensation. 

(b) A priori, when the premises contain truths prior in 
the nature of things to the truth contained in the conclusion, 
e. g ., ‘when we conclude from the existence and nature of a 
cause to the existence and nature of its effects, or from a 
universal law or principle to a particular application of it. ’ 

A posteriori, when, on the contrary, the truth of the ante¬ 
cedent is in the nature of things, or ontologically, posterior to 
and dependent on the truth of the conclusion, e. g., when we 
conclude from the existence and character of an effect to the 
existence and character of its cause, or from particular in¬ 
stances to a general law. 

70. The end of demonstration is Science in its strict 
and only accurate sense. Hence we may define scientific knowl¬ 
edge as true and certain knowledge acquired by demonstration; 
and a complete science as a complete system of certain truths 
in regard to a given subject, derived by demonstration from 
certain principles. 

Note. —Sciences are distinguished according to their 
formal objects, i. e., the particular aspect in which the subject- 
matter is viewed. Thus, one subject, e. g., ‘man,’ may be the 
material object of many distinct sciences, e. g., ‘of physiology, 
anatomy, ethics, etc.’ Again, the science, e. g., of human 
morals, is two-fold, according as we regard man, inasmuch as 
his duties, rights and destiny are manifested to us either by 
mere unaided human reason, or by divine revelation and faith, 
i. e., human sciences are distinguished, not only according to 




-50- 

their formal objects, but also according to the light in which the 
formal objects are presented. 

(iii..) Probable Reasoning. 

71. It is the deduction or induction of a legitimate con¬ 
clusion from one or more probable premises. The probability 
of the conclusion will be of course proportionate to that of the 
whole antecedent from which it is inferred. 

Note.— An hypothesis, in science, is a proposition whose 
truth has not been demonstrated, but which, for the time being, 
is assumed as true, because it seems to assign a satisfactory 
cause of known phenomena. It is a probable proposition giv¬ 
ing not what actually is, but what may be the unknown cause 
or antecedent of a given known consequent. It may be reduced 
to this formula: ‘If x existed y would exist; but y exists; 
therefore x exists.’ 

As to the laws which govern the formation of an hypothe¬ 
sis ; neither the proposition itself, nor any legitimate inference 
from it, should contradict any known truth. The antecedent 
assigned should account satisfactorily for all the facts it pro¬ 
poses to account for. 

If, finally, it is the only antecedent that can account for 
the given consequent (59 N. B.), it ceases to be an hypothesis, 
and is demonstrated to be actually true. 

(iii). Sophistical Reasoning. 

72. An open violation of any of the laws of correct 
reasoning is called a paralogism. When a false premise is 
introduced, or a false sense given to a premise, we have a 
sophism; the latter we may call a verbal sophism/the former a 
real sophism. Of paralogisms nothing further need be said. 

(a) Verbal Sophisms. 

Equivocation. An equivocal (16C.), or vague (16 a.) 
term is taken in different senses. 




51 


Amphibology. An ambiguous proposition is taken in 
ddifferent senses. 

Composition or Division. A predicate is attributed to a 
qualified subject, which really belongs to it only when without 
the qualification, or vice versa. Or again, a predicate true of 
each individual subject separately, is attributed to all taken 
collectively; or vice versa. 

(b) Real Sophisms. 

Accident. A predicate which is only accidental and occa¬ 
sional in a given subject, is represented as constant and essen¬ 
tial to it; and vice versa. Or again, what is true of a few 
instances only, is represented as true of a whole class; and 
vice versa. 

Missing or Evading the Question, Ignoratio elenchi. 
Attention is turned away from the real question to something 
like it, or in some way connected with it. Under this head will 
also come the Argumentum ad Hominem, ad Invidiam, etc. 

Begging the Question. The conclusion to be proved is 
in some way or other covertly assumed as true in the premises. 

False Cause. A mere antecedent or concomitant is repre¬ 
sented as cause: Post Hoc, Cum Hoc; ergo, Propter Hoc. 

Note.— Of all these forms of sophistical reasoning we 
have numerous instances in current literature and oratory, as 
well as of many others which a logician will easily recognize, 
e. g., ‘hasty induction,’ ‘false analogy,’ ‘unverified and impos¬ 
sible hypotheses,’ ‘citation of untrustworthy authorities,' etc., 
etc. 

Article XI—Method. 

73. By method, we mean orderly procedure in the acqui¬ 
sition, exposition or defense of truth in regard to a given 
subject-matter. The subject-matter is supposed to be presented 




52 


in the form of a question, e. g., 'Is the human soul immortal?’ 
Hence the general laws of method are 

(a) Let the question be clearly determined (status 
quaestionis) —This implies 

That there is no ambiguity in the terms; therefore, defin¬ 
ition of terms. 

That the subject be properly divided into the parts which 
it contains. 

That the truths assumed, in starting to resolve the ques¬ 
tion, be clearly recognized. 

It also helps greatly to a clear understanding of the ques¬ 
tion, to recall the doctrines of others on the subject, and their 
principal reasons for holding them. 

(b) In the process of argumentation, advance from that 
which is better known to that which is less; from that which is 
easily grasped and admitted, to that which is more difficult. 

(c) Advance gradually, i. e., so that each new step con¬ 
nects with and is justified by what has gone before. 

74. (26). HavingMethods of analysis and synthesis 

middle term which shall show us the relation between the 
determined the status quaestionis as above, we need to find a 
subject and predicate of our question. This we can do in two 
ways: 

(a) If the predicate belongs to the subject, it must be 
found among the notes of the comprehension of the subject, or 
at least be required by one of these notes. We therefore 
analyze the subject. If the predicate is one of the notes, or 
required by any of the notes which this analysis gives us, it 
must be affirmed of the subject. If, on the contrary, the predi¬ 
cate is incompatible with any of these notes, it must be denied 
of the subject. This is the analytic method; and when there is 
question of discovering for ourselves what predicates are to be 




-53- 

affirmed or denied of a given subject, it is obviously the safest 
and simplest way to proceed. 

(b) If the predicate belongs to the subject, it must con¬ 
tain the subject under its extension. We, therefore, by synthe¬ 
sis , divide the predicate as a logical whole into its subjective 
parts. If the subject is found among them, the predicate is 
affirmed of it; if not, the predicate is denied. When there is 
question of explaining or proving a doctrine, it is generally 
the shortest and clearest way to proceed. 

Note.— Hence, the synthetic method proceeds from that 
which is simpler in comprehension and more universal to that 
which is more complex and particular. The analytical method, 
on the contrary, starts with the complex and particular, and 
proceeds to the simple and universal. Which method should 
be adopted, or rather which should predominate in our treat¬ 
ment of a subject, will depend on the nature of the subject- 
matter, and the occasion and purpose of our dealing with it. 
Some sciences are primarily synthetic, e. g., 1 geometry, ’ ‘ ethics, ’ 
etc., which proceed from most simple and universal principles 
to gradually more and more complex applications of them. 
Others, on the contrary, as chemistry and physics, are pri¬ 
marily analytical. They begin, so to say, with concrete com¬ 
plex facts, and work their way laboriously back to general laws 
and principles. In general, we may say that a mixed method is 
the one most suited to the human mind. Theory regardless of 
fact, is dangerous. Mere knowledge of facts without an effort 
to understand the general laws and principles which govern 
them, is unnatural and unworthy of man. 

75. Method of Discussion. —The Circle. 

One undertakes to defend, another to attack a given prop- 
osition or thesis. Both are supposed to understand and agree 
upon the status quaestionis. All arguments and objections are 
proposed clearly and briefly in strict syllogistic form. 




54 


(a) The Defender .— 

(i) Proposes the thesis, explains the status quaestionis 
(70 a), proves each part of his proposition by one or two short 
solid arguments, and then awaits the attack of his opponent. 

(ii) When the first argument against his thesis is pro¬ 
posed, he first repeats it faithfully word for word, then repeat¬ 
ing each proposition, he says whether, and how far, he admits 
it, or denies it, e. g., i y is z/ I grant the major. But x is y, I 
deny the minor. Therefore, x is z, I deny the conclusion. ’ Or 

( y is z, I distinguish the major; in the sense m, I grant 
the major; in the sense n, I deny the major. But x is y, I 
contra-distinguish the minor; in the sense n , I grant the minor; 
in the sense m, I deny the minor. Therefore, x is z, I deny 
the conclusion.’ 

Note.— If the syllogism fails in logical form, he lets major 
and minor pass, and denies the conclusion and the consequence, 
i. e., that it follows from the premises, e. g., ( y is z, let the major 
pass. But x is y, let the minor pass. Therefore, x is £, I deny 
the consequences and the conclusion. ’ 

Note. (2).—As either S, P, or M may be ambiguous, each 
proposition in which the ambiguous term occurs must be dis¬ 
tinguished. Thus, if M is ambiguous, both major and minor 
premises must be distinguished, and M denied of S in the sense 
in which it was admitted to belong to P. If S or P is ambigu¬ 
ous, the premises in which it occurs must be distinguished, and 
also the conclusion; for S and P will agree with each in the 
conclusion, only so far as they agree with M in the premises. 

Note (3).—If one of the premises of the objection rests on 
a false supposition, the defender says, e. g., ( x is y, I deny the 
supposition.’ If the enumeration of alternatives is incomplete, 
a disjunctive proposition is denied. If an analogy is false, he 
denies the parity. 




-55- 

(b) The Objector may attack either the thesis directly or 
the argument by which it was proved. 

(i) If he attacks the thesis, he simply asserts the contra¬ 
dictory of the thesis, e. g., 1 Against the proposition which 
asserts that S is P, I say, S is not P, and I prove it thus: ’ etc. 
If he attacks the argument, he asserts, and attempts to prove 
the contradictory of either major or minor premise. 

(ii) As the defender has proved the main proposition, 
of course the ‘ Burden of Proof’ lies with him who would assert 
its contradictory. Hence the objector is obliged to prove his 
contradictory; and if the defender denies any premise of his 
argument, he is obliged to prove that premise. If one of his 
premises is distinguished, he may show that the difficulty 
remains even with what is granted, or he may prove what is 
denied in the distinction. 

(iii) If the defender denies something supposed in one 
of his premises, he may ask him to say distinctly what that 
supposition is. If the completeness of his enumeration of 
disjunctive alternatives is denied, he may ask the defender to 
assign the alternatives omitted. 

(iv) When an objection has been fully solved by the 
defender, he should not urge it further, but take up a new 
objection. Hence, he should have studied his subject carefully 
and be familiar with the objections urged against the thesis, 
know how to urge them strongly, and recognize a satisfactory 
solution when it is given. 







Book II 


Critics. 


76. So far we have considered merely the correctness of 
thought, i. e., its conformity with the laws of consistent think¬ 
ing. We now go on to consider the Truth of thought, i. e., its 
conformity with the objects which it represents. This book 
will comprise three chapters, viz.: 

I. Conceptional Truth and the Possibility of attaining it. 

II. The Trustworthiness of the Faculties we possess for 
attaining Conceptional Truth. 

III. The Criteria or Motives of Certitude. 


CHAPTER I. 

Conceptional Truth and the Possibility of Attaining It. 

77. Words, as we have said, are arbitrary signs. Hence, 
to understand what is meant by the word truth, let us consider 
in what sense or senses this word is ordinarily used by men. 
Now, men commonly speak (1) of true and false things, e . g., 
‘diamonds’; (2) of true and false knowledge , e. g., ‘as to his¬ 
torical facts’; (3) of true and false statements, e. g., of wit¬ 
nesses. That is, they speak of the truth of things, of the truth 
of thoughts, of the truth of speech. Further, by a true 
diamond, they mean one which corresponds with the idea of 
diamond; by true knowledge of a fact they mean knowledge 
in conformity with the fact as it really took place; by true 
speech they mean speech which is in conformity with the inner, 






-58- 

secret thought of the speaker. Hence we see that in all cases 
truth implies a relation to thought. In the first case, we have 
the relation of conformity between things and thoughts; in the 
second, between thoughts and things; in the third, between 
speech, or its equivalent, and thought. Hence truth in general 
is defined, conformity or correspondence between thoughts and 
things. 

Note.— From what has been said we can understand the 
reason of the division of truth into ontological, moral and 
conceptional. 

(a) Ontological truth, or the truth of things, i. e., their 
conformity with their archetypes or ideals, is the object of 
metaphysics. 

(b) Moral truth, or truth of speech, or its equivalent, 
e. g., ‘gesture,’ ‘writing,’ etc., i. e., its conformity with the 
speaker’s thought, is the object of Ethics. 

(c) .Conceptional truth, or the truth of thought, i. e., its 
conformity with its object, is the object of Critics. 

78. When we define conceptual truth as the conformity 
of a concept with its object, of course we refer, not to the 
material , but to the formal object (8) of the thought. 

Again, when we speak of conformity between a concept 
and an object we do not mean entitative likeness, but such a 
re-presentation of an object in a spiritual faculty, as results 
from the action of an object on the faculty and the perceptive 
reaction of the faculty apprehending the acting object; “ Cog- 
nitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis.” 

79. Conceptual truth is of two kinds, formal and 
material, or as others say, complete and incomplete. 

(a) Material conceptual truth consists in the simple con¬ 
formity between the mental representation and the object, 




59 


without any cognizance of affirmation by the intellect of the 
conformity. 

(b) Formal conceptual truth consists in conformity 
between the mental representation and the object, and includes, 
besides, the perception and affirmation of this conformity by 
the intellect. 

80. Hence, material conceptual truth is inseparable 
from the act of simple apprehension. For every simple ap¬ 
prehension or idea is conformable, as a representation, to the 
formal object represented. 

Note (1). —It must be borne in mind that simple appre¬ 
hensions merely represent , and neither affirm nor deny any¬ 
thing of what they represent. 

(2) Can one concept of an object be truer than another 
of the same object ? If there is question of the same material 
object, of course one concept can represent it more completely 
than another, i. e., re-present more of its notes. If there is 
question of the formal object, one proper concept (12. h) 
cannot be truer than another, as both represent the same notes, 
i. e,. both are equally conformed to their object; both are 
absolutely true of the object they represent. Hence to speak 
of the relativity of conceptual truth in regard to the formal 
object of the concept is a contradiction in terms. 

81. Formal conceptual truth is found only in the act of 
judgment. For formal conceptual truth implies conformity 
between thought and its object, and, moreover, the perception 
and affirmation of this conformity by the mind. 

Now, it is only in the judicial act by which, after com¬ 
parison, predicate and subject are united, that the mind, while 
directly affirming, e. g., 'all men are mortal,’ implicitly per¬ 
ceives and affirms that its concept of mortal represents a note 
common to all men, and that its judgment is therefore in con- 




-60- 

formity with the object. In other words, the Subject of the 
judgment holds the place of the thing judged of, as it is itself; 
the Predicate expresses some of the notes of the same thing 
affirming the conformity of predicate and subject, the mind 
implicitly perceives and affirms the conformity of its own con¬ 
cept with the thing as it is in itself. 

The two preceding assertions are confirmed by the com¬ 
mon usage of men. One must affirm or deny something before 
his words can be said to express either truth or falsehood. 

82. Falsity is the opposite, the contradictory of truth, 
the non-conformity of a concept with its object. It is clear 
that it can, properly speaking, be found only in the judgment 
in which the mind affirms or denies, contrary to the fact, that 
a certain predicate belongs to a certain subject. Simple appre¬ 
hensions, on the other hand, cannot be in themselves false, for 
they represent what they represent, and nothing else. 

Note (1). —Simple apprehensions and sense-perceptions 
may be called false, but only analogically, when they give 
occasion to or are the results of false judgments. 

(2).—A judgment (27) is a mental affirmation of the 
objective identity or non-identity of two concepts. This com¬ 
parative apprehension, and affirmation, if motived by objective 
evidence, cannot of course be false. If not motived by evi¬ 
dence, then it is not a purely intellectual act. For the intellect 
of its own nature apprehends and affirms only what is evident, 
i. e., what is. But it may happen that, comparing two objective 
ideas together, the intellect perceives a sort of confused and 
imperfect similarity between them, which really exists from the 
point of view in which they are regarded, and then the will 
desirous of identifying them, or impatient of suspense, inclines 
the intellect to affirm their absolute identity, attending only 




61 


to the apparent identity, and neglecting the grounds for hesi¬ 
tation. 

Hence the occasion of false or erroneous judgments is 
generally to be found in want of attention or obscure and con¬ 
fused ideas on the part of the intellect; the ultimate cause is 
the will desirous of some good, or impatient of suspense. 

(3).—The occasion of false judgments are classified by 
Bacon under four heads: 

(a) Idols of the tribe , i. e., Errors to which the human 
mind is liable from its own finite and limited nature, e. g ., the 
difficulties it finds in acquiring clear, distinct, complete ideas of 
a great many objects, and on the other hand, its eagerness for 
knowledge. 

(b) Idols of the den, i. e., Errors which arise from the 
peculiar character and disposition, education and prejudices, 
of each individual. 

(c) Idols of the market place , i. e., Errors which are 
almost imposed upon us by the tyranny of public opinion and 
our own innate love for novelty. Our newspapers and reviews 
or pet authors do our thinking for us. 

(d) Idols of the theatre, i. e., the various systems of false 
and fashionable philosophy current in our times. 

Add to these the influence of passion, negligence, lack of 
logical training, inaccurate use of language, etc., and we have 
abundant occasion of false judgments all the day long, unless 
we are constantly on our guard. 

83. Objections. 

Note. —In answering objections the following abbrevia¬ 
tions are used: c. (concedo, I grant), n. (nego, I deny), d. 
(distinguo, I distinguish), cd. (I contradistinguish), sd. (I 
subdistinguish), t. (transeat, let it pass), maj. (major), min. 
(minor), concl. (conclusion), neg. sup. (I deny the false sup¬ 
position implied). 




- 62-;- 

(a) Conceptual truth is conformity of concept with 
object. But there can be no conformity between concepts and 
objects. Therefore, there can be no truth in our ideas. 
Answer. —D. maj.; entitative conformity, n. maj.; representa¬ 
tive conformity, c. maj. Cd. min.; no entitative conformity, c. 
min.; no representative conformity, n. min.: and hence, n 
concl. 

(b) All our concepts are primarily derived from material 
objects. But from material objects you cannot derive con¬ 
cepts conformable to spiritual objects. Therefore, our concepts 
of spiritual objects are not true. 

Answer. —T. maj. D. min.; you cannot derive intuitive 
(10) and proper (12. h) concepts of spiritual objects, c. min.; 
you cannot form derivative (10) and analogous (12. h. note) 
concepts of spiritual objects, n. min.: and hence in this sense, 
n. concl. 

Note.— Analogous and derivative concepts are less perfect 
than intuitive and proper ones, but they are true as far as 
they go. 

(c) If truth is characteristic of the judicial act, it must 
be either as essential or an accidental character of the act. But 
it cannot be an essential character; else a false judgment would 
be impossible. Nor can it be an accidental character; else the 
intellect could not be said to tend necessarily to truth. There¬ 
fore, truth is in no way characteristic of the act of judgment. 

Answer 1. —N. maj.; for truth may be essential to one 
class judgments (i. e., those motived by evidence), accidental 
to another (i. e., those elicited under command of the will). 

Answer 2. —T. maj. D. min. As to First Part: a false 
judgment necessitated or motived by evidence would be impos¬ 
sible c. min.; a false judgment elicited under command of the 
will would be impossible; sd. without any apparent identity 
(or non-identity) between subject and predicate, c. min.; where 
there is some apparent identity (or non-identity), n. min. As 




63 


to Second part of min. D. the intellect could not be said to 
tend necessarily to truth if it erred in a judgment necessitated 
or motived by evidence, c. min.; if it erred in a judgment 
elicited under command of the will; sd. without any apparent 
truth, c. min.; with some apparent truth, n. min. 

Note.— The intellect is not a free faculty. Hence, in 
presence of its formal motive, objective evidence, it is com¬ 
pelled by its nature to assent. If there be no objective evi¬ 
dence there can be no necessitating motive for judging. But 
in a false judgment there can be no objective evidence. Hence 
the mind is not forced to a decision; and, as its acts are either 
spontaneous and necessary, or under the control of the will, 
it follows that a false judgment is elicited at the command 
of the will. Hence, while admitting that there must be ap¬ 
parent motives which allure the mind to a false judgment, 
we deny that they can he sufficient motives to compel intel¬ 
lectual assent without the intervention of the will. Hence 
purely intellectual judgments, i. e., motived by objective evi¬ 
dence, are essentially true; those elicited under command of 
the will, may or may not be true, i. e., they are accidentally 
true. 

Article II.— The Various States of Mind Possible in 
Regard to Truth. 

84. The mind is said to attain and possess truth when it 
pronounces judgments in conformity with things. Now, in 
regard to the attainment and possession of truth, the mind 
must be in one or the other of these five states. Either it 
pronounces a false judgment; or it has no knowledge of the 
object; or it has some knowledge, but hesitates to judge; or it 
judges, yet not with firmness and security; or, finally, it judges 
without any hesitancy or insecurity. In the first case, we have 
error; in the second, ignorance; in the third, doubt; in the 
fourth, opinion; in the fifth, certitude. Of Error we have 




spoken in the preceding article, and of Opinion and Certitude 
we shall speak presently in separate articles. A word here on 
Ignorance and Doubt. 

85. Ignorance is lack of knowledge, i. e., a state of 
mind in which one has neither ideas nor judgments in regard 
to a certain matter. It may he universal, as, e. g., ‘ in the case 
of infants’; or more or less partial, according as it extends to 
fewer or more truths. If the unknown truths are such as one 
can and ought to know, ignorance of them is called privative 
ignorance. In other cases, it is said to be merely negative. 

There are many things of which the mind of man, left to 
itself, can know nothing, either because they are above its 
natural capacity, e. g., ‘the mystery of the Godhead,’ or because 
it has not sufficient data to proceed upon, e. g., ‘ the number of 
the stars.’ But apart from these, there are many subjects upon 
which the human mind can acquire more or less full and per¬ 
fect knowledge. Ignorance in such matters is to be attributed 
to lack either of ability or of opportunities, or of application 
and industry, or of order and method in study. 

86. Doubt, we have said, is a state of mental hesitancy or 
suspense, so that the mind, on comparing two ideas together, 
finds itself unable to pronounce whether they are objectively 
identical or diverse. Hence, it is defined, hesitation or suspense 
of mind between two contradictory judgments. The doubt is 
positive when there are, or seem to be, good reason on both 
sides. It is negative when there is, or seems to be, no good rea¬ 
son for either side. Daily experience shows us that there are 
a multitude of judgments, in regard to which, under the pres¬ 
ent circumstances, it is rational to remain in doubt. There are 
some, however, who maintain that we must doubt about every¬ 
thing, or, at least, about many things of which our own reason 
and the common sense of mankind declare we are certain. 
These are called sceptics. Scepticism, in general, is a state of 




- 65 - 

doubt in regard to those things which are known with certainty 
by means of our natural faculties, properly disposed and 
applied. 

Note.— The word belief is used in many senses. In strict¬ 
ness it means, Assent to a proposition on sufficient testimony. 
In the language of the Church it means, Absolute certainty on 
the supreme authority of God. 


Article III. —Certitude. 

We will divide this article into two parts. In the first we 
will treat of the nature, in the second, of the existence of certi¬ 
tude. 


(i). Nature of Certitude. 

87. Certitude is defined, Firmness of mental assent, or of 
adhesion to a truth, from a motive which manifestly excludes 
all rational fear of error. Hence certitude includes three es¬ 
sential elements, two of which are subjective, and the third 
objective, viz.: (1) firmness of adhesion, (2) exclusion of all 
rational fear of error, and (3) an objective motive manifestly 
and really sufficient to exclude all fear of error. 

Note (1). — By a motive of assent we mean the reason why 
we give internal mental assent to a given proposition. By 
an objective motive, we mean something independent of our 
own views and feelings, something in objects themselves, or in 
their surroundings, which justifies and compels our assent, and 
to which we can appeal as justifying and compelling assent in 
any rational being who perceives it. By an objective motive 
which excludes all reasonable fear of error , we mean a motive 
which shows clearly that, in the given case, the contradictory 
of the proposition we assent to, is not merely improbable, but 
impossible. Hence, a certain judgment is always true. 

(2).—It is one thing to see clearly that a given predicate 




66 


belongs to a given subject, and that the contradictory propo¬ 
sition, in the given case, expresses an impossibility, it is quite 
another thing to be able to answer all the arguments that may 
be urged against our proposition, and in favor of the contra¬ 
dictory. Hence, as Newman says, ‘Hen thousand difficulties 
do not make one doubt. ’ ’ 

(3).—It is clear that of the two subjective elements of 
certitude one may be described as positive , i. e., the firmness of 
adhesion (this is variable , and may be greater or less, according 
to the force of the motive); the other may be called negative , 
i. e., the exclusion of all rational fear of error (this is invari ¬ 
able , and must be equally found in all certain judgments; for, 
if there be any, even the smallest rational fear of error, the 
judgment ceases to be certain). 

88. Kinds of Certitude. 

(a) Certitude is metaphysical , physical or moral , accord¬ 
ing as the manifest objective necessity of uniting or separating 
subject and predicate is metaphysical, physical or moral, i. e., 
according as this necessity is based upon the essential natures 
of things, or on the laws of nature, or on the moral laws which 
govern the constant and universal though free action of man, 
e . g ., ‘Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to 
each other’; ‘if you put your hand into the fire you will feel 
pain’; ‘Your mother is not praying that you may die a dis¬ 
graceful death.’ 

Note (1).— Moral certitude, taken strictly , must exclude 
absolutely all fear of error. Very often, however, a thing is 
said to be morally certain when it is only very probable; but 
this is not the sense in which the words are taken here. 

(2).—When we speak of various kinds or degrees of certi¬ 
tude, we consider, not so much the connexion between subject 
and predicate in the proposition we assent to, as the connexion 




67 


between the proposition itself and the motive accompanying it, 
which renders the contradictory (metaphysically, physically or 
morally) impossible in the given case. 

Hence, when a judgment is metaphysically certain, its con¬ 
tradictory is absolutely impossible. 

When a judgment is physically certain, the contradictory 
is physically impossible, i. e., unless God suspends the laws of 
nature in the given case. 

When a judgment is morally certain, the contradictory is 
morally impossible, i. e., unless man belies his nature and acts 
contrary to its tendencies in the given case. 

(b) Direct certitude is that which immediately accom¬ 
panies the direct perception of a truth. 

Reflex certitude is had when the mind, going back on its 
direct judgment, examines the motive distinctly and perceives 
that its direct certitude is justified and says, as it were, I am 
certain that I am certain. 

(ii). Existence of Certitude. 

89. Scepticism, as we have said, is, A state of doubt in 
regard to those things which are known with certainty by 
means of our natural faculties properly disposed and applied. 

(a) Objective Scepticism admits that we can be certain 
of our existence, or, at least, of the existence of our thoughts 
as phenomena; but holds that we have no means of acquiring 
certain knowledge in regard to anything else, and hence, that 
we must doubt of all else. 

(b) Subjective Scepticism denies, moreover, that we can 
be certain even of our own existence or of our own thoughts 
(universal scepticism). 

Note.— Some objective sceptics deny the veracity of all 
our faculties except consciousness; others deny only the verac¬ 
ity of the senses; others that of reason only, etc. (partial 
scepticism). 




68 


90. Universal or perfect scepticism is absurd, whether 
it be regarded as an internal mental fact, or as a doctrinal 
system. 

Note.— As a fact, i. e., it is impossible for a man actually 
to doubt of all things. As a doctrinal system, i. e., as a system 
attempting logical exposition and proof, it contradicts itself. 

Proof of 1st Part .—The man who affirms, either in thought 
or speech, that he doubts about all things, at the same time 
affirms that he does not doubt about all things, e. g., ‘his own 
existence and his present state of mind.’ He affirms that he 
exists and that he doubts about all things. To say I doubt, 
is as much an affirmation as to say, I am certain. 

Again, such a doubt would be a positive act of resistance 
to the tendency spontaneous natural and necessary in all men, 
to accept many truths as certain and evident. But such an act 
against man’s natural tendency requires either some reason 
inducing the mind to doubt, or some end soliciting the will 
to impel the mind to doubt, and hence, a certainty of some¬ 
thing. 

For the rest, our consciousness tells us clearly enough that 
it is absolutely impossible for anyone to doubt of everything; 
and every action of man’s daily life proves the same thing. 

Proof of 2d Part .—A doctrinal system which implies that 
two contradictories are simultaneously true is absurd. But 
scepticism as a doctrinal system implies, etc. For, according 
to doctrinal sceptics nothing is certain and at the same time 
some things are certain, i. e., their doctrine and all that goes 
to declare and prove it. It is as if a man were to make a 
long speech to prove that he is dumb. The mind proves that it 
does not exist, and that it is essentially untrustworthy; that 
uncertainty is certainty. 

91. Partial scepticism logically leads to perfect or uni¬ 
versal. 

Proof .—Partial scepticism teaches that some of our nat- 




-69- 

ural cognitive faculties, properly disposed and rightly applied, 
are untrustworthy. But this leads to universal; for, if some 
of our natural cognitive faculties, properly disposed, etc., are 
untrustworthy, there is no reason why we should not distrust 
them all. 

Further, our faculties are so connected that the higher to 
a great extent depend, at least extrinsically, on the lower. 

Again, to argue from the common sense and daily life of 
sceptics themselves; they trust eyes, ears, taste, touch, smell 
and reason just as much as other men. 

Note (1). —Hence, it is impossible, logically speaking, 
for a sceptic to argue, or to be argued with. “Every assertor 
of such a philosophy must be in the position of a man who 
saws across the branch of a tree on which he sits, at a point 
between himself and the trunk.” (St. George Mivart.) 
“Scepticism is a drug which purges out everything, itself in¬ 
cluded.” 

(2).—Self-evident as these propositions are, it is yet good 
that their truth be clearly brought home to us. The systems 
of philosophy prevalent in our day are more or less sceptical, 
and it is well to remember that any position which logically 
leads to perfect scepticism may be disproved by a reductio ad 
absurdum. Thus, Mivart refutes the Agnostic system which 
holds that all knowledge is merely relative and apparent. 
“Every philsophy starts with the assumption that something 
is really knowable and absolutely true. But if nothing we can 
assert has more than a relative value, this character must also 
appertain to the doctrine of the relativity of all our knowledge; 
therefore, either this system is absolutely and objectively true 
(and then all knowledge is not merely relative and apparent) ; 
or it is merely relative, and then it has no absolute value, and 
does not correspond with the objective reality. Such a system, 
then, refutes itself, and is necessarily suicidal. ’ ’ 




70 


92. To require that every truth be demonstrated is 
scepticism. 

Proof .—Every demonstration is a deduction from certain 
premises, and these premises are either certain and self-evident 
in themselves or need to be demonstrated. If they need to be 
demonstrated, then they must be proved from other premises. 
These other premises, again, either require demonstration or 
they do not; and so on to infinity, unless it be admitted that 
some truths are self-evident and certain without demonstra¬ 
tion. Hence, to deny that we can have certainty without dem¬ 
onstration is to deny the possibility of being certain of any¬ 
thing, i. e., it is scepticism. 

Note.— Hence it would be absurd to expect a demonstra¬ 
tion of the possibility of certitude in regard to self-evident 
truths. Nor do we assent blindly to such truths, but because 
of their self-evidence. 

93. These three self-evident truths are implied and 
necessarily admitted in every judgment, viz.: the existence 
of the thinking subject, the principle of contradiction, the nat¬ 
ural capacity of our reason to know the truth; i. e., the .first 
fact, the first principle, the first condition of certain knowledge. 

Proof .—If any of them be denied or doubted, there can 
be no certitude. For there can be no thought without an ex¬ 
isting thinker. There can be no certitude if two contradictories 
can be simultaneously true. There can be no certitude, if the 
mind is incapable of certitude. 

These three truths cannot be demonstrated without beg¬ 
ging the question; for they are, and must be, assumed in every 
demonstration, since there can be no certain premise in which 
they are not implied and necessarily admitted. 

Note. (1).— Nor need they be demonstrated, for they are 
self-evident, and in their very denial are affirmed. 




71 


(2) .—Hence the absurdity of Kant’s criticism or exam¬ 
ination of the reliability of reason in its perception of truth. 
In his examination he employs the very faculty of whose reli¬ 
ability he professes to doubt, and hence involves himself in 
the contradiction essential to all scepticism. 

(3) .—Hence, too, the absurdity of Decarte’s “Methodical 
Doubt, ” as he calls it. He held that a philosopher should try 
to doubt about all things, until they are demonstrated. Find¬ 
ing he could not doubt of the existence of his own thought, he 
takes this as the one principle of all philosophy, and thence, 
argues, ‘ ‘ I think, therefore I am. ’ ’ But this argument is good 
for nothing, unless the principle of contradiction and the in¬ 
fallibility of the reason, which perceives and affirms the fact 
of its own existence, be admitted as true. And even granting 
the premise, how is the conclusion certain if reason which 
deduces it be unreliable? Further, if all our other natural 
faculties are unreliable, why should not the faculty of con¬ 
sciousness, which tells me I think, be so too? 

94. The human mind spontaneously and naturally 
assents to many truths as objectively certain. 

Proof. — Spontaneously. It is a fact that men constantly 
invincibly and universally, without reasoning or reflection, but 
merely from perceiving the objective necessity of uniting sub¬ 
ject and predicate, hold many truths as objectively certain. 
But this fact proves the spontaneity of such assent. 

Naturally. What men do constantly universally and in¬ 
vincibly, must be attributed not to accidental circumstances 
(e. g., education, prejudice, etc.), but to their nature. 

95. This assent is certain in the true and proper sense 
of the word. 

Proof.—It is firm and without fear of error. For it is a 
fact that men so adhere to such truths as to be absolutely with¬ 
out doubt or fear of error. 




72 


It is from a sufficient objective motive. For, again, it is a 
fact that men in assenting to such truths are conscious of 
seeing that they are objectively true and could not be other¬ 
wise, e. g., in the judgment, a triangle is not a square. 

Hence many of our direct spontaneous judgments are, in 
the strict sense of the word, certain (metaphysically, physic¬ 
ally, or morally, according to the subject-matter). 

96. In regard to its positive subjective element, certi¬ 
tude is proportionate, on the one hand, to the objective 
motive and the light in which it is presented to the mind; 
on the other, to the perfection of the thinking faculty. 

Proof .—Every effect is proportionate to its cause. But 
the firmness of assent is the effect of the motive, the light in 
which it is presented and the thinking subject. Therefore, etc. 

Note (1). —Hence, the greater the objective necessity of 
uniting or separating subject and predicate, and the more per¬ 
fectly this is seen, the closer and firmer is the mental adhesion 
to the truth. Hence, the intensity of adhesion varies in meta¬ 
physical, physical and moral certitude. Of course, in all certi¬ 
tude the mind perceives the objective necessity of uniting or 
separating subject and predicate. In metaphysical certitude, 
however, it is perceived that this necessity is absolute, and can 
never admit an exception. In physical and moral certitude 
though we perceive that in the given case no exception is made, 
yet an exception is possible should God will to suspend in this 
instance the law of nature, or should man will to contradict 
the natural laws of his own moral nature. 

(2).—If, in a given case, no reason can be assigned why 
we should admit that God has made an exception to the ordi¬ 
nary course of nature, or that man has contradicted his natural 
moral instincts, we can be certain that the universal constant 
law holds good. Such an exception must have a sufficient cause 
or reason, and this is wanting in the given case. 




73 


(3).—Hence, the superiority in the assent of Divine faith 
above all merely natural assents. For here, the motive is the 
infallible authority of God, while the assenting faculty is ele¬ 
vated immeasurably above and beyond itself by the illumina¬ 
tion of the Holy Ghost. Hence, in cases where the material 
object to which we assent is the same, e. g., the existence of 
God, the certitude of the assent of faith is far higher than 
that of unaided reason, even though the latter be based on the 
clearest metaphysical motives. 

97. Objections. 

(a) An error may present itself to the mind as truth. In 
that case the mind cannot help assenting with certainty. 
Therefore an erroneous judgment may be certain. 

Answer .—D. maj.; as clearly and evidently true, n. maj.; 
as having much apparent truth, c. maj. D. min.; the intellect 
may be greatly attracted by the apparent truth, c min.; can 
be necessitated by it, n. min. 

Note. —There may be cases where error is morally un¬ 
avoidable. It is never physically unavoidable. 

(b) Exclusion of fear of error is requisite and sufficient 
for certitude. But a motive which shows the contradictory 
to be improbable , excludes the fear of error. Therefore certi¬ 
tude does not require a motive which shows the contradictory 
to be impossible. 

Answer. —D. maj.; perfect exclusion of reasonable fear 
of error, c. maj.; otherwise, n. maj. A motive which shows 
that the contradictory has no objective probability, c. min. 
(but this shows it to be impossible, as having no sufficient 
reason). 

Note (1). —Moral and physical certitude may in some 
cases be implicitly metaphysical, i. e., when the relation be¬ 
tween the motive and the contradictory is such that to assert 




-74- 

their co-existence would imply a denial of some metaphysical 
principal, e. g., of the Principle of Contradiction, or of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, or Causality, etc. 

(2).—The basis or motive of physical certitude implies 
two elements, viz.: (a) the constancy of the laws of nature 
positively known to us; and (b) the absence of rational 
grounds for admitting that in a given case, these laws have 
been or will be suspended or interfered with by the Creator’s 
omnipotent power. 

(c) Scepticism teaches that all things are doubtful or 
merely probable. But this doctrine involves no contradiction. 

Answer. —C. maj. N. min. The words have no meaning, 
unless the sceptic admits the three propositions mentioned in 
n. 93. 

(d) The human mind is fallible, i. e., liable to err. 
Therefore, we cannot trust it. 

Answer. —D. maj. fallible per se, i. e., in its purely intel¬ 
lectual acts motived by evidence, n. maj.; fallible per accidens, 
i. e., when it judges not on evidence, but under the influence of 
the will, c. maj. 

D. concl. in the same way. 

Note. —The intellect can never find its object, the true, 
in error; but the will may find some good, utility or pleasure 
in error. In that case the will can fix the eye of the mind only 
on the apparent truth in the error, and compel the mind to 
assent; “the wish is father of the thought.” 

Article IY. —Opinion. 

98. Opinion, as we have said, is a state of mind in re¬ 
gard to truth midway between doubt and certitude, i. e., the 
mind forms a judgment in regard to a certain matter and has 
a motive for doing so; yet this motive is not such as to exclude 




75 


all fear of error. As in certitude, the motive is the objective 
necessity of uniting or separating subject and predicate; so in 
opinion, the motive is the objective probability or likelihood 
of this union or separation being true. 

Note (1). —Objective probability is intrinsic if it is based 
upon the nature of the object of which there is question; 
extrinsic if it is based upon the authority of prudent men. 

(2). Probability admits of degrees and is greater or less 
according as it excludes more or less the danger of error, and 
more or less warrants firmness of assent. Hence, we have 
opinions which are slightly probable, solidly probable, more 
probable, most probable. 

9. Opinion, even when most probable, essentially dif¬ 
fers from certitude. 

Proof. —Two things essentially differ when one includes, 
as an essential element, something which the other does not 
include. But certitude includes, as an essential element, the 
exclusion of all rational fear of error, which opinion, even 
when most probable, does not include. The motive of assent 
either excludes the fear of error, or it does not; there is no 
mean. If it does, we have certitude ; if it does not, no matter 
how much it may really lessen the fear of error, we can only 
have opinion. 

Note. (1). —At times many distinct motives, each of which 
taken separately could only produce opinion, when taken to¬ 
gether produce certainty. But in this case the certitude is 
the result, not of the mere sum of the separate probabilities, 
but of the collection of motives, taken as a whole, in which 
each motive gains from and gives to all the rest an entirely 
new force and value, e. g., the case of several independent wit¬ 
nesses. 

(2). A solidly probable opinion does not cease to be so, 




76 


because the contradictory opinion is more probable. For, a 
good motive does not lose its force by being compared with 
a better; therefore, the opinion founded on the one does not 
lose its value by being compared with that founded on the 
other, so long as this other does not give us certainty. 


CHAPTER II. 

The Trustworthiness of our Faculties for the Attain¬ 
ment of Conceptional truth. 

100. Our faculties of cognition are of two orders, 

sensitive and intellectual. By the former we perceive individual 
concrete material objects, facts and phenomena. The proper 
object of the latter are positively immaterial objects, and ma¬ 
terial objects abstracted from the individual and universalized. 

101. As truth and certitude in the strict sense of the 
word, belong only to the judgments of the intellect, the simplest 
way to treat our present subject will be to group our judg¬ 
ments under three general heads according to the different 
classes of objects about which we judge. These are, (a) our own 
internal states, acts, feelings, (b) external individual material 
objects, (c) positively immaterial objects, and universalized 
material objects. Of the trustworthiness of our judgments 
in regard to these three different classes of objects, we shall 
speak in the three following articles on Consciousness, the 
External Senses, and the Intellect. 


Article I. —Consciousness. 

102. By consciousness we here mean the intellect inas¬ 
much as it apprehends and judges of the existence of present 




77 


acts, feelings and other internal phenomena of self (i. e., the 
composite substantial self knowing, desiring, feeling pain and 
pleasure, etc.). 

Note (1) .—The subjective phenomena are the direct object 
of consciousness; the enduring substantial self to which the 
phenomena are referred is the indirect object. That is, in 
apprehending the phenomena we apprehend the existence of 
the Self of which they are the phenomena. 

(2).—We do not say that all internal acts and phenomena 
are apprehended by consciousness; we speak only of those that 
are apprehended. 

103. The man who would profess to deny, or to doubt 
of the veracity of consciousness in regard to its proper 
object would, in the denial, affirm its veracity. For, in 
affirming his mental doubt or denial, he would affirm the 
veracity of the consciousness which perceives that he doubts 
or denies. 

Again, to say that 1 perceive myself to be internally 
affirming or denying a given statement, to be deliberately con¬ 
senting to a given suggestion, to be experiencing sensations 
of pain or pleasure, to say that I clearly perceive these things 
in myself and to deny that these things are in myself, is to 
say that the same acts, feeling and phenomena can be in 
a given subject and not in it at one and the same time. 

Note (1). —Hence,* the certitude of the clear, normal 
judgments of consciousness in regard to its proper object is 
metaphysical, being based immediately on the principle of con¬ 
tradiction. So, too, in our certitude of the existence of a 
permanent Self in us. 

(2).—We say, clear normal judgment in regard to its 
proper objects (i. e., present internal facts), in order to ex¬ 
clude the occasional error, which may arise from a diseased 




78 


or disturbed imagination, e. g., a past experience of pain may 
be so vividly recalled, that if we are inattentive we may take 
it for actual present suffering. In this case, however, it is not 
the simple perception of consciousness that is at fault; it 
truly affirms the presence before the mind of that which is 
actually represented by the imagination. The error is in the 
judgment confounding the imaginary representation with an 
actual sensation of pain. A sane man can always safeguard 
himself against such erroneous judgments. 

The occasion of error is the similarity that one mental 
state or act may bear to another, on account of which we may 
hastily judge of it, as if it were that other. But the error is 
not to be attributed to the intellect which of itself yields only 
to evidence, but to our more or less wilful inattention and 
hastiness. 

(3) .—When, a man complains of a pain in an amputated 
arm, the pain is really felt in the corresponding branch of the 
nervous system, but confusedly. Imagination and custom 
may cause one to attribute it to the missing member. 

(4) .—Note the distinction between consciousness (the 
intellect judging of the existence of present mental facts), 
and conscience (the intellect judging of the morality of our 
acts). 


Article II. —The External Senses. 

104. External sensation implies three essential condi¬ 
tions, viz.: a living organ capable of perception, an individual 
J material object capable of being perceived, and a certain 
presence of the latter in the former. How is this presence 
accomplished? The action of the object is received in the 
sensitive faculty and perceived by its objective , and thus, the 
object itself in so far as it manifests itself by its action, is 




79 


perceived by us. This vital perception of the acting object 
may be accompanied by subjective feelings of pain, pleasure, 
etc. But in normal conditions we find no difficulty in dis¬ 
tinguishing the subjective element from the objective element 
in our sensations. 

That the direct object of our external sense-perception 
is not something merely subjective, but something objective, 
is clearly seen by considering the difference which conscious¬ 
ness distinctly recognizes between our external sensations and 
purely internal phenomena, e. g., the former are clearly per¬ 
ceived to be determined from without; the latter, from within. 
Again, we clearly distinguish our direct sensations of objects 
from the representations of the same objects preserved and 
recalled by memory ; the latter we can alter and group as we 
will, while the order, succession, etc., of the former are in¬ 
dependent of our will. 

105. Hence, in our external sensations, we perceive 
external objects directly and immediately, and not merely 
subjective affections or modifications; for, our own conscious¬ 
ness and the common sense of mankind tell us so. If one 
denies, in the case of the constant inevitable declaration of 
normal human nature, that we perceive, immediately and di¬ 
rectly, extended resistant bodies distinct from ourselves, he 
must logically fall into absolute hopeless scepticism. For, if 
we cannot trust the necessary evident perceptions of our fac¬ 
ulties in this, we have no ground for trusting them in anything. 

Note.— Idealism denies that there is any objective reality 
which corresponds to our external sense-perceptions. Sub¬ 
jective idealism holds that our sensations are merely sub¬ 
jective modifications, the sole work of the subject in which they 
exist; and that what is supposed to be an external world, may 
be, for all we know, “a projection of the Ego on a background 
of nothingness.” Objective idealism (Berkeley) holds that it 




80 


is God himself who immediately produces in our senses the 
impressions which we suppose to come from an external 
world. Transfigured Realism (H. Spencer) holds that there 
is an external world, which is the cause of our sense-percep¬ 
tions; but that it in no way corresponds to our perceptions, 
but is, and must always be unknown and unknowable to us: 
“what we are conscious of, are but subjective affections pro¬ 
duced by objective agencies which are unknown and un¬ 
knowable. ? ’ 

All these views are based on the assumption that the 
object of all our knowledge is simply and wholly our own sub¬ 
jective states. The argument given above is a simple and 
conclusive ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’ of all forms of idealism. 
The consistent idealist must deny not only the existence of his 
fellow-men, and all experimental science, but even the testi¬ 
mony of consciousness and his own existence. In their normal 
conditions, either all our own natural faculties are valid, or 
none are. 

106. The external senses are Sight, Hearing, Taste, 
Touch, Smell. These senses are really distinct from each 
other, for each has its own organ and perceives an object for¬ 
mally distinct from that of any other sense. The act of ex¬ 
ternal sensation in each case, is produced, not immediately 
in the brain, but in the living organ proper to each sense. 
Our own consciousness declares that we do not see, or taste, 
or smell with our brains; nor is there any valid reason for 
saying that we do. And again, if all sensation is produced in 
the brain, no reason can be assigned for the marvelous diversity 
of structure manifest in the different sense-organs, and the 
adaptation of each to its peculiar functions. 

107. That which is represented in an act of cognitive 
sensation is called the object of the act We may distinguish 




- 81 - 

three classes of objects in regard to which the act of sensation 
may be exercised, viz.: 

(a) The proper object of a sensitive faculty is that 
which belongs to the faculty in question alone, and can be 
perceived by no other, e. g., ‘colored extension’ is the proper 
object of sight; ‘sound,’ of hearing, etc. 

(b) A common object of sensation is that which can 
be perceived by several sensitive faculties, e. g ., ‘extension,’ 
‘shape,’ ‘rest,’ ‘motion,’ etc., can be perceived both by sight 
and by touch. 

(c) The acccidental object of sense is that whicn ac¬ 
companies or sustains those qualities which constitute the 
proper and common objects of sensation, e. g., ‘substance,’ in 
a broad, indeterminate sense of the word, i. e., inasmuch as 
it is the subject of substratum of sensile qualities. For, our 
senses do not perceive color, extension, etc., in the abstract, 
but in the concrete, i. e., we perceive this or that particular 
colored, extended thing. 

108. In the following propositions on the validity of the 
testimony of our external senses it is supposed that all the 
necessary conditions for the natural action of the faculties 
in question are verified, viz.: 

(a) The sense organ should be sound and in a neutral, 
normal condition; to the jaundiced eye all things are yellow. 

(b) The object should be properly applied to the fac¬ 
ulty, i. e., the distance at which the object acts, the medium 
through which it acts, and the manner in which it is presented 
should be such as to allow it to produce a sufficient impression 
on the sense. Thus, it could not be expected that one at a dis¬ 
tance of half a mile could distinguish the colors green, blue and 
violet; or that one looking through green spectacles could per¬ 
ceive a pure white color as such; or that one standing still 




-82- 

could distinguish accurately the various colors of a body in 
rapid motion. 

109. The testimony of our external senses in regard 
to their proper objects is reliable. 

Proof. —They are our natural means of perceiving these 
objects; for there is in all men an invincible tendency to accept 
without fear of error, and abide by the testimony of their 
senses in regard to such objects; and, a consciousness of per¬ 
ceiving a necessitating objective motive for doing so. But if 
they are the means which nature has given us to perceive those 
objects, they are, when normally disposed and properly ap¬ 
plied, reliable; else, our normal nature would necessitate con¬ 
stant invincible error, and there would be nothing left for us 
but universal scepticism. 

110. The united testimony of the external senses con¬ 
cerned, in regard to the common objects of sensation, is 
reliable. 

Proof. —They are our natural means of perceiving such 
objects, and to doubt the validity of their normal action is 
scepticism. 

111. The testimony of the external senses in regard to 
the accidental objects of sensation is never, indeed, posi¬ 
tively false; but it may easily give occasion to erroneous 
judgments. 

Proof of 1st Part.—Never positivety false; for, the acci¬ 
dental object of sensation is, e. g., the substance precisely as 
affected by the qualities which are the proper or common ob¬ 
jects of sensation, and not the substance according to its in¬ 
trinsic essential nature. Of this the senses tell us nothing. In 
other words, the senses perceive that there is something col¬ 
ored, hard, odorous, etc.; but they do not pretend to per¬ 
ceive or to inform us what that something is. But in this 
there is no positive falsity. 




-83- 

Proof of 2d Part.—May easily give occasion to erroneous 
judgments; for, where the sensile qualities perceived a 
given sense are the same, the sensile representation (at least 
in regard to these qualities) is the same. But the substances 
underlying those qualities may be altogether different, e. g., 
'in a living rose, an artificial rose, the image of a rose formed 
in front of a concave mirror.’ In such cases, the sense-repre¬ 
sentation may readily give occasion to the false judgment that 
the artificial rose is really a living flower. 

112. Supplementary Notes. 

(a) Intellectual judgments immediately following upon 
normal sense-perception (in regard to the proper and common 
objects of sensation) can never be erroneous. 

(b) As to the certitude of such judgments: (1) Our 
certitude of the existence of an external material world in 
general, is equivalently metaphysical; since the contradictory 
would involve the existence of an effect (our necessary per¬ 
ception of an external world) without a proportionate cause. 
(2) Our certitude of the existence of a particular material ob¬ 
ject of which we have constant and uniform perception, is 
also equivalently metaphysical, for the same reason. (3) Our 
certitude of the objective existence of a particular material 
object here and now represented by our sensation, is physical, 
inasmuch as God could directly determine such a sensation. 
However even here, in most cases, the certitude may also be 
equivalently metaphysical for the reason given above. 

(c) We can know that the conditions requisite for nor¬ 
mal sense-perception (108) are verified, for defects in the 
organs of sense and in the proper presentation of their objects, 
are not natural but occasional and accidental, and can be 
recognized by attention, and comparison with normal cases. 

(d) When it is said that our sense-perception is en- 
titatively subjective, representatively objective, the meaning is 




84 


that the act of perception is in the sentient subject, the thing 
perceived is the determining object as acted on, and so far 
manifesting itself to, the perceptive sense. Hence, to say that 
we need to compare our normal perception with their ob¬ 
jects before we can be sure of a correspondence between them, 
is the same as saying that we must compare an object with 
itself to be sure that it corresponds with itself. 

(e) We do not affirm that bodies have in themselves the 
sensations of e. g., ‘extension/ ‘harness/ etc.; but we do affirm 
that there are formally in the bodies t which ^determine these 
sensations in us, qualities corresponding t^ the'kensations pro¬ 
duced. To deny this leads logically to unh^erss& scepticism. If 
you deny that a piece of coal is black, you haVe no right to 
affirm that it has extension or even existence. 

(f) Our sight informs us that the oar in the water is 
broken, when it is not; but in the first place, the shape or figure 
of the oar is not the proper object of sight. Again, the me¬ 
dium through which the different parts of the oar affect the 
eye is not uniform. 

(g) Prom what has been said above, we can readily 
answer the objection: That our senses deceive us in regard to 
magnitude, e. g., ‘of the sun’; or in regard to the apparent 
motion of bodies really at rest, e. g., ‘of houses/ ‘trees/ etc., 
as they appear to one on board a fast train. 

(b) In the Blessed Sacrament, the quantity of the bread 
and wine exists (miraculously, it is true) after the manner of 
a substance; therefore, when our senses tell us that something 
objective exists with the taste, color, weight, etc., of bread 
and wine, they do not deceive us; though to one ignorant of 
the mystery of the Eucharist, their testimony might in this 
case readily give rise to the erroneous judgment that the sub¬ 
stance of bread and wine is present. 




85 


Article III.— The Intellect. 

113. Consciousness and experience testify that there 
is in man a faculty that perceives and represents: 

(a) Objects which in no way come within the sphere of sensi¬ 
tive cognition, e. g., ‘possibility,’ ‘necessity,’ ‘certitude,’ 
‘doubt,’ ‘relation,’ ‘eternity,’ ‘virtue and vice,’ ‘rights and 
duties,’ ‘liberty and obligation,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘thought,’ ‘God and 
His attributes’; (b) Sensile objects, but in a manner transcend¬ 
ing the representations of sensitive cognition, e. g., ‘material 
objects, abstracted from individuating notes, from all the con¬ 
crete conditions of actual existence (shape, size, etc.) and even 
from the note of actual existence itself.’ (c) Sensile objects 
which make no impression on the senses, e. g., ‘ the effect, as yet 
unproduced, in the cause’; ‘the cause, which has ceased to 
exist in the effect’; (d) Itself and its own acts. Now, such a 
faculty is necessarily a faculty which elicits its acts independ¬ 
ently of a material organ, i. e., a spiritual faculty. For imma¬ 
terial or universalized objects cannot be represented in or per¬ 
ceived by a material, extended subject, nor can such a subject 
reflect upon itself and make itself the object of its own per¬ 
ception. 

“Ideas are not sensible pictures. The least experience is 
sufficient to convince us that we have many ideas which cannot 
be reduced to any sensible picture.”—Lewes. “Neither sense- 
experiences, nor any modification of them.”—Huxley. 

Note. —The intellect is in its action, intrinsically inde¬ 
pendent of the material organism, i. e., it does not need the 
concurrence of a material organ to elicit its acts; hence, it 
is said to be subjected in the soul alone. The sensitive facul¬ 
ties, on the contrary, need the concurrence of a material organ 
in eliciting their acts; hence, they are said to be subjected, not 
in the soul alone, nor in the body alone, but in the living com¬ 
pound. While the soul is united to the body, the intellect is 




86 


dependent on the senses—not, indeed, intrinsically, i. e., in 
eliciting its acts, but extrinsically —i. e., the senses furnish the 
matter upon which the intellect begins its work. 

114. The three primary functions of the intellect are 
simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning. It is one and 
the same faculty which performs all these various functions; 
but considered in relation to its acts of simple apprehension 
and immediate judgment, it may be called intelligence or in¬ 
tellect; in relation to its act of mediate judgment or reasoning 
it is called reason. 

We shall therefore briefly consider the validity of each of 
the three primary acts of the intellect in three separate para¬ 
graphs : 

(i). Ideas. 

115. We have already enumerated and defined the prin¬ 
cipal classes of ideas. It only remains here to answer the 
question, Have our ideas an objective value? i. e., are they 
merely subjective creations of our mind, to which nothing real 
and objective corresponds? or, on the contrary, do they repre¬ 
sent and correspond with objective realities? For instance, 
when I mentally represent, ‘The whole as greater than the 
part,’ ‘The sum of the angles of a triangle as equal to two 
right angles,’ do these representations hold good in reality as 
well as in thought? are they true in the world of actual and 
possible things, quite independently of my thoughts? do they 
express laws of being as well as laws of thinking f This is 
what is meant by asking are our ideas valid. 

116. Now, to deny or doubt the validity of ideas in 
general, is absolute scepticism and involves an open con¬ 
tradiction. For, to deny or doubt the possibility of attaining 
truth is scepticism. But to deny or doubt the validity of our 
ideas, is to deny or doubt the possibility of attaining truth 
(i. e., conformity of thought with objective reality). 




87 


Again, every judgment, affirmative or negative—even the 
negation of the validity of our ideas—implies something ob¬ 
jective corresponding to the terms, i. e., implies the conformity 
of onr thought with the reality of things. Hence, the validity 
of ideas is affirmed in its negation. 

For the rest, the idealist reasons about his own past mental 
states, about other men’s opinions, etc., and thus practically 
admits that his ideas represent objective realities different 
from themselves. 

Note.— Hence ideas or intellectual perceptions are like 
sense-perceptions, -e ntitatively subjective, representatively ob¬ 
jective. 

117. A special difficulty is raised against the objectiv¬ 
ity or validity of the universal idea (11. b), i. e., that which 
represents a note univocally common to and predicable of 
many objects distributively. A few words on the different 
erroneous views—Nominalism, Conceptualism, and Exag¬ 
gerated Realism—before explaining the true theory—Moderate 
Realism. 

(a) Nominalism admits common names for things, but 
rejects any universality in ideas or in objects. But words have 
no meaning except inasmuch as they are signs of ideas and of 
things. Hence, when we intelligently apply a common name, 
e. g., circle, to many distinct individual objects, there must be 
something corresponding to the word in our thought, and in 
each and all of the things to which the word is applied. Else 
all speech is nonsense. 

(b) Conceptualists admit universality in ideas, but 
contend that such ideas are mere intellectual fictions to which 
no objective reality corresponds; since, as they truly say, every 
existing thing must be a definite individual. They admit, 
however, that the universal concept is univocally predicable 
of many distinct individual objects. But a concept is a repre- 




- 88 - 

sentation ; and hence, a common or universal concept must rep¬ 
resent something common to all the inferiors of its extension, 
i. e., something objective in things, else the concept would be 
universal and not universal at the same time. 

(c) Exaggerated Realism holds that the formal uni¬ 
versal exists as a real object, i. e., that there actually exists 
in nature an object corresponding to our universal idea, not 
only as to what is represented by the idea, but also as to the 
manner in which it is represented, viz., apart from individua¬ 
tion, e. g., an existing circle, horse, etc., which is no particular 
circle or horse, but circle or horse in general. This is clearly 
absurd. For, the universal man, for instance, would either 
exist in every individual man, or he would not. In the latter 
case, he would not be a universal man, but an individual, and 
no other object but himself could be truly called a man. In 
the former case, he would either be one and the same identical 
man, in each and all of the individuals called by that name; 
and then there would be but one man in all the world, and 
every so-called man would be his own son, grandfather, neigh¬ 
bors, etc.—one man multilocated in time and space; or he 
would be different men, multiplied as often as there are actual 
or possible men, and then he would be one and many at the 
same time. 

118. But leaving aside these self-contradictory views, let 
us explain the true view.— Moderate Realism. 

A universal idea represents one thing (one note or one 
sum of notes) as capable \of belonging to many distinct objects 
and of being predicated of each and all of them univocally. 
The matter of the idea is that which is represented by it: the 
form is the manner in which the matter is represented. The 
matter of the universal idea is derived from concrete individ¬ 
ual objects; the form is due to abstraction, reflection and com¬ 
parison on the part of the intellect. 




-89- 

Thus as we said above (11. c, Note), seeing a single con¬ 
crete circle described and seeing how it is done the mind by 
its power of abstraction (9. Note) can neglect the concrete 
characters of place, time, size, material, etc., which make the 
figure this particular , individual circle and attend only to 
what makes it a circle. What is represented in this abstract or 
prescinded idea, is merely the nature or essence of circle with¬ 
out any reference to the peculiarities or individuation of par¬ 
ticular circles. This idea is called the direct universal idea. 
It represents one nature or essence, that of Circle. Its con¬ 
tents or Matter is real, and realized in the given circle we are 
considering, though not in the abstract Form or manner in 
which it is conceived. 

The mind reflecting on this direct universal idea, which 
simply represents the abstract nature or essence of Circle and 
comparing it with the many individual objects and circum¬ 
stances in which it is or may be realized, forms a new concept, 
of one nature or sum of notes capable of being univocally 
realized in and predicated of any number of actual or possible 
individuals. This is the reflex universal idea. It differs from 
the direct universal in this, that the latter represents one na¬ 
ture, absolutely and without any reference to predication; 
while the former represents that same one nature, or predi¬ 
cable of many individuals. 

Hence, there are three ways in which we can consider any 
nature, essence or note: (1) as individuated in a concrete 
existing or possible being, (represented by a singular idea), 
(2) absolutely and in itself without reference to individuation 
or Extension,( represented by a direct universal idea), (3) as 
multiplied or multipliable in many individuals, i. e., as having 
Extension, (represented by a reflex universal idea). 

119. Hence we say that: 

(a) Our direct universal idea is objectively real , i. e., 




-90- 

the sum of its contents is realized and realizable in objects 
(though not in the manner in which it is conceived). 

(b) Our reflex universal idea is logical, i. e., the sum 
of its positive contents ( one thing wholly and completely in 
each and all of many distinct things, i. e., one and manifold at 
the same time) is not realized or realizable in objects. Yet 
it is without a solid foundation and justification in the real 
order of things. For, though the distinct objects covered by 
the reflex universal idea have not one and the same numeri¬ 
cally identical nature, yet they have absolutely similar natures, 
and this justifies the mind in embracing them all under a com¬ 
mon concept. 

Note (1).—The object represented by a direct universal 
idea, e. g., the nature of a circle, is said to be eternal and nec¬ 
essary, because all circumstances of time, place, etc., are pre¬ 
scinded from in the concept, and because the sum of notes rep¬ 
resented is always and everywhere requisite and sufficient to 
constitute the nature represented by the concept. 

(2) .—In a judgment, the Comprehension of the predicate 
as a direct universal is affirmed or denied of the subject. 

(3) .—Observe carefully the difference between the clear- 
cut, universal idea, e. g., of a circle, and the vague, indefinite 
picture in the imagination, which accompanies it. This latter 
is sometimes called a common phantasm, but in reality it is 
rather a confused unsteady image of a particular circle, than 
a clear representation of that which is realized and realizable 
in each and every actual and possible circle. Compare also 
the phantasms excited by the words ‘mathematical point/ 
‘line/ ‘a twenty-sided plane figure/ ‘justice/ ‘patriotism/ etc. 
(See Clarke, Logic, p. 110 seqq.: Maher, Phychology, p. 274, 
279.) 

(ii) Judgments. 

120. In the present article we shall only consider imme- 




91 


diate judgments. They are either analytical or synthetical, 
i. e., they are either about abstract truths or concrete facts 
(external or internal). 

121. It is clear that so long as our senses and our con¬ 
sciousness do not deceive us, our immediate synthetical judg¬ 
ments, in regard to what they testify, cannot be erroneous; 

in other words, if my consciousness truly perceives me think¬ 
ing, if my sense of sight truly perceives this white paper, my 
judgments, I am thinking; This paper is white, cannot be 
wrong. 

122. In immediate analytical judgments, the predicate 
is a note which necessarily belongs to the subject and which 
the mind by merely comparing the terms, sees at once so to 
belong to it, that to deny that the predicate in question be¬ 
longs to the subject in question would be to deny the identity 
of the subject with itself, e. g., by merely considering the idea 
of a whole , we are at once forced to attribute to it the predicate 
greater than any of its parts. Such judgments are necessary 
and universal. The mind cannot help pronouncing them, and 
cannot attempt to think a possible case in which they are not 
true. The certitude of such judgments is metaphysical, i. e., 
in no hypothesis can their contradictories be true. 

Note (1). —Certain analytical judgments are of such uni¬ 
versal application that they are called axioms, or first prin¬ 
ciples of all scientific knowledge. Such are, for instance, the 
judgments— 

(a) Every actual or possible being has, either in itself 
or outside of itself, a sufficient reason for its existence or pos¬ 
sibility. 

(b) Every new being, i. e., everything which begins to 
be, or acquires an existence which it had not before (and, 
therefore, every change, every phenomenon, etc.), supposes a 




92 


cause, i. e., an existing being, prior to itself, and necessary and 
sufficient to account for the existence of the new being. 

(c) Similar necessary (as opposed to free) causes, in 
similar circumstances produce similar effects, unless the laws of 
nature be suspended. 

(2) .— Synthetical judgments, as they are concerned about 
matters of fact, of themselves, can never become scientific 
principles. It is only by means of analytical principles that, 
after sufficiently numerous and varied experiments, we are 
enabled to form the universal judgment, e. g., that all fire will 
produce painful sensations in sensitive organs. Synthetical 
judgments thus universalized are called empirical or experi¬ 
mental axioms or principles. They are of constant applica¬ 
tion in science and in practical life. 

(3) .—There is no one axiom in which all others are vir¬ 
tually contained, or from which they can be directly demon¬ 
strated. Yet there is one axiom which is implicitly contained 
in all others, whose denial involves the denial of all others, 
and to a denial of which we may reduce an adversary who 
denies any evidently true judgment. This is the Principle of 
Contradiction: “Nothing can be, and not be-, at the same 
time.” 

(iii). Reasoning. 

123. Demonstrative reasoning is an infallible means of 
acquiring true and new knowledge. 

True knowledge. For if A and B are each identical with 
C, they must be identical with each other. If all A is con¬ 
tained under B, and all B under C, all A must be contained 
under C. In other words, the conclusion simply expresses 
explicitly what is expressed implicitly in the true and certain 
premises; therefore, it is true and certain. 

New knowledge. It is new knowledge for me, if now I 




-93- 

know explicitly that a certain predicate belongs to a certain 
subject, which before I did not know belonged to it; or if I 
now learn for the first time why it belongs to it. But this 
knowledge I acquire by demonstrative reasoning. 

Note ( 1 ).—Of course, there are such things as erroneous 
conclusions, but they do not follow legitimately from true 
premises. Either we have irrationally admitted as true, pre¬ 
mises which are not so, or we have irrationally violated one or 
other of the laws of reasoning. 

(2).— Memory is the power of retaining, recalling and 
recognizing knowledge acquired by us in the past. As the 
validity of our reasoning depends on the validity of the 
premises, and as we depend greatly on our memory for our 
premises, a word must be said here on the trustworthiness of 
memory. 

Intellectual memory is not a distinct faculty; it is merely 
another name for the intellect considered in relation to a 
special function —that of reproducing and recognizing our 
past mental states. It is, therefore, in itself a matter of simple 
apprehension—Before my mind is an idea or judgmewt which 
1 have had before. Hence, as in other acts of simple appre¬ 
hension, we must admit that the object apprehended has the 
characters clearly and evidently apprehended in it, unless we 
are prepared to deny the capacity of the mind for perceiving 
truth. We are much necessitated to accept many of the judg¬ 
ments founded on memory as we are those founded on present 
consciousness; and if evidence can compel us to err in the 
one case, there is no ground for security in the other. 

On the other hand, the man who would argue against the 
trustworthiness of memory, would, like every other sceptic, 
assert its trustworthiness in his argument against it. For, to 
go no farther than his argument itself, what happened the ten- 
billionth part of a second ago, is as truly past as what hap- 




94 


pened a billion centuries ago; hence, he can never state his 
conclusion unless he trusts memory for the fact that he has 
stated his premises—nay, he cannot be sure he existed when 
the premises were stated. Hence all science, as well as all 
practical and social life, is based on the trustworthiness of 
memory. 

Rule. —Assert only what memory distinctly recognizes, 
and as it recognizes it, and memory will never give occasion 
to erroneous judgments. 

124. In the present chapter we have considered the 
various faculties which man possesses for the attainment of 
true and certain knowledge, their proper objects, the condi¬ 
tions of their normal exercise and their general trustworthi¬ 
ness within their natural limits. It must be borne in mind 
that this last point cannot be demonstrated directly without 
'Begging the Question.’ The validity of our faculties in their 
normal exercise is a primary fact which must be accepted on 
its own self-evidence under penalty of falling into absolute 
scepticism. Hence, we can prove the validity of our faculties, 
only indirectly , i. e., by showing that to deny their validity in¬ 
volves contradiction and all the absurdities of universal scep¬ 
ticism. 

CHAPTER III. 

The Objective Causes of Certitude. 

We have so far considered the nature of Conceptional 
Truth, the possibility of attaining it with certainty, and the 
trustworthiness of our faculties, or the subjective causes of 
our certain knowledge. In the present chapter we shall ex¬ 
amine the objective causes or motives of certitude. 

125. The motive, or objective cause, or formal object, 

of a certain judgment is that which determines or compels 
the mind to pronounce it. It is usually expressed in the an¬ 
swer one gives to the question, “Why do you hold such a prop - 




-95 —- 

osition f If I am asked why do I hold with certainty that the 
whole is greater than any of its parts, I answer, Because it 
is self-evident. Thus, I assign, as the objective cause of my 
judgment, the immediate intrinsic evidence of the proposition. 
Again, if I am asked why do I hold that in a right-angled 
triangle the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum 
of the squares of the other two sides, I answer, Because it fol¬ 
lows, with evident consequence , from immediately evident 
principles. Though not evident to me at first sight, or from 
the mere consideration of the subject and predicate, yet, by a 
process of legitimate reasoning from prior truths, I at length 
come to see the evident intrinsic necessity of uniting them; 
and I say that the objective cause of my assent is the mediate 
intrinsic evidence of the proposition. Again, if I am asked 
why I am certain that I am bored by this logic lecture, or that 
the sun is now shining, I answer, Because they are facts, here 
and now evident; the one to my consciousness, the other to my 
senses, i. e., here again, it is inexorable objective evidence of 
the truth that at once compels and justifies my assent. Lastly, 
if I am asked how I can be certain that the city of Tien-Tsin 
exists, since I have no intrinsic objective evidence of the fact, 
i. e., the existence of Tien-Tsin has never immediately man¬ 
ifested itself to me as a physical fact; nor from the mere con¬ 
sideration of the intrinsic nature of the terms can I gather 
either immediately, or by any process of reasoning, that exist¬ 
ing city is a predicate objectively to be attributed to Tien- 
Tsin, I answer, What you say is quite true. I have no intrinsic 
evidence of the truth of the proposition; but yet I am perfectly 
certain of it, for I have testimony which bears on its face in¬ 
trinsic evidence of its trustworthiness, and this testimony as¬ 
sures me that Tien-Tsin exists. That is to say, I have extrinsic 
evidence of the truth of the proposition. 

These instances show us that the objective motives of 
certitude may be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the truth to 




96 


which we assent; and they will serve to introduce us to our 
subject, which we will examine in the following articles, viz.: 

1. The extrinsic motives of certitude. 

2. The intrinsic motives of certitude. 

3. The ultimate and fundamental motive or criterion of 
natural certitude. 

Article I.— The Extrinsic Motives of Certitude. 

126. As we have said, the truth which we here and now 
mentally affirm is called the material object of our assent; 
while the motive or objective reason why we assent to it and 
hold to it with certainty is called the formal object. Now, we 
have seen that, while in some cases the formal object is some¬ 
thing intrinsically connected with the material object, in other 
cases the formal object is something quite extrinsic to the 
material object. In the former case we see the necessity of 
uniting subject and predicate, and our knowledge is called 
science or experience, as the case may be; in the latter, we 
believe the necessity of joining subject and predicate, and our 
knowledge may be called by the general name of faith. 

127. Testimony in general, is the act by which one com¬ 
municates to others a fact or truth as known to himself. The 
one who gives the testimony is called a witness; immediate, if 
he has himself perceived the truth or experienced the fact; 
mediate, if he has received the truth or fact from others. The 
authority of the testimony is the force or weight which it has 
to win the rational assent of the hearer, i. e., the witness’ right 
to credence. The act by which the hearer assents to the truth 
testified to is called faith ; which is either divine or human , 
according as the witness is God, or man. The natural inclina¬ 
tion of the human mind to accept with certainty what is at- 




97 


tested by sufficient authority, is called credulity, or the instinct 
of faith. 

In regard to the matter testified to, testimony is either 
doctrinal or historical, i. e, either to a scientific truth, or to a 
concrete individual fact of experience. 

Human testimony is either particular, i. e., that of some 
who are in a position to know the fact or truth to which they 
bear witness; or universal, i. e., the spontaneous natural ut¬ 
terance of human nature in all times and places. In the latter 
case it is called the testimony of the Common Sense of man¬ 
kind. 

128. The principles on which we base our trust in human 
testimony are the moral laws which govern human action, i. e., 
certain constant and uniform modes of action which men, 
though free, spontaneously follow, from the very nature of 
the will as an innate tendency towards good, and away from 
evil. They may in truth be called physical laws of the free 
will. These laws, as far as they concern us here, are: 

(a) Every man naturally desires to know the truth, es¬ 
pecially in regard to matters of general importance, or which 
greatly affect his interests. 4 ‘ Omnis homo natura scire desid- 
erat. ’ ’ 

(b) A lie is, of itself, neither good, useful or pleasurable 
to human nature, but repugnant to it. Hence, if in a particu¬ 
lar case, it is apprehended as useful or desirable, this is not 
for its own sake, but for the sake of something else which the 
liar apprehends as good, useful or pleasurable. Hence the say¬ 
ing, “Nemo gratis mendax,” “No one lies gratuitously”; and 
much less will one lie for the sake of bringing trouble and ruin 
on himself. 


(i). Particular Human Testimony. 

129. In general, we may say it is not only a useful, but 
a necessary means of acquiring knowledge. Man is bom and 




-98- 

lives a social being, in communion with his fellow-man, and 
each is to be helped by, and to help the other. There are many 
things a child must know, which, if left to himself, it would 
take him his life-time to discover. As he grows up, there are 
still a thousand truths, useful and necessary for him to know, 
which he has neither the time, nor the means, nor the ability, 
to verify for himself. It is only by testimony that we know 
the place of our birth, that the property we inherit is lawfully 
ours, that the laws we obey were really made by competent 
authority, etc. Testimony, again, is the only means we have 
of knowing the chief facts of history and geography. The 
physical sciences, too, (physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc.), 
are, to a great extent, inductive, and therefore, based upon 
multiplied observations and experiments beyond the power 
of any one man to verify. In a word, the greater part of our 
knowledge is motived by human testimony; and we may even 
say with St. Augustine, that “the whole practical life of man 
is founded on faith.” This natural necessity, and the in¬ 
stinctive tendency of man to trust to the testimony of his fel¬ 
low-men in many of the most important concerns of life, is 
sufficient proof that human testimony is, at least, a safe and 
prudent motive for assent; else, nature and nature’s God 
would have placed us in such a condition that, from morning 
to night, we should be hopelessly and unavoidably deceived in 
regard to those matters which it most interests us to know. 
Our own experience, too, shows us that as a rule, in our pru¬ 
dent assents motived by human testimony, we have not been 
deceived. But the question with which we are concerned here 
is, can human testimony ever be a sufficient motive of perfect 
certitude ? 

130. In regard to mere matters of fact, particular hu¬ 
man testimony is in certain cases a sufficient motive of 
perfect certitude. 

Note (1). —We say in regard to matters of fact; for, 




99 


though the testimony of scientific men in regard to scientific 
conclusions may, in many cases, justify and even demand as¬ 
sent, yet it is comparatively rare that such testimony has all 
the conditions requisite for a motive of perfect certitude. 

(2) .—We say in regard to mere matters of fact; for, all 
theoretical speculations as to the nature, causes, consequences, 
purposes, etc., of the facts in question, are really scientific 
conclusions about the facts, and to be regarded as such. 
Hence, in regard to such mere matters of fact, the testimony 
of a simple, unlettered laborer is, ceteris paribus, as valuable 
as that of a learned lawyer or professor. 

(3) .—We say in 'certain cases, e. g ., when the facts, ac¬ 
tions, statements, phenomena, etc., are public, of general im¬ 
portance and easily perceptible to any one who has the normal 
use of his senses. 

Proof. —If we can be certain of the knowledge and ver¬ 
acity of the witnesses, we can have in particular human testi¬ 
mony a sufficient motive for assenting, with perfect certitude, 
to that to which it testifies. But in regard to mere matters of 
fact, we can, in certain cases , be certain of the knowledge and 
veracity of the witnesses. Therefore, in regard to mere mat¬ 
ters of fact, we can have at times in particular human testi¬ 
mony a sufficient motive of perfect certitude. The major is 
clear; for it is an immediate application of the principle of 
contradiction. Granting that men know the fact truly, and 
truly communicate their true knowledge to me, it is a contra¬ 
diction in terms to say that what they communicate to me is 
false, or that I can err in assenting to it. 

Proof of the Minor. 

(a) We can be certain of our witnesses’ knowledge of 
the fact; for it is a certain truth that men’s faculties do not 
deceive them when properly disposed and duly applied. Now, 




100 - 


in certain circumstances, we can be certain that men’s facul¬ 
ties are normally disposed and duly applied. 

For a normal disposition of the senses is natural and gen¬ 
eral, the contrary is rare and accidental and should be proved 
before it can be reasonably assumed. Again, if the witnesses 
are many , it is clearly unreasonable to suppose that the senses 
of all are indisposed in the same way. Finally, there are many 
facts so obvious that no one can be mistaken about them, e. g., 
‘a severe earthquake,’ etc. 

As to due application of the senses, this is sufficiently 
guaranteed by man’s natural desire of true knowledge in re¬ 
gard to obvious facts which are of general importance and 
affect serious interests, also by the known prudence and cau¬ 
tiousness of the witnesses, etc. 

(b) We can be certain of the veracity of our witnesses. 
For if the witnesses be many differing in conditions, pursuits, 
habits, aims and interests—such, in fact, that they can have 
no common motive or purpose in deceiving us, we can be sure 
that, when they all agree in affirming a fact, they are not de¬ 
ceiving us. 

If the witnesses be but few or even one , a man’s honesty 
and truthfulness may be so well known to us by experience, 
that it would be not only unreasonable, but even unjust, to 
doubt his veracity in a serious matter. Again, it may be clear 
from the circumstances, that our witness has absolutely noth¬ 
ing to gain, but on the contrary, much to lose, by his testi¬ 
mony to the fact; in which case to suppose deception would be 
to suppose an effect without a cause. 

Note.— At times we may have physical certainty on hu¬ 
man testimony, e. g., when it is absolutely clear that there is no 
motive in the given case to entice the witness to lie. In such a 
case a lie is physically impossible, as it is against the nature 
of the will to act without the attraction of at least some ap- 




101 - 


parent good. Nay, at times the certitude may be metaphysical, 
e. g., if many independent witnesses of different interests, con¬ 
ditions, etc., where illusion and collusion are impossible, agree 
in consistently narrating a certain fact as witnessed by each 
and all—in such a case to doubt the veracity of their testi¬ 
mony would be to affirm the possibility of an effect without 
a proportionate cause, and absolutely to deny the existence of 
a moral order. 

131. Objections. 

(a) Each one of several independent witnesses can be 
guilty of falsehood, therefore all can. 

Answer. —Of different falsehoods, t. maj.; of one and the 
same falsehood; sd.; if it can be apprehended by all as good, 
useful or pleasurable, t.; if not, n. 

(b) The stronger motive should commend our assent 
rather than the weaker. The motive for admitting the occur¬ 
rence of miraculous facts is moral, that for denying their oc¬ 
currence is physical. Therefore, the motive for denying their 
occurrence being the stronger, it must command our assent. 

Answer. —T. maj. As to min. 1st part, c. (and I observe, 
that a moral motive may often give physical and even meta¬ 
physical certitude). As to min. 2nd part, n. (and I observe, 
that there is no physical motive for holding that miracles do 
not occur, but simply for holding that the laws of nature are 
constant unless God in a given case suspends or modifies them. 
It is a metaphysical truth that God can so suspend or modify 
the natural mode of action of his creatures, and that He has 
done so in a given case may be proved with as much certainty 
by legitimate testimony as any other matter of fact). 

Note.— If the testimony for the occurrence of a given 
miracle is not certain, but solidly probable, we may suspend 
our judgment, and neither affirm positively that the miracle 
has occurred, or that the witness has erred or lied. 




102 


132. Tradition or mediate testimony. Competent imme¬ 
diate testimony can give us certainty as to the statements of 
others, and as to the number, character, etc., of those who 
made those statements themselves. In this way we can trace 
an important fact back to immediate trustworthy witnesses 
through a long series of mediate trustworthy winesses. We 
can have certainty that each succeeding group of the series 
truly transmits what was learned from the original trust¬ 
worthy witnesses. Hence, an unbroken public tradition com¬ 
ing down to us in many independent lines, and testifying to 
important facts, can give us perfect certitude just as truly as 
immediate witnesses can. 

133. History or written testimony can give us perfect 
certitude if we have evidence of the authenticity and integrity 
of the work and of the knowledge and veracity of the writer. 

A work is said to be authentic when it is really the work 
of the author to whom it is ascribed. This may be gathered 
from the style of the author, the character of the narrative, 
the agreement between the details of the narrative with what 
we know from other certain sources of the time and place in 
which the author lived, etc. These are called internal criteria. 
Of much more importance, however, are the external criteria, 
i. e., testimony of contemporaries to the authenticity of the 
work, continuous public tradition as to its authenticity, etc. 

The same criteria serve to show the integrity of the work, 
i. e., that it has not been mutilated or interpolated in the 
course of its transmission to our time. If, moreover, the work 
was widely circulated among different people at its first publi¬ 
cation, it is impossible that it should be altered in regard to 
any important matter without attention being called to the 
fact. 

The knowledge and veracity of the writer may be deter¬ 
mined as above (132). 

Note. —Besides tradition and history, other sources of 




-103- 

knowledge of past facts are, historica remains (ruins, etc.), 
monuments (statues, medals, temples, inscriptions, etc.), pri¬ 
vate records, letters, etc. When all these various sources of 
information corroborate one another in attesting past facts, 
falsity in their common testimony is a physical impossibility. 

134. The New Criticism, as it is called, pretends to de¬ 
termine on a priori rationalistic principles the value of his¬ 
torical and traditional testimony, especially in regard to super¬ 
natural facts. 

(1) .—It assumes, to start with, that the supernatural 
(revelation, inspiration, prophecy and miracle) is incredible. 
1 ‘ The essence of criticism is the denial of the supernatural. ’ ’— 
Renan. 

(2) .—It ignores or rejects extrinsic evidences of authen¬ 
ticity, integrity, veracity, etc., and trusts wholly or mainly to 
internal criteria based for the most part on arbitrary a priori 
principles (e. g., the impossibility or incredibility of the super¬ 
natural, etc.). 

(3) .—History or tradition, therefore, which records facts 
contrary to these arbitrary principles is rejected as unauthori- 
tative, no matter what abundance of testimony exists in its 
favor. 

This method of treating early Christian history and tradi¬ 
tion has been proposed under various forms, but its funda¬ 
mental canons are the same in all. It is enough to observe 
that: 

(a) External facts of the past are certified by legitimate 
testimony , not by a priori theories; 

(b) The supernatural is neither impossible nor improb¬ 
able; whether we consider the power and wisdom of God, the 
needs of man, or the general constancy of the laws of nature; 

(c) The power to perceive and relate the existence of 
external important facts does not depend on scientific culture, 
though the interpretation and explanation of the facts may; 




-104-- 

(d) In point of origin, contents, and recognition as au¬ 
thoritative by contemporary and succeeding generations, Holy 
Scripture cannot be placed on a common level with the Iliad, 
Odyssey, etc. (See Cath. Quarterly Review, July, 1894, p. 
562.) 

135. Prom what has been said, it is clear that though 
particular human testimony may be a sufficient motive for 
certain assent, yet it can never be the ultimate motive oi 
assent, for I assent to a truth on testimony because I am cer¬ 
tain of the knowledge and veracity of my informant. Now, I 
either see this knowledge and veracity myself, or I believe it 
on the testimony of others. In the former case the ultimate 
motive of assent is the evidence of the authority of my wit¬ 
nesses, because I see that they know what they tell me of, and 
that they are telling me the truth, as they know it, I assent to 
what they tell me. In the latter case the question recurs, on 
what grounds do I admit the authority of my informant in re¬ 
gard to the testimony of the witnesses? Either the authority 
of my informant is immediately evident, or it is believed on 
still prior testimony, etc. 

(ii). Universal Testimony. 

136. Reason is the distinctive attribute of man, and it is 
therefore no wonder that certain conclusions of reason, in re¬ 
gard especially to the most obvious and important interests of 
life, should be common to all men in all times. The investiga¬ 
tions of succeeding ages have but confirmed the assertions of 
the ancient moralists that all nations have held and hold the 
existence of a personal God, the future life of man, and his 
accountability to an unseen Judge, the intrinsic goodness or 
malice of certain acts, etc. But we are not concerned here to 
prove the fact of the existence of such judgments, which would 
indeed be no hard task; but supposing the existence of uni¬ 
versal, constant and uniform judgments in regard to certain 




-105- 

matters, among all men, in all times and places, is this fact of 
itself a sufficient motive for our certain assent to the truths 
these judgments express? 

137. The universal constant uniform judgments of the 
common sense of mankind are an infallible motive of perfect 
certitude. 

Note.— Universal in existence, constant in duration, uni¬ 
form in the use of subject and predicate. 

Proof .—A constant uniform universal effect requires a 
corresponding cause. Therefore, these universal, etc., judg¬ 
ments require a universal, etc., cause. But in men differing in 
every accidental circumstance of time, place, race, education, 
character, interests, etc., there is nothing common but their 
nature and their natural faculties. Therefore, the judgments 
of which we speak are the natural and spontaneous pronounce¬ 
ments of man’s rational nature, and therefore cannot be false. 

Note (1).-—The universality required is, of course, not 
metaphysical, but moral. 

(2) .—In regard to the objection that the judgment of 
the common sense of mankind has often erred (e. g., in regard 
to Polytheism, etc.), we deny that such judgments have the 
notes of universality, etc. 

(3) .—The faculty which elicits such judgments is reason, 
and their motive, objective evidence. Their objects are im¬ 
portant truths necessary for the conduct and preservation of 
human life and society—not, indeed, immediately evident, but 
requiring so very little of reflection and reasoning as to be, 
at least in regard to their substance, within easy reach of all 
who have the use of reason. Hence, their objects are rational 
truths, not matters of fact. 

(4) .—Of course we can also have, and we have universal, 
and therefore sufficient human testimony to facts of the high- 




-106 


est importance and interest. Thus, when we examine the uni¬ 
versal testimony, written and traditional, of all nations to 
certain primitive facts connected with the human race, we can 
find, by process of elimination, that as neither ignorance, nor 
prejudice, nor corruption of morals, nor superstition, nor edu¬ 
cation, nor self-interest, etc., can be a sufficient reason for the 
universality, constancy and steady uniformity of the testi¬ 
mony, our reason compels us to affirm that the testimony is 
originally based on the objective evidence of the fact, i. e., that 
the fact really happened, substantially at least, as it is re¬ 
corded in the testimony. 

(5).—Lastly, we can gather from what we have said of 
universal testimony, that though it may be a sufficient motive 
for perfect certitude, yet it is not the ultimate or fundamenal 
motive of our certitude in regard even to the truths it attests, 
and much less in regard to all truth. For, how do we know 
that all men at all times, and in all places, etc., have held such 
and such a proposition except by the particular testimony of 
historians, travelers, etc. Hence, when we assent to a propo¬ 
sition on the universal testimony of mankind, we do so because 
we believe the existence of the universal testimony on partic¬ 
ular human testimony. Hence, if particular human testimony 
cannot be an ultimate motive of assent to the truths it attests, 
much less can universal testimony. 

(iii). Divine Testimony. 

138. God is essentially omniscent and all-holy, and there¬ 
fore it is metaphysically impossible that He can be deceived 
or deceive us. His testimony, therefore, is the firmest of all 
motives of certitude. 

139. It is not the province of Logic to determine at 
length the relations of reason to revealed truth. A word or 
two on the subject, however, will not be out of place here. 

(a) Though no truth can be against reason, yet reason 




-107- 

itself shows that there may be many truths above it, 

simply and absolutely exceeding its grasp. For, our natural 
knowledge of God is not intuitive, but discursive, i. e., gathered 
from effects in which His perfections are but faintly and ana¬ 
logically shadowed forth. But such knowledge, true though 
it be, as far as it goes, is still very far from representing all 
the perfections of its object. Hence, many truths must remain 
to be known about the Nature, Attributes, and Free Action 
of God, which lie forever beyond the reach of unaided human 
reason. 

Note.— A proposition against reason is one which involves 
an evident contradiction. A proposition above reason is one in 
regard to which unaided reason can find no evident motive 
either for uniting or for separating subject and predicate. 

(b) Such superrational truths may be divinely 
revealed. For, on the one hand, we can understand, with suf¬ 
ficient clearness for intellectual assent, the signification of sub¬ 
ject and predicate; and, on the other, God, who has given man 
so many ways of communicating his knowledge to his fellow- 
man, cannot lack means of communicating to us His own 
knowledge of the relation of subject and predicate in the given 
case. Nor can this knowledge be said to be useless to man. For 
(1) it perfects our knowledge of God and of our relations to 
Him, which is, of all knowledge, the most useful and necessary 
for us; (2) it sobers and steadies the mind by giving it a 
healthy sense of its very limited capacities; (3) it gives us an 
occasion of exercising most noble worship of our Creator by 
submitting and conforming our highest faculties to His; (4) it 
gives us the firmest certitude in regard to the sublimest truths; 
lastly (5) if, besides superrational truths, God should also re¬ 
veal the principal truths in regard to man’s origin, his place in 
the universe, his final destiny and the means of attaining it, his 
relations to his fellowman and his Maker, bis rights and duties, 




108 


etc.—truths, indeed, many of which, at least, are, absolutely 
speaking, within the reach of cultivated human reason—such 
a revelation would be an incalculable benefit to the human race, 
as furnishing all men, lettered and ignorant, with a secure and 
easy means of acquiring perfect certitude in regard to the 
most important truths. 

(c) Hence, supposing a revelation of such truths to have 
been made—which, as being a matter of fact, is to be proved 
by historical arguments just as any other fact—we should have 
two orders of knowledge emanating from the same Eternal 
Source of Truth. The one would be elaborated by reason, 
acting as its Maker fitted it to act in accordance with the laws 
of thought upon a basis of self-evident data; the other would 
consist of a body of truths divinely revealed, many of which 
at least, are superficial. The latter would be in every way 
the higher and nobler order, and if entrusted for interpretation 
and exposition to an infallible teacher, would be as a pillar of 
light to guide the steps of reason, and save her from the many 
mazes of error. 

(d) The formal act of divine faith is, as we have just 
said, intrinsically and wholly supernatural, i. e., it is 
the assent of a supernaturally elevated mind to a certain 
truth, for a supernatural motive, i. e., the supernatural revela¬ 
tion of God. We know, moreover, that it is a free act; for, it is 
a meritorious act. In the act of divine faith, then, as such, the 
intellect is not necessitated to assent by the objective evidence 
of the truth to which it assents; its assent is, therefore, deter¬ 
mined by the free will. Again, the act of the will which com¬ 
mands the formal assent of faith is supernatural, i. e., elicited 
by the supernaturally elevated will. But this act of the will, to 
be a human, rational act, presupposes as conditions certain pre¬ 
vious intellectual acts which in themselves, and absolutely, are 
within the reach of unaided reason, though, de facto, so far 




109 


forth as they positively dispose the mind for the formal act of 
faith, they are elicited by the help of supernatural grace. 

Thus, the unaided mind can understand, at least obscurely, 
the terms of the proposition; it can see that the proposition is 
not in evident contradiction with the evident truths of rea¬ 
son ; it can see that the truth in question is evidently credible , 
and that it is an evident rational duty to believe it. Hence, 
the assent of faith, far from being against reason, is such, 
that to refuse it is irrational. Hence, it is the Catholic doc¬ 
trine that no adult can be received into the Church until he is 
certain that it is his duty, in prudence, to assent to Her 
teaching. 

Nor can we, as rational beings, be indifferent as to 
whether God has given us a revelation or not. Our reason 
will tell us that this is God’s world, and that we are God’s, 
absolutely and entirely at every moment of our lives, and that 
our first and essential duty is to use the natural means He has 
given us to find out what it is He would have us to do, and 
then to go and do it. The man who denies this duty can, as 
the man who denies the facts of revelation, be proved to a 
demonstration to be acting irrationally. 

(e) But supposing the fact of supernatural revelation 
and our dutiful acceptance of the truths so proposed to us, 
can these truths ever contradict the objectively evident 
knowledge which we acquire by the natural exercise of 
our reason? The question on the face of it is absurd; for it is 
asking, can God contradict Himself? can God lie? Of course, 
He cannot. If He could, He would not be God. Our faculties 
are from Him, and if their normal rational use leads us to form 
certain judgments He is accountable for those judgments. The 
objects around us, from the contemplation of which we derive 
our natural knowledge, have their being, and consequently 
their truth, from Him; and hence the knowledge we gather 
from them is ultimately derived from Him. The truths of 
revelation come from Him immediately; hence, if there 




could be a contradiction between these rational and super- 
rational truths, as one of two contradictories must be false, 
it would follow that God had lied—that He was God and not 
God at the same time. When, then, we hear talk of the con¬ 
flict between science and faith, all it shows is this, that the 
speaker is mistaken in his understanding either of the truths of 
revelation or of those of science. If he saw both orders of 
truth as they really are, he would see, not conflict, but har¬ 
mony, as God intends. 

(f) From what we have been saying, it follows that all 
opinions, theories, hypothesis, etc., which in themselves or 
their consequences contradict a revealed truth, or any of its 
necessary consequences, are, ipso facto , proved false; 

and that if there be an infallible custodian and exponent of 
revelation, he has the right and duty to pronounce upon them 
and condemn them. Nor can this be said to hinder the prog¬ 
ress of science, any more than the pilot who keeps the ship off 
rocks and sand-banks can be said to hinder her progress into 
harbor. 

140. Supernatural revelation is not the ultimate motive 
of all perfect natural certitude; for here, too, as in all other 

cases of testimony, before we can assent with certainty to what 
a witness attests, we must be certain, as a prior condition of 
our assent, that our witness exists, that he has spoken, that he 
is trustworthy, that we understand, at least obscurely what he 
says, etc., for, either we see all these things ourselves, or we 
believe them on others’ testimony. In the former case, assent 
to testimony clearly implies, as a necessary condition, intrinsic 
evidence of certain truths; in the latter case, the same dif¬ 
ficulty recurs, i. e., how do I know that this new witness exists, 
has spoken, is trustworthy ? etc., ad infinitum. 

Article II.— The Intrinsic Motive of Certitude, 

We have already said that the intrinsic motive of certitude 




-Ill- 

is the intrinsic objective evidence, either mediate or imme¬ 
diate, of the truth or fact to which we give our perfectly cer¬ 
tain assent. Before going further, it will be well to explain 
some of these terms. 

141. We have already defined what is meant by a per¬ 
fectly certain assent. We know, too, what a motive of assent 
is, and what an intrinsic motive is. Evidence is, literally, 
Visibility, Seeableness. Now, that an object may be visible 
to me , two things are requisite, viz.: (1) That it be visible in 
itself, i. e., an extended colored illuminated object: (2) That 
this visibility manifest itself to my eyes. Again, if one is 
asked what makes the object visible in itself, one can answer 
that it is nothing really distinct from the colored, illuminated 
object itself considered in relation to an actual or possible 
faculty capable of perceiving it, i. e., the living eye. 

But though the word evidence literally belongs only to 
objects of sight, yet it is used of the objects of all our cognitive 
faculties; and thus it may be broadly defined, The intrinsic 
knowableness of an object clearly manifesting itself to a cog-,, 
nitive faculty. 

Hence, it is clear that evidence, in the strict sense of the 
word, is something objective; nay, is simply the object of our 
knowledge manifesting or showing itself to our cognitive fac¬ 
ulties—something quite independent of us and of our thoughts 
of it, which would be just what it is whether we perceived it 
or not. 

What we mean, then, by objective evidence as a motive 
of assent is this: The objective necessity of uniting or sepa¬ 
rating subject and predicate, manifesting itself to the mind, 
and compelling the mind to judge accordingly; or, The ob¬ 
jective identity or diversity of the two terms of the judgment, 
so manifesting itself to the mind as to necessitate assent or 
dissent; or, again, The necessary objective relation between 




- 112 - 

subject and predicate manifesting itself to the mind, and 
necessitating assent to the clearly objective truth. 

142. Now, as we have already said, the objective neces¬ 
sity of uniting or separating subject and predicate may be 
either metaphysical ( i. e., when the contradictory is abso¬ 
lutely impossible), or physical ( i . e., when the contradictory 
is impossible, unless in the hypothesis that the ordinary laws 
of nature have been suspended or counteracted), or moral ( i . e., 
when the contradictory is impossible, unless on the hypothesis 
that man has contradicted the natural tendencies of his being). 
Accordingly, evidence is either metaphysical, physical or 
moral. In the first case, the objective truth or fact here and 
now clearly manifesting itself to my mind, is, and could not, 
on any supposition, not be. In the second case, though the 
truth or fact here and now manifesting itself to my mind, is; 
yet it might not have been, had God willed to suspend the 
laws of nature. In the third case, through the truth or fact 
actually manifesting itself to my mind, is; yet it might not 
have been, had men willed to contradict the natural tendencies 
of their being. 

143. Evidence is either immediate or mediate, accord¬ 
ing as the objective necessity of uniting subject and predicate 
manifests itself to the mind, either immediately, or as a neces¬ 
sary logical consequence of immediately evident premises. 
In both cases we see that, at least here and now, the subject 
requires the union or separation (as the case may be) of the 
predicate. 

144. In the assent of faith, as we have said, we do not 
see any intrinsic necessity of uniting subject and predicate, or 
that the subject, as it stands, requires the predicate; but we do 
see the authority of the witnesses or that the subject, These 
Witnesses, in the present circumstances, necessarily requires 
the predicate Cognizant and Truthful. Hence the truth of fact, 




-113 


which we believe, with perfect certainty, is said to be extrin- 
sically evident, i. e., the necessity of uniting subject and pred¬ 
icate is manifested to us, not by its Own, but by a borrowed 
light. Again, such a truth or fact is said to be evidently cred¬ 
ible, i. e., we have intrinsic evidence of the authority of the 
witnesses on whose testimony we assent to it. 

145. Intrinsic objective evidence is an infallible mo¬ 
tive of perfect certitude. 

Proof. —Intrinsic objective evidence is the objective truth 
manifesting itself to the mind, as it actually is. But what 
actually is, cannot, not be. Therefore, a judgment motived 
by intrinsic objective evidence is necessarily in conformity with 
its object—is, therefore, infallibly true. 

Note.— As truth is the proper object of the mind, and as 
the mind is not a free faculty, it follows that when the mind is 
brought face to face with the evident objective truth, it cannot, 
unless its natural action be interfered with, help perceiving it, 
any more than our sight can help perceiving the colored ex¬ 
tended object before *it. We say unless its natural action be 
interfered with; for, as the will can close the eye, or turn it 
away from an object, so it can, in certain cases, turn the mind 
away from the evident truth. Thus: 

(a) In regard to truths which are immediately evident 
all the will can do is to turn the mind away from their consid¬ 
eration; and even this is often impossible, e. g., when they 
obtrude themselves upon us, so to say, in spite of ourselves, 
e. g., such truths as our own existence, the principle of con¬ 
tradiction, etc. But in some cases it can really divert the in¬ 
tellect from the immediately evident truth and engage it upon 
the sophisms which are intended to establish its contradictory. 

(b) In regard to truths that are mediately evident. If 
the will cannot hinder the mind from assenting to the prem¬ 
ises, still it may* divert the mind from comparing them to- 




114 


gether and, thus, from assenting to the logical consequence 
from them. If the reasoning is complicated and abstruse, of 
course it is all the easier for the will to interfere. 

Hence, there is a true sense in which we may say that all 
our mediate certitude is free, whether based on reasoning or 
on authority. The intellect of course is not free to give or 
withhold its assent in the presence of evident objective truth; 
but the will is free to turn attention from the motives, and fix 
it only on the apparent reasons which favor the contradictory. 

145. The comparative value of the different motives 
of certitude: 

(a) Other things being equal, intrinsic evidence is a 
higher motive than extrinsic, as giving greater satisfaction 
to the mind. 

(b) Metaphysical evidence is a higher motive than 
physical, and physical than for moral, for the same reason. 

(c) The certitude of the assent of divine truth is strong¬ 
est, because its subjective and objective.causes are the highest 
and most perfect. 

Article III.— The Ultimate or fundamental Motive or 
Perfect Natural Certitude. 

146. By the ultimate or fundamental motive of certi¬ 
tude, we mean that on which all other motives are based, to 
which they are ultimately reducible, and independently of 
which they have no force as rational motives, and which, 
moreover, is itself manifestly and necessarily connected with 
the truth. 

Now, we have already seen that testimony cannot be this 
ultimate motive of natural certitude. 

Nor can it be verification by the senses; for this is at best 
applicable only in the case of judgments concerning individual 




115 


material objects, whereas the greater and nobler part of our 
knowledge regards the universal and spiritual, the scientific 
and philosophical; to make this, therefore, the ultimate motive 
of all certitude, is to deny all intellectual knowledge, and to 
reduce man to the level of the brute. 

Nor can it be consciousness; for this merely informs me 
of the fact that I am certain, and does not (except in regard 
to internal facts) even assign the motive of my certitude, much 
less constitute the motive of it. 

Nor can it be a blind tendency to believe; for this instead 
of giving a motive for rational certitude, would make all our 
knowledge unintelligent and motiveless. 

Nor it is clear and distinct ideas; for these do not neces¬ 
sarily imply true judgment. 

Nor is it a consistency or agreement with my other judg¬ 
ments; for a number of propositions may be quite consistent 
be true if I were a thousand miles away. In a word, my 
with one another, and yet the whole system very far from 
conformity with objective reality—a consistent novel is not 
necessarily true history. 

Nor is it the inconceivability of the opposite. Some 
writers take inconceivable as synonymous with unimaginable 
In this sense to say that what is inconceivable is impossible 
or untrue, is simply to deny all intellectual knowledge. Others 
mean by inconceivability the mere inability of the human mind 
to conceive a given union or separation of subject and pred¬ 
icate ( negative inconceivability). But it does not follow that 
a thing is untrue or impossible because it is above and beyond 
my power of conception. Finally, a proposition is incon¬ 
ceivable in the strict and accurate sense of the word when it 
is clearly seen to be a contradiction in terms, self-destructive 
(positive inconceivability). The contradictory of such a 
proposition is indeed necessarily true, but even here our ulti¬ 
mate motive for assenting to it is the objective evidence either 




-116- 

of its own truth, or of the positive inconceivability of the oppo¬ 
site. 

We have, therefore, to look elsewhere for our ultimate 
motive. Now, suppose I put my hand on the stove when the 
fire is well lighted. I at once form the judgment, This is hot. 
Why do I form this judgment, and why is my judgment true? 
The stove is not hot because 1 perceive that it is hot; but be¬ 
cause it is hot I perceive that it is so, and my judgment is true. 
It would be hot, and the judgment, This stove is hot, would 
be true if I were a thousand miles away. In a word, my 
judgment is not the cause of the objective truth, but the ob¬ 
jective truth is the cause of my true judgment. In the same 
way, the judgment, Two and two are four, is not true because 
I perceive or feel that it is so; it would be true if I never ex¬ 
isted. Hence, the ultimate motive of perfectly certain assent 
is something independent of us and our faculties—some¬ 
thing objective. 

153. The ultimate motive of perfect natural certitude 
is intrinsic objective evidence. 

Note.— We speak here of natural certitude , and hence 
exclude the assent of divine faith in which the assent is super¬ 
natural, as proceeding from supernatural subjective and ob¬ 
jective cases, and therefore firmer than any merely natural 
evidence could necessitate or justify. 

Proof .—That is the ultimate motive of assent, which un¬ 
derlies all other motives, and on which their value as motives 
depends, and which is itself immediately perceived to be so 
necessarily connected with the objective truth that it necessa¬ 
rily compels the assent of the mind with absolute exclusion 
of all fear of error. But intrinsic objective evidence is such 
a motive. 

(a) That evidence is the ultimate basis on which all 




117 


other motives rest, is clear from what we have already said 
of the extrinsic motives of certitude. 

(b) That it is necessarily connected with the objective 
truth is also clear; for it is itself the objective truth clearly 
manifesting itself to the mind; and since the mind, while 
seeing that a thing actually is, cannot at the same time see or 
fear that it is not, it cannot help assenting without fear of 
error to the objective truth so manifesting itself. 

Hence, as objective truth is the measure of subjective 
truth, objective evidence is the ultimate rule or standard or 
criterion by which subjective truth or the truth of our judg¬ 
ments, is to be measured. 

Note. —The intrinsic evidence of certain axiomatic truths 
is so manifest to all who have the use of reason that they may 
be regarded as tests or standards by which we may determine 
the truth of other less obnoxious propositions. In this sense 
such axioms, especially the Principle of Contradiction, are 
called criteria of truth. 

In the preceding pages we have considered the process 
of correct thinking, the nature of true thought, the possibility 
of attaining it, the faculties with which we are endowed for 
this purpose, and the motives which assure us of the posses¬ 
sion of truth; and we have seen that as long as we are true 
to nature we are safe from error. “That we fall into error 
happens not from a defect in our nature, but from a defect 
in the employment of our faculties or in the use of our free 
will. . . . But if all our errors may be traced to the will it 

may seem strange that we should ever be deceived, since 
nobody wishes to be deceived. But it is one thing to wish 
to be deceived, another, to wish to assent to something which 
involves error. Truly no one wishes to be deceived, but there 
are few who do not sometimes wish to assent to what involves 
error. ’ ’—Descartes. 




METAPHYSICS 


ITS DEFINITION AND DIVISION. 

I. Metaphysical means literally beyond the physical. If, 
then, we take the physical, as those who originally used the 
word seem to have done, as synonymous with the material, 
or that which is perceptible by the senses, Metaphysics will 
mean the Science of Immaterial Things. Now, things, real 
notes, may be either positively or negatively immaterial: pos¬ 
itively immaterial if they cannot be realized in or predicated 
of matter, i. e., if they positively exclude matter; negatively 
immaterial if they neither include nor exclude matter, but can 
belong either to the material or immaterial. Hence, the defini¬ 
tion of Metaphysics will be The Science of things which are 
either Positively or Negatively Immaterial. 

II. Metaphysics may therefore be divided into General 
and Special Metaphysics. 

General Metaphysics has for its object negatively imma¬ 
terial real being. It is called General because it embraces all 
orders of beings, material or immaterial. 

Special Metaphysics has for its object positively immate¬ 
rial real being, and, strictly speaking, embraces two treatises: 
terial real being, and, strictly speaking,embraces two treatises: 
Psychology, or the science of the human soul, Natural The¬ 
ology or the science of God. Of late, however, as the phe¬ 
nomena of the material world have come to occupy almost ex¬ 
clusively the attention of physics to the neglect of the nobler 
investigation of inner natures and ultimate ends, this latter 
aspect of material things has taken its place as a part of Special 
Metaphysics under the name of Rational Physics, or Cos¬ 
mology. This branch of science has, at least, this much of 
title to a place in Metaphysics that its object is something 



119 


suprasensible, i. e., those aspects of material things which lie 
beyond the limits of sense-perception. 

III. We will begin with General Metaphysics as investi¬ 
gating real notes and supplying real principles which are com¬ 
mon to all orders of beings. Then, proceeding according to the 
natural evolution of our knowledge we shall take up suc¬ 
cessively Cosmology, Psychology, Natural Theology. 









































PART II 


GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 


General Metaphysics, as we have said, is the science of 
negatively immaterial real being, i. e., the science of real being 
as such and of those real notes or characters which are pe¬ 
culiar neither to spirit or matter, but may be common to both, 
e. g., the notes of ‘substance/ ‘accident/ ‘cause/ ‘effect/ 
‘goodness/ ‘truth/ etc. Hence the purpose of our present 
study is 

(a) To examine and analyze those real notes which are 
common to all orders of being, and thus to set them clearly 
and distinctly before the mind; 

(b) To set forth and defend the primary principles 
which flow from the analysis and comparison of such real notes. 

Our subject may be divided into four chapters: 

I. Being and its Transcendental Attributes. 

II. The Primary Division of Beings. 

III. Causality. 

IV. The Various Grades of Perfection of Being. 

CHAPTER I. 

Real Being and Its Transcendental Attributes. 

Article I— Real Being. 

5. Being is literally the participle of the verb to be. To 
be means primarily and strictly, to exist. Hence, Being means, 




122 


strictly, The Existing, that which actually exists. But, by 
our power of abstraction we can resolve the concept of existing 
things into two simpler concepts each of which represents an 
objective reality, viz.: the concept of existence, and that which 
has or is conceived to have existence ; and to the objects of both 
concepts the same term being is applied. 

Hence Real Being may signify either existence, or that 
which exists or is capable of existing. Now, considering that 
which exists or is capable of existence in relation to existence 
we may regard it either as positively having the act of ex¬ 
istence, and then we have actual or existent being; or we may 
regard it as positively without the act of existence though 
capable of it, and in this case we have purely potential or 
possible being; or, finally, we may fix our thought only on 
itself and prescind from its actual existence or non-existence, 
and then we have transcendental being, the Existible, purely 
and precisely as such, without any regard to its state of ex¬ 
istence or non-existence. It is in this last sense that Real Being 
and its synonyms, Thing, Entity, Reality, are taken in the 
present chapter. 

Note. (1).— As Being has two significations, so also, its 
opposite,Nothing, may be taken in two senses, viz.: either as 
opposed to actually existent being, or as opposed to existible 
being. In the former case we have relative nothing, as, ‘when 
we say that the soul which God will create a year hence, is now 
nothing,’ i. e., it is now non-existent though capable of re¬ 
ceiving existence. In the latter case we have absolute nothing, 
as, ‘ when we say that a square circle is nothing, ’ i. e., it is not 
only non-existent but incapable of ever receiving existence. 

The concept of Nothing is formed by representing a 
reality as wanting. 

(2) Logical Being, ens rationis, is that which is in¬ 
capable of extra-conceptual existence, i. e., it can be repre- 

% 




123 


sented in a concept, but the contents of that concept cannot be 
realized outside of the thinking mind, e. g., ‘the object repre¬ 
sented by a reflex universal idea/ etc. 

6. Real being, as above described, is: 

(1) . A transcendental note, i. e., it belongs to all that 
is not absolute nothing, whether existent or non-existent, 
whether substance or accident, whole or part, etc. Hence, it 
has the greatest possible extension. 

(2) .—It is a most simple note incapable of resolution into 
other real notes, while all others can be resolved into it. Hence 
it has the least possible comprehension. 

(3) .—As predicated of its inferiors it is not an equivocal 
term; for they all agree, at least in this, that they are existible 
realities, not absolute nothings. 

(4) .— Nor is it a generic term; for the differential addi¬ 
tion which contracts a genus neither includes nor is included 
in the notes of the genus it contracts, e. g., ‘we cannot say 
that rationality includes or is included in animality; while 
on the contrary, of every conceivable real differential note, we 
can and must say it is an Entity, a Something. 

(5) .— Nor yet is it a univocal term; for the infinite and 
finite, substances and accidents are not equally and independ¬ 
ently beings. 

(6) .—Hence it is an analogical term of intrinsic attribu¬ 
tion, i. e., what it expresses is intrinsic in each of its inferiors, 
but not equally and independently in each. 

(7) .—Hence the objective concept of real being as such is 
contracted to its inferiors, not by the addition of notes which 
are not Being, but by conceiving and expressing in thought 
the special modes and determinations of that which was at 
first conceived merely as a Being, a Something. The former 
concept is distinct; the latter, indistinct; as if one looking at a 




room full of boys should first think of them confusedly as a 
large number and then distinctly as exactly sixty-five. 

Note.— The Infinite Being, God, is, as we shall see, un¬ 
thinkable as non-existent, while it would imply no contradic¬ 
tion of thought to conceive the whole universe of finite things 
as non-existent. Again, God possesses, or rather is eternally 
and independently, infinite pure perfection without any limi¬ 
tation or admixture of imperfection; whereas, finite beings are 
dependent and limited and lack more of perfection than they 
possess. 

Hence, God is really the primary analogate to whom the 
title Real Being completely and independently belongs, and 
hence He is called in Holy Scripture, The Being; while finite 
beings, though our concept of being is first derived from them, 
are in reality but secondary analogates. 

7. The essence of a being is given in the answer to the 
question, What is it? This answer may be given with various 
degrees of distinctness, e. g., in answer to the question, What 
is a horse ? it may be said, ‘ it is a substance, ’ ‘ a living sentient 
substance,’ etc., and all these answers, as far as they go, give 
us true essential characteristics. But in the strict sense of the 
word, in which we use it here, essence signifies the sum of real 
notes, which is requisite and sufficient to constitute a being the 
\§pecific being, it is, e. g., ‘a horse.’ 

Now it is clear that every being has an essence, which con¬ 
stitutes it the determinate specific being it is, and that it cannot 
lose any of its essential notes without ceasing to be the being 
it is; and furthermore, that there is no thinkable point of space 
or time in which all these notes are not requisite and sufficient 
to constitute it the specific being it is. 

But the further question arises, Can we know what con¬ 
stitutes the specific essences of things? Can we give complete 
essential definitions of things? Now to limit our question it 




125 


must be admitted that in moral and mathematical science we 
can define with accuracy, ‘humility/ ‘patience/ ‘theft/ ‘mur¬ 
der, ’ etc.; as we can assign distinctly all that is necessary and 
sufficient to constitute ‘a circle/ a ‘triangle/ etc. The question 
then amounts to this, Can we know the intrinsic specific con¬ 
stituents of any of the physical things in the world around us ? 

Our answer is that we can and do attain to true, though 
imperfect, knowledge of the essences of many things in nature. 
For, by legitimate induction we can know properties of things 
which are independent of individual and accidental circum¬ 
stances. Among these properties we can distinguish those 
which a given class of things, A, has in common with other 
classes of things, B, C, D, and those which are peculiar to itself. 
Finally, from the character of these constant common and pe¬ 
culiar properties, we can know the character of the intrinsic 
principles from which they flow, and thus we reach the generic 
and differential elements of the specific essence A. 

This knowledge may well be called imperfect, as not being 
immediate and intuitive, but mediate and discursive, and only 
reached with difficulty after much patient study. It is no 
child’s play to formulate essential definitions of things. 

Note. —As the word perfection is often used as a syno¬ 
nym for entity, we may explain it briefly here. Perfect, etymo¬ 
logically, means completely made; but in common usage the 
word signifies that which has all it needs, to be complete in 
essence and action. 

Hence the perfections of a thing are all of those elements, 
whether really distinct or not, which go to constitute its 
essence and render it capable of faultless action proportionate 
to its place in the hierarchy of beings. Each such element is 
called a partial perfection. All together constitute the total per¬ 
fection of the thing. 

A pure perfection is one whose objective concept does not 
imply the exclusion of any higher perfection, e. g., ‘intellect’ 




- 126 - 

as such. A mixed perfection, on the contrary, is one whose 
concept implies the exclusion of some higher perfection, e. g., 
‘corporeal substance.’ Hence the saying, “It has the defects of 
its perfections.” 

8. From the concept of Real Being flow three primary 
judgments or principles, which are as universal and objective 
as the concept from which they are derived. 

(a) Comparing Being with itself, we have the Principle 
of Identity, Being is Being. It may be variously expressed, 
according to the sense in which the word Being is taken, e. g., 
“the existible is existible,” “what actually exists, actually ex¬ 
ists,” “a determinate essence is the determinate essence it is,” 
etc. That this principle is not a mere tautology is evident from 
the way in which men use such expressions as, “Business is 
business,” “A man’s a man for a’ that.” 

Applied to Logis, the principle gives us as a primary law 
of thought, that the mind must abide by its affirmations and 
negations. 

(b) Comparing Being with its opposite, Not-being or 
Nothing, we have the Principle of Contradiction, Being is not 
Nothing. This again, may be variously formulated, e. g., ‘the 
existible is not, under the same respect, non-existible,’ ‘the 
existent is not at the same time non-existent, ’ ‘ a given essence 
cannot at the same time be not that given essence,’ etc. 

Applied to Logic, it may be formulated thus, ‘The mind 
must not, under the same respect, affirm and deny the same 
predicate of the same subject. ’ 

(c) Lastly, again comparing Being with Not-Being, we 
get the Principle of Excluded Middle. It may be thus formu¬ 
lated, ‘ Every assignable combination of notes is either existible. 
or non-existible, ’ ‘ every existible being is either actually exist- 

J ent or nonexistent,’ ‘every real being either has a given real 
note, A, or it has not.’ 




127- 


In Logic we have the corresponding law that ‘Every 
clearly defined subject, A, either admits a clearly defined 
predicate, B, or it does not.’ 


Article II.— Unity. 

9. The transcendental attributes of Being are so called 
because they are coextensive, identical in fact, with Being, and 
merely express aspects of every Real Being not explicitly con¬ 
veyed in the word Being itself. 

These transcendental attributes are Unity, Truth, Good¬ 
ness. The first is called an absolute attribute, as being predi¬ 
cable of every real Being considered in itself. The others are 
called relative attributes, as belonging to every real Being con¬ 
sidered in relation to cognition and appetition respectively. 

10. Unity or Oneness means the absence of division, 
indivision. Now, as we have said in Logic (20, etc.), things 
may be divided into constituent, or into subjective parts. Hence 
we have four kinds of indivision or unity. 

Indivision into constituent parts is called formal unity. 
Indivision into subjective parts is called individual or numeri¬ 
cal unity. 

(a) Unity of simplicity, when the Being is not composed 
of constituent parts, and is therefore not only undivided, but 
indivisible. 

Note. —There is a simplicity of imperfection, i. e., when 
the object represented by an idea has so little of reality as to be 
indivisible; e. g., ‘the contents of the idea of transcendental 
Being,’ ‘a mathematical point,’ etc. This may be called nega¬ 
tive or abstract simplicity. 

There is also a simplicity of perfection, i. e., when one 
indivisible Being possesses in its simple reality the equivalence 
of many perfections, e. g., ‘-the human soul,’ etc. This may be 




-128-- 

called positive or real simplicity; and it is more or less perfect, 
according as all composition, metaphysical and physical, or 
only physical composition is excluded. 

(b) Unity of composition, when the Being, though 
actually undivided, yet consists of constituent parts into which 
it is divisible. 

Note.— In a composite Being the indivision, and, conse¬ 
quently, the unity may be more or less perfect according to the 
character of the component parts and the manner of their 
union. Thus we have unity in the strict and proper sense of 
the word, unum per se, when either 

(1) Some at least of the components are entitatively and 
intrinsically incomplete and imperfect in themselves and are 
destined to find their complete perfection only through their 
union with the other elements of the compound, e. g ., ‘the 
human soul and body,’ or 

(2) When the parts into which the Being is divisible but 
not divided, have identical extremities or common limits, e. g., 
1 the parts of continuous extension. ’ 

On the contrary the unity is only improperly so called, and 
accidental, unum per accidens, when the components are com¬ 
plete entities in themselves, and remain such, intrinsically un¬ 
changed in the compound, such, e. g., is the unity of ‘a watch’ 
artificial unity, of ‘ a basket of eggs, ’ mere aggregation. 

(c) Unity of individuality or singularity, when a Being 
is undivided and indivisible into many such as itself, i. e., into 
subjective parts. This is often called numerical unity. 

(d) Unity of universality when a Being is conceived as 
divisible into many such as itself, i. e., into subjective parts. 
This is called logical unity, and is exemplified in the object of 
a reflex universal idea. 




129 


11. Every real Being as such is formally one. For, 
either it is a simple Being, and then it is undivided and indi¬ 
visible, or it is a composite Being; and, then, though it is divis¬ 
ible, yet, so long as it is a Being, even a heap of stones, it is 
undivided; else it would be, not Being, but Beings. 

12. Every real Being is individually one, i. e., undivided 
and indivisible into many really distinct Beings, each of which 
is itself. For, if it were so divided it would, at the same time 
and under the same respect, be one Being and not one, e. g., 
“If A were divided into a, b, c, each of which is A, then it 
would at the same time be one A and not one A, but three A’s, 
i. e., it would be itself and not itself at the same time.” Hence, 
though innumerable Beings, like A in all respects, can be pro¬ 
duced, this Being, A, can never be duplicated. 

Note (1).— It is not the same thing to say one and the 
same individual nature may belong to three distinct persons, or 
that one and the same individual Being may be in many places 
at the same time, as to say that one and the same individual 
Being may be at the same time, and under the same respect, 
one and many. The latter proposition is an evident contradic¬ 
tion in terms, which cannot be said or proved of the two 
former. 

(2).—Without entering into any controversy on the sub¬ 
ject, we may say in passing, that in a concrete individual Being, 
e. g., 1 a man,’ there is no real distinction between his specific 
nature, that by which he is a man, and his individuality, that by 
which he is this man. His concrete nature and his Thisness 
are but one and the same real entity represented in thought by 
intrinsically different concepts. 

One is often used in the sense of imique, i. e., that which 
has not got its like or equal, the sole, the only one of its kind, 
e. g., one God, one true Church. If the Being could have its 
like, though as a matter of fact it has not, the uniqueness is 




-130- 

accidental; if it could not have its like or equal, the uniqueness 
is essential. 

13. Akin to Unity is Identity or Sameness, the oneness 
of Being with itself. It implies a comparison. If terms com¬ 
pared be really one Being, the identity is real, e. g., ‘ This is the 
same (identical) pencil you gave me a year ago.’ If the terms 
compared be not really one, but only similar, whether in nature 
or qualities, and therefore representable by one concept, the 
identity is logical, e. g., ‘My book is the same as yours.’ 
Hence, in this last sense identity merely means likeness. 

It is in this last sense that the axiom, ‘ ‘ Two things which 
are identical with a third are identical with each other,” is 
usually taken. Hence, for the validity of the axiom: (1) the 
two must be compared with one and the same third, (2) under 
exactly the same respect, and, (3), the conclusion must be that 
they are alike precisely in that respect. 

Note. —Physical identity is had when the terms compared 
are really and physically one: e. g., “The substance of your 
soul is the same now as it was the day you were bom. ’ ’ On the 
contrary, when the terms compared are not really and physi¬ 
cally the same, but only according to the common estimate of 
men, the identity is moral, e. g., ‘The hand that signed the 
Declaration of Independence was the same that years before 
had cut down the cherry tree. ’ 

14. Opposed to Unity is Multitude or Plurality, which 
may be described as Beings or Units divided off from each 
other, one of which is not the other. 

Number is distinguished from mere Multitude in that it is 
Multitude as measurable by a common unit. Hence, for Num¬ 
ber we need (1) plurality, (2) some sort of similarity in the 
several units, (3) a collecting or gathering together of the 
several units into a sort of unity under a common concept, on 
account of their similarity. Thus, if you have five men you 




131 


cannot number them unless you prescind from individuation, 
and take as your common unit man as such; if you have five 
men, four horses, three stones and two thoughts, you must 
prescind from individual, specific and generic differences, and 
take as your common unit Thing, Being. Hence, number, as 
such, is beyond the reach of sense-perception. 

15. The opposite of Identity is Distinction or ‘Other¬ 
ness. ’ Two things are distinct when one is not the other. 

(a) If the Otherness is real, independently of our 
thoughts about it, the distinction is real. Thus between you 
and your neighbors, between your soul and your body, there is 
a real distinction. 

When the distinct things are such that each exists, or can 
exist apart from the others, we have a major real distinction. 

When the distinct things are such that either cannot exist 
apart from the other, we have a minor real distinction, e. g., 
‘between our mind and its thoughts,’ ‘between a cannon ball 
and its velocity,’ etc. 

If we have no real Otherness, but only one and the same 
thing, as represented by various concepts of the mind, the dis¬ 
tinction is called mental, e. g., ‘the distinction between six and 
half-a-dozen,’ ‘between Washington and the first President of 
the United States,’ etc. 

If the various concepts thus representing one and the same 
reality are intrinsically identical the distinction is said to be 
purely logical, e. g., the distinction between man and rational 
animal. 

But if these various concepts of one and the same thing are 
intrinsically different, i. e., different in contents or comprehen¬ 
sion, the distinction is called virtual, or a mental distinction 
with a foundation in fact, inasmuch as one and the same object 
is capable of being represented in thought by intrinsically dif¬ 
ferent concepts. Thus one and the same person may give 




132- 


ground for concepts of himself of such various comprehension 
as “society angel” and “domestic devil.” In such cases each 
concept represents one and the same whole, but neither repre¬ 
sents it wholly. 

Lastly, if the intrinsically different concepts, representa¬ 
tive of one and the same indivisible thing, are such that one 
neither formally nor implicitly expresses the notes represented 
in the other, we have an adequate or complete virtual distinc¬ 
tion; and each concept gives what is called a metaphysical part 
of the whole. Thus, ‘the human soul,’ which is a simple entity, 
and therefore without real physical parts, may be considered as 
a principle i of vegetative life, and as a principle of intellectual 
life, neither of which concepts implicitly includes the contents 
of the other. 

If, on the contrary, the concepts are such that one im¬ 
plicitly, though not formally, includes the notes of the other, 
we have an inadequate virtual distinction. Thus the concept 
of infinite self-existent power is not, indeed, formally the con¬ 
cept of infinite wisdom or holiness, but essentially implies their 
contents. 

Note.— The reason why our minds form intrinsically dif¬ 
ferent concepts of one and the same simple object is to be 
found, partly, in the perfection of the object whose simple 
entity is virtually equivalent to several distinct entities, and 
partly in the imperfection of our knowledge, which cannot 
grasp this simple entity wholly by one act and express it in 
one adequate distinct concept, but must represent it piecemeal, 
so to say, by many true but inadequate concepts. 


Article III. —Truth. 

16. As we speak of true thoughts, so we speak of true 
things, e. g., ‘of true gold,’ ‘true friends,’ ‘true courage,’ etc. 
And if we consider what is meant by the truth of things, 




133 


we shall find it is their conforming to ideas , e. g., ‘a true friend’ 
is one who has all the characters comprehended in the idea of 
friend. This correspondence with an idea of itself is actual , if 
the Being is a term or object of actual thought is actually 
known. It is potential or aptitudinal, if the Being is capable of 
being a term or object of true thought, is knowable, is capable 
of determining and terminating a true concept of itself. 

17. Can we say that every being is true, conformed and 
conformable to a true idea of itself, known and knowable for 
what it is? To answer the question satisfactorily we must 
assume certain propositions which will be proved, independ¬ 
ently of the present article, in other places. 

God is an eternal, self-existent, infinitely perfect Being, 
possessing in His simple, infinite essence all pure perfection in 
an infinitely perfect way, so that every Being is a Being, only 
inasmuch as it is in its grade and measure a far-off, limited 
imitation of God. This infinite, “ocean of all-perfect Being” 
is the eternal object of the Divine Mind, which comprehends it 
and its imitability and all its possible imitations, and conse¬ 
quently all finite things, in eternal, infinitely perfect thought. 
Hence every existible being is an actual object of eternal, true 
thought, and is, therefore, true. 

Furthermore, nothing exists, or has ever existed, or will 
ever exist, even a child’s transient thought, which God has not 
foreknown and ordained or permitted, and produced or co¬ 
operated to produce; so that there never can be an existent 
Being which does not depend for its existence on the divine 
thought, just as a work of art depends for its existence on the 
mind of the artist who conceived it. Hence, again, every 
existent being is an object of eternal, perfect thought, and is, 
therefore, true. 

Lastly, among existent imitations of God there are finite 
intelligences very limited indeed in capacity, but still modeled 
after God’s own mind and so capable of apprehending more or 




-134-- 

less perfectly the Divine Being and its imitations. In regard to 
these, therefore, also every Being is true, i. e., capable of deter¬ 
mining and terminating true knowledge of itself. 

Creatures correspond to God’s knowledge of them and are 
capable of making themselves known, and tend to make them¬ 
selves known just for what they are to finite intellects made in 
the image and likeness of God. 

All things, then, are true, primarily, in regard to the Di¬ 
vine Mind in which they are actually perfectly and eternally 
represented, secondarily, in regard to finite minds in which 
they are capable of being more or less perfectly represented. 
Hence, we might say that things are ultimately true because 
they correspond to the divine ideas; and that our thoughts are 
true because, being conformed to things, they thus correspond 
with the thought of God. 

18. Hence, when things are spoken of as false, the epi¬ 
thet can only be applied to them by a metonymy, i. e,. as acci¬ 
dentally, by their likeness to other things, giving occasion to 
the imperfect finite mind to judge them to be what they are not. 
But in regard to God, nothing can be called false; even the 
sinful act itself, though in discord with his law, is eternally 
before his mind in all its deformity. 

Article IV. —Goodness. 

19. We have said that the perfections of a thing are those 
elements really or virtually distinct, which constitute its essence 
and render it capable of attaining and holding the place pro¬ 
portioned to its nature in the commonwealth of things. Now, 
everything has, or may be conceived to have, an inclination, 
tendency, appetite for all that goes to fill up the measure of 
its adequate perfection; and that which is in any way capable 
of satisfying such inclination, tendency, etc., is said to be good 
for that Being. Hence, goodness is usually defined, entity as 




135 


appetible. But as entity is appetible only inasmuch as it really 
or apparently, completely or partially, perfects that which de¬ 
sires it, the more radical definition of goodness would be, entity 
as perfective , or, Being, as connoting some appetite tendency 
or capacity which it is capable of satisfying. 

20. That, then, which perfects a Being is good for it. 
Now, between that which perfects and that which is perfected, 
between the perfective and the perfectible, there may be only 
a mental distinction, e. g., we may consider ‘a beautiful flower 
as perfected by all that which makes it what it is, and we may 
even attribute to it a sort of metaphorical joy and gladness in 
the possession of itself.’ In this case we have Being as self- 
perfective, good for itself, good in itself. This is called the 
absolute goodness of a thing, i. e., its goodness in and for 
itself, apart from all reference to other things really distinct 
from itself. 

This absolute goodness is adequate, if the Being has all 
that is needed to constitute its essence, to perfect its activities, 
and completely to satisfy all its tendencies, capacities, etc.; else 
it is only partial or inadequate. 

If, on the contrary, we do not consider the Being as self- 
perfective, but as a perfective, meeting the deTmands, of some¬ 
thing really other than itself, we have what is called its relative 
goodness, i. e., its goodness, a perfectiveness, in regard to 
another. The various ways in which a thing may be relatively 
good will give us the divisions of goodness in the next para¬ 
graph. 

Note. (1). —There is another sense in which a Being may 
be called absolutely good, i. e., if it has all pure perfection with¬ 
out lack, or limit, or dependence. In this sense, God alone is 
absolutely good. 

(2).—Among absolutely good and adequately good things 
one may be better than another, i. e., if its nature requires and 




- 136 -- 

admits higher and greater perfections, e. g., ‘an adequately 
good man is a letter Being than an adequately good humming¬ 
bird.’ 


21. That which is an object of desire or affection may 
be so, either for its own sake, or for the sake of something 
different from itself. In the latter case we have what is called 
the useful good, the goodness of utility. Such an object is 
really desirable, yet not in and for itself, but as a means, re¬ 
mote or proximate, for attaining, something which is desirable 
in and for itself, i. e., its relative goodness consists in its use¬ 
fulness. 

Again, that which is desirable in and for itself, may be so, 
either for the sake of its objective entity , as perfective of the 
appetent subject, e. g., ‘wholesome food’; or merely for the 
subjective pleasure it affords, e. g., ‘a cigar.’ The latter gives 
us the pleasurable or pleasure-giving good, i. e., an object in 
which a vital faculty, spiritual or sensual, finds rest and repose, 
whether it be an object really perfective of the appetent sub¬ 
ject or not. 

Lastly, that which by its objective entity is perfective of 
another is called the befitting good, i. e., that which is fitted 
to perfect and is, therefore, a suitable object of appetition for 
a Being bent on acquiring its perfection. 

Taken in a broad sense of the w r ord, in which sense it is 
also called natural good, the Befitting Good is that which by 
itself is perfective pf a complete nature or of any natural fac¬ 
ulty, e. g., ‘-food is a natural good of animal nature,’ ‘knowl¬ 
edge is a natural good of the mind. ’ 

Taken in a stricter sense, however, the Befitting Good is 
that which perfects, and so is a fitting, congruous object of de¬ 
sire for a rational Being as such, i. e., for a Being endowed 
with the power of deliberate, responsible choice. In this sense 
it is also called moral good. 




137 


Note (1). —One and the same object may be at once use- 
fully, pleasurably, naturally, morally good for the same sub¬ 
ject. But as a moral good, it is desirable under one aspect, 
as a pleasurable good under another, etc., e. g., ‘study,’ ‘play,’ 
‘prayer,’ etc. 

(2).— True good is that which really perfects the appetent 
subject as a simple or composite whole. Apparent good is that 
wdiich, though desired, does not so perfect the subject. Where 
there are, as there are in every finite Being, many different 
appetites or tendencies, all other appetites should be subordi¬ 
nate to the primary specific tendency of the Being; what is 
unsuitable to it, though agreeing with a lower tendency, is not 
the true good of the Being. 

(3). —Supernatural good, in the strict sense of the word, 
is that which perfects a being in a manner above the exigencies 
of its own, or of any finite nature, e. g., ‘ santifying grace,’ ‘the 
beatific vision of God,’ etc. 

22. Every Real Being, as such, is absolutely good. 

For it is good for itself, as constituting itself the Being that 
it is, as distinguished from mere nothing. 

Every Being is relatively good, i. e., good for something 
else, not for everything else. The Infinite Being, God, is good 
for all finite Being, as their exemplar, efficient and final cause; 
and finite Beings, in their turn, may be said to be good for 
God, inasmuch as being imitations of Himself and the work 
of His hands they are objects of His complacence and loving 
care. Again, even among finite Beings, one is good for an¬ 
other. For the universe is a cosmos of relations and correla¬ 
tions, so that it is literally true that a leaf cannot fall from a 
tree without affecting the equilibrium of the whole. Each 
material element can enter into some sort of combination with 
some other. Substance is good for accident, accident for sub¬ 
stance, part for whole, or whole for part. Some Beings supply 




-138- 

necessaries of life, some, pleasure; all are sources of knowledge, 
and in their way, if properly used, can act a part in lifting up 
the mind and heart of man to God. 

23. A Real Being, which as such is good, may lack some 
of the perfections it ought to have, and inasmuch as it is so 
wanting in due perfection it is called bad in itself, or absolutely 
bad. Thus we speak of ‘bad food,’ ‘bad thoughts,’ ‘a bad 
lawyer,’ etc. 

Again, a Real Being, whether quite perfect in itself or 
not, may be such that, if brought into relation with some other 
real Being, it destroys or hinders the perfection of the latter. 
Such a Being is said to be relatively bad, i. e., bad for that 
whose perfection it destroys or hinders. 

24. Hence, evil or badness, absolute or relative, is no 
positive entity; for every Being as such is good. 

Nor is it a mere negation; for no one would say that, e. g., 
‘ ink is bad merely because it is not nutritious. ’ 

But it is a privation, or cause of privation, of that which 
a thing ought to have for its well-being and proportionate 
action. 

25. A privation as such is non-entity, absence of entity, 
which ought to he present, in a given subject. Hence, evil or 
badness supposes a subject which it informs, as it were, and 
this subject, as a Being, is good; hence “there is some soul of 
goodness in things evil”; so that a bad thing is simply a good 
thing affected by a privation of some perfection it ought to 
have. 

26. Absolute evil, or privation of due perfection, is 
not, it is clear, natural to any Being, else it could not be 
called a privation. Hence, it must be the effect of some cause 
which hinders or destroys the perfection in question. But 
every efficient cause is a real Being, and, as such, is good. 
Therefore, the efficient cause of evil is good. 




--13$-* 

But as non-entity, as such, cannot be for its own sake an 
object of desire, nor in itself a direct effect of positive action, 
it follows that evil, as such, can only be caused indirectly and 
accidentally , i. e., the efficient cause directly producing a pos¬ 
itive entity, which, as such, is good, produces indirectly the 
defect or privation affecting or accompanying it, i. e., produces 
a something which involves a privation. 

Note. (1). — Physical evil is privation, or that which causes * 
privation of some natural good in a Being. 

Moral evil is privation, or that which causes privation, of 
due rectitude in the free act of the will. A sin is an act of the 
will freely and deliberately elicited with knowledge of its re¬ 
pugnance to right reason and the law of God. Its formal 
badness is the lack of due rectitude in the physical act, which, 
as a physical entity, is good, but is intrinsically and wholly 
spoiled and marred by privation of the rectitude it ought to 
have. 

(2).— Physical evil may sometimes be an object of rational 
choice, i. e., as a means to attain a higher good, e. g., our lower 
appetites may and must at times be deprived of what they 
might legitimately claim, if we wish to strengthen our will and 
gain control over ourselves But moral evil can never be ra¬ 
tionally eligible, for it is necessarily a privation of the highest 
good of life, and a marring of our noblest faculty. 

CHAPTER II. 

The Primary Divisions of Being. 

27. Every real Being is either 

(1) . Actually Existent, or merely Possible; 

(2) . Such that it can subsist in itself, without needing 
another being as a subject or sustainer in which to inhere, i. e., 




140 


a Substance; Such that it cannot naturally subsist in itself, but 
needs another being in which it inheres as a subject or sus- 
tainer, i. e., an Accident. 

These two classes of disjunctive attributes which divide all 
real Being, give us the primary divisions of Being which we 
are to consider in the present chapter, viz.: Actual Being and 
Possible Being, Substantial Being and Accidental Being. Hence 
the chapter may be divided into two sections. 


Section I. —Actual and Potential Being. 

Article I.— Act and Potentiality. 

28. When we see a block of marble transformed into a 
statue, our attention is at once called to two kinds of power or 
capacity, viz.: the power or capacity of the marble to receive 
the figure and lineaments of the statue, and the power of the 
sculptor to produce the figure. The latter is called active 
power; the former, passive or receptive power. 

The active power may be in a state of inactivity, i. e., not 
exercising the energies it possesses, e. g., ‘the sculptor sitting 
idly by the unhewn marble.’ In the same way the passive 
power or receptivity may be without that which it is capable 
of receiving. In both cases the active and passive powers are 
said to be in a state of potentiality or potency, and they are 
perfected by doing and receiving that which they are capable of 
doing and receiving respectively. 

29. Potentiality or Potency, therefore, signifies capacity 
to receive perfection, and at the same time connotes the absence 
of that perfection, here and now. In the present article the 
word is used to signify passive or receptive potentiality. 

30. Act signifies perfection as actually and really, here 
and now, present. 




-141- 

31. To the capacity of an existing being to receive a 
new modification or perfection, corresponds as Act this mod¬ 
ification or perfection as received by it. . This capacity or re¬ 
ceptivity in an existing being is called subjective potency. The 
new modification received may be either accidental or sub¬ 
stantial, and will be called an accidental or substantial act 
accordingly. 

32. To the capacity of a non-existent essence to receive 
existence, corresponds as act, its real existence. The capacity 
of the non existent essence, is called objective potency or 
pure possibility. 

33. The capacity of an existing being to receive new 
perfection, i. e., its subjective potentiality, may be considered 
in relation to the ordinary agencies at work in nature, and then 
it is called natural potentiality ; or it may be considered in 
relation to the special supernatural power of God, in which 
case it is called supernatural or obediential potentiality. 

34. A Pure Act is an existent being in which essence and 
existence, active power and action, are really and ideally iden¬ 
tified, and which is incapable of any intrinsic modification. It 
is unthinkable, as non-existent, or as undergoing any intrinsic 
modification substantial or accidental. In other words, its es¬ 
sence cannot be conceived as an objective or subjective poten¬ 
tiality. It is therefore unproduced by an active power and 
unreceived in any passive power or potentiality. It is wholly 
independent and unalterable, it is in itself and of itself, self- 
existent. 

35. From the foregoing explanations it is clear that 
every Being is either a pure act, or a pure potentiality, or a 
compound of act and potentiality, i. e., a mixed act. 

36. Some axioms in regard to Act and Potency. 

(a) A thing is perfect so far forth as it is actual, im¬ 
perfect, so far forth as it is potential. 




142 


(b) A thing acts only inasmuch as it is actual, and re¬ 
ceives perfection only inasmuch as it is potential. 

(c) Potentiality, as such, cannot give itself actuality. 
Else it would give itself what it has not got. Therefore, no 
Potential Being can be, of itself alone, the adequate cause of 
any new perfection it acquires; though, under the influence of 
some actual agency, it may co-operate in the production of such 
perfection. Thus, the intellect cannot form any concept un¬ 
less determined by some object; though, under the determin¬ 
ing influence of the object, it reacts and co-operates with it in 
producing the vital act of knowledge. 

(d) Everything susceptible of change is a mixed act, 
i. e., a compound of act and potency. 

(e) Absolutely speaking, Act is prior to Potency. For 
nothing can act unless it exists, or give what it has not got. 
But if Act were not prior to Potency, this would be the case. 
For Potency, which, as such, has not actuality, would give 
actuality. 

(f) The ultimate act of every entity is existence. 

37. A First Cause, as being first, cannot have an efficient 
cause. Therefore, there can be no distinction, not even a vir¬ 
tual distinction, between its essence and its existence, 
i. e., its essence is inconceivable as a purely possible Being. 
For if its existence be conceived as something distinct from its 
essence, then its existence must be conceived, either (1) as 
communicated to its essence by some extrinsic agency, in which 
case it would not be a First Cause; or (2) its existence must 
be conceived as emanating from its essence, in which case its 
essence must be conceived as existing before it exists; for 
nothing can emanate from that which does not exist. There¬ 
fore, its existence, being neither received from another nor 
emanating from its essence, is identical, even in concept, with 
its essence; and, hence, the essence of the First Cause is actual, 




143 


existing Being, an unreceived Act of Being, without any ad¬ 
mixture of potentiality. 

38. Again, the First Cause is inconceivable as finite or 
limited in Actual Being. For limitation results either because 
the giver is unable or unwilling to give more, or because the 
receiver is unable to receive more, or because the thing pos¬ 
sessed, of its nature, excludes some ulterior perfection. But in 
the present case, there is neither giver nor receiver; and 
Actual Being, which is the essence of the First Cause, excludes 
no pure perfection. Therefore, the essence of the First Cause 
is unlimited, or infinite actual Being. Hence, the First Cause 
is an infinite Act of existent Being. 

39. A created Being is one which has received existence 
from a cause distinct from itself. Now, the question may be 
asked, In the concrete, existing, created Being, is its essence 
really distinct from its existence? St. Thomas, and some of 
the greatest of ancient and modern philosophers, answer in 
the affirmative. Their argument amounts to this. In the ade¬ 
quate concept or definition of the individual essence of any 
created Being, existence is not comprehended; therefore, in 
every such Being existence and essence are two distinct real¬ 
ities. The individuated essence really exists, but in virtue of 
something really distinct from itself, its acts of existence. 
Such a being is therefore a compound of act and potency, an 
actuated subjective potentiality. 


Article II.— Possible Being. 

40. A thing is said to be possible, when, though non¬ 
existent, it is capable of receiving existence. This capacity to 
receive existence may be considered absolutely, i. e., in the 
Being itself, which is said to be possible. So considered it 
consists of the congruity or non-contradiction between the 




-144- 

constitutive notes of the Being. Considered then, merely as 
exhibiting a combination of non-contradictory notes, a Being 
is said to be intrinsically or absolutely possible. 

Note.— As our human intellects are so very limited in 
range, it is clear that it would be the extreme of rashness for 
us to venture to determine in every case what is intrinsically 
possible and what is not. We are safe in pronouncing a thing 
impossible, only when we manifestly, evidently perceive that 
its constituents are contradictory and mutually destructive, 
e. g., ‘a square circle,’ ‘a potential First Cause,’ 'a thinking 
stone,’ etc. 

41. The aptitude of a Being intrinsically possible, to re¬ 
ceive existence, may further be considered in regard to the 
extrinsic causes capable of conferring, upon it the existence it 
does not possess. So considered a Being is said to be extrin- 
sically or relatively possible . Now, though, in regard to finite 
created forces, many things intrinsically possible are not ex- 
trinsically so; in regard to an omnipotent First Cause, the 
extrinsic possibility of things is limited only by their in¬ 
trinsic possibility, every sum of notes not intrinsically self¬ 
destructive can, absolutely speaking, be realized and actuated 
by Omnipotence. Hence, the impossible is no limit on the 
Divine Power; it is unrealizable, not from any lack of power 
in the First Cause, but simply because it is absolutely nothing. 

Note (1). — There may be cases where things which, taken 
separately, present no intrinsic contradiction, yet, when taken 
together, or in conjunction with certain circumstances, may 
involve contradictions. These give us the class of Incompos- 
sibles, i. e., things possible separately, but not conjointly. 

(2).—In regard to extrinsic possibility, a thing is said to 
be Physically Possible with respect to an efficient cause which 
has the power sufficient to produce it; and this even though 
the circumstances be such that it is Morally Impossible for the 
cause to overcome the difficulties involved in its production. 




-14fi 


42. Possible Being, as such, 

(a) Is Relative Nothing, for it. has no existence in the 
actual order of things; 

(b) Yet it is not Absolute Nothing, for it can actually 
exist; it is a positive, thinkable thing; it can be a final cause 
and a motive of action, etc.: things which cannot be said of 
absolute Nothing. 

43. The intrinsic possibility of things is ultimately 
founded:— 

(a) Not on their actual existence, for many things are 
possible which have never existed and will never exist, e. g., 
‘things good and bad in our own past history which might 
have been.’ Again, that which is mutable and transient can¬ 
not be the ultimate foundation of that which is immutable 
and eternal. But finite existences are mutable and transient, 
whereas the intrinsic possibility of things is immutable and 
eternal. 

(b) Nor on the human mind , for consciousness testifies 
that our minds do not cause, but merely perceive, the congru- 
ity or contradiction of constituent notes. These are congruous 
or contradictory, quite independently of us and of our 
thoughts about them. 

(c) But in God, for God as a necessarily-existing infinite 
Being contains in the most perfect manner all pure perfection 
expressed by the word Being. But if the First Cause be 
such, no real Being is conceivable which is not in some way 
an imitation of Him. For, if any such Being were conceived 
it would consist of a reality in no way either formally or emi¬ 
nently contained in the infinite Being, in which case the latter 
would not be infinite. Again, God to be omniscient, must know 
all possible things; to act with wisdom in His works, He must 
be guided by His knowledge of the object He is to produce. 
But if the intrinsic possibility of things Wiere not ultimately 
dependent on Him, both His knowledge and His action would 




146 


be conditioned by and dependent on something anterior to and 
independent of Himself. He would be obliged in creating to 
work according to a rule which had no origin in Himself and 
to which he would, therefore, be subject. But in this case He 
would not be an absolute all-perfect self-sufficient Being, and, 
therefore would not be God. 

(d) Yet not on the Divine Free Will, for if so, antece¬ 
dently to the act of the Divine Will, nothing would be possible 
or impossible, and hence, if God so willed it, a four-sided tri¬ 
angle, a self-existent creature, etc., would be possible, i. e., 
absolute nothing would be Being, and real Being would be 
absolute nothing: i. e., notes intrinsically contradictory and 
incompatible would at the same time be congruous and com¬ 
patible, 

(e) Nor on the Divine Omnipotence, for the intrinsic 
possibilities of things are not actually existing entities; but 
only existing entities are produced by power. Again, if a Be¬ 
ing were said to be possible, simply because God could produce 
it, it would follow that a thing was impossible simply because 
God could not produce it; and hence either all combinations of 
notes would be possible, or the ultimate reason of the impos¬ 
sibilities of things would be the limitation of the Divine Power, 
viz.: because God is unable to produce them. 

(f) But immediately and formally in the Divine In¬ 
tellect, for possible Being in regard to God, is like a work of 
art before its execution in regard to the artist. But in the 
latter case, whatever being the ideal work of art has, It has it 
in the mind of the artist, i. e., it is formally represented there. 
Again, the divine intellect, being infinite in its grasp, must 
know distinctly all the ways in which the Divine Essence is 
capable of being imitated, and, hence, all the possible must be 
formally and distinctly represented in the mind of God. 

(g) Ultimately and radically in the Divine Essence, for 




- 147 - 

on the one hand, the intellect, as such, does not make but per¬ 
ceives its object. That a mind may know, there must be an 
object to be known. On the other hand, the Divine Mind 
cannot be dependent for its knowledge on anything outside of 
God Himself. Hence, the Divine Mind in perceiving and rep¬ 
resenting the Divine Essence perceives and represents the pos¬ 
sibles. 

But how? God, as we shall prove in the proper place, is 
an infinitely perfect Being, and, therefore, contains in Himself, 
in an infinitely perfect way, every conceivable perfection. The 
Divine Mind, eternally contemplating this infinite, self-existent 
essence, represents It and all its imitations in distinct, infin¬ 
itely perfect thought. The imitations of the Divine Essence, 
formally represented in that Divine thought, are the possibles. 

Note (1)—Possible beings are not contained in the Di¬ 
vine Essence, either entitatively or representatively; yet the 
Divine Essence is that, through the comprehension of which 
the Divine Mind knows all possible beings. 

(2).—The Divine Mind contains the possibles not enti¬ 
tatively, but representatively . Hence, the possibles are not the 
Divine Ideas, but those objects, non-existent, which are repre¬ 
sented in the Divine Ideas. 


Section II.— Substance and Accident. 

Article I.— Substance. 

44. Etymologically, the word Substance, sub-stare, 
means that which underlies, supports something else. Hence, it 
signifies the ultimate substratum which underlies, is affected 
by, sustains the various non-essential modifications, qualities, 
activities, phenomena of things. But to be the ultimate sus- 
tainer or subject, it must not be itself subjected in another. 




-148- 

Hence, it must not need a subject in which to inhere, but must 
be capable of subsisting in and by itself. Hence, a Substance 
is that which cannot subsist in and by itself, that to whose es¬ 
sence it belongs not to subsist in another, as in a subject of 
inhesion: whereas an Accident is that which cannot naturally 
subsist in itself, that to whose essence it belongs to subsist in 
another, as in a subject of inhesion. 

The best way to realize the difference between substance 
and accident is to turn our thoughts in upon ourselves, and to 
consider the multitude, variety and succession of transient 
thoughts, volitions, movements, etc., which affect and modify 
the one, same permanently enduring subject, self. Hence, two 
notes go to constitute the essential concept of substance, viz.: 
Real Being and Independence of a Subject of Inhesion. But, 
to be a subject of inhesion or a sustainer of accidents is not 
essential to the idea of substance. 

Note.— When it is said that a substance is a Being which 
subsists or exists in itself, by itself, etc., all that is meant is, 
that it does not need a subject in which to inhere, in order to 
exist; not that it does not need the creative and conservative 
influence of a supreme cause in order to exist. Briefly, we 
might say that Perseity, In-itselfness, is the essential character¬ 
istic of substance as such, Inaliety , In-another-ness, is the 
essential note of accident; while Aseity, Of-itself-ness, is the 
peculiar incommunicable attribute of that self-existent Sub¬ 
stance which is the uncaused Cause of existence in all finite 
Beings. 

45. Our concept of substance as above described repre¬ 
sents an objective reality. 

For, every Being that exists, either exists in itself, or in 
another, as the subject of inhesion. In the first case we have 
substance; in the second, accident. If the existence of the first 
is denied, then we ask what is that in which the second exists ? 




—-149- 

Either a substance or an accident; if a substance, then we have 
what we claim; if an accident, then the same question recurs; 
and so on to infinity, which is absurd, viz.: a multitude of 
entities sustained without a sustainer. 

Again our consciousness clearly testifies that beneath the 
ever-varying succession of thoughts, desires, feelings, etc., 
which fill up our life, there is an enduring substantial Ego, a 
self, which is the ultimate source of their existence, and the 
ultimate subject of our varying modifications. 

Our external experience, too, enables us to judge with 
certainty that the men and beasts and plants and minerals 
around us are not mere accidents, but substantial principles, 
each an independent unit subsisting in itself. Lastly, to the 
concurrent testimony of the common sense of mankind, we 
can add that of our adversaries themselves, who, in soberer 
moments when the rational nature in them is allowed to speak 
out, confess with Locke, that “ Sensation convinces us that 
there are thinking ones”; or with Hume, that “ ‘Tis vain to 
ask whether there be body or not, that is a point which we 
must take for granted in all our reasonings”; or with Spencer, 
that “We are compelled to think of a substance affected, before 
we think of its affections .” 

Note.— A Real Being, then, is called a Substance, inas¬ 
much as it subsists in itself; it is called a Nature, inasmuch as 
it is an ultimate intrinsic principle of action; it is called an 
Essence, inasmuch as it possesses all the elements, really or 
virtually distinct, which are necessary to constitute it a Being 
complete in its kind or species. 

46. An Incomplete Substance is one which by its nature 
is destined to be a part, essential or integral, of a physical com¬ 
pound, so that in composition with other incomplete substantial 
elements it goes to constitute one complete nature, or first prin¬ 
ciple of action, e. g., ‘the human soul cannot exercise the 




--150-* 

functions of sensitive or vegetable life unless it be united in 
substantial composition with matter, and much less can matter 
do so unless it be informed by a substantial vital principle.’ 
But when soul and matter are substantially united, we have a 
New Being, a substantial source of new activities wholly un¬ 
like those of either component taken separately. 

47. A Compound Substance is one which is composed of 
and can be resolved into, physical parts. 

A Simple Substance, on the contrary, is one that is not 
composed of or resolvable into, physical parts. 

A Spiritual Substance is a simple substance, whose action 
and existence are intrinsically independent of matter. 

48. An Individual Substance, i. e. ; one undivided in 
itself, and divided off from every other, complete in itself as a 
nature, and self-possessed, i. e., not actually a part of a physical 
whole, nor destined by nature to be such a part, is called a 
Suppositum, or Hypostasis, as being the ultimate principle of 
attribution to w r hich are ascribed all the actions, properties, 
passions, etc., of a Being. Thus the motion of your feet, the 
knowledge you have acquired, the headache you suffer, your 
good and evil actions, your faculties, your whole human nature, 
all are referred to and belong to the whole substantial self- 
possessed, You. Self-possession, For-itself-ness, then, is the 
special characteristic of a hypostasis; and the more perfectly a 
subject possesses itself, and its activities, the more perfect it is 
a hypostasis. 

Hence, an an intellectual hypostasis possesses itself and 
controls its actions more perfectly than any other, it is called 
by a special name, Person. Personality, then, implies three 
elements, viz.: (1) an individual intellectual nature, (2) com¬ 
plete as a nature, (3) forming a whole by itself, or self- 
possessed. 

Hence, the Sacred Humanity of Our Lord, though an 
individual intellectual nature perfect in every human endow- 




151 


merit, yet as being possessed, owned as his own, in a way quite 
mysterious to us, by the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, 
has not a human personality; it is the human nature of a 
Divine Person, and all its gifts and faculties, all its actions and 
sufferings, are His, and are ultimately attributed to Him, and 
have all the infinite worth of actions, etc., of a Divine Person. 

And as the worth of actions depends on the dignity of 
the personal agent from whom they ultimately proceed, so, too, 
the gravity of an offense is chiefly measured by the dignity of 
the person offended. This is the reason why the personal 
character of the wrong done by sin should be chiefly insisted 
upon. The sinful act is inordinate in itself, it is true, but its 
full deformity is not perceived until we consider who is the 
Person offended. 


Article II. —Accident. 

49. We have said that an accident is a Being which can¬ 
not, naturally, subsist in and by itself, but needs another 
Being as a subject of inhesion in which to exist. But we 
must determine more precisely the special kind of Inexistence 
which is peculiar to accidental Being. 

One thing can be said to be in another, either (1) as con¬ 
tained in container, e. g., ‘money in a safe,’ or (2) as a con¬ 
stitutive part in a substantial whole, e. g., ‘the soul in the man,’ 
or (3) as the specific nature in an individual, e. g., ‘human 
nature in Brown,’ or (4) as a modification or affection in the 
thing modified, e. g., ‘learning,’ ‘desires,’ ‘feeling’ in a man; 
‘heat,’ ‘color,’ ‘shape,’ ‘velocity’ in a cannon-ball. 

It is in this last sense that accidents are said to exist in 
a substance as in a subject of inhesion. They are Forms, which 
affect or modify the subject they inhere in and give it a title 
to various denominations which do not belong to it considered 
merely as a substance. Thus, ‘a man is denominated learned’; 




152 


‘a stove, hot’; ‘a piece of marble, a statue,’ etc., not on account 
of their substance, but on account of accidental modifications 
which affect their substance without altering it as a substance. 

50. According to Aristotelian and Scholastic philos¬ 
ophers, there are nine ways in which a finite substance re¬ 
maining unaltered as a substance may be conceived as mod- 
fied, and so acquire new denominations, viz.: in regard to its 
quantity, its action, passion, relation, ubication or position in 
space, quandocation or position in time, posture and habit. 

Or, in other words, we may say that a substance can re¬ 
ceive a new denomination: 

(1) On account of something wholly extrinsic to itself, 
e. g., ‘ a man is called well-dressed on account of his clothes.; 
here, the new name implies no new reality in the denominated 
subject; the man would be what he is if he were clad in rags. 

(2) On account of something intrinsic in itself consid¬ 
ered with reference to an extrinsic term , e. g., ‘the height of A 
considered in reference to the height of B, entitled A to the 
denomination, Taller than B; here, the height of A as con¬ 
sidered with reference to the height of B is called a Referent 
or Relative accident. 

(3) On account of something intrinsic in the subject 
considered without any reference to anything else, thus, a man 
may be called ‘learned,’ ‘tall,’ ‘clever,’ ‘virtuous,’ etc., apart 
from any reference to other Beings, on account of certain 
physical realities in him over and above the substantial con¬ 
stitutes of his individual manhood. Such realities really in¬ 
herent in a substance, really distinct from that substance, yet 
depending upon it for their existence, are called Absolute acci¬ 
dents. It is of this last class of accidents we speak in the 
present article. 




-153- 

To our concept of absolute accident there corresponds 
an objective reality. 

(1) It cannot be denied that thought, volition, figure, 
velocity, etc., are real physical entities, real modifications 
which can come and go without any substantial alteration of 
the subjects in which they inhere. 

(2) Real changes take place from hour to hour, in our- 
selves and many of the substances around us. Now, every 
real change implies the acquisition or loss of some “form,” 
some reality, by the subject which is said to be changed. That 
which has neither gained nor lost anything cannot be truly 
said to be changed. But, on the other hand, it is equally clear 
that not every change in a substantial Being is a substantial 
change, e. g., a man does not become a different substance be¬ 
cause he acquires knowledge of a subject of which he was 
previously ignorant; nor does the wax change its substance 
when from a shapeless mass it is molded into the form of a 
beautiful flower; nor does the acquisition of its destructive 
velocity alter the substance of the cannon ball. 

Hence, we have real entities which are not substances, but 
which inhere in substances and modify and perfect substances; 
which are products of real physical action; and which makes 
all the difference that exists between the scholar and the un¬ 
lettered man, between the cannon-ball at rest and the cannon¬ 
ball in motion, etc. But such entities are what we call “abso¬ 
lute accidents,” and hence, our concept of absolute accident 
represents an objective reality. 

51. Furthermore, though these accidents intrinsically 
modify the substances they inhere in and are naturally de¬ 
pendent upon them, as upon subjects of inhesion, for their 
existence, yet it cannot be doubted that they are really distinct 
from them. 

(1) That Being which really and intrinsically modifies 




154 


and perfects another is really distinct from that other. But 
accidents, e. g., knowledge, motion, heat, color, etc,, really and 
intrinsically modify and perfect the substances in which they 
inhere. Therefore, they are really distinct from them. 

(2) Things which are really separable from one another 
are really distinct. But a man may lose his knowledge, desires, 
etc., a cannon-ball may lose its velocity, etc. 

52. Of the absolute accidents of which we have been 
speaking some are such that they cannot, without a contract ic- 
tion in thought, be conceived as existing, even miraculously, 
apart from a subject in which they actually inhere. Such are, 
for example, motion, figure, etc.; also vital acts, such as 
thought, volition, etc. Such accidents are often called purely 
modal or purely modifying accidents, i. e., “ actual” inhesion 
in a subject is an essential character of their existence 

But must this be said of all accidents? Can it be shown 
to evidence to be an impossibility, even for the Almighty 
Power of God to sustain in existence certain accidents or 
certain collections of accidents, apart from the subjects in 
which they should connaturally inhere? 

To this question we answer in the negative, that it cannot 
be shown to be impossible that God should sustain in existence 
some accidents apart from their connatural subject of adhesion. 
For such accidents are real entities, really distinct from the 
substance they inhere in, and, though, according to the ordi¬ 
nary course of nature, actual adhesion in substance is a char¬ 
acteristic of their existence, yet it cannot be demonstrated that 
actual inhesion in a subject is 4 ‘essential” to their existence in 
such a way, that God has not within the resources of His 
omnipotence a means of miraculously supplying for the sus¬ 
taining influence of the created subject in which they would 
connaturally inhere. 




155- 


We do not mean to say that reason can prove the possi¬ 
bility of accidents so existing; be we say that if reason is 
powerless to affirm such a possibility, it is equally powerless 
to deny it, and that if a competent authority should declare 
that certain accidents do, as a matter of fact, so exist, reason 
would have nothing evident to urge against it; nor would such 
accidents lose their true character of accidents—they would 
always imply a natural need of a subject of inhesion to sustain 
them, and could exist apart from it only because its sustaining 
influence was replaced by a miraculous exercise of Divine 
Power. 


Article III. —Relation. 

Of the nine Aristotelian categories of accidents, only Re¬ 
lation will be treated of here. The others, as far as they con¬ 
cern us, will be more conveniently examined in connection with 
the matter of other treatises. Thus, Action and Passion belong 
to the chapter on Causality. Quantity, Space and Time will 
find their place in the treatises on Cosmology, etc. 

53. Every real Being has its own proper entity, truth and 
goodness, and hence, may be considered in itself and on its 
own account. Such a Being, so considered, may be called 
“absolute.” But such absolute Beings may be like or unlike 
one another; may be dependent in origin, one upon another, 
etc., and thus involve a reference of one to the other. Con¬ 
sidered as thus referred one to another, they are called “re¬ 
lated” Beings, and the reference or respect they bear towards 
each other is called a “relation.” 

54. A relation, then, implies three elements, viz.: 

(1) A “subject,” which is referred to another, as like or 
unlike that other, equal or unequal to it, its cause or its ef¬ 
fect, etc. 




156 


(2) A “term,” to which the subject is referred, or corre¬ 
lative. 

(3) A “foundation” or basis in the subject or term, or 
in both, on account of which one is referred to the other. 

55. In order that a “relation” be real, both subject and 
term must be real Beings, really distinct from each other; and 
further there must be a real foundation in either, or in both, 
on account of which one is referred to the other, independently 
of any operation of the mind. Hence, the mind does not make 
real relations, but perceives them. 

56. A real relation is called “mutual,” if both subject 
and term are really referred to each other, on account of a real 
foundation in both e. g., A and B may be mutually referred to 
each other on account of a similarity of features, character, etc., 
in both; teacher and pupil are mutually related on account of a 
continuous new exercise and activity on both sides in com¬ 
municating and receiving knowledge 

A real relation is won-mutual, if the basis or the foundation 
of the reference is found only in one of the extremes. Such 
is the relation between the Creator and the creature. The crea¬ 
ture has a real relation to God, founded in its complete de¬ 
pendence on Him for all that it has. God, on the contrary, 
is not really referred to the creature, for the creature’s ex¬ 
istence implies no new reality in God which cotild be the basis 
of a real relation on His part. 

57. A relation is merely “mental” or “logical,” when 
either the extremes are not real Beings, or are not really dis- 
I inct, or when the foundation for referring one to the other is 
unreal, or a mere creation of the mind. Thus, the relation 
between “Washington” and the “first President of the United 
States , 9 9 between six and a half-a-dozen, is merely mental; and 
such too, is the realation by which we can conceive God to be 
referred to His creatures. 




157 


58. That there exist real relations between the things 
around us is clear; for quite independently of our thoughts 
about them many things are similar to each other, in essence, 
in qualities, in quantity, etc. 

But it may be further asked, is the real relation which one 
Being bears to another an entity really distinct from that 
which is the foundation, or reason why the subject is referred 
to the term; e. g., when the wall A is said to be like the wall 
B, on account of its whiteness, is the likeness of A to B an 
entity really distinct from its whiteness? The answer is ob¬ 
viously negative. A white wall in San Francisco, which has 
been in existence for the past five years, may, without any 
change or newness of any kind in itself, acquire a real relation 
of likeness, by simply building another white wall in London. 
Of course there is a mental distinction between the San Fran¬ 
cisco wall, considered absolutely in itself, and considered in 
reference to the London wall, inasmuch as the contents of both 
concepts are different; but in reality, the former is ipso facto 
referred to the latter as like it, by its whiteness, without the 
addition of a new entity to constitute the relation. 


CHAPTER III. 

Causality. 

60. A Principle is that from which anything in any way 
proceeds. That which so proceeds is called a Principiate. 
The connection between the two may be merely extrinsic, i. e., a 
mere matter of precedence and sequence in time or space; but 
with such Principles and Principiates we are not concerned 
here. Or the connection between the two may be intrinsic , i. e., 
when the principiate really derives from the principle, its truth, 
its entity, etc. Here we speak only of Real Principles, i. e., 
principles of entity. 




- 158 - 

But once more a Being may be a Real Principle in two 
ways, viz: Either, 

(1) By simply communicating the same numerically 
identical nature and perfection which itself possesses, as Reve¬ 
lation teaches us is the case in the Blessed Trinity; or 

(2) By producing some perfection at least numerically 
different from its own. In this latter case we have what is 
called a cause and an effect. 

In every case, however, there is always a real distinction 
between a Real Principle and its Principiate, as such, and a real 
relation between them, i. e., the relation between giver and 
receiver. 


Article I.— Causes in General. 

61. A cause is a principle which, by its positive influence, 
determines the existence of a new Being, substantially or acci¬ 
dental, but other than itself. The new Being is called an 

effect. 

Hence, a cause implies, (1) a Real Being, (2) whose 
positive influence in the given case, is necessary, and at least 
partially sufficient, for the existence of a new Being, (3) really 
distinct from itself. 

Now, there are five ways in which a Being may be thus 
requisite, and at least partially sufficient, for the existence of 
a new Being really distinct from itself, viz.: 

(1) As the Material out of which it is made, e. g., ‘the 
marble of which a statue is made, ’ 

(2) As the Form which determines the material, inde¬ 
terminate and indifferent of itself, to be the particular thing 
it is, e. g., ‘a statue of Washington.’ 

(3) As the Agent by the exercise of whose energies the 
form is educed in, or introduced into, the material, 




-159-- 

(4) As the End which efficaciously moves the agent to 
exercise his energies, 

(5) Finally, as the Exemplar or type which guides the 
agent’s energies in the execution of the work. 

Whatever then contributes in any of these five ways to 
the existence of a new Being, fulfills the conditions of a cause 
in regard to it, and accordingly is called its material, formal, 
efficient, final, or exemplary, cause, as the case may he. In the 
following articles, we shall explain the nature, the chief divi¬ 
sions, and the character of the causality of each of these five 
classes of causes. 

Note. (1). Hence, though every Cause is a Principle, 
not every Principle is a Cause; for a cause implies 11 entitative ’ ’ 
otherness, and dependence in its principiate, which a Principle 
as such does not. 

(2) Material and Formal causes, as being constitutive 
parts of the compound Being, resulting from their union, are 
called intrinsic causes; Efficient, Final and Exemplary causes 
are called extrinsic causes. 

(3) .—A Condition differs from a cause in this, that 
though it is necessary, yet it in no way suffices to account for 
the existence of the effect, i. e., it exercises no direct positive 
influence upon its existence, e. g., ‘light is a condition for 
writing a letter.’ A condition may be requisite for the 
existence of an effect inasmuch as it may be requisite to pre¬ 
pare, dispose or apply the true cause, or at least to remove 
what would otherwise hinder causation. 

A Condition sine qua non is one whose place cannot be 
supplied by any other. 

An occasion is neither necessary nor sufficient for the ex¬ 
istence of the effect; yet by its presence it facilitates its pro¬ 
duction, so that, as a matter of fact, the effect is produced 
when otherwise it would not be produced. 




-160-- 

Article II.— Material and Formal Causes. 

62. The Material Cause of the statue spoken of above, 
i. e., the marble out of which it is made, is of itself, passive, 
indifferent, potential, as to being a statue or a mile-stone, and 
it will remain the same marble as it is, though it should be 
successively both. 

The Formal Cause, by its union with the Material de¬ 
termines its indeterminateness, actuates its potentiality, makes 
it actually be one particular thing of the many it is capable 
of becoming, e. g., a statue, and finally, will pass away, to 
give place to other formal causes, as the same marble becomes 
successively mile-stone, door-step and mantel-piece. 

Hence, wherever we have a Being made up of two ele¬ 
ments really distinct and separable, one of which is in itself in¬ 
determinate, potential and constant, while the other is deter¬ 
minant, actuating and variable, we have a material and formal 
cause, Matter and Form in the broad sense of the word. In 
strictness, however, only corporeal Beings are said to consist 
of Matter and Form. 

63. The constant element in the various Substantial 
changes which are continually taking place around us, is called 
Primordial Matter. It is the source of the passivity, inertia, 
divisibility, etc., which are common to all corporeal substances. 

That which determines the same primordial matter to be, 
at different times, clay, or grass, or the flesh of an ox, or the 
brain of a man, is called a Substantial Form. It is the source 
of unity, and of the various properties, activities, etc., by which 
one corporeal substance is specifically distinguished from 
another. 

The constant element in the Accidental changes which 
corporeal substances undergo is called Secondary Matter, and 
the various forms which actuate its potency are called Acci¬ 
dental Forms, i. e., the absolute accidents spoken of above. 





161 


64. That Matter primordial or secondary and Form 
substantial or accidental are true causes, cannot be doubted; 

for surely the constituents of a thing exercise a direct positive 
influence on its existence. They contribute to the production 
of the new Being, the compound, not by any efficiency, i. e., 
by any exercise of their energies; but by their entity, as its con¬ 
stituents, i. e., their causality consists in their mutual self-com¬ 
munication and intrinsic union. 

Note.— Hence, with more or less of mataphor, that which 
can in any way be conceived as affecting or determining a 
Being, whether it be a perfection, or a privation, or a mere 
extrinsic denomination, e. g., ‘being well known,’‘loved,' etc., 
can be called a Form; while that which is conceived, as de¬ 
termined, or affected by such a form, may be called Matter. 
Thus, the matter of a sin is the physical act of the will; the 
form, the deliberate privation of rectitude in it. So, too, we 
speak of the matter and form of a poem, a judgment, a society, 
etc. Indeed, in every proposition, that which is expressed by 
the predicate may be conceived as a Form of the subject con¬ 
sidered as the Matter. 


Article III.— Efficient Causes. 

65. An Efficient Cause is defined by Aristotle, “A 
principle of change in another.” It may also be defined, A 
Being, which, by the exercise of its energies, makes something 
else to be which was not before, i. e., transfers something 
from non-existence to existence. 

Action in general may be described as any exercise of 
energies. Now, as the term Principle has a greater extension 
than Cause, so Action has a greater extension than efficient or 
Causal Action. For causal action it is requisite that the term 
of the action, that which results from it, be some entity or 




——162 -- 

perfection at least numerically distinct from the agent; while 
the concept of action, as such, is fully verified, even if the 
principate is numerically identical in entity and perfection 
with the principle. 

On the other hand, as we have seen, material and formal 
causes are truly causes, not by reason of any action or exercise 
of energies, on their part, but simply by their mutual intrinsic 
union. Hence, not all causality is action, nor is all action 
causality. 

Carnal action, or efficient causality, amounts to this, that 
a Being, by the exercise of its energies, not by its mere entity 
as a constituent part, brings into existence something which 
did not previously exist, something that has not in itself the 
sufficient reason of its existence. 

Now, this may be done in two ways, either by producing 
a new form, substantial or accidental, in a previously existing 
subject, or by producing the whole substantial Being inde¬ 
pendently of any pre-existing subject, i. e., out of being. 
The latter is called creative action or Creation; the former 
may be called Eductive or transformative action. 

If the term of the causal action is produced within the 
agent the action is called immanent, as by it the agent modi¬ 
fies itself. If, on the contrary, the term of the action is some¬ 
thing produced outside the agent, the action is called transi¬ 
tive, as by it the agent modifies a Being really distinct from 
itself. Lastly, if it be possible for an agent to produce a new 
Being outside of itself by merely willing it, without the exer¬ 
cise of any other energy, such an action may be called formally 
immanent, but virtually transitive. 

A cause is said to be in second act when it is actually 
influencing the existence of the effect. It is- said to be in 
proximate first act, when, though not exactly producing the 
effect, yet none of the conditions for its doing so are wanting. 




-163-■ 

If all or some of the conditions are wanting, it is said to be in 

remote first act. 

66. As to the various classes of efficient causes much 
might be said, but it will suffice for our purpose briefly to 
enumerate the principal heads under which they may be 
classed. 

The First Cause is that which uncaused itself and abso¬ 
lutely independent in its entity and action causes and pre¬ 
serves in existence, and co-operates in each and every action 
of all other Beings. These latter, inasmuch as they are efficient 
causes, are called secondary causes. 

A universal cause is one whose positive causal influence 
concurs immediately in the production of every effect, i. e., 
without whose concurrent efficiency no effect can be produced. 

A particular cause is one whose causal influence extends 
only to a certain class or certain classes of effects. 

Note.— Hence, a free universal cause would efficaciously 
control all causation, since no effect could be produced without 
its immediate occurrence. 

When two causes so occur in the production of an effect 
that one acts by its own proper energies , while the other acts 
only as moved and directed by the former, e . g ., the sculptor 
and the chisel in the formation of a statue, the former is called 
a principal cause; the latter, an instrumental cause. The 
main characteristic perfections of the effect are due to the 
influence of the principal cause, yet the instrumental cause, 
while transmitting the influence of the principal, and moved 
and directed by it, still contributes some efficiency of its own, 
and thus manifests its own perfections, though only in a sec¬ 
ondary degree, in the effect. The total effect is attributed to 
each, primarily to the principal cause, secondarily to the in¬ 
strumental cause, though not totally to either, e . g ., we can 
speak of ‘the pen that wrote the Declaration of Independence.’ 




164 


A free cause is one which, though in First Proximate 
Act, i. e., all requisites for action being present, has still such 
dominion over its action that it can act or not act, act in this 
way or that, according to its own choice. 

A necessary cause, on the contrary, is one which cannot 
but act, and in one determinate way when all requisites for 
its action are present, e. g., 1 a machine. ’ 

A physical cause is one which produces an effect directly, 
by the exercise of its own energies. 

A moral cause is one which entices (by counsel, promises, 
threats, etc.) a physical cause to action; or does not hinder its 
action, when in a position, and under an obligation to do so. 

A direct cause, causa per se, is one which produces and 
effect determined by the nature or by the free choice of the 
agent. An indirect cause, causa per accidens, is one which 
produces an effect not intended by the nature, or by the free 
choice of the agent, e. g., ‘ if a man should start to dig a grave 
and turn up a pot of gold. ’ 

A cause is univocal when it produces an effect of the 
same species as itself; analogical when it produces an effect of 
a different kind or species from itself. 

67. The Principle of Causality is analytical. For, every 

Being has, either in itself or in another, a sufficient reason why 
it exists, why it is as it is, and not otherwise. Now, no New 
Being, i. e., one that begins to exist, one that passes from non¬ 
existence, to existence, has in itself the sufficient reason of its 
existence, of its transition from non-existence to existence; 
else a pure potentiality would give itself what it has not, i. e., 
actuality. Hence, the sufficient reason for the existence of such 
a Being must be sought for, in some actually existing Being 
really distinct from it. 

But again the mere existence of this latter Being is not 
enough to account for the existence of the former: some in¬ 
fluence must be exercised, in order to effect a transition from 




-165- 


non-existence to existence. This influence is what is meant by 
efficient causality. 

Hence, the Principle of Causality, “every new Being re¬ 
quires an efficient cause,” is analytical. In other words, the 
concept of a New Being, involves the concept of another 
Being, which actually exists, and exercises the influence, neces¬ 
sary and sufficient, to give it the existence, it has not of itself. 

Note.— The word Chance may mean, (1) the absence of 
all efficient causality; and in this sense, to say that anything 
happens or is produced by chance, is a contradiction in terms; 
or it may mean, (2) that, owing to unperceived circumstances, 
the efficient causality exercised, results in an effect neither 
foreseen nor intended by the agent, i. e., an effect unforeseen 
and unintended resulting from an accidental concurrence of 
causes. In this sense, many things my be said to happen by 
chance in regard to us, but not in regard to an All-wise Om¬ 
nipotent Providence. 

To our concept of efficient cause there corresponds an 
objective reality, i. e., efficient causality is actually exercised 
both within and around us. Wherever new Beings come into 
existence, there efficient causality is exercised. But new Beings 
come into existence, within and around us, as our internal and 
external experience abundantly testifies. Therefore, etc. ^ 

Though it must be admitted, as we shall see later on, 
that the Divine Concurrence is absolutely necessary for each 
and every action of the creature, yet, finite Beings are true 
efficient causes really and truly acting on one another and 
producing things that are new. For our internal experience 
testifies that we exercise true efficient causality in our thoughts 
and resolutions, in many of the movements of our body, etc., 
i. e., we have immediate consciousness of our own efficient 
action. 

As to corporeal substances distinct from ourselves, the 
common sense of mankind is unanimous in asserting that the 




-166-- 

horses produce motion in the carriage, that fire burns, that 
food nourishes, that plants produce flowers, fruit, etc. 

Again, if corporeal substances have no activity of their 
own, they can make no impression on our faculties, and as it 
is only by their action on our faculties that we come to know 
their nature and even their very existence, it would follow 
that we have no certitude of their very existence, much less 
any knowledge of their nature. In a word, all impressions 
made by material things upon us, and upon everything else, 
would be simply Divine effects, and all corporeal Beings would 
be idle superfluities without purpose or function in the uni¬ 
verse, incapable alike of manifesting themselves or their 
Creator. 

Note (1). —It is one thing to know that a thing is, and 
quite another to know distinctly what it is. We readily admit 
that, while we know with certainty that efficient causality is 
exercised even by finite Beings in the universe around us, and 
have a sufficiently clear concept of it, to distinguish it from a 
mere relation of invariable antecedence and sequence, yet, our 
concept of what it precisely consists in, is far from being ade¬ 
quate or distinct. 

(2) .—God does not confer existence on things because 
He is incapable of accomplishing all He wishes by Himself 
alone. Existence and activities alike, are gifts of an omnip¬ 
otent self-sufficient Creator, who wishes his creatures to mani¬ 
fest, and participate in their measure, in his own Divine per¬ 
fections. 

(3) .—As we shall see later on, God gives existence to his 
creatures and their faculties, and by a continuous positive free 
exercise of his Power preserves them in existence, and further¬ 
more, co-operates with them in the immediate production of 
their effects, inasmuch as these latter are entities. Hence, to 
attribute true efficient causality to creatures, in no way dero¬ 
gates from God’s absolute dominion over every created thing. 




- 167 - 

(d) An effect as such cannot surpass the actual perfec¬ 
tion of its efficient cause. For, the effect or new Being pro¬ 
duced has all that it has from its cause, as resulting from the 
exercise of its energies. But nothing can give what it has not 
actually got; the less cannot give the greater. Therefore, etc. 

Note (1).— In regard to transitive action, we must care¬ 
fully distinguish what is produced by the action of the external 
cause, and what results from the reaction of the object on 
which the external cause acts. In regard to the latter the ex¬ 
ternal agent is called an equivocal cause, though in reality it 
is rather a condition or an occasion. 

(2).—The effect, it is clear, does not pre-exist in the 
cause Entitatively, i. e., the same, numerically identical, per¬ 
fection which is produced, did not previously exist in the cause; 
else we should have no New Being, no effect, but simply a 
transference, so to say, of an existing entity from one Being 
to another. Hence, the effect is said to pre-exist in the cause 
Virtually, inasmuch as the latter has the power to produce it; 
and, moreover, Formally, if the cause possesses specifically the 
same perfection which it produces in the effect; Eminently, if 
the cause possesses not the specific perfection of the effect, but 
a higher perfection, which embraces and surpasses all the pure 
perfection of the effect, as for instance, ‘from a merely finan¬ 
cial point of view, a ten-dollar gold piece embraces and 
surpasses all the perfection of a silver dollar.’ 


Article IV.— Final Causes. 

68. A Final Cause, or End, is that on account of which, 
or for the sake of which, an efficient cause exercises its en¬ 
ergies, acts, produces something. Hence, as positively in¬ 
fluencing the action of the efficient cause, it exercises a positive 
influence upon the existence of the effect, and so is a true 




168- 


cause. The final cause, however, influences the existence of 
the effect, not by its immediate physical action, but only inas¬ 
much as itself is an object of appetition to the efficient cause, 
moving the latter to action. It may be something non-existent 
which the agent seeks to produce, or something really existing 
which the agent seeks to get possession of, or finally, some¬ 
thing actually possessed which the agent enjoys. 

The effects of the final cause are all those things which the 
efficient cause does for its sake, i. e., in producing it, in getting 
possession it, in enjoying it. These things, inasmuch as 
they are selected and executed because they lead to the pro¬ 
duction, possession, or fruition of the end, are called means. 
Hence, the End is loved, sought, aimed at, for its own sake; 
the means, as such, only for the sake of the end. 

A Being, then, which is, for its own sake, an object of 
appetition to another, and which by its true or apparent good¬ 
ness, moves that other to action, is a final cause of those 
actions. It is the goal, the actions are the means to reach it; 
it is first in the Order of Intention, i. e., it is, in this order, a 
Causal Principle of the actions necessary to produce, possess, 
or enjoy it, last in the Order of Achievement, i. e., in this order, 
it is the Term of the actions actually done in order to attain it. 


The effects which the Final Cause produces are in detail: 

(1) Complacence or love for itself, in the efficient cause, 

(2) Intention or efficacious purpose to attain it, 

(3) Serious consultation about the means necessary to 
attain it, 

(4) Election or choice of determinate means to attain it, 
chosen, 

(5) Execution or actual employment of the means 
chosen, 

(6) Attainment of the end, 

(7) Fruition or enjoyment of the end possessed. 




169 


The first four regard what is called the Order of Inten¬ 
tion ; the rest, the Order of Execution or achievement. 

From what has been said, it follows that an End exer¬ 
cises its causality, not precisely, inasmuch as it is something 
really existing in the physical order of things, but rather inas¬ 
much as it is represented in thought, and perceived to be good 
for the agent, and attainable by it. Hence, in strictness only 
those Beings can be said to act on account of an end, for the 
sake of an end, which are capable of representing the end in 
thought, and of determining and choosing the means to at¬ 
tain it. 

Of course unintelligent Beings can be said to act for 
the sake of an End, but they do so only inasmuch as their end 
is determined by an intelligent Being, which fits them to attain 
it, and thus directs them towards it. Thus, ‘a steam-engine can 
be said to act for a certain end, but only because the end 
influences the conscious mind which constructed and controls 
it.’ 

69. A thing is strictly a Final Cause only so far forth 
as it is desired and aimed at for its own sake; it is a Means 
inasmuch as it is desired and sought after for the sake of 
something else. Now, as there are many ways in which a 
thing may be aimed at or intended for its own sake, these will 
give us the divisions of final causes. It will suffice for our 
purpose here, however, to call attention to a few of the prin¬ 
cipal ones. 

An end is said to be ultimate or final when, while aimed 
at for its own sake, it is referred to no other ulterior end; and 
all other ends aimed at by the agent, are, in one way or another, 
referred to it, e. g., God’s glory in our eternal happiness. On 
the contrary, when, though desired for own sake, it is referred 
and subordinated to an ulterior end, it may be called an 
intermediate or proximate end, e. g., ‘one may love play, 
or study, or prayer, for their own sake, without making them 
ultimate ends.’ 




-170- 

Two things may be so connected that both may be achieved 
by the same action, and both may he desirable for their own 
sake and intended by the agent; yet one may be such that, 
for its sake, even if it were alone, the action would be per¬ 
formed, while the other, apart from it, would not, though very 
desirable, be sufficient to move the agent to action. In this 
case the former would be a primary or total final cause, the 
latter a secondary or partial one. 

Again, we may consider the end of the action or work 
produced, and the end of the agent in producing it. The 
former is that which the action exercised by the efficient cause 
is of its nature destined and able to achieve. The latter is that 
which the agent intends to attain by his work. The latter may 
be called the extrinsic end of the effect; the former, its intrinsic 
end. The two may be identical or different. Thus, the end of 
the physician’s action and of himself may be simply the restora¬ 
tion of the patient’s health; or it may be that, while the treat¬ 
ment is of its nature directed to the cure of the patient, the 
doctor himself is mainly influenced by the prospect of fame or 
a fat fee, etc., for the attainment of which he regards his 
patient’s cure merely as a means. 

Lastly, we may consider the thing intended, the person 
for whom it is intended, and the possession or enjoyment of 
the former by the latter. Thus, a good teacher will aim at (1) 
accurate knowledge, (2) thoroughly possessed, (3) by his 
class for their advantage. These are not really distinct ends, 
but rather three elements of every final cause. For we are 
moved to action by a final cause, only inasmuch as it is (1) a 
good, (2) capable of being possessed, (3) by some one, whether 
by ourselves or by another it does not matter. 

70. To our concept of final cause there corresponds an 
objective reality. For our consciousness places it beyond 
doubt that we are moved by ends which propose themselves 
to us as desirable, to carry out even long series of works to 




171 


achieve them. They are clearly causes in our regard, because 
they solicit and call forth into action our energies, which, with¬ 
out their influence, would remain inactive. They truly cause 
our action, not compelling indeed, or necessitating it, yet ex¬ 
ercising upon its existence that positive influence without which 
none of our deliberate actions would exist. Hence, th^ ex¬ 
istence of final causality as a fact in the world is absolutely 
certain from the simplest analysis of our own deliberate con¬ 
duct. 

But a much broader question may be asked, Does every 
efficient agent act for an end? As we have already said, in 
order that a Being can be said to act for an end, it must either 
be intelligent itself or be adapted for action, by an intelligent 
Being. Now, is there ground in reason for maintaining that 
the actions of the non-intelligent Beings in the world around 
us are the result of adaptation by intelligence ? 

But the question must be still more restricted. We can 
prove the existence of an infinitely intelligent First Cause, from 
the existence of any New Being, even a thought, and then we 
can show that such a First Cause must efficaciously control and 
direct for wise ends every action of every creature. Hence, 
the question we would briefly discuss here is this, Merely con¬ 
sidering the natural mode of action of the non-intelligent 
Beings around us, are we forced to admit that they act for an 
end under the adaptation and direction of an intelligence not 
their own ? 

The argument for an affirmative answer is absolutely con¬ 
vincing for every unprejudiced mind. The argument may be 
briefly stated thus, ‘Wherever we find a constant uniform fit¬ 
ness and tendency in a Being to produce a certain determinate 
effect, and this fitness and tendency has not its adequate suffi¬ 
cient reason in the material constituents of the Being, we must 
conclude that this fitness and tendency, this directive principle, 
has been caused in the Being for the sake of producing said 
effect. But in the non-intelligent Beings around us, minerals, 




172 


plants and animals, there is a constant uniform fitness and 
tendency to produce determinate effects, and this tendency and 
fitness, this directive principle, has not its sufficient reason in 
their material constituent elements. Therefore, etc. 

The major is simply the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
applied to our case. For, the constant uniform aptitude and 
tendency we speak of either comes from the material con¬ 
stituent elements of the Beings or from some directive principle 
distinct from those elements, and introduced into them in 
order to control and adapt them for the attainment of fixed, 
determinate ends. 

As to the minor, it is a matter of evident experience that 
each of the material things around us has a uniform, constant 
aptitude and tendency to produce certain determinate effects. 
Nor is it less evident that this aptitude and tendency has not 
its sufficient reason in the material elements of which these 
Beings are composed. For, not to go further back than the 
chemical ultimates recognized by science, these of themselves 
are simply indifferent to any one of innumerable combinations 
and modes of action and motion. Hence, the sufficient reason 
why they are combined as they are, to form Beings capable of 
producing fixed, determinate effects beneficial to themselves 
and to the universe at large must be sought in some ultimate 
cause outside of themselves which so originally combined them 
and introduced into them fixed directive principles, with a 
view and purpose of attaining such determinate results. 

Hence, each and all of the unintelligent Beings around us 
act for the attainment of fixed ends, under the influence and 
determination of an intelligent cause distinct from themselves. 


Article V.—Exemplary Causes. 

72. An exemplary cause is a representation of a thing 
to be produced, existing in the mind of the efficient cause, 




173 


which guides and directs his energies in the execution of his 
work. This practical idea is a true cause inasmuch as it de¬ 
termines the work of the efficient cause, and guides his hand 
in its execution. Indeed, the effect is nothing but the more or 
less perfect realization, the transference, as it were, from the 
mind to the actual physical order, of the ideal in the mind of 
the agent. 

The causality of the exemplar consists in directing the 
efficient cause in the accomplishment of his work; and as the 
effect of the final cause is simply the action of the efficient 
cause, so far forth as the latter is exercised for the sake of an 
end; so the effect of the exemplary cause is the same action of 
the efficient cause, inasmuch as the latter is directed to the 
realization of an idea. That such causality is really exercised 
in daily life is sufficiently evident from experience. 


CHAPTER IV. 

Grades of Perfection of Being. 

73. We have already explained (8) the sense in which 
we use the word perfection. We have also said (21, note 2) 
that among good and perfect things of different orders one 
may be better, more perfect, than another. It is of this com¬ 
parative perfection we shall treat in the present chapter. Per¬ 
fection may regard the essence of a Being, or its mode of ex¬ 
istence, or the relations which exist between many distinct Be¬ 
ings, or between the parts of one composite Being. 


Article I. —Perfection in Regard to Essence. 

(i) Simple and Composite Beings. 

74. A Simple Being is one which is not composed of 
distinct components or parts, and is therefore incapable of 
being resolved into component parts. 




174 


A Compound Being, on the contrary, is one which is made 
up of distinct constituent parts, and is therefore capable of 
being resolved into its component parts. 

75. A physical compound is composed of parts which 
are really distinct from one another. This may be again, essen¬ 
tial, if the parts are essential constituents; quantitative , if the 
parts are quantitative; accidental, i. e., the physical compound 
resulting from a substance and its absolute accidents; such a 
Being, however, is a physical compound only in a loose analog¬ 
ical sense of the word. 

A Being is physically simple when it consists neither of 
essential nor of quantitative parts. 

Note.— A metaphysical compound is a physically simple 
Being, between whose various perfections there is a complete 
virtual distinction (16, c). Where, on the contrary, the virtual 
distinction between the perfections of the Being is only incom¬ 
plete, the Being is said to be metaphysically simple. 

76. Composition is a mixed perfection, i. e., it essen¬ 
tially involves inperfection , e. g ., 'limitation of parts,’ 'de¬ 
pendence of the parts on each other, and of the whole on the 
parts,’ ‘divisibility’ or ‘dissolubility.’ 

Simplicity, on the contray, is a pure perfection, i. e. ? 

it excludes no perfection, but only the imperfections of com¬ 
position. 

Note.— Hence, no composite Being can be a First Being, 
an All-Perfect Being, a Pure Act of Being. 

(ii). Finite and Infinite Being. 

77. A finite Being is one that is limited in perfection or 
entity; i. e., it has so much perfection, but no more. The idea 
of the finite, therefore, is partly positive, partly negative 




175 


An infinite Being is one that is unlimited in perfection, 
in real entity. 

Note.— The idea we can form of the Infinite is a per¬ 
fectly clear one, though not as distinct or direct as the mind 
craves for. The idea is formed by combining the note of Real 
Being or Pure Perfection with the note absolutely unlimited, 
or absolutely excluding all lack or limit or imperfection. There 
is therefore no need of any roundabout theory to account for 
the origin of this idea. It is not innate, nor is it formed by 
adding together a vast sum of finite entities; we know what 
Being is, what a limit is, and what a negation is, and we have 
the power of combining those characters so as to form one 
complex concept expressing Being or perfection without any 
limit. 

78. It is obvious that an infinitely perfect Being cannot 
be a produced or dependent Being, a composite Being, or a 
mixed Act. It is necessarily a First or uncaused Being, or a 
simple Being, a Pure Act of Being. 

Note.— In the preceding paragraphs we have spoken of 
the absolute Infinite, the infinite in Being or pure perfection. 
We do not intend to enter into the question of the conceivabil- 
ity or possibility of an actually infinite number or multitude, 
relative infinity. We may content ourselves with saying with 
Fr. Rickaby that it will be time enough to answer the question 
when it can be intelligibly proposed. 


Article II.— Perfection in Regard to Existence. 

79. A self-existing Being is one which has the sufficient 
reason of its existence in itself, in its own essence , one whose 
essence and existence are, even in concept, identified. A caused 
Being, on the contrary, has the sufficient reason of its existence 
not in itself, but in another Being distinct from itself. 




176 


80. A necessary Being is one whose non-existence is 
absolutely impossible, i. e., whose essence is positively incon¬ 
ceivable as non-existent, whose essence or nature involves, or 
rather is, actual existence. 

A contingent Being is one whose non-existence is pos¬ 
sible, i. e., whose essence is adequately conceivable as non¬ 
existent—whose adequate essence does not include or imply 
actual existence. 

81. Hence, (1) A necessary Being is a self-existent Be¬ 
ing: whereas a contingent Being is a caused Being. 

(2) A necessary Being is an infinitely perfect Being 
(39). 

(3) A necessary Being is absolutely immutable, unbe¬ 
ginning, unending, unchangeable. 

Article III.— Perfection Arising from Relations. 

82. Order may he defined, An arrangement of distinct 
things, according to some relation which they bear to one 
another, for the attainment of a definite result. The things 
arranged are the material cause of the order, the arrangement 
or grouping, the formal cause, while the result achieved may 
be called the end or final cause. The relation attended to, in 
grouping, is called the principle of order. 

83. If things are arranged according to their active 
properties or forces, we have Dynamic Order; if according 
to their substance, or more or less inactive properties, we have 
Static order. Quantitative relations give us the basis for Sym¬ 
metry, qualitative for Harmony. The relation of means to end 
gives us final order. Relations arising from rights and duties 
are the foundation of Moral and Social Order, etc. 

If but one kind of relation is attended to in the grouping 
of the material, the order is said to be Simple; if the relations 




- 177 - 

regarded in the arrangement are manifold, the order is Com¬ 
plex. 

84. Only intelligent Beings can perceive order as such, 

for to do so, one must apprehend the relation or relations ac¬ 
cording to which the various ordered elements are grouped, 
and for this the power of intellectual abstraction and univer¬ 
salization is needed. 

A fortiori intelligence is needed to plan and produce 
order as surely as this implies apprehension of the end to be 
attained, and of the various relations existing between the ele¬ 
ments to be co-ordinated or subordinated in order to attain it. 

Hence, a constant ordered arrangement of many distinct 
elements, of themselves unintelligent, and indifferent to this 
arrangement or another, requires intelligence as its propor¬ 
tionate efficient cause. This is a simple metaphysical prin¬ 
ciple universally recognized by the common sense of mankind. 
It is, in fact, an immediate application of the Principle of 
Causality. 


Supplementary Article.—Beauty. 

85. Beauty is that property or perfection in things, on 
account of which their mere perception, apart from use, posses¬ 
sion or other advantages, pleases; “ perfection giving pleasure 
to the beholder.” 

That an object be beautiful, therefore, it must be (1) per¬ 
fect in entity and action; (2) all its elements, really or virtu¬ 
ally distinct must be duly proportioned and harmoniously re¬ 
lated to each other; (3) this perfection and harmony of parts 
must clearly manifest itself to the beholder. 

Wherever, therefore, these three elements are found in 
any object, whether of the spiritual or material order, there 
we have beauty, the “splendide perfectum.” 




178- 


86. As only intelligence can apprehend completeness and 
harmony of elements, it follows that the intellect is strictly the 
aesthetic faculty; as our power of reasoning may be culti¬ 
vated and perfected, so our taste or power of apprehending 
and enjoying beauty may be perfected by culture. 




PART III 


COSMOLOGY 


1. Cosmology is, The science of the material universe. 
Its material object is corporeal substance and its properties. 
Its formal objects are the ultimate supra-sensible causes of the 
same. As the ultimate efficient , final and exemplary Cause of 
all finite Beings is the subject-matter of Natural Theology, 
we shall confine ourselves here mainly to the investigation 
of the ultimate material and formal causes of corporeal sub¬ 
stances, their properties and phenomena. 

We start with the data of observation and experiment, 
and applying rational principles to these we shall deduce a 
systematic body of ultimate truth in regard to the nature and 
properties of corporeal substance in general and of the three 
highest genera into which it is divided, viz.: the mineral, vege¬ 
table and animal kingdoms of nature. 

We may conveniently divide our subject into three Chap¬ 
ters :— 

I.—The General Properties of Corporeal Substance; 

II.—The Intrinsic Constituents of Corporeal Substance; 

III.—Organic Life. 


CHAPTER I. 

General Properties of Corporeal Substance. 

We may group what we have to say on this subject under 
two heads, viz.: I, Quantity ; II, Motion. 




-180- 


Article I.—Quantity. 

2. Quantity. —The most obviously manifested property 
of bodies is quantity, i. e., that property in virtue of which they 
are extended, have parts outside parts, are divisible and oc¬ 
cupy space; so that different parts of the occupying body cor¬ 
respond to different parts of the occupied space. 

Omitting other senses in which the word quantity may 
be used, we speak here only of continuous quantity. This is 
had when the extraposited parts are bounded by common 
limits, that is to say, the parts into which the extended sub¬ 
stance is divisible , but not divided have, antecedently to divi¬ 
sion, no extremities of their own distinct from those of the 
whole. We have in reality but one thing, though that one 
thing is divisible into many parts, i. e., it is actually one; 
potentially, man. 

3. That we have the concept of such continuous quantity 
is undisputed: the whole science of geometry is based upon it. 
Let us briefly analyze its contents. Take, for instance, a cubic 
foot of continuous extension, prescinding from the particular 
substance to which it belongs. Extension thus conceived is 
mathematical quantity. It has three dimensions: length, 
breadth, and depth, or thickness. The solid is bounded or 
terminated by surfaces; the surface, by lines; the line, by 
points. A point has no extension; a line, neither breadth nor 
depth; a surface, no depth. Points, lines and surfaces, then, 
are but the limits or extremities of linear, superficial and solid 
extension, respectively, and have no positive entity of their 
own apart from that of the extension they terminate. 

Note.— All actual extension, therefore, is represented by 
lines, surfaces or solids, .i. e., extension of one, two or three 
dimensions. This may be expressed algebraically by the sym¬ 
bols x, x 2 , x 3 , e, g., 'an inch long,’ 'an inch square,’ 'a cubic 




-181- 

inch. ’ But if we go on, in the same sense of the terms, to write 
x 4 . . . x n , it becomes impossible to realize or to conceive a 
geometric figure which such a symbol might represent. Hence, 
the N-dimensional extension of the non-Euclidean geometry 
becomes when applied to continuous quantity a mere algebraic 
illusion. 

4. Continuous extension of whatever kind is necessarily 
divisible. But how far is it divisible? Take a line an inch 
long, for instance, halve it, take half of that half again, and 
so on, as often as you please. Shall you ever reach a part 
which is incapable of further division, that is to say, unex¬ 
tended ? Clearly no; for, if you could divide the line into un¬ 
extended points, then the sum of these points should give you 
the line, and you should have 0, 0, 0, etc., equals 1 inch. In 
the same way, it is obvious that a surface cannot be divided 
into a sum of lines; or a solid into a sum of surfaces. Hence, 
continuous extension is divisible into parts which are them¬ 
selves extended and, therefore, indefinitely divisible. 

Note. —In the preceding paragraph we have been speak¬ 
ing of the divisibility of continuous quantity as such , i. e., con¬ 
sidered in itself and without regard to the substance to which 
it belongs. If we consider, however, the quantified corporeal 
substance, then we admit that there is a minimum beyond 
which division cannot go, atoms in the literal sense of the 
word. Thus, there is a minimum quantity of material sub¬ 
stance required for the smallest existible portion of 0., C., H., 
etc. But in all these cases the indivisibility is due, not to the 
quantity as such, but to the nature of the substance. 11 Corpus 
mathematice acceptum divisible in infinitum; corpus naturale 
non est divisible in infinitum # # # sed requirit determinatam 
quantitatem. ’ ’ 

5. But, again, we may ask: In what sense are the parts 
into which it is divisible contained in the undivided con- 




- 182 -• 

tinuous whole? A quantitative part implies two things, viz.: 
(1) a positive extended reality, (2) with limits or extremities 
of its own; so that it is impossible to conceive a part without 
conceiving it as terminated by limits of its own independent 
of those of the whole of which it is part. Now, in continuous 
extension we have the positive reality, but not the independent 
boundaries; consequently, we have no actual parts; we have 
actual unity and only potential plurality. Hence, if we are 
asked how many parts are there in a given continuous line, 
we answer there are no parts; there may be more than you 
can think. 

6. But now we go on to ask, Is continuous extension 
a real property of bodies in the world around us (physical 
quantity) ? or are the bodies we see and touch made up of a 
multitude of unextended mathematical points? The question 
is general; nor do we care for the moment to inquire whether 
the larger tangible masses around us are themselves contin¬ 
uously extended, or merely composed of contiguous smaller 
masses which are so continuously extended. We are satisfied 
here, if it be admitted, that there is in nature an objective 
reality corresponding to our concept of continuous quantity. 
Now, we say it is absurd to maintain that the extension and the 
extended resistance which our senses perceive in the material 
world can arise from a multitude of unextended points. For, 
either these points are contiguous, and then, as they have no 
extension either of length, breadth or solidity, any number of 
them touching each other will give us, as far as extension is 
concerned, only 0, 0, 0, etc. = 0 ; or they are not contiguous, 
but separated from each other by an interval, and then, as 
unextended points do not occupy space, the visible tangible 
universe becomes in reality an unoccupied vacuum • and exten¬ 
sion a subjective illusion projected upon a background of 
nothingness. Nor will it help to say that it is the motion of 
these points in space which furnishes the basis of our percep¬ 
tion of continuous extension. For, to perceive the motion of 




•183 


an object is simply to perceive the object itself as it moves 
from place to place; but here, the object is imperceptible, and, 
consequently, its motion and the path in which it moves are 
imperceptible. We conclude, therefore, that our concept of 
continuous extension is verified in the corporeal substances 
around us, i. e., that bodies have continuous extension of 
dimensions. 

Note.— Some have supposed that the continuous extension 
we perceive can be accounted for by supposing that bodies are 
made up of unextended points of force separated off from one 
another and acting across the interval which divides them. 

In this supposition, we ask what sort of a being is it that 
bridges over the vacuum between unextended force centers 
and gives us the continuity we perceive in our own bodies and 
in the material world around us ? A substance t Then we have 
real extension. An accident? Then we have an accident self- 
supporting, ah accident which is not an accident but a sub¬ 
stance and extended so as to fill the interval. Nothingt Then 
the continuous extension which our senses, whether alone or 
when aided by the most powerful physical instruments, cannot 
help perceiving is merely an inevitable illusion , and idealism 
and scepticism are the necessary logical consequence. 

It is true that science reveals that many bodies which seem 
to be continuous to the unaided senses are in reality porous. 
But science, too, reveals and requires true continuity, and in 
order to account for the propagation of light, etc., fills all those 
ultimate pores with hypothetical ether, itself a continuously 
extended and highly elastic material substance. 

7. Continuous quantity, then, is a real property of bodies. 

In what does it formally consist? 

In corporeal substance we may consider many character¬ 
istics, all of which are more or less closely connected with that 
actual extension in space from which we derive our concept of 




184 


continuous extension. Thus (a) we may consider the corporeal 
substance in itself; and this of its very nature, as distinguished 
from spiritual substance, implies entitative parts and parts; 
(b) we may consider this multiplicity of parts as continuously 
connected and extraposited in a certain determinate order in 
relation to each other; (c) we may consider this internally 
quantified body as actually occupying a definite portion of 
space. 

Now, the mere multiplicity of parts included in the essen¬ 
tial concept of corporeal substance in no way corresponds with 
our concept of continuous quantity. On the other hand, the 
actual extraposition of continuous parts in a definite order in 
relation to space implies as prior to itself their extraposition in 
a definite order in relation to each other. 

Hence we say that the formal or primary effect of quantity 
consists in the continuous extraposition of the parts of a sub¬ 
stance in relation to each other whence flows its Connatural apt¬ 
itude and capacity to occupy space. Hence, quantity may be 
described as a property which gives to corporeal substance 
internal continuous extension in virtue of which it becomes 
capable of occupying space and actually does occupy spac^ 
unless the ordinary laws of nature are interfered with. 

i '} 

8. That this property must be conceived as a positive 
perfection not included in the adequate essential concept of 
corporeal substance is clear from what we have just said. But 
we may go further and ask, If the substance and the quantity 
of a body are two distinct things t Long ago the old Greek phi¬ 
losophers by mere “discourse of reason” arrived at the con¬ 
clusion that the substance of a body is one thing; its 
quantity, quite another. For, as they said, the corporeal 
substance, e. g., of a fig-tree or of a crystal of sulphur, is 
certainly something different from the property which extra- 
posits their entitative parts in the order which they naturally 




- 185 - 

take and gives them the power of occupying a definitely out¬ 
lined portion of space. 

This property would then be an absolute accident of cor¬ 
poreal substance, nor could any valid reason be assigned why 
it could not be miraculously sustained in existence from the 
corporeal substance in which it connaturally inheres. 

9. Variability of Volume.— External local extension, 
we have said (6), is a connatural result of quantity. Now, is 
this external extension—this actuation of the quantified body’s 
aptitude to occupy space— constant under all circumstances? 
Or is it variable within certain limits under the influence of 
natural agencies, e. g., heat, pressure, etc.? The latter is the 
view of the plain common sense of mankind, and, philosophic¬ 
ally speaking, seems altogether necessary to account for some 
of the commonest phenomena in nature, e. g., ‘the contraction 
and extension of bodies,’ ‘elasticity,’ ‘universal attraction,’ 
‘the transmission of sound,’ ‘heat,’ etc., etc. Indeed, if we deny 
this variableness of real volume, we must ultimately assume the 
existence of action at a distance, i. e., across a vacuum—“an 
assumption which may be made to account for anything; but 
it is impossible, as Newton long ago pointed out, for any one 
who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of think¬ 
ing to admit for a moment the possibility of such action. 

If, then, there are good reasons for maintaining that ex¬ 
ternal local extension as a secondary effect of quantity is nat¬ 
urally variable within certain limits, there can be little diffi¬ 
culty in admitting that a quantified body may miraculously 
exist without any external local extension, i. e., with merely 
aptitudinal or potential external extension. 

10. Impenetrability is that power by which an actually 
extended body maintains its possession of the portion of space 
it occupies and hinders another actually extended body from 


Tait & Stewart, “The Unseen Universe,” p. 146. 





186 


simultaneously occupying it. But here again we must distin¬ 
guish the power from its actual exercise; just as we distinguish 
between the power of thinking and its actual exercise. The 
power of excluding other bodies from the same place is an 
essential concomitant of quantity; but, though its actual exer¬ 
cise naturally follows upon its possession, just as actual local 
extension is a natural consequence of quantity; yet, there is 
no ground for denying that its exercise may be prenaturally 
modified or suspended by the all-controlling power of God. No 
power can be exercised without His free concurrence, and there 
is no reason why He should not modify or suspend this con¬ 
currence in a particular case, when His Wisdom sees fit to 
do so. 

11. Space.— From the actually extended bodies around 
us, we easily derive the concept of abstract continuous exten¬ 
sion indefinite in length, breadth and depth, and this we can 
further conceive as of itself unoccupied —a sort of receptacle 
of inexhaustible capacity capable of containing extended 
bodies. This is the concept of absolute or ideal space. 

In as far as it is conceived as occupied by extended bodies 
at rest or in motion, it gives us what is called actual or real 
space, which may, therefore, be described as the Interval of 
absolute space included within the ultimate limits of the exist¬ 
ing corporeal universe. 

Now, as it would be absurd to say with Kant that our con¬ 
cept of space is a mere arbitrary fiction of the imagination, 
without any sort of foundation in objective reality, so it would 
be no less absurd to say that space as such, i. e., considered as 
a mere receptacle of extended bodies really distinct from them, 
and independent of their presence or absence, is something real 
in itself and actually existing. 

The true fiew avoids both extremes and holds that ivhat is 
conceived, i. e., actual or possible extension, is real and object¬ 
ively realized or realizable; though it is not realized or realiza- 




-187-- 

ble in the manner in which it is conceived, i. e., as a mere inde¬ 
pendent capacity or receptacle. 

If, then, we must answer the question, What is space? 
we answer that, in reality actual space is the total extension of 
the existing universe, conceived as one continuous container or 
receptacle of that which occupies it; possible or ideal or abso¬ 
lute space is the total possible extension of all existible bodies, 
conceived as one continuous container or receptacle in which 
they would exist and move, if they existed. 

Note (1). —When absolute space is conceived as eternal, 
indestructible, limitless, etc., it is clear that these are attributes 
not of actual but of possible extension. 

(2).—To avoid confusion of thought, we must take care 
to distinguish accurately between the concept of space as above 
described and the image which accompanies it in the imagina¬ 
tion. The imagination being an organic faculty can repre¬ 
sent objects only in terms of sensual perception, and so cannot 
represent purely abstract notes, such as mere abstract exten¬ 
sion; hence, it pictures space as a sort of phantom substance 
perfectly permeable and extending indefinitely in all directions. 

12. Place.— Akin to the idea of space is that of place. 
When a body moves from one portion of space to another, we 
say it changes its place. It leaves the place it occupied and 
passes to another; but the place itself remains immovable: we 
never speak of a place as moving. Place, then, is an immovable 
portion of space shut off, as it were, from the rest of space by 
definite bounding surfaces in which the occupying body is con¬ 
tained as in a perfectly-fitting receptacle. 

Fixity, then, is a characteristic of place. But how can 
there by fixity where everything is in motion? For us, there 
can be only relative immobility, i. e., a constant relation of dis¬ 
tance is preserved in regard to certain definite points on the 
earth or outside of it. Thus New York and San Francisco, 




-188 


though in motion with the earth and with the whole solar sys¬ 
tem, yet in regard to certain fixed points, e. g., ‘the equator,’ 
‘the poles,’ etc., are immovable; and this relative fixity suffices 
to verify our idea of place. 

The place of a body, then, may be described as, The volu- 
minal interval enclosed within the bounding surfaces which 
immediately surround it, considered as immovable. 

13. A finite substance may be said to be ubicated or in a 
place in two ways, viz.: (a) Commensurably, when the dimen¬ 
sions of the occupying body correspond to and are measured 
by those of the occupied space so that the whole body occupies 
the whole place and different parts of the body different parts 
of the place. It is in this way that corporeal substances nat¬ 
urally exist in place. 

(b) Incommensurably when the whole substance is whole 
in the whole place and whole in each and every part of it. It is 
only in this way that a finite spiritual substance, e. g., ‘the 
human soul, ’ can be said to be in place. 

Note (1). —Hence an actually extended body is referred 
to place by its quantity, which occupies a definite determinate 
amount of space. A finite spirit, on the contrary, is related to 
place not by its quantity (for it has none), but by its energy or 
activity, which can be exercised within certain limits but not 
beyond them. 

(2).—There is another mode of presence in a place, which 
we know of only through revelation. It may be called sacra¬ 
mental ubication and is realized in the Blessed Eucharist. The 
Body of Our Lord is not referred to place by its own quantity 
or activities, but by the quantity (miraculously sustained) of 
the bread which has been trans-substantiated. How this is 
accomplished we do not know. Reason is simply silent in 
presence of the mystery and has nothing to say for or against it. 




189- 


(3).—Whatever may be said in favor of the intrinsic pos¬ 
sibility of an absolute vacuum , it seems sufficiently certain that 
no such thing exists in the actual universe; else we could not 
rationally account for universal attraction, the diffusion of 
heat, light, electricity, etc. 


Article II. —Motion. 

14. Change.— (a) A thing is said to be changed when it 
has become in some way different from what it was before, 
i. e., when it has gained or lost some perfection. Hence the 
idea of change implies three elements, viz.: a previous con¬ 
dition of the thing, a new condition, the thing itself which has 
passed from the one condition to the other; or, as they say, a 
term from which, a term to which, and a subject which passes 
from the one to the other. In every change, then, we conceive 
something which ceases to be; something which begins to be; 
and something which remains constant and common to both 
terms. 

(b) If one complete substance wholly ceases to be in 
order to give place to another and only the same accidents 
remain constant, the change is called Trans-substantiation. If 
one substantial form gives place to another in the same pri¬ 
mordial matter, we have what is called a Substantial Change. 
If the same complete substance remains and the difference 
regards only its accidents , we have an Accidental Change. 

(c) Again, when the terms, from one to the other of 
which, the subject passes, are contradictorily opposed—A and 
not-A—the passage from the one to the other is called an 
Instantaneous Change; inasmuch, as on merely leaving one 
term, the subject must necessarily be in the other. On the other 
hand, if the opposition between the terms is merely one of 
contrarity, and that in a broad sense of the word, i, e., so that 




-190- 

there is an assignable mean between them, e. g., ‘10 deg. C., 
and 20 deg. C.,’ the change is called Successive; inasmuch as 
the subject, on leaving 10 deg. C., must pass through all the 
grades of the interval one after another before reaching 20 
deg. C. Now this successive change, if continuous, i. e., with¬ 
out stop or break from starting point to goal, is what is called 
Movement or Motion. 

(d) But before going on to analyze more fully this idea 
of motion we must notice one or two axioms which hold true of 
every changeable Being:—- 

1st—Every mutable Being is of its nature a potential 
Being; for, it is of its nature in a state of potency as to the 
possession or privation of a given perfection. 

2d—Every mutable Being is, so far forth, an imperfect 
Being; inasmuch as it either has not the perfection in question; 
or if it has it is at least capable of losing it. 

3d—That a mutable Being may pass from the state of 
privation to the possession of a given perfection, the positive 
action of an efficient cause is needed; else, we should have an 
effect without a cause: while, on the contrary, to pass from 
possession to private, it would suffice that the causal action 
which maintained the given perfection in existence be sus¬ 
pended. 

15. Motion.— (a) All change then involves a transition 
from potentiality to act; and, if this transition is successive and 
continuous , we have Movement. Hence, Aristotle defines 
motion as ‘ The act of that which is potential, inasmuch as it is 
potential. ’ The Being in process of change has left the state of 
mere potency, but has not yet arrived at the term towards 
which it is unceasingly advancing; and, therefore, its motion 
is but a partial and incomplete actuation of its potentiality in 
regard to that term. When, then, motion is said to be an Act, 
our attention is called to the prior state of potentiality which is 




■191 


constantly being' left behind: while, the words, of a Being in 
potency inasmuch as it is in potency, remind us that, though 
our subject has emerged from a mere state of potentiality, its 
actuation in regard to the term towards which it is tending is 
not yet complete. 

(b) The two characteristics, then, of motion are suc¬ 
cession and continuity; it is the passage of a thing successively, 
i. e., one after another, through all the parts of the interval 
between two terms without break or halt. Hence, the difference 
and the similarity between continuous quantity and motion. 
They differ in this, that the parts into which extension is divis¬ 
ible exists simultaneously; while the parts into which motion is 
divisible exist successively. They are alike in this, that as it is 
impossible to assign, even in thought, a minimum of extension 
which is not conceivable as capable of still further division, 
so it is impossible to conceive a minimum of motion which is 
not further divisible: a point, if we may say so, of motion, like 
a point of extension, has no entity of its own apart from that 
of the preceding and succeeding parts which it connects or 
terminates. 

16. Time.— (a) As for the perception of continuous 
extension in the world around us, we rise to the concept of 
space; so from the perception of motion within and without us, 
we elaborate our idea of time. What, then, is time ? 

Duration, in general, is defined as Permanence or perse¬ 
verance in existence. Now, we can conceive a Being as exist¬ 
ing without beginning, without end and without change or 
possibility of change in its substance or action so that it is abso¬ 
lutely, and in every sense the same forever without any shadow 
of difference in its full and simultaneous possession of all- 
perfect life. This duration is eternity in the strict sense of the 
word; and it belongs to God alone. 

On the other hand, we can conceive a thing whose existence 
is rather a continuous becoming and ceasing than an abiding 




192- 


fact, i. e., whose existence is had only by parts, and in such a 
way that each preceding part ceases to be, just as the succeed¬ 
ing part begins, yet without break or interruption in the con¬ 
tinuous succession of Before and After. Such is the successive 
duration of motion which gives us our idea of time. 

Now, the whole corporeal universe and everything in it is 
in a continual state of change or motion. From the perception 
of this concrete motion we naturally rise to the abstract con¬ 
cept of one uniformly flowing motion whose successive duration 
is conceived as co-existing with and measuring the various 
motions of all actual or possible moving things. This is the 
concept of absolute or ideal time. 

That portion of this ideal evenly flowing successive dura¬ 
tion which has been, or is, or will be co-existent with the actual 
motion of concrete existing things is what is called real time. 

Time, then, as we have already said of space, is neither a 
mere baseless fiction of the imagination; nor yet, on the other 
hand, is it an independent entity in itself standing out apart 
from the concrete motion of actual or possible moving sub¬ 
stances. Wliat is conceived, i. e., actual or possible successive 
duration, is real and objectively realized or realizable, but not 
precisely in the manner in which it is conceived, i. e., as a mere 
successive duration whose onward uninterrupted flow is inde¬ 
pendent of and embraces and measures the concrete duration of 
all moving things. 

(b) Wherever, then, there is continuous change or move¬ 
ment, there is successive duration; and, wherever there is suc¬ 
cessive duration, there is real time; and hence, as each chang¬ 
ing moving thing in the corporeal universe has its own changes 
and motion, so it has its own intrinsic time. But just as we 
take one fixed standard of extension to measure the extension 
of other things, so we can take one particular actual motion 
to measure the duration of all other motion that takes place 




-193- 


around us. Hence, as the motion of the heavenly bodies is the 
most even and uninterrupted we can find, we take its regular 
succession as the measure of our time. 

Note (1).—A being is said to exist in time inasmuch as it 
undergoes successive change or motion. 

A being which endures unchanged along with other beings 
which are in time may be said to co-exist with time. It has and 
is (all that it has and is) unchangeably without any succession 
in itself, and its simple unaltered duration is virtually equiva¬ 
lent to the imperfect successive duration of all possible chang¬ 
ing things. 

(2).—The word Present is used in many senses in regard 
to time. Sometimes we mean an interval of time part of which 
is past and part of which is yet to follow, e. g., the present 
century, ‘ year, ’ ‘ day, ’ etc. Sometimes we mean that small por¬ 
tion of time which passes while we think or say Now. In 
strictness, however, the present is that indivisible point which 
has itself no duration, but is conceived as a limit connecting 
the past' and future. “Time speeds onward,” says Seneca, 
‘ ‘ what is past is not mine, nor what is future; all of existence 
that is really mine consists of a point of fleeting time. ’ ’ 

If we find it hard to explain to ourselves or to another, 
what time is, St. Augustine’s words may console us: “What 
is time ? If no one asks me, I know; but if I am asked, and I 
try to explain, then I know not. ’ ’ 

17. Turning now from motion in the abstract to the 
actual world of corporeal things in which we live, we find 
that is is a world of ceaseless change and motion. The mate¬ 
rial of which it is made is in constant circulation, now borne 
upwards to become living rosebuds or human hearts and brains, 
and then, as if by an inevitable law, returning to the lowly 
condition of dead dust. Take any one of the most familiar 
substances around us, e . g., ‘the post to which you tie your 




-194 


horse’; what a volume it would take to chronicle the changes 
it undergoes in a single day! How much space it has passed 
through, as it moves forward with the moving earth! how per¬ 
sistently it has been enticed to move this way and that by the 
manifold attractions of its fellow bodies! how it has been 
affected and modified by their chemical activities! how it has 
expanded and contracted in the heat and cold, etc., etc.! 

All these changes that take place in corporeal substance, 
as such, may be grouped under two general heads, viz.: Sub¬ 
stantial and Accidental Changes; and these latter again may 
be subdivided into Local, Qualitative and Quantitative changes. 

A brief word, then, on each of these four kinds of change, 
and we shall dismiss the subject of corporeal motion. 

18. Substantial Change.—The ultimate inner nature of 
a Being is manifested to us by its properties and actions, as the 
source is revealed by the stream. Hence chemistry, as well as 
the common sense of mankind, makes similarity or difference 
in specific properties the test of similarity or difference in 
substance. Now, it is a matter of every day experience that 
certain substances may be so transformed as to acquire wholly 
different properties so that no trace of their former specific 
character remains, e. g., to take a most obvious instance, ‘hy¬ 
drogen burns readily in the air, and oxygen supports com¬ 
bustion better than the air; while the properties of water into 
which they may be transformed are quite different and even 
opposite.’ Hence, we argue that since the specific properties 
are different, the sources from which they flow are different; 
and that, therefore, the substantial natures are different; and 
consequently that in such transformations we have true sub¬ 
stantial changes. 

Here, then, as in every change, something has passed from 
one condition to another—something from being one substance 
has become another—the source of the old specific properties 
has given place to a new one from which new specific proper- 




195- 


ties proceed. Now, that determinable potential constituent 
which remains constant and common in both substances is 
called Primordial or Ultimate Matter, while the old determin¬ 
ing actuating constituent that has passed away and the new 
one that has taken its place are called Substantial Forms. 

Whatever may be said of the character of these two in¬ 
trinsic constituents of corporeal substance—and we are not con¬ 
cerned to say anything here—their existence is a fact which we 
cannot ignore: there is a Material Cause which remains con¬ 
stant in both terms of a substantial change, and there is a 
Formal Cause which is different in each. 

Note (1). —It is not necessary to call attention to the 
difference between a Mixture, e. g., ‘gun powder,’ and a Com¬ 
pound, e. g., ‘water’; the former is a mere aggregate, or col¬ 
lection of heterogeneous substances; the latter is strictly one 
homogeneous substance. 

(2) .—When chemistry writes, e. g., ‘water as I1 2 0,’ the 
meaning is not that these substances are actually there, which 
would be contrary to all experience, but that they are poten¬ 
tially or better virtually there. Just as when some misfortune 
befalls a newly sown field which destroys the seed, the farmer 
may complain that he has lost his crop, though, in strict truth, 
he has lost not an actual, but only a potential or virtual crop. 

(3) .—Composite bodies have spectra of their own differ¬ 
ent from those of their components. In the cases where the 
spectra of the original elements are clearly detected, the condi¬ 
tions are such (extreme heat, etc.) that we are justified in 
saying that the compound substance, as such, has ceased to 
exist, i. e., that it has been decomposed into the primitive sub¬ 
stances from whose substantial transformation it originated. 

(4) .—Substantial change is effected in two ways, viz.: by 
combination when two substances, e. g., ‘H and O’ unite to 
form a third substance, water, different from either; or by 





-196- 

assimilation, when a living being transforms by its nutritive 
powers other substances into its own. 

(5).—The transformed substances are said to exist vir¬ 
tually in the compound, i. e., the compound has been formed 
from them and can be resolved into them. - 

19. Quantitative Change.—Actual extension we have 
already said is a connatural property of all corporeal substan¬ 
ces. In virtue of this property and of the cohesive and resist¬ 
ive forces which accompany it, the parts into which a body is 
divisible are held together in continuous unity and maintain 
their occupation of a portion of space against each other and 
against all other bodies. Now, apart from these changes of real 
volume in living Beings consequent on nutrition, etc., it is 
necessary, as we have already said (8), to admit, not merely 
apparent , but real rarefaction and condensation, i. e., of a per¬ 
fectly continuous solid, in inorganic substances in order to 
account, on the one hand, for the possibility of rectilinear 
motion, and, on the other, for the propagation of light, for 
universal attraction, elasticity, etc. 

For either the corporeal universe is a perfect Plenum of 
inelastic particles; and then how account for the possibility of 
free rectilinear motion? Or there are parts of actual space 
perfectly vacant; and then how account for universal attrac¬ 
tion, for the propagation of light, etc., across the Vacuua? 

Here Quantitative Change, or real rarefaction and con¬ 
densation, is one of the commonest phenomena in nature, and, 
as might naturally be supposed, accompanies more or less all 
other accidental modifications of quantified corporeal sub¬ 
stances. Indeed, it is clear that an extended substance cannot 
be intrinsically modified without having its extension in some 
way or other affected by the change. 

20. Local Motion.—The passage of a body from one 
place (11) to another is called local motion. If the whole body 




197- 


changes its place, we have what is called Molar Motion. If 
the whole body maintains the same relative place, while only its 
continuous parts are rarified and condensed successively, and 
so change their relative places, we have what is called Molecu¬ 
lar Motion. 

Now, apart from the Spontaneous Motion of the animal 
world—obvious sufficient reason of which is found in facul¬ 
ties of the living Being, which are clearly distinct from the 
mere change of place—we say that, even in inorganic bodies, 
local motion is inexplicable, unless we admit the existence, in 
the moving body, of a real physical quality which is not the 
mere change of place, but its efficient cause. 

Let us roughly illustrate what we mean. Take a baseball 
lying at rest in the field. It will never move itself, hut it has 
the capacity or potentiality to be moved; and if you once 
actuate that potentiality, it will, if unhindered, keep the even 
tenor of its way long after the pitcher’s name is forgotten. An 
impulse, or force, or quality has been actuated in it which will 
bear it on in a straight line forever with a steady velocity, un¬ 
less some opposing force intervene to stop it or turn it aside. 

Now, this impulse, or propelling force is something in¬ 
trinsic in the moving body which is the immediate efficient 
cause of its continuous change of place. Hence, local motion, 
whether molar or molecular, implies an active force actuated in 
the moving body which is not local motion, but its cause. 
“Motion,” as Silliman puts it, “requires a force to maintain it, 
as well as to produce it. ’ ’ 

21. Qualitative Change.—All the remaining absolute 
accidents (51) or corporeal substance as such may be classed 
under one common head as Qualities, e. g., ‘shape,’ ‘color,’ 
‘taste,’ ‘heat,’ ‘electricity,’ etc. Now, if these things are ob¬ 
jectively what our normally disposed faculties perceive them 
to be—and we cannot deny it without taking up a position 




-198- 

which leads to absolute scepticism—then, the existence of Qual¬ 
itative Changes in the corporeal world is an obvious fact. 

That these changes affecting as they do extended bodies 
in space should be accompanied by local change, molecular or 
molar, in the modified body, is, as we have said (18), to be 
expected. Nay, that to every qualitative change a certain meas¬ 
ure of quantitave or local change should so exactly correspond, 
that the measure of one may be taken as the symbol of the 
other, is but what we should anticipate. But if one should go 
on to confound the two and say, e. g., that different colors are 
merely different modes of local motion, he would be perpetrat¬ 
ing the puerile sophism, that because two things are invariably 
associated, therefore, one of them is the other. 

For the rest, we might ask him, how does he know of the 
existence of the local motion? If he will not trust his senses 
when they tell him of the objectivity of light, color and heat 
why should he trust their testimony to the existence of local 
motion ? 

Hence, as we do not object to a chemist using a certain 
formula for a compound substance, which expresses not what 
it is, but what it may be resolved into; so we do not object to a 
physicist’s expressing the various qualities of bodies, as far as 
may be, in terms of local motion, provided it be understood 
that the formula represents, not the quality in question, but its 
invariable concomitant , or, perhaps we might better say, effect. 

22. So much then for the four kinds of change or motion. 
(Though substantial changes are not strictly Motion, still they 
imply motion, or successive Qualitative change, preparatory to 
the education of the new Substantial form). 

Now, as all change implies a transition from potentiality 
to act, and as such transition can only be effected by active 
forces actually exercising their energies, it follows that there 
are constantly at work in the corporeal world a variety of act¬ 
ive as different in their specific character as these changes are, 





-199- 

On the other hand, these active forces could effect nothing, 
if there were not corresponding capacities or potentialities in 
material substances, reducible to act; the greatest artist cannot 
make a statue out of mere water. 

Hence, recalling what we said in General Metaphysics 
(67 c) about the efficiency of Secondary Causes we conclude 
that the corporeal substances around us are really endowed 
with a vast variety of active and passive properties by the 
efficiency and actuation of which all the wonderful cosmic 
changes we behold are produced. 

But though all these cosmic phenomena result immediately 
from the efficiency of material forces; yet the measure, har¬ 
mony, uniformity and constancy,—the finality , in a word—of 
the world’s motion as a whole can find its sufficient reason only 
in an Intelligence which has so adapted these blind activities 
and potentialities and so ordered their mutual relations that 
all work together for the universal good (Metaphysics, 71). 

23. The Laws of Nature.—A law is primarily, A per¬ 
manent rule of action. Now ordinary experience shows us that 
the irrational natures around us follow uniformly and con¬ 
stantly each its own fixed mode of action, and hence, these con¬ 
stant uniform modes of action are called Laws of Nature. 
That many of these laws are known to us with certainty is 
also clear. 

But we may ask further, how far are these laws neces¬ 
sary? As the very existence of finite beings is contingent, of 
course their action is also, absolutely speaking, a contingent 
fact. But supposing their existence and the existence of a 
final cosmic order freely determined by the Creator, how far 
is their mode of action necessary? To this we may answer 
again, that supposing certain conditions present, the mode of 
action of irrational beings is necessary, i. e., the laws of nature 
are conditionally necessary. The conditions of which we speak 




200 


are chiefly—(1) the absence of impediment to or interference 
with the natural action of the agent, (2) the presence of the 
ordinary divine preserving and concurring influence. Hence 
in a particular case the free Omnipotence of God can hinder, 
neutralize, elevate or otherwise modify the action of the crea¬ 
ture for wise and worthy ends. Such a particular instance of 
deviation from the ordinary rule of action of a corporeal being 
can be recognized as easily as any other obvious fact, and upon 
proper examination of all the circumstances, can be known to 
be due to divine interference, on the principle that every effect 
must have a proportionate cause. 


CHAPTER II. 

The Intrinsic Constituents of Corporeal Substance. 
This chapter may be divided into three articles, viz.:— 

I. —-The State of the Question; 

II. —Unsatisfactory theories; 

III. —Hylomorphism. 


Article I.—State of the Question. 

24. From what we have said in the preceding chapter, we 
may, in general, describe a body as A substance which connat- 
urally possesses continuous extension of three dimensions, and 
is endowed with certain activities of powers of producing 
change in other Beings like itself. But reason will not rest 
satisfied with a mere generic description: it seeks a Real Defi¬ 
nition. A knowledge of properties will not suffice: we want 
to know what the substantial thing is to which the properties 
belong; seeing the stream we wish to know its source. 




201 


We are in search, then, of a theory as to the ultimate 
inner nature of corporeal substance, as such. Now, it would 
seem to be sufficiently obvious that we are not at liberty to 
construct a theory of the nature of bodies a priori, and then to 
force the facts with which all men are familiar into harmony 
with it; rather surely, the other way about, the familiar facts 
are the secure fixed data, while the value of a theory will de¬ 
pend wholly on its capacity rationally to account for them. 
Yet this plain rule is only too often forgotten. Theories are 
daily invented and obtruded upon us, in regard to the intrinsic 
nature of corporeal substances, which, far from explaining, 
contradict the manifest facts; and when the plain man remon¬ 
strates that he with the rest of mankind is conscious of per¬ 
ceiving the facts, he is calmly told, 11 So much the worse for the 
facts and for mankind that perceives them: they are mere 
illusions of sense. ’ ’ 

25. Before proposing, then, any theory as to the ultimate 
forces corresponding to the various changes taking place, and 
intrinsic nature of bodies let us set before us clearly and briefly 

one or two classes of facts which such a theory is bound 
to harmonize with and explain. 

(a) We have first, what we may call the Antinomies of 
corporeal substances, e. g ., in one and the same substance, the 
unity and multiplicity involved in its continuous extension; its 
elective affinities and antipathies; its inertia and passivity 
on the one hand and its aggressive activity on the other, etc., 
etc. 

(b) We have cohesion, elasticity, gravitation, universal 
attraction and the other physical properties common to all 
bodies to account for. 

(c) We have, again, what are called Chemically Simple 
substances, i. e., those which are not chemically resolvable into 
specifically different substances, e. g., ‘H.,’ ‘0.,’ ‘C.,’ etc, 
which though generally alike in possessing extension, divisi- 




- 202 - 

bility, mobility and many other properties common to all 
bodies; yet are specifically different in density, affinities, active 
and passive properties, etc. 

(d) Lastly, we have substantial changes (18) of two 
or more chemically simple substances into a new compound 
substance wholly different in specific properties from any or 
all of the components, yet resolvable into them and into them 
alone by chemical analysis, and so, virtually, though not for¬ 
mally, containing them. “Bear in mind that when we say that 
water is composed of H. and 0., we mean no more than this, 
that by various chemical processes these two substances can 
be produced from water. * # * We cannot say that water 

consists of Id. and 0. # * In all instances of true 

chemical union and decomposition, the qualities of the sub¬ 
stances concerned in the process entirely disappear, and 
wholly different substances with new qualities appear in their 
place. ”* 

Finally, these substantial changes are not effected at ran¬ 
dom, but require the combination of certain determniate sub¬ 
stances according to fixed invariable laws of Definite Propor¬ 
tions, Multiple Proportion, etc. 

26. Independently, then, of any hypothesis, we are safe 
in making the following syllogisms as to the ultimate nature 
of all corporeal substances. 

(a) Properties which are not only different, but diamet¬ 
rically opposite, imply a difference in the substantial sources 
from which they flow. But the unity and multiplicity, the 
activity and passivity, etc., which are characteristic of every 
corporeal substance, etc., are properties not only different but 
mutually contradictory. Therefore, there is a certain dualism 
or composition in the ultimate intrinsic nature of every cor- 


# Cooke, “The New Chemistry,” p. 98-99. 





—- 203 - 

poreal substance which a satisfactory theory of the nature of 
bodies must account for. 

(b) If in a given class of substances there are certain 
properties common and constant in every individual of the 
class, while certain other properties are 'peculiar and constant 
in different groups of these individuals, then, the inner sub¬ 
stantial nature of all these substances is composed of two 
principles, one of which is homogeneous and the source of 
their generic likeness; the other, heterogeneous and the source 
of their specific difference. But it is a fact, that there are 
certain properties common to all corporeal substances, and 
certain others peculiar in different species of them. There¬ 
fore, all corporeal substances are composed of two principles, 
etc. 


(c) In every substantial change, we must account for 
two distinct substantial principles, one of which is generic and 
constant in both terms of the change, the other differential 
and specific w T hich in union with the generic common element 
constitutes a complete substance of this or that peculiar spe¬ 
cies. But all corporeal substances are susceptible of substan¬ 
tial change. Therefore, in all corporeal substances we must 
account for the existence of two distinct substantial compo- 
ponents. 

27. To account for this substantial dualism in the nature 
of bodies is a problem which has occupied the attention of 
thinking men as far back as the history of philosopohy ex¬ 
tends : and well it may; for, the answer to it will express the 
relation in which the Mind and Matter of which man himself 
is composed stand to each other. 

Setting aside the Idealism which would make the whole 
substantial universe a mere illusory projection of the Ego upon 
a background of nothingness, and the Pantheism which main¬ 
tains that all bodies are nothing but the one eternal substance 




- 204 - 

of God evolving, modifying and variously manifesting itself, 
all views on the subject may be reduced to one or other of 
the three famous theories: Atomism, Dynamism and Hylo- 
morphism. If antiquity be a fault or newness a merit in a 
theory, all three have about equal claims on our consideration; 
for, all three come to us from Ancient Greece. 

The Atomic theory may be said to have been first pro¬ 
posed as a system by Democritus (about 400 B. C.) ; and Tait 
tells us that, as to what corporeal substance is, modern Atomism 
“know T s no more than Democritus or Lucretius did.” The 
origin of the Dynamic theory is ascribed to Pythagoras (about 
5550 B. C.) ; it has never been popular, “rather a hobby of 
esoteric circles, than an accepted theory in schools of science. ’ ’ 
Hylomorpkism dates from Plato and Aristotle (about 350 
B. C.). Evolved and perfected by SS. Augustine and Thomas 
this theory has always held a prominent place in the history 
of philosophy. 

We now proceed to examine briefly these various theories. 


Article II— Atomism and Dynamism. 

28. Both these systems agree in supposing all bodies to 
be mere aggregations of immutable indivisible units, but they 
differ in the account they give of the character of these ulti¬ 
mate units. Atomism postulates atoms of mass; while Dyna¬ 
mism would construct the material universe out of atoms of 
mere force. 

29. Pure Atomism, or as Tyndall calls it, “the mechan¬ 
ically intelligent theory of Dalton,” supposes all bodies to 
consist of very minute perfectly hard particles, “extended 
pieces of matter,” in fact, “with shape and motion, intelligible 
subjects of scientific investigation.” These particles, or mass 
atoms, have no inherent forces or activities of their own: they 




205 


are merely the passive subjects or recipients of local motion 
of great velocity and complexity. Tait, for instance, tells us 
that in a mass of H, at ordinary temperature and pressure, 
each of these minute particles is moving at the rate of seventy 
miles a minute and collides with other particles and, there¬ 
fore, changes its direction 17,700,000,000 times in a second. 
"Where this motion comes from, we are not told, except that 
it does not come from the particle itself, but is communicated 
to it from without. 

As to the nature of these particles there has been much 
variety of opinion among atomists. The common tendency 
at present is to regard them as perfectly homogeneous , either 
all of hydrogen, or all of ether, or of some other kin of Cosmic 
Vapor, or Cosmic Dust, or Perfect Fluid, which is supposed 
to fill all space. All the various so-called substances in nature, 
simple as well as compound, all their differences, and all their 
physical and chemical properties “result,’’ Herbert Spencer 
says, “from differences of arrangement (and local motion) 
arising from the compounding and recompounding of ultimate 
homogeneous units.” 

Sir John Herschel describes the whole theory briefly, as 
‘ ‘ one that resolves the entire assemblage of natural phenomena 
into the mere knocking about of inconceivably minute billiard 
balls (or cubes, or tetrahedrons if that be preferred) which 
once set in motion and abandoned to their mutual encounters 
and impacts work out the totality of natural phenomena.”* 

Note (1).—This theory when it is assumed, as is often 
the case, to account for all the phenomena material, vital and 
intellectual, with which we are familiar is called Materialism. 
It is the starting-point and fundamental assumption of all 
thorough-going evolution. “As we now understand it,” writes 
H. Spencer, “evolution is definable as a change from an in- 


# “ Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects,” p. 463. 





-206- 

coherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity accompany¬ 
ing the dissipation of motion and integration of matter.” 

(2).—The reader will observe the vast difference between 
the Philosophical Atomism, and the Atomic Theory with which 
he is familiar in the common text-books of chemistry. Of this 
latter we shall have a word to say presently. 

30. Now setting aside for the moment all vital 
phenomena, is this theory, with its inert homogeneous atoms 
and purely passive local motion, a satisfactory explanation 
even of the inanimate material world in which we live? 

We think not; and, for the following out of many reasons 
which will naturally suggest themselves to anyone who gives 
any thought to the question. 

1st.—It does not answer our question, what are the in¬ 
trinsic constituents of corporeal substances? It tells us that 
all bodies are made up—of what? Of other little bodies each 
of which, as being an extended piece of matter , exhibits in its 
unity and divisibility, i. e., its continuous quantity, in its co¬ 
hesion and resistive force the intrinsic dualism or corporeal 
substance just as truly as a mountain does. 

2d.—It explains all the manifold properties and activities 
of things by mere varieties in the position and motion of the 
inactive particles of the homogeneous atomic mass, i. e., its 
explanation is a denial of what it undertakes to explain. ‘ ‘ The 
Kinetic theory,” says W. Thompson, “gives not even a sug¬ 
gestion towards explaining the properties in virtue of which 
the atoms or molecules influence one another.” And, in an¬ 
other place, the same great physicist declares that the theory 
“ is a dream and can be nothing else until it can explain chem¬ 
ical affinity, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, etc., ’ ’ which it 
is plain it cannot do; for, no number of inactive zeros, arrange 
them as you will, will ever give you an active unit. 





-207- 


3d.—In like manner, it explains away all the substantial 
differences between bodies by simply denying them. Gold and 
iron, water and coal-oil, sugar and strychnine, chalk and cheese 
are simply one and the same substance with the slight acci¬ 
dental difference that the particles are variously grouped and 
are “knocked about” in various directions and with various 
velocities. Finally, we are left without even a suggestion as to 
why each chemical element is limited by nature to a select list 
of admissible companions; and the terms of its partnership (as 
to definite proportions, etc.) with every one of them are so 
strictly prescribed that no power in nature can alter them 
by the most trivial fraction. 

31. If one asks how such a theory could ever be ac¬ 
cepted, and become popular among reasonable men, the rea¬ 
son may be found: 

1st—In the natural tendency of the mind to reduce all 
things to some sort of unity and harmony; 

2d—In the tendency, equally strong, in our modern minds 
to do so in the easiest possible way without any very serious 
regard to the strictness of our method; hence, as the knocking 
about of billiard balls is a phenonemon familiar to most people, 
the formula Matter and Motion is a delightfully simple syn¬ 
thesis of all physical and chemical knowledge; 

3d—Lastly, the fact that it is not unpleasant for a troubled 
conscience to be permitted to hope that perhaps itself and its 
bad thoughts and deeds as well as its good ones are mere 
“ modes of atomic motion over which no fellow has any con¬ 
trol,” may have contributed somewhat to the popularity of 
materialism. 

32. As pure Atomism admits matter only and no force, 
so Dynamism will have force only and no matter. Instead of 
of solid particles with mass, shape and size, it recognizes only 
mathematical points or force-centers dotted about in space and 




-208- 


influencing one another, not by impact, but by action at a dis¬ 
tance. If you can imagine an attraction (or repulsion) without 
any solid thing which attracts or is repelled; if you can localize 
this disembodied attraction in a mathematical point, and make 
it subject to the influence of other similar attractions; you can 
have some idea of a dynamical force-atom. 

If you can make up your mind that such unextended force- 
atoms actually exist, and that all that we call corporeal sub¬ 
stance is a mere aggregation of them; and that the difference 
between one body (simple or compound) and another, arises 
from a mere difference in the grouping and interplay of these 
mathematical force-atoms; then, you are a dynamist. 

Your explanation of bodies refines away from the universe 
everything corresponding to our notion of corporeal substance: 
you deny extension and all substantial differences and changes: 
you reduce all our sense-perceptions to illusions: and hence, 
we cannot accept your theory. Though we may not enter with 
full sympathy into the first two items of Bossuet’s criticism of 
it, we cannot help agreeing with the last when he says that it 
is “nova, pulchra, falsa.” 

33. We are compelled, therefore, to reject the purely 
Atomic and Dynamic hypotheses; because both fail to ac¬ 
count for the substantial difference of bodies and for the sub¬ 
stantial changes which are patent facts in nature; and because, 
moreover, the former denies all activities in corporeal sub¬ 
stances, while the latter denies its extension and, we might al¬ 
most say, its very existence. In a word, both fail to account for 
the essential dualism manifested in every body, great and small. 

Yet both have a certain value, as seeking to express half 
truths. Atomism errs by attending only to the characteristics 
of bodies which are on the side of the passive homogeneous 
element in them: Dynamism attends solely to those which are 
on the side of the active element in them. When you synthesize 
both theories by assigning substantial sources of both orders of 




-209- 


phenomena in the intrinsic nature of corporeal substance as 
such, you are at least on the way to a true theory of bodies. 
Now, this is precisely what Hylomorphism does, as we shall try 
to show briefly in the following article. But first a word on 
Chemical Atomism, as it is called. 

34. Chemistry recognizes the existence of some sixty- 
five or seventy specifically different bodies which, so far at 
least, have resisted all attempts to analyze them into chem¬ 
ically simpler bodies. Besides these, it recognizes a vast num¬ 
ber of other specifically different substances each of which on 
analysis, i. e., by the destruction of the compound as such, 
yields two or more of the elemental substances in certain fixed 
proportions. Now, it is assumed and on good grounds that, 
in the act of synthesis or analysis, each of the combining ele¬ 
ment is divided up into the smallest quantitative parts in which 
it is naturally capable of existing. Immediately before actual 
combination, these atoms, as they are called, are, at first, true 
substances of the same nature as the original masses of which 
they are parts, e. g., ‘an atom of II is as truly H as a gallon 
of it.’ These specifically different particles under the influ¬ 
ence of external agents act and react on one another in virtue 
of their mutual affinities until at length the nature of both is 
so altered that we have no longer distinct atoms of different 
substances, but perfectly homogeneous molecules of a new sub¬ 
stance wholly different in properties from any of the original 
components. Hence, the chemist knowing the elemental sub¬ 
stances from which these products spring names them after 
their ancestors, and thus expresses every compound substance 
in terms of two or more of the sixty-seven elements. 

35. So far, we are all with the chemist. But should he 
go on to conclude, that since all bodies can be thus expressed 
in terms of his sixty-seven elements, therefore, the corporeal 
universe is nothing but a vast collection of very small bodies 




- 210 - 

of sixty-seven different kinds and that all compound sub¬ 
stances are mere groups of these small bodies; then, we tell him 
that his conclusion is not philosophical: 

1st—Because it explains an obvious fact (substantial 
change) by gratuitously denying it; and 

2d—That, even omitting this decisive objection, his ex¬ 
planation of the nature of bodies is, at best, penultimate; for, 
each of his sixty-seven elemental bodies exhibits all the dualism 
of an essentially composite substance; and the question is, what 
are its substantial components ? 

Of course, it is quite allowable and very convenient for 
the chemist to express a compound substance in terms of the 
elements from whose chemical combination it is derived: but 
it must always be remembered that in this, Chemical Atomism 
is, as Cooke says, ‘ ‘ only a temporary expedient for representing 
the facts of chemistry to the mind;”* and that, as another 
great modern chemist adds, its symbolism is a device of lan¬ 
guage, not a representation of actual facts.** 


Article III. —Hylomorphism. 

36. As has been said, every phenomenon of the corporeal 
universe asserts the intrinsic dualism of corporeal substance 
and manifests the presence in all bodies of two essential phys¬ 
ical constituents really distinct from each other, viz.: a homo¬ 
geneous material principle which is the source of their divisi¬ 
bility, mass, inertia and other generic properties, and a differ¬ 
ential dynamic principle which is the source of their unity, 
activity, specific properties, etc. 

The former or homogeneous mass-principle, is of itself 


*The New Chemistry, p. 103. 

**Berthelot, Synthese Chimique, p. 167-69. 





- 211 - 

indifferent, potential, determinable as to being this specific sub¬ 
stance or that, and is that constituent of bodies which remains 
common and constant in all substantial changes. The later, or 
differential specific principle, determines the specific principle, 
determines the specific nature of the substance and varies in 
the various substantial changes which bodies undergo. Both 
are incomplete substances from whose intrinsic union a com¬ 
plete corporeal substance or body of this or that specific nature 
results. 

Now if you call the former element Primal or Primordial 
or Ultimate Matter; and, the latter Substantial Form, you have 
in brief the hylomorphic (“matter-and-form”) theory of the 
nature of bodies. 

Of course, many questions remain as to the peculiar char¬ 
acteristics of each of these two ultimate constituents of bodies, 
their mutual relations, the passing away of old and the origin 
of new substantial forms, etc., etc.; but the existence, in bodies 
of a constant and a variable substantial element will not be 
questioned by any one who analyzes the idea of substantial 
change. 

The argument, then, for hylomorphism is based on the 
facts and reasoning given above (25, 26), and it is needless to 
repeat it here. Substantial changes are a fact. In a substantial 
change the subject is something substantial, and so are the con¬ 
stituents lost and gained; else, the change would be merely acci¬ 
dental. That the constant subject and the variable terms are 
really distinct is also clear, since the same matter is actuated 
successively by different forms. 

37. As far as the general answer to the question, What 
are the intrinsic constituents of bodies ? is concerned, we might 
safely leave the matter here; but the mind will feel more sat¬ 
isfied if we can determine a little more precisely the character 
of this Primal Matter and Substantial Form, their relation to 
each other, etc. This we shall try to do very briefly, leaving a 




- 212 - 

large unexplored field for the genius of the philosophic student 
to work in. 

38. As to the ultimate material element of bodies. It 
is not a complete substance but an incomplete constituent of 
substance, the primal, constant, fundamental subject of sub¬ 
stantial changes. It is a positive reality; yet it cannot exist 
alone unactuated by any form and any more than extension can 
exist without a definite shape and figure. It is indestructible 
except by annihilation: no force in nature can do more than 
substantially change it; hence, the law, as it is called, of Con¬ 
servation of Matter, i. e., whatever the change, the new being 
will always give the exact weight of the elements from which 
it is derived. Of itself considered apart from the forms which 
differentiate it, it is perfectly inert and homogeneous, essen¬ 
tially needing some form, yet indifferent to all forms and al¬ 
ways in potency and ready to receive the proportionate action 
which would substantially transform it. It is neither C. nor 
fruit or flesh, but is successively the material basis of them 
all. The senses cannot perceive it: imagination cannot picture 
it: reason alone can apprehend it, and is compelled to recognize 
it as the constant, passive, inert element in the constitution of 
bodies. 

39. As to the formal element. 

(a) It, too, is clearly a constituent of corporeal sub¬ 
stance, not a complete substance in itself. It may be described 
as The ultimate substantial determinant which actuates and 
differentiates primal matter and, by its union with it, consti- 
tntes a complete substance of this or that specific nature. All 
the specific differences with which we are familiar in the 
actions, properties and nature of bodies come from differences 
in their substantial forms. As matter passes up the line of cor¬ 
poreal being from the state of a simple elemental body to the 
condition of living sensitive flesh, it is informed successively 




213 


by a series of substantial forms each of which contains virtu¬ 
ally and excels by a new degree the perfections of the lower 
forms which have gone before it, whose place it takes; just as a 
higher number contains and excels those below it. Hence, we 
have a sort of hierarchy in substantial forms according to which 
the various grades of perfection in corporeal substances are 
determined. 

(b) In the entire cosmic order we can distinguish four 
broad generic grades of substantial forms, viz.: 

1st, Those of inanimate bodies, 2d, the vital principle in 
plants, 3d, the animal soul, 4th, the spiritual soul of Man. Of 
these four orders of substantial forms, the first three, as being 
wholly dependent on matter in their action and, consequently, 
in their existence and origin are called material forms. In 
each of these three orders of forms are included innumerable 
specific diversities in ascending degrees so that the highest 
species of a lower order just touches the boundary-line which 
separates it from the lowest species of the order above. 

The human soul, on the contrary, as being independent of 
matter in its higher characteristic operations and, therefore, 
in its existence, its origin and its destiny is called a spiritual 
form. Hence, in the human body, primordial matter reaches 
its highest level. Here it is informed and constituted a com¬ 
plete substance by its immediate union with a spiritual soul ‘ ‘ a 
little less than the angels,” proceeding immediately from the 
creative hand of God; so that the resultant compound, Man, 
unites within himself the two great words of Spirit and Matter 
into wdiich all creation is divided, and, hence, is well styled a 
Microcosmus or Little Universe. 

(c) The spiritual soul, or substantial form of man, needs, 
as we shall see later on, the immediate creative action of God 
to bring it into existence. But, leaving man out of the ques¬ 
tion, it is clear that in the three lower kingdoms of the irra- 




-214- 

tional world, new substantial forms are constantly coming into 
existence, while others are as constantly disappearing. 

Now, whence do these forms come? whither do they go? 
how are they produced in matter ? An analogy drawn from a 
common accidental change will help us to understand the an¬ 
swer. Take a cube of soft wax and carefully model it into the 
shape of a rose. The new shape is something; for, it has cost 
you labor to produce it, and, if you are only skilful enough, 
it has given the wax a market value much greater than it had 
before. Now, whence this new perfection? You will say and 
rightly that the aptitude or passive potency of the wax and the 
action of the artist are sufficient to account for the new figure; 
or, in technical language, if you prefer it, that the rose-shape 
has been educed out of the potentiality of the wax by the action 
of a competent efficient cause. If, again, I ask you, what has- 
become of the cubic form which the wax originally had and 
lament that you have annihilated it, you will answer that you 
have done nothing of the kind, that though it is not actually 
there—since wax cannot, at the same time, be rose-shaped and 
cubic—yet it is potentially there and can be had back again by 
a little effort on the part of an efficient cause. 

Finally, before leaving our simile, notice (1) that the wax 
is of its nature indifferent as to what shape it may have; (2) 
that it must always have some shape; (3) that it cannot have 
two different shapes, e. g ., ‘of a rose and a cube,’ at the same 
time; (4) that, while actually in any given shape, it is still in 
potency to receive any of the other innumerable shapes which 
the artist’s skill can give it; (5) that the change from one 
shape to another may require more or less manipulation on the 
part of the efficient cause , e. g., ‘it is easier to change our cube 
into a tetrahedron than into the figure of a rose’; (6) that the 
wax needs the action of a competent efficient cause external to 
itself to effect any change in its shape. 

Now we can apply all this to what is called the Passive 
Evolution of Matter, if we only bear in mind that, in substan- 




215- 


tial changes, there is question of the ultimate inner nature of 
the body, not of its outer visible accidents. 

Primal matter, of itself and theoretically considered, is in¬ 
different to any of the innumerable substantial forms which 
can complete it as a substance and make it a body of this or 
that specific nature, e. g., ‘ C’ or ‘human flesh. ’ Yet it never ex¬ 
ists alone, but is always actuated by some form. It cannot, 
however, be at once actuated by two forms; else, it would be 
two specifically different substances at the same time. But 
while actuated by one form it is still in potency to receive any 
other form. Yet it is not always in proximate potency to re¬ 
ceive every form, e. g ., ‘matter under the pure elemental forms 
of C. H. 0. and N without intermediate substantial changes, 
would be but doubtful nourishment for man or beast. 7 Hence, 
there is a fixed order in nature, according to which matter is 
gradually elevated from lower to higher substances. Again, 
even when matter is in proximate potency (owing to the sub¬ 
stantial form by which it is actuated) for a new substantial 
form, it is not by every agent that the new form can be educed, 
e. g., ‘only a horse can transform barley into horse-flesh. 7 
Lastly, when in matter thus proximately disposed, a new and 
higher form takes the place of the lower one preceding it 
through the action of proportionate natural causes, the new 
form is not created but educted from the potentiality of the 
matter so disposed. Nor is the old form which passed away 
annihilated, but reduced to potency, and it, with all its charac¬ 
teristic properties and activities, can again be actuated by ef¬ 
ficiency of proportionate causes. 

40. Such, in very brief outline, is the scholastic theory 
of the nature of bodies. It may seem, at first sight, subtle and 
hard to grasp, but when we come to examine it closely and, 
especially, to apply it to the solution of the great problems 
connected with vegetative, animal and human life, we shall find 




that it is forced upon us with overwhelming cogency by the 
inexorable facts of nature. 


CHAPTER III. 

Organic Life. 

Article I.—Organic Life in General. 

41. Definition of Life. —A living being is one which 
moves itself , which acts upon and perfects itself; one whose 
action as a living being begins and ends in itself. 

The essential characteristics of vital action are, therefore, 
spontaneity and immanence as opposed respectively to the 
inertia and transitive activity of inanimate things. 

42. Division. —Hence, we may classify the various 
grades of life with which we are familiar in the world around 
us under three general heads according to the different degrees 
of spontaneity manifested in their vital action:— 

(a) The vital activity may be exercised without cognition 
of any kind on the part of the living being, e. g., 1 a plant sim¬ 
ply assimilates material substances’, i. e., changes them into its 
own living substances and thus develop and reproduce itself. 

(b) Or the self-motion may imply cognition and appe- 
tition of individual material objects on the part of the living 
being, but without liberty , or power of consciously determining 
the end of perceptions, desires, local motion, etc., in regard to 
the individual material objects around it. 

(c) Or finally, the living being may be capable of cog¬ 
nition and appetition of abstract, universalized or ivholly im¬ 
material objects and, consequently, endowed with liberty and 
with the power of apprehending and determining the end of its 
actions. This “perfecta suique potens spontaneitas”—this 




-217- 

self-controlled spontaneity—is the characteristic excellence of 
human life. 

43. Organic Life; i. e., vegetative and sensitive life, is 
exercised in and by a material organism. An organism is a 
natural material structure composed of various parts (organs) 
each of which exercises a special function in relation to the 
life of self-motion of the whole. The organism at first con¬ 
sists of a single cell of protoplasm which nourishes and in¬ 
creases itself by assimilation of external substances and then 
divides so as to form two connected cells. Each of these again 
in turn increases, divides, etc., until the whole organism of 
cellular tissue is built up according to a fixed specific type. 

44. Essential Difference between living organisms and 
non-living bodies. 

(a) In Origin. Living organisms are produced only by 
living bodies of their own specific type. 

(b) In Development. By nutrition and growth they con¬ 
struct and preserve themselves according to a certain morpho¬ 
logical type within certain limits of size and during a certain 
limited time, after which they decay and disintegrate, even 
though all external conditions remain the same. 

(c) In the variety of functions exercised by different 
parts of the same organic body. 

(d) In the mutual interdependence of the different parts 
of the organism, so that all the organs constantly and per se 
act for one ultimate result—the development, preservation and 
propagation of the whole organic being. 

(e) Lastly and chiefly, in the character of the action of 
the organic being, which is spontaneous and immanent and 
tends, not to equilibrium or rest, but to continual self-perfec¬ 
tive motion. 




-218 


Note.— The formal or dynamic principle of organic life is 
called a soul. 


Article II.— Vegetative Life. 

45. This is the lowest, and in the visible world the most 
universal grade of life. The lowest because least independent 
of matter in its exercise, which consists in the development, con¬ 
servation and propagation of a material organism. The most 
universal, as being common to plants, animals and men. Its 
chief functions are nutrition, increase and propagation of the 
organism. 

46. Nutrition is that function by which a living organism 
converts external substances into its own. This implies various 
operations on the part of the living organism: absorption of 
external substances by roots, leaves, mouth, etc.; digestion , or 
preparation of these raw materials by various elaborate chem¬ 
ical processes; circulation of the food thus elaborated through¬ 
out the organism; and finally, assimilation or conversion of the 
food into the living substance of the organism. This last is 
strictly the act of nutrition or the vital act. The previous 
preparations may be called Vital actions, only inasmuch as they 
are accomplished under the influence and directive power of 
the living organism and for its benefit. 

The purpose and necessity of the nutritive activity in the 
organism is clear. A microscopic germ cannot grow and evolve 
itself into a perfect plant or animal without assimilation or 
intussusception of new material. 

47. Growth or increase is that function by which the 
living being builds up its complete organic structure according 
to a definite morphological type out of the nutriment assimi¬ 
lated. 

48. Generation is that function by which the living 
organism produces out of its own living substance a germ or 




219 


seed capable of evolving itself into a new living organism simi¬ 
lar in specific nature to the parent. 

49. Vegetative Life, therefore, requires a dynamic prin¬ 
ciple in the organism which: 

(a) Modifies, elevates and controls the physico-chemical 
properties of the anorganic matter absorbed, as it passes 
through the various channels which fit it for immediate assimi¬ 
lation ; 

(b) Makes the living organism capable of constant, self- 
perfective action, e. g., ‘development/ ‘continual change and 
renovation of itself’; 

(c) Enables the living organism to communicate to a 
special portion of its own substance a formative power which 
makes the microscopic germ capable of building itself up 
into a complete living organism of the parent type, of pre¬ 
serving and restoring its integrity, and of propagating itself 
indefinitely. 

But such a principle is essentially different from and supe¬ 
rior to the dynamic principle in anorganic bodies. 

Therefore, there is in every living vegetative organism a 
dynamic principle essentially different from and superior to 
the Forms of anorganic substances, i. e., a Vital Principle or 
soul. 

Note (1). —Hence, a living vegetative organism is essen¬ 
tially different from a crystal. In the latter there is no nutri¬ 
tion, growth or generation, as explained above—no immanent 
action of any kind: its development is the result of mere 
external accretion, not of assimilation. 

(2).— Organicism pretends to account for the phenomena 
of vegetable life by the mere grouping and interplay of inani¬ 
mate atoms. But, no mere arrangement of a multitude of dead 
particles can account for one constant, spontaneous, immanent, 
self-perfecting activity. It would not help us at all to account 




- 220 - 

for life to give us a piece of dead protoplasm, even if chemistry 
could succeed in producing it (which it cannot). We can get 
a whole perfectly-organized dead ox any day in the meat mar¬ 
ket. What we want is protoplasm with the power of nutri¬ 
tion, growth and reproduction, i. e., besides organized matter, 
we want a special dynamic principle within it, animating it, in 
order to account for the phenomena of vegetative life. 

Again, it is not the organism that produces life, but life 
that produces, develops, preserves and propagates the organ¬ 
ism. It is as if a little particle of matter should build itself up 
into a perfect watch, keeping itself in constant repair and be 
able to detach from itself little specks of matter, each capable 
of growing into, and reproducing the parent type indefinitely. 
Organization , therefore, far from being the cause , is the effect 
of life. 

(3) .—The physical and chemical forces of matter are 
undoubtedly at work in the living organism, but they can 
account neither for the organism itself nor for its vital action, 
unless a special vital principle be admitted which permanently 
modifies, elevates, controls their action for a fixed end, viz.: 
the development, preservation and reproduction of a living 
organism of a specific type. As a matter of fact, all scientists 
are agreed that no force of chemistry can combine anorganic 
elements so as to form a single cell of protoplasm; much less, a 
living cell; much less, an organism capable of developing, pre¬ 
serving and propagating itself. “It is futile to attempt by 
chemistry to bridge over the chasm between the living and the 
non-living.’’—Du Bois Reymond, “Chemistry can never pro¬ 
duce a leaf, a fruit, a muscle, an organ.”—Berthelot. “All 
scientific experience tells us that life can be produced from a 
living being only.”—Stewart and Tait. (See Maher, Psychol¬ 
ogy, p. 504 seqq.) 

(4) .—Within each living organism there is a non-living 
liquid (blood or sap) in continual circulation to nourish the 




221 - 


organism, and to carry away the material continually being 
detached from the organism. What is called organic or syn¬ 
thetic chemistry has succeeded with difficulty in producing 
some of the non-living elements thus carried upwards or down¬ 
wards by the non-living stream, e. g ., ‘formic acid/ ‘urea,’ etc. 
This is the utmost that chemistry has been able to accomplish 
in regard even to the external products of life, and it does so 
only by means of powerful electric currents or enormous 
temperatures. 

50. In plants there are no organs of sensation, no evi¬ 
dences of perception, feeling, emotion or spontaneous local 
motion. Hence, we are justified in saying that plants have no 
power of sensation. 

The motions of the sensitive plant, fly-trap, etc., are due 
to physical contractility of fibre, etc., under the influence of 
heat, light, friction, etc. The motions of zoospores, anthero- 
zoids, etc., have not that irregularity, intermittence and arbi¬ 
trary change of direction which indicate spontaneous local 
motion. 

51. A fortiori the dynamic principle of merely vege¬ 
tative life is not spiritual, i. e., capable of acting and existing 
by itself apart from matter. For, all the vital operations of 
plant are essentially dependent on the material organism, i. e., 
nutrition, growth and generation are exercised in and through 
the material organism. 

Note. —Hence, the Soul of the plant is not created by a 
special action of God but educed from the potentiality of mat¬ 
ter by the action of a proportionate natural cause, i. e., by a liv¬ 
ing being of the same species, and ceases to exist on the destruc¬ 
tion of the organism. 

52. Natural corporeal substances are specifically distin¬ 
guished from each other, not by the mass-principle in them, 
but by the active or dynamic principle. Plants are natural cor- 




- 222 - 

poreal substances, and the matter of which they are composed 
does not distinguish them from other corporeal substances. In 
fact, it may become C, 0, H, N, as simple elements, or any of 
their combinations. Hence, plants are distinguished by the dy¬ 
namic or life-principle in them, from other corporeal sub¬ 
stances. Hence, the vegetative soul is truly a substantial form— 
the differentiating substantial constituent of the living body. 

Note (1).—Take care not to imagine the plant soul as one 
complete substance indwelling in the organism as in another 
complete substance. In that case the organism would not be 
a living body endowed with immanent activity. The soul of the 
living plant must therefore be conceived as a substantial con¬ 
stituent pervading and vivifying the whole organism whence 
flows the unity, activity and specific properties of the plant. 

(2).—In general, therefore, a Soul may be defined as The 
substantial form of an organized body capable of spontaneous 
immanent action. We say, capable of vital action: because a 
thing may be a living body even though it does not actually 
excerise any vital function, e. g ., ‘hybernating animals/ 
‘frozen fish/ ‘frogs/ etc. 

53. In each individual plant there is but one vital prin¬ 
ciple or soul. For, one vital activity manifests one vital prin¬ 
ciple. But in each separate plant all vital activity constantly, 
naturally and per se tends to one definite result—the develop¬ 
ment, preservation and reproduction of one living organism of 
a fixed specific type. Amid all the variety of parts and func¬ 
tions in the plant, one immanent result is steadily aimed at and 
procured; and this constant ultimate unity of effect demands 
unity of principle as its proportionate cause. 

Note (1).—We said above, each individual plant, because 
we have many instances of numbers of both plants and animals 
living together in connected clusters or colonies, e. g. f ‘corals/ 
‘mosses/ etc. 




-223- 

(2).—The phenomena that sometimes take place on the 
separation of parts from a living organism require a word of 
explanation here. In some cases the separated parts, if cared 
for in a special way, can continue to exercise indefinitely some, 
though not all, of the functions of the original organism, e. g., 
‘a graft of a pear tree, if planted in the earth, will die, hut if 
properly inserted in another suitable tree it will live, grow and 
produce its own species of leaves, fruit, etc.’ In other cases the 
separated parts can live on by themselves and exercise all the 
functions of the original organism, e. g., ‘ branches of the vine, ’ 
‘poplar,’ etc. 

The explanation is this. Each organism begins as a simple 
living cell of protoplasm. This Mother Cell, as it is called, 
increases by nutrition and divides into two cells; these again 
increase, divide, etc., until a whole organism of the parent type 
is built up. These Derived or Daughter-Cells, as they are 
called, are all living matter, but incomplete in themselves and 
destined to form part of some organ, e. g., ‘root,’ ‘fibre,’ etc. 
In the lower grades of plants and animals the whole organism 
is very simple, and when such plants have built up all the 
organs of their simple structure their further growth is but a 
repetition of the whole previous structure. If, then, one of 
these living sections, e. g., ‘of a vine,’ is separated, it possesses 
a complete organism and can put forth roots, etc., and live on 
alone. The vital principle of such a plant is actually one, but 
potentially as manifold as there are completely organized sec¬ 
tions in it, i. e., while the parts are united there is but one vital 
principle in the whole plant, as is evidenced in the mutual in¬ 
terdependence of all the parts upon each other, and upon the 
whole; but when the parts are separated each has enough of 
organization to sustain the vital principle and to live an inde¬ 
pendent life of its own. 

Sometimes no one section is quite complete in itself. It 
may lack, for instance, the power of putting forth roots and 




-224- 

thus acquiring nutriment for itself. But if this deficiency can 
be artificially supplied, e. g ., by properly grafting it on a suit¬ 
able rooted stem from which it can receive its nutritive mate¬ 
rial, it can do all the rest for itself. It will assimilate the nu¬ 
triment and change it into, e. g., pear-wood, produce pears, etc., 
though grafted on quite a different tree. And here again we 
have an instance of “anima vegetatrix, actu una, potentia 
multiplex. ’ ’ 

54. As to the origin of organic life upon the earth, 

the doctrine of Abiogenesis or Spontaneous Generation, i. e., 
the origin of life from the mere grouping and interplay of in¬ 
animate anorganic atoms has been sufficiently refuted above 
(49). No grouping or multiplication of 0’s, no matter how 
long you may continue the process, will give you 1; and in the 
same way no mere grouping of inanimate particles will give 
you a living self-perfective organism. Reason cannot admit an 
effect without a proportionate cause. 

Moreover, all the elaborate experiments of Pasteur, Tyn¬ 
dall, etc., have shown to a certainty that, as Huxley says, “the 
doctrine of biogenesis, ‘life from life,’ is victorious all along 
the line.” 

On the other hand, it is certain from Geogony, or the sci¬ 
ence of the formation of the earth, and from Geology, or the 
science of the material substances of which the crust of the 
earth is composed, that there was a time when organic life did 
not exist upon the earth and was in fact impossible. 

Hence, all life that has appeared since, from monera to 
man, is a caused thing, an effect, and requires a proportionate 
cause. Very little reflection will show us that the ultimate 
living cause of life must be itself uncaused —a self-existent 
eternal life. 

55. Organic life is transmitted by generation, i. e., 

the production by a living organism out of its own living sub¬ 
stance of a new living being specifically similar to itself, i. e., 




-225 


of a new being having within itself the power of developing 
itself into a complete organism specifically similar to the 
parent type. 

Sometimes the new organism may be had by taking cut¬ 
tings or bulbs from the parent stem. The formation of such 
parts by the parent organism is called Aggeneration. 

Usually, however, the new being produced by generation 
is a highly specialized particle containing within its small 
dimensions the power of building itself up into a complete 
organism (a fly or an elephant, an oak tree or a fern) accord¬ 
ing to the nature of the parent. 

Again, there are some cases where the complete life-germ 
is wholly the product of a single organism without any influ¬ 
ence from without. This is called Asexual Generation. 

More frequently, however, the living germ is the product 
of two factors. One plant, for instance, produces Ovules, 
another plant of the same species produces Pollen. Neither of 
these elements separately, but the combination of the two, will 
give us the complete life-germ or seed. Naturally, the new 
being, as it is produced by two distinct causes, will tend to 
possess the characteristics of both, a fact which the gardener 
takes advantage of to produce new varieties of the same spe¬ 
cies of flower. The union of pollen and ovule is called Fertil¬ 
ization or Fecundation of the ovule, and it results in an in¬ 
ternal substantial modification by which the life-principle of 
the new plant is educed from the potentiality of matter. 

Note.— We have said that both ovule and pollen must 
come from plants of the same species. If they are taken from 
plants of different species, the great universal law is that their 
union will give no result; both ovule and pollen will simply 
decay. In exceptional cases, when the two species from which 
these elements are derived are very similar, fecundation may 
take place, in which case the seed will produce neither of the 
parent types, but a cross between the two, called a hybrid. 




-226- 

These hybrids cannot perpetuate their new type. As a rule 
they are altogether sterile, or incapable of reproduction. In 
the few cases where they produce offspring, these after a few 
generations either die out or return to one or other of the two 
original types. This law, which is absolutely universal in na¬ 
ture, is called The Law of Reversion, and is the great safe¬ 
guard of the permanence or fixity of specific types in nature. 

56. The fecundated life-germ produced by generation 
will give us an individual living being of a definite spe¬ 
cific type, possessing in itself the power to build up by slow 
degrees a fixed type of organism and no other. The order and 
the path it must follow in its development are defined for it 
beforehand and no power in nature can change them. You 
may destroy the germ or embryo, but you cannot alter its pow¬ 
ers or its destiny. “It is possible that at the first moment of 
their existence all animals resemble each other as spheres of 
protoplasm, but the specific type of each is fixed from the first 
and governs all its development. The embryo of a vertebrate 
is a vertebrate (potentially) from the start, and never corre¬ 
sponds to an invertebrate.”—Von Baer Agassiz, etc. 

Note.— Of course accidental modifications may result from 
food, climate and other external circumstances; but they can 
never substantially alter the fixed specific type. 

57. Finally as our life-germ has to build up gradually 
into a complete organism, e. g., ‘of an oak,’ ‘a horse’ or ‘an 
elephant,’ it is no wonder that on its passage to perfection it 
should exhibit many strange shapes and appearances more or 
less resembling creatures lower than itself. In some cases 
these successive changes take place while the new being is still 
enclosed in the egg or within the organism of the parent. In 
other cases the changes take place after the birth of the new 
being, but are all accomplished within the lifetime of a single 
individual, e. g., ‘a butterfly.’ These changes of form are 




-227- 


called Metamorphoses. Lastly, we have cases where it would 
appear that the lives of several successive individuals are re¬ 
quired to bring the offspring to the full parental type; so that 
“the parent finds no resemblance to herself in her offspring 
till she comes down to the great grandchild”; e. g., 'the me¬ 
dusa. ’ This is called the phenomenon of Alternate Generation. 

But whatever the mode of development may be, it is as 
fixed for each type as natural law can make it. 

58. Not only, then, is Life only from Life, or “Biogen¬ 
esis,” a fundamental law of nature, but “Like from Like,” or 
“Homogenesis,” is a law equally universal. All observations 
and experiments affirm it. Reason itself requires it on the 
principle that every effect must have a proportionate cause. If 
a living being communicates vitality to a portion of its own 
substance, that vitality cannot be superior to or of a different 
nature from that which the parent itself possesses. 

Heterogenesis, therefore, or Equivocal Generation, i. e., 
offspring of a different type from parent, in whatever form it 
may be proposed, is inadmissible. 

Article III.— Sensitive Life. 

59. Sensitive Life implies a living organism capable of 
perceiving individual material objects, of feeling, desire and 
aversion and of spontaneous local motion. In the present 
article we shall consider briefly these functions of animal life, 
and the nature of the animal soul from which they proceed. 

(i). Functions of Sensitive Life. 

60. Sensitive Cognition in General may be described as 
a Vital reaction by which a sentient faculty, in response to an 
impression received from an individual material object, pro¬ 
duces within itself an intentional representation (78, below) of 
the object. Hence, there are four elements to be considered in 




-228- 

sensation, viz.: (a) the sentient faculty, (b) the sensile object, 
(e) the impression produced by the sensile object in the sen¬ 
tient faculty (technically called Impressed Image or Species), 
(d) the formal act of perception or the actual representation 
of the object (technically called the Expressed Image or Spe¬ 
cies). We may illustrate this by a rough analogy; thus, Given 
a substance on the one hand, a seal on the other, it is required 
to stamp the seal on the substance. In the first place, the sub¬ 
stance must be in a condition to receive the impression, and the 
seal must be in a condition to give the impression. Again, the 
substance of itself is indifferent as to what impression it shall 
receive; it can receive the impression of this seal, or that, or the 
other. That it express one rather than the other depends upon 
which acts upon it or determines it to a particular representa¬ 
tion; hence, the seal must act upon the substance in order to 
produce an impression of itself. But this is not enough. The 
seal may act forever and produce no image of itself unless 
the substance reacts; but when the substance acted upon by 
the seal reacts it becomes a re-presentation of the seal. If, 
finally, we can imagine the substance thus informed with the 
image of the seal, as perceiving , not the image, but the seal 
itself which helped to produce it, we shall have a rough illustra¬ 
tion which will help us to form an idea of sensation, and, in¬ 
deed, of cognition generally. 

61. Applying the preceding analogy to our present sub¬ 
ject and remembering that (according to the axioms, “quid- 
quid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur,” and 
“agere sequitur esse”) the impression received in and the re¬ 
action of the sentient organ are not merely physical, but psy¬ 
cho-physical phenomena, we may gather up the general doc¬ 
trine of sense-perception in the following brief statements. 

(a) In all sensitive cognition the object must be united 
to the faculty by its impressed image or species, else, as the 




-229-- 

cognitive faculty is indifferent and undetermined of itself, it 
will not represent any one object rather than another. 

(b) Sensation is not the mere reception of an impres¬ 
sion of the object in the living organic faculty; for, sensation 
is a vital immanent action, while the mere impression of the 
object is nothing more than a transient action of the object by 
which the faculty suffers an intrinsic modification. 

(c) The impression received from the object determines 
the vital faculty and thus enables it to produce the expressed 
image or vital representation; for, the formal act of sensa¬ 
tion is such that it can proceed from neither independently of 
the other. The faculty is incapable of producing it without a 
determination received from the object; and, on the other hand, 
as we have said above, the mere passive reception of the de¬ 
termination is not a vital act of perception. 

(d) The subjective image or species is not that which is 
perceived in sensation, but that by which the cognitive faculty 
directly and immediately perceives the object. It is essentially 
a formal sign by which not itself but the thing signified is 
directly and immediately perceived. 

(e) Hence, the fundamental difference between cognitive 
and non-cognitive natures; the latter possess only their own 
proper form; the former, besides their own form, acquire also 
intentional or representative forms of the objects of their actual 
cognition. 

Note.— “The organic constituent of the sentient faculties, 
generally, consists of the nervous system. This is composed 
of two parts, the central mass and the branches which ramify 
throughout the body. The central mass, called the cerebro¬ 
spinal axis, is made up of the brain and the spinal cord passing 
from it down through the backbone. The brain consists of a 
soft convoluted substance of mixed grey and white matter. 
The spinal cord consists of a column of the white fibrous mat- 




-230- 

ter, enclosing a core of the grey cellular substance. From the 
spinal cord between every two vertebrae there issue forth two 
pairs of nerves. The nerves proceeding from the front of the 
spinal column are called anterior, efferent or motor nerves, as 
they transmit impulses outwards, and are the organic instru¬ 
ments of muscular movement. The nerves coming from the 
back of the spine are called afferent , or sensory nerves, be¬ 
cause by their means the organic impressions which accom¬ 
pany sensations are conveyed inwards from the various ex¬ 
ternal sense-organs of the body. In the several external sense- 
organs these nerves are arranged and modified in various ways 
to suit the various psychic faculties and to respond to their 
external stimuli.” 

It is hardly necessary to remark that the perfection and 
differentiation of the nervous system varies according to the 
grade of the sentient being in the scale of animal life. 

62. As we have already said, the sphere of sensitive 
cognition is limited to material objects as affected by material 
individuating notes. Hence, the first great division of the 
sensitive faculties of cognition is into those which perceives 
material objects external to the sentient subject and those 
which perceive, retain or recall the sensations of the external 
senses, or perceive certain other concrete material aspects of 
external objects which do not fall within the sphere of the 
five external senses, and yet are necessarily connected with the 
preservation and perfection of animal life. The former are 
called external senses, the latter internal. 

63. The External Senses.—These are sight, hearing, 
smell, taste and touch. The peripheral extremities of the 
nervous system immediately concerned in the operations of 
these five senses are, respectively, the rods and cones of the 
retina of the eye, the Cortian organ of the ear, the mucous 
membrane of the upper cavity of the nose, the gustative 





-231- 

papillae of the tongue and palate, and the tactile, papillae of 
the dermis, or under-skin. 

64. The formal objects of these senses are (following the 
order above) colored extension, sound, odor, sapidity and ex¬ 
tended pressure or resistance. 

Note (1).— Temperature in so far as is it perceived as 
an objective quality of bodies may be considered (like soft¬ 
ness, roughness, etc.) as a secondary modification of the proper 
object of touch. 

(2).—The five external senses are found only in the 
higher of more perfect animals. The lower types have only 
the sense of touch and probably of taste. Yet even some of 
these lower types manifest a certain vague sensibility to light 
and sound which is often spoken of as Dermatoptic Sensibility. 

65. As to the objectivity of the perception of the external 
senses, see Logic, n. 104, etc. 

66. The Internal Senses.—The immediate and direct 
objects of external sense-perception are individual facts and 
phenomena external to the sentient subject as such. The 
immediate and direct objects of the internal senses, on the con¬ 
trary, are the present or past sensations, or subjective states 
of the sentient subject, as well as certain concrete aspects of 
the objects perceived by the external senses, which, however, 
do not fall within the sphere of any of the five external senses. 
These internal senses are four: the common or central sense, 
the imagination , the sensuous memory and the estimative sense 
or instinct. The organs of these senses are situated in the 
hemispheres of the brain. 

67. The central or common sense is an internal organic 
faculty which perceives, distinguishes and synthesizes the 
actual operations and affections of the various sensitive organs 
which ramify from the brain. Thus, the sense of sight may 




-232- 

perceive a certain object as white; the sense of touch, as hard; 
and the sense of taste, as sw T eet. When these several data are 
referred on to the central sense, the sentient subject becomes 
aware that it is in the presence of one external object which 
is white, sweet and hard, pleasant to sight and taste, but pain¬ 
ful to the touch. 

As the central sense is thus the terminus to which all our 
external sense-perceptions are referred, so it is also the source 
from which all the sensitive activity of the peripheral senses 
is derived. “Vis sentiendi diffunditur in organa quinque sen- 
suum ab aliqna una radice communi, ad quam etiam terminan- 
tur omnes immutationes singulorum sensuum.” Hence, when 
the central sense is rendered inactive, as in sleep, or by nerve- 
poison, e. g., chloroform, all the external senses become in¬ 
operative. 

68. The imagination is an internal sensitive faculty which 
retains and reproduces the past experiences of the central and 
external senses. It may recall these representations singly, 
or combine them to form entirely new images. Thus it can 
recall the sensations of sight, sound, etc., which have been 
experienced, and it can also form new representations by com¬ 
bining them, e. g., ‘representations of mountains of gold/ 
‘walking trees/ ‘rivers of blood/ etc. 

69. The causes which determine the imagination to re¬ 
produce the sensile representations it retains are mainly: 

(a) The association which exists between the objects whose 
images are recalled, e. g., ‘co-existence or succession in time 
and space/ ‘relations of whole and part/ ‘relations of similar¬ 
ity and contrariety, ’ etc. On account of this association, an ob¬ 
ject will naturally recall those related to it in past experience; 

(b) The internal condition of the body, inasmuch as it 
affects the brain. The brain is the organ of this faculty; hence, 
an impression, however produced on the living brain, similar to 




■233 


that which accompanied a given imaginative sensation, is 
likely to recall that sensation. Hence, the varied unconnected 
series of imaginative representations which occur in dreams 
or in cases of violent fever; hence, too, the predominance of 
sad or pleasant phantasms according to the various states of 
the nervous system. 

Note (1). —The state of sleep , as we have said, results 
from the temporary suspension of the activity of the central 
sense (caused either by natural fatigue or by artificial means) 
and the consequent inactivity of the other sensitive faculties. 
During the time of sleep the nutritive functions are exercised 
more regularly and perfectly, and the wear and tear of the 
nervous system, occasioned by sensuous activity, is repaired. 
Hence, natural sleep has been described as “ vinculum sensorii 
primi quod fit gratia salutis.” 

If, however, during this state of sleep, any impression, 
whether from within the organism or from without, should 
reach that portion of the brain which is the organ of the imag¬ 
ination and arouse this faculty to action, it will reproduce some 
of the many images of past experience of which it is the store¬ 
house ; and these, in turn, will recall others in a series accord¬ 
ing to the nature of the present impression and the laws of 
association, etc., spoken of above. This activity of the imagina¬ 
tion partially arouses the central sense to action: and as the 
primary function of the latter faculty in the normal waking 
state is to refer the various impressions passed on to it from 
the external senses to the external objects which produced 
them, so now abnormally stimulated to action and without the 
influence of the external senses to guide it, it refers the phan¬ 
tasms of the imagination to the external world and “gives to 
airy nothing a local habitation and a name.” 

This projection into the outer world of the phantasms of 
the imagination when it occurs in sleep is called a dream. 




-234- 


(2) —In somnambulism some of the external senses seem 
to be open to impressions from without which are woven into 
the texture of the dream, and this serves to intensify the illu¬ 
sion and to call even the motor faculties into play. 

(3) .—A hallucination may be called a waking dream. In 
some cases of hyperaesthesia, or exceptional morbid excitement 
of the nervous system, the representations of the imagination 
become so extremely vivid as even to counterfeit and overbal¬ 
ance the normal external sensations. The whole sensitive en¬ 
ergy of the soul is, as it were, absorbed by the phantasmal im¬ 
age, and the waking sufferer regards it as an external reality. 
It is even said that, at times, the internal disturbance may be 
so great as to produce modifications in the peripheral organs 
similar to those that are normally produced by external ob¬ 
jects. 

(4) .— Hypnosis is a species of artificial sleep in which 
some of the sentient organs are inhibited, while others are over- 
stimulated. When induced by human agency this state in¬ 
volves a dependent condition of the subject which makes him 
responsive to the suggestions (by words or other signs) of 
the hypnotizer. The secret of this strange power of sugges¬ 
tion is probably to be found in the fact that the last and strong¬ 
est impression left in the central sense and imagination just 
before the inhibition and hyperesthesia are affected, is pro¬ 
duced by the commands and personality of the hypnotizer. 
Ilis image will then occupy all the energies of the imagination 
and central sense and his suggestion will, as a general rule, 
be followed and obeyed with almost automatic precision, while 
the subject remains insensible to all other external impres¬ 
sions.” 

70. The sensitive memory retains, recalls and recognizes, 
as perceived before, the representations of the various internal 
and external senses. In this, it differs from the imagination, 
that while the latter merely reproduces objects of past experi- 




235 


ence, the memory also recognizes them as old acquaintances 
that have been met before. Recognition of past objects of in¬ 
ternal or external sense-perception is therefore the character¬ 
istic function of the sensitive memory. 

Note.— “The tendency of an experience to lapse out of 
memory is in proportion to the feebleness of the original im¬ 
pression and the infrequency of its repetition. ’ ’ 

“A past experience becomes unrecognizable in proportion 
to the length of time and the number and vivacity of the ex¬ 
periences which have intervened since its last occurrence or 
reproduction. ’ ’ 

71. The estimative sense or instinct, as it is commonly 
called, is an internal organic faculty which apprehends certain 
individual concrete notes of material objects which do not 
come within the sphere of any or all of the external senses. 
Thus, “the lamb does not flee because the color or form of 
the wolf is disagreeable to the external senses, and the bird 
does not collect twigs for its nest because they are attractive 
in themselves, but both animals are endowed with a faculty 
which, under appropriate conditions, is determined by the 
apprehension of these objects to guide them in the mere exe¬ 
cution, without foresight or reflection, of operations beneficial 
to their specific natures respectively. ’ 9 

72. The organic character of all the faculties enumer¬ 
ated above is manifest, as their objects do not transcend the 
sphere of individual concrete material facts and ‘ ‘ phenomena— 
singularia qualia-quanta. ’ ’ In man, as in the lower animals, 
these faculties are organic, but their operations are more per¬ 
fect, inasmuch as they are subject to the guidance of intellect 
and free will. 

73. The Sensuous Appetites.— The term appetite is 
used in a very wide sense. It denotes all forms of internal 




-236-- 

inclination, comprehending alike, (1) the natural tendencies 
or affinities implanted in all finite beings, even plants and in¬ 
animate substances, which impel them blindly towards what 
is suitable to and perfective of their nature, independently of 
all cognition on their part; and (2) the attractions and aver¬ 
sions which follow upon cognition in sentient and rational 
beings. 

The former class of inclinations or tendencies are called 
natural appetites, inasmuch as they flow from the very nature 
of the being, i. e., from the dynamic element, or form which 
constitutes it the being it is. To this class of appetites belong 
the natural tendencies or nisus in the various powers and fac¬ 
ulties of beings to fulfill the function for which they are by 
their nature and constitution destined. 

The latter class of tendencies are called Elicited Appe¬ 
tites, because they are aroused to vital action by cognition. 
Elicited appetition is again of two kinds, rational or sensuous , 
according to the character of the cognitive faculty by which 
their objects are perceived and proposed. 

74. That the sensuous appetite is an organic faculty fol¬ 
lows from the nature of the objects in regard to which it is 
exercised, viz., those presented by the external and internal 
senses, i. e., concrete individual material things. As to the 
organ of this faculty, however, opinions are divided. Some 
hold that it is the brain, others, on the contrary, maintain that 
it is the ganglia and nervous fibres of the heart. In favor of 
the latter opinion it may be said, (1) that it is the common 
usage of men to attribute the feelings, e. g., of ‘love/ ‘hatred,’ 
‘fear,’ etc., to the heart; (2) that no part of the organism is so 
much modified by these feelings as the heart, so that as Cl. 
Bernard has said, it may be considered the organic index of 
their intensity. 

75. The various forms of sensitive appetition may be 
classified as follows: the object presented by cognition may 




-237 


be, (1) suitable or repugnant in itself simply and just as it 
stands; or (2) it may be a suitable object difficult to obtain, or 
a repugnant object difficult to avoid. The former would be 
the object of what is called the concupiscihle appetite; the lat¬ 
ter, of the irascible appetite. In other words, the object of the 
cmcupiscible appetite is the good or evil to be attained or 
avoided: the object of the irascible appetite is the difficulty to 
be overcome in attaining the good or avoiding the evil. 

The acts of the concupiscible appetite are love and hatred, 
desire and aversion, joy and sadness. 

The acts of the irascible appetite are hope and despair, 
courage and fear , anger. 

Note.— Sensuous Pleasure and Pain. — Sensuous pleasure 
is the satisfaction or repose which the faculties of a sentient 
being find in the possession or enjoyment of their proper ob¬ 
jects. It is, therefore, an accompaniment of the natural nor¬ 
mal exercise of these faculties. In proportion as the energy of 
the faculty is greater and the object more fitted to call forth 
and satisfy that energy, so is the pleasure more intense. Pain, 
on the other hand, arises from excess or defect in the exercise of 
a faculty, or from imperfection or unsuitability in the object 
presented to it. 

Both pain and pleasure are therefore dependent on, (1) 
the natural scope and efficiency of the faculty, its acquired 
habits and its actual condition of health and energy; and (2) 
the suitable presence of an object in harmony with the ener¬ 
gies of the faculty. 

76. Locomotion. —Every sentient being is capable of 
some kind of exterior spontaneous local motion. In fact, it is 
by the exterior motion that they manifest to us their sensitive 
faculties of cognition and appetition. Perception of agreeable 
or disagreeable objects is followed by desire or aversion; and 




-238-- 

this, in turn, gives rise to movement towards or from the 
object. The special organ of this faculty of movement is con¬ 
sidered to be the efferent nerves which terminate in the mus¬ 
cles. 

Note. —The vital movements, e. g., of the heart, lungs, 
etc., which are effected independently of cognition, are called 
automatic: those which result from cognition and appetition 
are called autonomic. These latter, again, are either instinctive 
or volitional, according as they are determined by the sensuous 
appetites (as in brutes), or by the free will (as in man). 

(ii). Nature of the Animal Soul. 

77. That the brute animals around us possess pow¬ 
ers of perception, appetition and autonomic locomotion 

is the unanimous verdict of the common sense of mankind. 
These animals have various organs of sense perception more or 
less similar in structure and function to our own, and, on the 
other hand, they exhibit in their exterior action generally, all 
the signs of true perception, feeling and autonomic movement. 

The higher animals, at least, also clearly manifest by their 
actions that they possess the four internal, as well as the five 
external senses. 

78. Now if we consider the character of the chief and 
fundamental operation of sensuous activity, i. e., perception, 
or cognition, we shall see clearly that it differs essentially from 
the activities of merely inanimate bodies on the one hand and 
from those of merely vegitative activities, on the other. 

For, on the one hand, all the activities of inanimate sub¬ 
stances, e. g., their power of attraction, of producing motion, 
heat, chemical changes, etc., are merely transitive, i. e., they 
are capable of producing changes in other bodies, but not in 
themselves. As to bodies at a distance, they affect them only, 
inasmuch as having first affected the intervening media, the 




-239- 

energy thus transmitted produces physical change in the dis¬ 
tant object. 

The vegetative activities, on the other hand, are merely 
immanent; the term of their action is change in the organism 
of the agent, i. e., its nutrition, development, etc. 

Cognitive activity, on the contrary, is, at the same time 
under different respects, tooth immanent and transitive, sub¬ 
jective and objective. The action is entitatively immanent and 
does not emerge from the sentient faculty which produces it; 
and it is at the same time representatively transitive, i. e., it is 
wholly occupied upon an external object. For instance, the 
action by which the sense of sight perceives the sun does not 
issue forth from the eye or produce and change in the sun 
or in the intervening ether, and yet it is wholly engaged upon 
an object 93,000,000 of miles away. Hence it is, that we speak 
of the scope which is aimed at and reached by mechanical, 
physico-chemical and vegetative activity, or the term of their 
efficiency, i. e., the effect produced by them; while the scope 
aimed at and reached by cognitive and appetitive activity, is 
called their object, i. e., that external thing upon which their 
immanent action is occupied. Hence, the actions of cognitive 
and appetitive faculties are sui generis and eventially different 
from and superior to the action of mere physico-chemical or 
vegetative powers. 

Note.— Hence, the cognitive act is called intentional, i. e., 
an immanent act with a transitive or objective reference or 
efficacy. 

There is also another aspect of sensitive cognition and 
appetition which deserves consideration. On the one hand, 
the objects of our sensations are extended material things. 
These make an extended impression on the extended peripheral 
sense-organs, and these, in turn, transmit their impression to 
the extended nerve-centers which are the organs of the internal 
senses, and hence, the objects are perceived, imagined, etc., 




-240 


as individual extended things or as qualities or properties of 
individual extended things. On the other hand, experience 
shows us that these objects are perceived as units. 

Now, it is a contradiction to say than an extended organ 
can perceive an extended object as a unit, unless the organ be 
informed by a simple dynamic principle which is itself not 
made up of parts. Take for instance a marble in your hand. 
Your sense of touch apprehends it as one thing. But it is 
impossible that the different parts of the marble which make 
different impressions, e. g., on the different tactile papillas 
distributed over your hand should . be apprehended as one 
thing unless the hand is informed by a simple perceptive 
principle. 

And this becomes more manifest still, if we go on to con¬ 
sider that while the sight apprehends the marble as a colored 
thing; the touch, as a cold thing; the taste, as an insipid thing; 
the smell, as an odorless thing, etc., it is apprehended by the 
central sense, recalled by the imagination, recognized by the 
memory, etc., as one colored, cold, tasteless, odorless thing. 

79. From the preceding considerations it is evident that 
no aggregation of merely inanimate, or merel vegetative 
forces, can give us the cognitive and appetitive faculties 

which manifest themselves in the operations of what is called 
the animal kingdom; unless, indeed, we are prepared to admit 
that a sum of zeros can give us a positive number. An animal 
is, therefore, an organism informed by a dynamic principle 
sui generis, essentially different from and superior to the sub¬ 
stantial forms of merely vegetative or anorganic substances. 

80. Brute cognition and appetition, however, are 
strictly limited to certain concrete aspects of individual 
material things. Even the estimative sense never rises above 
the apprehension of the concrete suitableness or repugnance, 
here and now, of individual material objects to the actual 




-241- 

needs of the sentient organism. This estimate or instinctive 
apprehension is the same in all individuals of the same species 
and differs according to difference of species. Just as each 
plant builds up its own organism according to a fixed type 
without cognition of any kind, so “omnis hirundo similiter 
nidificat ’ ’ guided solely by the concrete sense-perception which 
excites the impulse to act in a fixed determinate way according 
to the specific nature of the sentient being. 

Note. —Hence, in all the phenomena of animal life there 
is no trace of any perception of abstract universal truths and 
principles. There is no progress or change of any kind in the 
instinctive action of animals. They make no use of instru¬ 
ments, fire, etc., to aid them in their work. They have no 
scientific, moral or spiritual notions of any kind. “ Instinct is 
perfect in its narrow sphere, but it cannot rise beyond this into 
the sphere of unlimited thought and contrivance.”—Dawson. 

81. Brute cognition and appetition, therefore, is essen¬ 
tially sensuous, the action neither of the dynamic principle 
alone, nor of the organism alone, but of the animated organism 
( psycho-physical action). Now the action of a being man¬ 
ifests its nature, and hence, as the action of the brute soul 
is intrinsically and essentially dependent on the material or¬ 
ganism and inseparable from it; the brute soul is, therefore, 
completely immersed in the organism which it animates. It 
is incapable of acting or existing apart from the body and 
perishes with the disintegration of the latter. Accordingly it 
does not need annihilation to account for its destruction, nor 
creation to account for its origin. It is a product of substantial 
transformation effected by generation by which an existing 
vital energy educes from the potentiality of matter a new 
principle of activity similar to itself. 

82. In the animal, the vegetative functions produce, 
preserve and develop an organism adapted for sensation; and, 




242 


on the other hand, the sensitive faculties are chiefly exercised 
for the preservation, development and reproduction of the or¬ 
ganism. Again, every modification of the sensitive activity 
(anger, fear, etc.) involves a corresponding modification of the 
vegetative activities; and, on the other hand, ill-health, disease, 
etc., of the organism affect the sensuous perceptions, desires, 
feelings, etc., of the animal. But such mutual interdependence 
of the various vital functions, sensitive and vegetative, of the 
animal organism can only be accounted for by recognizing that 
all these various activities have their source in one and the 
same dynamic principle. Hence, the brute soul is a substan¬ 
tial dynamic principle, or form, which immediately actuates 
primal matter and is the ultimate source of all the specific 
properties and activities of the living sentient corporeal sub¬ 
stance. 

Note (1).—As to the divisibility of the brute soul, the 
origin, transmission, etc., of animal life, see above n. 54. 

(2).—On the subjects so briefly treated in the present 
article, see Maher, especially chapter 7, 9, 10 and 12; also the 
supplementary chapter on Animal Psychology. 


Art. IV. —Origin of Species in the Organic World. 

83. As we have already more than once seen, the specific 
nature of a corporeal substance is determined by the substan¬ 
tial dynamic principle, or form, which actuates and completes 
primal matter. For our present purpose, however, it will 
suffice to describe a species in the living organic world; A 
collection of living organisms (a) essentially similar in struc¬ 
ture and function and (b) productive of offspring by their 
union with each other, so that the collection can be indefinitely 
perpetuated in nature by generation ; and hence, such that the 
whole collection might have sprung originally from a single 




-243 


pair. Or more briefly: A collection of individuals of one essen¬ 
tially similar inalienable type capable of indefinite perpetua¬ 
tion by generation. Similarity and filiation are therefore the 
chief indications of specific unity. 

Note (1). — Accidental diversities of color, size, etc., give 
us varieties within the same species. When these are perpet¬ 
uated by artificial selection on the part of gardeners, breeders, 
etc., or by other causes, we have races or breeds. Hence, dif¬ 
ference of race between parents in no way hinders offspring. 
But even here, “ Domestic varieties, on returning to savage 
life, gradually, but invariably assume the characters of the 
original type.”—Darwin. 

(2).—The offspring that occasionally results from the 
union of individuals of different species is called a hybrid.. In 
the rare cases of hybrid fecundity, the inevitable return of the 
offspring to one or other of the original specific types is called 
reversion. The offspring of individuals of different races of 
the same species is called a mongrel. The casual appearance in 
a descendant of such mongrels of one or other of the external 
racial characteristics of either of the primitive parents is called 
atavism. 

84. That there is in the organic world such collec¬ 
tions of individuals as we have described is a manifest fact, 

e. g., the various races or breeds of horses are like each other in 
fundamental structure and function; they differ essentially in 
structure and function from other groups of animals, e. g., 
‘dogs’; and finally, the union of individuals of these different 
races or breeds with one another is capable of perpetuating 
the species indefinitely, while their union with individuals of 
other groups is either fruitful or produces a hybrid offspring 
incapable of perpetuating itself. Hence, our description of 
species is objective, i. e., realized in the actual world around us. 




-244- 

85. Most of the species both of plants and animals with 
which we are familiar are comparatively new in the history of 
life upon the earth. From the first appearance of organic life 
upon the earth to the present time, many species of both plants 
and animals have disappeared and many new ones have been % 
introduced. The question before us is, , How is the origin of 
these various species of living organisms to be accounted for? 
Various hypotheses have been proposed to solve the problem. 
All the different views on the subject, however, may be clas¬ 
sified under two heads:—the theory of independent formations, 
and the theory of descent or derivation. 

86. The Theory of Independent Formations, holding to 
the principle of causality , the essential immutability of species 
and the absence of connecting links by which one species can 
be shown to have been gradually transformed into another, 
maintains that the first beings (few or many) of each species 
were produced by the Creator at the period of the world’s 
history when the earth was fitted to receive them and the 
well-being of the whole would be benefited by their presence. 

They would thus have been produced from pre-existing 
material by the immediate action of the Creator. This action 
could not strictly be called either creative, or miraculous. Not 
creative, as it would not imply the production of the whole 
new being out of nothing, but the eduction of a new substantial 
form in matter, by a proportionate cause. Not miraculous, 
because it would not be against any law of nature, nor beyond 
the course of nature as designed by the Creator, any more than 
the creation of matter itself, or of each individual human soul, 
is beyond the order of nature. 

Note.— The vague term Evolution may be applied to this 
view in so far as the word can express the gradual working 
out of a predetermined creative plan. In a somewhat similar 
sense we speak of the evolution of the steam engine, of the 
bicycle, without at all implying that the perfect machines of 




-245- 

our day are connected by any bond of filiation with their ruder 
predecessors. 

87. The Theory of Descent or Derivation maintains, 
in general, that many organic species are derived or descended 
from one common parental stock. This hypothesis has been 
proposed in various forms, differing from one another as to 
(a) the extent of the field covered by the transformation; (b) 
the manner in which the transformation was effected. It will 
suffice for our purpose, however, to classify the views of 
transformists under the following four heads:— 

88. Monistic Evolution is simply the extreme materialis¬ 
tic atomism alluded to above (n. 29, Note 1). It starts with 
a vast cloud of homogeneous atoms, each atom standing in a 
definite position relatively to all others, so that the existing 
order of the world “lay potentially in the cosmic vapor.” To 
these atoms at a certain definite time, a certain definite measure 
of motion in a certain definite direction, was communicated; 
and the actual solar system and all being therein, great and 
small, living and not living, have been the result. The motion 
of the homogeneous cosmic dust gave, first, the simple chemical 
elements, then various chemical compounds, then the simplest 
living organisms, and these, in turn, advanced from stage to 
stage, radiate, mollusc, articulate, vertebrate, fish, serpent, bird, 
mammal, man. There is no telling where the cosmic dust came 
from, or whence the primitive arrangement of its particles, 
which yet contained potentially the actual cosmic order. We 
are not told when the motion came, or why in such a definite 
measure and direction. There is no substantial difference be¬ 
tween bodies simple or compound, between plants and animals, 
animals and men. There is no such thing as soul, or mind, 
or free-will. All things are simply groups of homogeneous 
atoms in motion. There is an accidental difference in the 
grouping of the atoms and in the mode of motion; that is all. 




-246 


89. In the preceding chapter, we have shown (n. 30) that 
this system is in open contradiction with the most obvious facts 

' of experience which clearly manifest the existence of different 
substances in the anorganic world. In the preceding articles of 
the present chapter we have also shown that as Tait says, “to 
say that even the lowest forms of life can be explained by the 
mere relations, motions and interactions of inanimate matter 
is simply unscientific.” It is needless, therefore, to attempt 
further refutation of the system. 

It is well to remark, however, that (a) as to its starting 
point it assumes uncaused matter, an uncaused orderly arrange¬ 
ment of the particles of this matter and an uncaused motion of 
a definite intensity and intensity and direction, communicated 
to this matter at a definite time, (b) In its progress it assumes 
that inanimate matter can produce life, and that lower vital 
principles can produce higher, (c) Finally, it assumes that 
the irrational and material can change itself into the rational 
and immaterial and spiritual, and that inert extended matter 
can give us the intelligent free soul of man. It is, therefore, 
from first to last, a gratuitous and absurd hypothesis. 

90. Darwinian Evolution holds that all the forms of 
life that have appeared upon the earth have sprung from one 
or two of the lowest types of organisms. Organic life origi¬ 
nated with a few specimens of, e. g., amoeba or myxomycetes 
or something lower still. Offspring differs from parent, and, 
in this case of course, was an improvement on parent according 
to the laws of variation . As generation followed generation 
and variations multiplied and were transmitted according to 
the laws of heredity, a struggle for existence ensued which re¬ 
sulted in the survival of the fittest which is another name for 
natural selection. Add to these factors the necessity each living 
organism would be under to adapt itself to its environment, the 
use and disuse of different parts of its body according to cir- 




247 


cumstance and finally, the sexual selection by which the most 
highly gifted males and females would seek and win each 
other, and you have all the machinery which the Darwinian 
theorist requires to obtain from his bit of slime-mould, grass, 
wheat, the rose, oak, sequoia, etc.; and from his primitive 
amoeba, oysters, crocodiles, bees, eagles, elephants and men. 
Of course, time was needed to accomplish all these wonderful 
changes—more time in fact, than geology or physics can afford 
to grant. Of course, too, these changes were gradual, genera¬ 
tion after generation slowly accumulating the infinitesimal 
links of the chain which unites monera with man, and conse¬ 
quently, the strata of the earth must be stored with fossil re¬ 
mains of the Intermediate or Transitional forms. 

91. As to this Darwinian evolution, we say, that 

it is an hypothesis in manifest contradiction with reason and 
fact. 

(a) It is repugnant to reason to attribute stupendous 
effects to wholly disproportionate causes. Now, Darwinism 
attributes the production of all the manifold forms of life that 
have ever peopled the earth to one or two types of the very 
lowest grade under the influence of the so-called laws of 
variability , heredity , etc. But these agencies, if they can be 
called so, at work to-day with all the ingenuity and skill of man 
to control and apply them, are wholly incapable of producing 
more than slight varietal changes in living species. • Therefore, 
much less, when left to chance, are they capable of effecting 
specific changes, and still less of producing from a few of the 
lowest forms of living matter all the vast and wonderful 
variety of plant and animal life which has appeared upon 
the earth. 

The slightest reflection will convince us that Darwin’s so- 
called laws are neither universal laws of nature nor even re¬ 
motely adequate to accomplish the task which he assigns to 
them. It is not true, that the accidental variations of offspring 




-248- 


from parent always imply an improvement on parental char¬ 
acters. It is not true, that parents always transmit to offspring 
by a law of heredity, all the minute points of excellence which 
they themselves have inherited or acquired. It is not true 
that only the more perfect among the offspring of each plant 
and animal are selected by nature (whatever that may mean) 
to survive and propagate the race. Environment may acci¬ 
dentally affect the organism, but, it is gratuitous and contrary 
to all experience, to say that it can effect a specific change. 
The moderate use of an organ will doubtless strengthen and 
perfect it, but it is nonsense to talk of the use of an organ 
producing the organ itself. 

Realizing the inadequacy of the causes assigned by their 
leader, later Darwinians are satisfied with simpty maintaining 
that transformism is a fact, though we are yet unable to de¬ 
termine the causes which effected it. 

(b) We, therefore, take up the second part of our 
proposition: Darwinian evolution is in contradiction with all 
known facts of the past or present history of life upon the 
earth. Known facts are: (1) Those which are verified by 
present observation and experiment. (2) Those which are 
recorded in trustworthy history. (3) Those which are re¬ 
corded in the strata of which the earth’s surface is composed. 

Now as to the first class of facts. Present observation and 
experiment proves: (1) That no new species of plants or 
animals can be produced from individuals of the same specific 
type by the most careful artificial selection on the part of 
gardeners, breeders, etc. Innumerable varieties have been so 
produced, but not a single new species, (ii) That no new 
species is produced by the numerous generations of micro¬ 
scopic plants and animals which succeed each other with such 
astonishing rapidity all around us, “Koch took specimens of 
the phthisis microbe and placed them in a medium where they 
could increase and multiply without restraint. He cultivated 




-249- 

the microbe most carefully, while modifying its surroundings 
in various ways to see what would become of it, and whether 
perhaps it would turn into something else. The stock multi¬ 
plied prodigiously, but remained absolutely unchanged in 
species to the end.” (iii) That no new species can be produced 
by cross-breeding between different species. This is shown 
by the sterility of hybrid offspring and in the rare cases of 
their fecundity by the ultimate reversion of the new offspring 
to one or other of the original parental types. 

As to the second class of facts. “The crocodiles, ibises, 
oxen, cats and various other creatures that were embalmed 
among the mummies of Egypt were animals such as still live 
on the earth without having undergone any change. The same 
fact is shown by the Assyrian sculptures, etc. Here, then, we 
have proof that external influences acting through thousands 
of years have failed to modify the living organisms that flourish 
around us.” Williamson, etc. One might catalogue a long 
list of plants and animals described by ancient writers, sculp¬ 
tured on ancient monuments, preserved in tombs, ruins, etc., 
but in no case is there a trace of difference between them and 
those of the present day. Three thousand years is a long time 
in the life of a species: and one may be permitted in reason 
to calculate what a longer time would accomplish by multiply¬ 
ing what 3000 years has accomplished in modifying any known 
species. But three thousand years have done nothing in this 
respect. Therefore, etc. 

As to the third class of facts. Huxley tells us that “the 
only perfectly safe foundation for the doctrine of evolution 
lies in the historical or rather archaeological evidence that par¬ 
ticular organisms have originated by the gradual modifica¬ 
tions ” of their predecessors which is furnished by fossil re¬ 
mains. Now here is the latest testimony of palaeontology on the 
subject in the words of one of the great makers as distinguished 




-250- 

from the retailers of science—Sir G. W. Dawson writing in 

1893. 

‘ ‘Palaeontology (i) furnishes no direct evidence as to the 
actual transformation of one species into another; but the 
drift of its testimony is to show that species came in “per 
saltum” (i. e., suddenly and without connection with preceding 
species) rather than by any slow or gradual process, (ii) In 
so far as we can trace their history, specific types are per¬ 
manent in their characters from their introduction to their 
extinction, and their earlier varietal forms are similar to the 
later ones, (iii) We are now prepared to say that the Struggle 
for Existence has not been the determining cause of the in¬ 
troduction of new species. The periods of rapid introduction 
of new forms of marine life were no periods of struggle, but 
of expansion, i. e., periods in which the submergence of con¬ 
tinents afforded new and large space for their extension and 
comfortable subsistence. In like manner it was continental 
emergence that afforded the opportunity for the introduction 
of land animals and plants, (iv) Another important palaeon¬ 
tological fact is the remarkable fixity of certain types of living 
beings in geological times, especially in the case of many low 
types of life, through vicissitudes of physical conditions of the 
most stupendous character and over a lapse of time scarcely 
conceivable. And this holds true in groups which, within 
certain limits, are the most variable of all. In the present 
world, no creatures are more variable that the protozoa, e. g., 
1 foraminifera and sponges.’ Yet these groups are funda¬ 
mentally the same from the beginning of the palaeozoic until 
now; and modern species scarcely seem to differ from speci¬ 
mens taken from rocks at least half way back to the beginning 
of the geological record.” 

As to this last fact (the permanence throughout vast 
periods of specific types) many instances might be cited. Thus, 
of forty-six species of mammals of the quaternary and glacial 




251 


period, thirty-nine have survived down to our own times with¬ 
out any appreciable change; the other seven have become ex¬ 
tinct rather than changed. The common sand-clam and the 
short clam now abounding on our shores are identical with 
those of the crag of the Pleistocene. The oyster is substantially 
the same today as when first introduced in the Carboniferous. 
“The corals of the Gulf of Mexico have been the same for over 
200,000 years.”—Agassiz. Of the trilobites which suddenly 
appeared in the lower Silurian in vast number and very high 
perfection, Barrande, the great discoverer and authority on 
the subject, says, “throughout a series of strata 5000 metres in 
thickness they remained specifically unchanged until their 
complete disappearance.” And he adds, “the study of the 
primordial Silurian shows that modern theoretical calculations 
are quite contrary to facts: so much so, indeed, that the real 
fauna would seem to have been calculated designedly to con¬ 
tradict evolutionist theories.” 

Darwinian evolution is, therefore, in contradiction with 
palaeontological facts. Hence, even supposing (as Christian 
evolutionsts do) that the first lowly forms of plant and animal 
life w^ere produced by the Creator in the beginning, and sup¬ 
posing that each human soul, as being a spiritual substance 
beyond the causality of matter, is directly created by God— 
even, on this supposition, this second form of the doctrine of 
descent, or Darwinian evolution, is an untenable hypothesis in 
contradiction with observation and experiment, with the facts 
of history, with the discoveries of palaeontology and with the 
first principles of rational science, e. g., ‘the Principle of Pro¬ 
portionate Causality.’ 

Note. —Some have felt so much the force of the argument 
from palaeontology that they have abandoned the notion of slow 
insensible changes and have adopted the view that the transi¬ 
tion from lower to higher forms was effected suddenly and 




-252- 

by great jumps. This, of course, saves them the trouble of 
finding the Missing Links of Darwin’s finely graduated chain; 
but it only increases the violence done to the testimony of actual 
and historical experience and to the first and most imperative 
principles of rational science. It was just to avoid this out¬ 
rage on common sense that the Darwinian hypothesis was pro¬ 
posed, so that by bridging the interval between lower and 
higher types of life, by a continuous procession of gradually 
changing organisms, the transition from one species to another 
might be more easily accepted. It would be too glaring an 
absurdity, to say, e. g., that a man who had absolutely no 
money, gave at once $10,000 to another, but the absurdity 
would be less noticed (though not less real) if it were said that 
he gave it gradually, e. g., in small fractions of a cent at a time. 

A third form of derivation theory would suppose that 
the Creator, at certain periods when new forms were to be 
introduced, either directly transformed pre-existing species 
into new ones, or in some way enabled them to produce 
the germs of new species. This is certainly a possible hypo¬ 
thesis inasmuch as a proportionate cause of the new species is 
assigned. Yet the philosopher must consider it as arbitrary 
and gratuitous—an interference with the ordinary laws of 
organic nature—and hence, far less philosophical than the 
theory of independent formations which are a part of the order 
of the nature, not an interference with it. 

93. The fourth form of the derivation theory supposes 
that in the beginning God created all specific forms of plant 
and animal life that have ever appeared upon the earth, but in 
a condition suited to the circumstances of the time. Outwardly 
they would all appear more or less alike, just as, in the em¬ 
bryonic stage, all animals now resemble one another. In one, 
however, there was the Substantial Form or dynamic principle 
of a horse; in another, the form of an eagle; etc. These higher 
forms could not at first develop themselves into full perfection, 




-__253—— 

owing to the conditions of the time. Each conld only reach 
some low stage of embryonic development and reproduce its 
kind before passing away. Gradually as conditions changed 
each specific type in succeeding generations would be enabled 
to manifest its innate specific power either by slow impercep¬ 
tible degrees, or suddenly and “per saltus.” In this view again 
there is no violation of the law of causality. Species are dis¬ 
tinct from the first, only the embryonic development which is 
now accomplished in one individual life would then have taken 
perhaps thousands of individual lives to reach its maturity. 

The objection to this view, and it is a strong one, is that 
it is hard to see why the Creator should create high specific 
types in circumstances in which it was impossible for them to 
attain their natural perfection. Moreover, there is no animal 
known to palaeontologists which would represent, e. g., ‘a 
horse,’ at any period of its present embryonic development. 

Note ( 1 ).—This last theory differs from Darwinian evo¬ 
lution in two essential points: (i) Darwinism supposes nothing 
to start with but the simplest forms of almost undifferentiated 
living protoplasm. This acted upon by external physical 
agencies would give all the varied life of the p£st and present 
world. This theory, on the contrary, supposes that the different 
organisms are, from the first, differentiated Iby different 
dynamic principles, but that the organisms were unable to 
attain their full development until suitable surrounding cir¬ 
cumstances occurred, (ii) Darwinism holds that the human 
soul is merely a development of the animal life-principle. This 
theory, on the contrary, holds that the human soul is in every 
case a spiritual substance directly created by God. 

(2).—“The term ‘evolution,’ has been employed in so 
many senses, as to have become nearly useless for any scien¬ 
tific purpose.”—Dawson. The word is used in all the senses 
considered above, and in many more. When, then, a man says 




-254- 

he is an Evolutionist, or asks you if you admit the doctrine of 
Evolution, you will do well to ask what he means by the word, 
where his evolution begins, where it ends, how it is accom¬ 
plished, etc. 

(3) .—What has revealed religion to say as to the origin 
of species? Very little, (i) God is the Author and Creator 
mediately or immediately of all finite beings, (ii) Each indi¬ 
vidual human soul is directly and immediately created by God. 
(iii) As to the origin of the first human body, Holy 
Scripture says that God formed it from the earth. Hence 
the words literally imply an immediate action of God in the 
formation of the first human body. Now it is a canon of all 
interpretation that the words of a document are to be taken 
literally, unless there is a cogent reason for taking them in a 
figurative sense. In the present case no such reason exists. 
Therefore, etc. Again, it is a rule of interpretation in the 
Church, that, it is not permissible to interpret a statement of 
scripture in a sense opposed to that in which it has been unani¬ 
mously understood from the beginning by all the great doctors 
and theologians of the church. But the scripture narrative of 
the formation of the body of Adam has always been taken in 
the literal sense of the words by the great doctors and theo¬ 
logians. Therefore, etc. 

Hence, as the matter is so closely connected with some of 
the fundamental truths of revelation, e. g., the unity and 
original state of the human race, etc., it would be rash and im¬ 
prudent on the part of a Christian to admit that the first 
human body was in any way evolved from a brute organism; 
all the more so, as there is not a shadow of a scientific reason 
for doing so. 

(4) Why have so many scientific men (they will be found 
to be, generally speaking, the popular retailers rather than the 
great makers of science) accepted the theory of Evolution? 




255 


The reasons given above (n. 31) will hold here also, (i) A 
want of grasp of logical and metaphysical principles. The law 
of Proportionate Causality is lost sight of in hasty efforts to 
classify isolated facts, (ii) A desire, it would seem, to push the 
Creator as far back as possible from the affairs of the world 
He made and governs, if not to get rid of the thought of God 
altogether. 

In this connection it is worth while to draw attention to 
two significant passages quoted by Lord Salisbury in his 
address, as president of the British Association, delivered at 
Oxford before the assembled scientific representatives of Amer¬ 
ica and Europe, August, 1894. 

Lord Kelvin, ‘ ‘ the greatest living master of science among 
us ” is quoted as saying: ‘ ‘ I feel profoundly convinced that the 
argument of design has been greatly too much lost sight of in 
recent zoological speculations. Overwhelmingly strong proof 
of intelligent and beneficent design lie around us, and if ever 
perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific, turn us way 
from them for a time, they come back upon us with irresistible 
force, showing to us, through nature, the influence of a Free 
Will and teaching us that all living things depend on one Ever¬ 
lasting Creator and Ruler.” 

Prof. Weismann, a prominent evolutionist authority, is 
quoted as follows: “We accept Natural Selection, not because 
we are able to demonstrate the process in detail, not even be¬ 
cause we can imagine it; but simply because it is the only expla¬ 
nation we can conceive * * # without assuming the help of 

a principle of design. 

For a clear and authoritative exposition of Evolution and 
allied topics of articles by the eminent biologist and entomolo¬ 
gist, Eric Wasman, S. J., and Herman Muckermann, S. J., in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia. 

94. Objections. 

(a). Form Palaeontology. 




-256- 

(1) .—Geology shows that the order in which the various 
forms of organic life were introduced was one of gradual pro¬ 
gress from lower to higher types. But this proves that higher 
types are descended from lower. 

Answer. (1).—T. maj. N. Min. Fallacy, Post Hoc; ergo 
Propter Hoc. 

(2) .—T. maj.. D. min.; If transitional forms connect the 
various types, this would give probability to some rational 
hypothesis of descent, c. min. If no such forms exist, the mere 
fact of ascending series of types would justify any hypothe¬ 
sis of descent, n. min. 

(3) .—N. maj. An ascending series would be protozoa, 
ccelenterates, echinoderms, worms, molluscs, arthropodes, tuni- 
cates, vertebrates. Now all these sub-kingdoms are found in 
the lower palaeozoic and all are found together in all the eras. 
Nor is there an ascending series in the classes of these sub¬ 
kingdoms, except reptiles, birds and animals of vertebrates. 
Nor is there an ascending series in specific representatives of 
these classes. The trilobites, cuttle-fishes and ganoid fishes of 
the Silurian and Devonian—the amphibians of the Carbonifer¬ 
ous—the reptiles of the Mesozoic, etc v are, as a rule, far su¬ 
perior to the corresponding types of later times. 

(ii).—Geology gives us transitional forms , e. g., ganoid 
fish of the Devonian join teleost fish and reptiles. Ichthyo¬ 
saurs (swimming reptiles), Dinosaurs (walking reptiles), 
Pterosaurs (flying reptiles), show the connection between fish, 
birds, amphibians, etc. 

Answer. —These are the Transitional Forms required to 
prove descent, N. assert. You might as well say that our bat 
is a bird on its way to become a mouse. 

These are distinct specific types intermediate between 
other species, and permanent in their own, just as the bat is, 
C. assert. 




257 


Note. —The forms just mentioned may be called general¬ 
ized types suited to a mixed land and water and aerial exist¬ 
ence, such as the condition of the earth at the time of their 
introduction required. But there is no trace of genealogical 
connection between them and more specialized forms. 

(iii) —At least we can trace the transformation of the 
horse from a little four-toed animal about the size of a fox in 
the Eocene.— (See Leconte, Compend, p. 361). 

Answer. —N. assert. The best palaeontologists, even 
among those who favor the doctrine of derivation, e. g., 
Gaudry, etc., reject this argument for transformism. The vari¬ 
ous animals mentioned as ancestors of the horse are too differ¬ 
ent in structure to suggest connection by descent; and the 
Transitional Forms to bridge over the intervals are, as usual, 
missing. ‘ * If the horse is evolved out of Hipparion, myriads of 
individuals must have existed to effect this gradual change.” 
—Williamson, etc. If we begin with Anchitherium or Mio- 
hippus, three toed animals, as Marsh and Cope do, the difficulty 
remains the same. 

Note. —The Plasticity of species, within the limits of vari¬ 
etal changes, is very great, e. g., ‘pigeons,’ ‘dogs,’ ‘horses,’ etc. 
Geologists justly complain of the tendency among fossil dis¬ 
coverers and naturalists, for every trifling difference in struc¬ 
ture, to multiply species; while the animals in question may 
well be merely varieties of the same species. 

(iv) —The geological record is imcomplete, and therefore, 
it furnishes no argument against evolution. (See Leconte, 
passim). 

Answer (1).—“The geological record is much more com¬ 
plete than is generally supposed. Over long periods of time 
and many lines of being, we have a nearly continuous chain of 
facts, and if these do not show the desired tendency, the fault 
is as likely to be in the theory as in the record. ”—Dawson. 




-258- 


(2).—This is a strange method of argument. Evolution 
depends on Palaeontology as its “only perfectly safe founda¬ 
tion.” The “foundation” refuses to support the airy super¬ 
structure. Therefore evolution is “exact science,” etc. 

(b) From Anatomy. 

(1) .—Similarity of structure shows descent from a com¬ 
mon stock. But all plants and animals are similar in structure, 
e. g., ‘ the limbs of a fish, a bird and a horse. ’ Therefore, etc. 

Answer (1).—The argument may be retorted. Dissimi¬ 
larity of structure shows descent from different stocks. But 
all species of animals differ in structure and function from 
their neighbors, e. g., 'the limbs of fish, bird, etc.,’ as above. 

(2) .— Specific similarity in structure and function shows 
descent from a common stock, c. maj. Generic similarity shows, 
etc., n. maj. But all animals are specifically similar in struc¬ 
ture, n. min.; all animals are generically similar, t. min. 

Note. —The fallacy here is in the transmission from the 
abstract to the concrete. We can form the abstract concept of 
a backboned warm-blooded four-limbed being; and this con¬ 
cept, so far as it goes, represents all such things. But when we 
come to the actual concrete world we find that the abstract 
notes are realized in essentially different ways. The abstract 
similarity is modified in the concrete by decided differences as 
essential as itself. 

(ii).—In many organisms we find certain organs atro¬ 
phied ,• rudimentary organs—useless to their possessors, but 
fully developed and useful in other animals, e. g., 'the wings of 
the apteryx,’ ‘ostrich,’ etc. Now, such rudimentary organs 
show genealogical relationship between their possessors and 
those organisms in which they are found fnlly developed. 

Answer. —To say that these so-called rudimentary organs 
are useless is altogether gratuitous. ‘' There is no organ of the 




-259- 

body, however small, however seemingly unimportant, which 
we can presume to neglect. It may be that the balance of 
assimilation and nutrition, upon which the health of the whole 
organism depends, hinges upon the integrity of such obscure 
structures: and it is the maintenance of this balance which 
constitutes health; its disturbance, disease.”—Schafer. 

Note.— The law of the Correlation of Parts for the Per¬ 
fection of the Whole governs all perfect work in nature as in 
art. To construct, e. g., a vertebrate of some particular specific 
type, the general parts essential to all vertebrates must be ar¬ 
ranged and developed in subordination to the idea of this par¬ 
ticular whole. Some of the parts will be more developed, some 
less, than in other species of the class, in order that the whole 
may be a perfectly balanced structure; and any modification of 
any of these parts, for better or for worse, will injure the 
whole. Hence, it is misleading to speak of the normally devel¬ 
oped parts of any specific type as Rudimentary. They would 
be rudimentary in other types, just as the spring of a lady’s 
watch would be rudimentary in a town clock. 

(c) From Embryology. 

(i) —Every day the most varied organisms are evolved out 
of similar cells of protoplasm. Therefore, all organisms have 
arisen from a primeval, undifferentiated mass of protoplasm. 

Answer. —From cells similar in origin , internal energy 
and outward appearance, n. anteced. Similar in outward ap¬ 
pearance but different in origin and internal energy, t. anteced. 

(ii) .— Ontogenesis is a summary of phylogenesis. But the 
history of the embryonic development of each individual of a 
higher species exhibits a series of transformations from a sim¬ 
ple cell through all the types of life inferior to its own. 

Answer. —N. maj. It is a mere fanciful and gratuitous 
assertion. Also, n. min. Yon Baer, on whose authority 




- 260 - 

Haeckel tries to base this assertion, calls it flatly a falsification 
of science. So, too, the greatest biologists, e. g., Milne-Edwards, 
‘ ‘ There is never a complete likeness between any adnlt animal 
and the embryo of another at any period of the latter’ develop¬ 
ment.” Thus at a certain period the vertebrate embryo has 
something of the appearance of an arthopode; but closer exam¬ 
ination shows ‘ ‘ that the vertebrate has its nerve-centers in the 
dorsal side; the arthropores, in the ventral. Indeed, all the or¬ 
gans are oppositely situated.”—Yon Baer. 

Note. —It is the dynamic principle within that differenti¬ 
ates one form of life from another, and this is fully manifested 
only in the mature definitive stage of a being’s development. 
Hence the present objection, as well as those drawn from meta¬ 
morphosis, alternate generation, etc., do not really touch the 
question. 

(d) From Philosophy. 

The theory of Immediate Formation is an interference 
with, while that of Evolution is in accordance with, the laws 
of nature. 

Answer .—As to the first part of this assertion, see n. 86. 
As to the second part, it must be clear from what has been said 
that fixity and immutability of species is the law of nature as 
revealed to us by the facts of present, historical and geological 
time. Hence, the transformation of species would be an inter¬ 
ference with law, and as such a true miracle. 




PART IV 


RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 


1. Rational Psychology is, The science of the human 
soul, i. e., of that principle in man by which he lives, feels, 
thinks and wills. Here, however, we take account only of those 
vital acts which are characteristic of man and distinguish him 
from all other living things in the visible world around us. We 
start, then, with the data which consciousness (our own, and 
that of other men), expressed in their life and language, fur¬ 
nishes as to the characters of the vital acts of thought and 
volition; and from these we reason back to the nature of the 
ultimate principle from which they proceed, its relation to the 
body, its origin, etc. From what the soul does we gather what 
it must be. Thus, our natural knowledge of the essence, origin 
destiny, etc., of our souls is not arrived at by intuition , but by 
deduction. 

The subject may be divided into two Chapters:— 

I.—Intellect and Will; 

II.—The Nature of the Soul. 

CHAPTER I. 

Intellect and Will. 

Article I.— Intellect. 

2. We have already shown in Logic (n. 113) that there 
exists in man a cognitive faculty far higher and nobler in its 




-262- 

grasp than sense, whose perceptions, as Hurley is forced to 
admit, “are neither sense-perceptions nor modifications of 
them/’ inasmuch as it not only apprehends individual material 
things under abstract universal essential aspects altogether dif¬ 
ferent from the concrete singular accidental representations to 
which organic faculties are necessarily restricted, but it occu¬ 
pies itself, chiefly and in preference to all others, with objects 
which lie wholly beyond the range of sense, e. g., ‘truth/ ‘moral 
beauty’ and ‘goodness/ ‘rights and duties,’ ‘perfect happi¬ 
ness/ ‘the future/ ‘the possible/ ‘causality/ ‘eternity/ ‘in¬ 
finity/ ‘God.’ 

3. This faculty is the intellect whose chief functions we 
have already enumerated and considered from certain special 
points of view in Logic. Assuming, therefore, what has been 
said elsewhere, we shall consider briefly in the present article 
the chief points of philosophical doctrine in regard to the 
objects, the origin and the spirituality of our intellectual 
knowledge. And that the present matter may be more easily 
connected with what has gone before, we shall treat our sub¬ 
ject under three separate heads, viz.: ideas, judgment, rea¬ 
soning. 

i. Ideas. 

4. The formal object of a cognitive faculty is that special 
note or character in things which is requisite and suffices to 
make them objects of the faculty in question, i. e., capable of 
being perceived and represented by it. Now, as we know from 
General Metaphysics, the human intellect apprehends the ab¬ 
stract note of Being; and hence, whatever is proposed to it, 
whether by intuition or reasoning or authority, as A Being, 
A Something, can be apprehended and represented by it as 
such. 

Being, therefore, is the formal object of the intellect. 

Hence, there is nothing in the whole range of being , actual or 
possible, substantial or accidental, necessary or contingent, 




263 


which cannot be more or less perfectly apprehended by the 
human mind at least analogically or under some transcendental 
or broad generic aspect, i. e., only Absolute Nothing is abso¬ 
lutely unknowable. 

5. The proportionate object of the human intellect 

in man’s present state comprises those beings which are pri¬ 
marily immediately and directly presented to and perceived by 
it, ‘ 4 ea quae primo et per se cognoscuntur, ’ ’ those objects which 
are first apprehended by the intellect and represented by it ac¬ 
cording to their own proper notes and characters. 

Now, it is a matter of experience that the first immediate 
and direct objects of our intellectual knowledge in our present 
state are the abstract universalized quiddities or essential notes 
of the material objects perceived by the senses and represented 
in the imagination. 

Thus, the child’s first judgments are about material things. 
In abstract reasoning we recur to material objects to illustrate 
our highest and most immaterial concepts. The words used to 
express externally, and the phantasms in the imagination which 
accompany our loftiest spiritual thoughts, are originally de¬ 
rived from material phenomena. Finally, those deficient in 
any sense from birth are without direct immediate knowledge 
of the objects corresponding. 

Nor is it less evident that our intellectual concepts of these 
material objects are wholly different from merely sensuous 
representations of them. Thus, if I describe a circle on the 
blackboard, your sight perceives, and your imagination pic¬ 
tures, the mere concrete external characters of this particular 
circle, its color, size, position, etc.; while intellect forms the con¬ 
cept of what constitutes a circle, anywhere and everywhere, in¬ 
dependently of all relations of time, space, color, etc. Sense 
perceives the individual accidental contingent; intellect , the 
universal essential necessary in regard to the same material 
objects. Cfr. Logic, n. 118. 




--264- 

6. That the intellect can form these abstract universal 
concepts of material things, is beyond doubt. “ Contra 
factum non est argumentum ’ ’: we have the universal ideas of 
a circle, a substance, a metal, an animal, etc., derived somehow 
from the contemplation of individual concrete objects. These 
ideas do not represent mere individuals or mere collections of 
individuals; but they answer the question what is a circle, an 
animal, etc., i. e., they represent the quiddities or essential 
notes of these objects. We know, and cannot help knowing, 
e. g,. that it is not a matter of mere customary association con¬ 
firmed by heredity, but an objective necessity, independent of 
all our thoughts about it, that a circle is a figure in which, 
everywhere and eternally, the diameter is to the circumference 
as 1:3.14159. 

7. As to the origin of these abstract, universal concepts 
of material things. To be able to see the universal in the indi¬ 
vidual, the necessary and eternal in the contingent and tran¬ 
sient, is truly a marvelous power. But in order to explain it, 
there is no need to deny its existence, as Empiricists do; or to 
have recourse to the doctrine of innate ideas, or merely sub¬ 
jective forms, as Cartesians and Kantians do; or to postulate 
an immediate vision of the divine ideas, as Ontologists do. Of 
these theories we shall speak briefly in a few notes at the end of 
this article. The scholastic explanation is substantially this. 

(a) As we have said above (Cosmol. n. 60, 61), four 
elements must be accounted for in the cognitive act, viz.: the 
object, the faculty, the action of the object on the faculty, and 
the vital reaction of the faculty by which the object acting on it 
is perceived and represented. 

(b) Man is endowed with cognitive faculties of two 
essentially different orders, viz.: sense and intellect. In the 
material objects, primarily and immediately presented to us, 
the formal object of sense is the individual concrete fact or phe- 




265 


nomenon, e. ‘ this Something, ’ ‘ this Movement, ’ ‘ this Cirele. ’ 
The intellect, on the contrary, “intus legit/’ and apprehends 
and represents these objects as quiddities deindividualized 
abstracted from individuation, universalized, e. g., ‘being,’ 
‘movement,’ ‘circle.’ 

(c) Now this proper proportionate object of the intellect 
is not and cannot be presented to it, either by the individual 
object, or by any concrete sense-perception of it which merely 
represents the individual object according to the impression 
received from it; though, indeed, the abstract Quiddity ex¬ 
pressed, e. g., by the common noun circle is potentially in every 
individual circle. 

(d) To reveal this abstract essence or nature in the indi¬ 
vidual object, the intellect is endowed with an active power 
(intellectus agens), which, when a concrete phantasm of a 
material object is pictured in the imagination, spontaneously 
deindividualizes, abstracts from individuating notes, universal 
deindividualizes, abstracts from individuating notes, universal¬ 
izes the essence of quiddity (generic or specific) of the object 
represented, and thus makes it a proportionate object of intel¬ 
lectual apprehension, capable of determining the perceptive 
power of the intellect (intellectus patiens or possible ) which 
reacts by perceiving it and representing it in an abstract spir¬ 
itual concept (the direct universal idea). Logic, 118. 

“The process, then, in brief, is this: An individual ma¬ 
terial object is perceived by the external senses , and an indi¬ 
vidual concrete representation of it is formed in the imagina¬ 
tion; and here the work of the lower powers ends. Since, how¬ 
ever, in man the sensuous faculties of cognition have their 
source in a soul endowed with intellectual power, this latter 
now issues into action. The presence of the phantasm is a con¬ 
dition of rational activity, furnishing, as it were, the raw mate¬ 
rial on which it works; and when this is present the intellect, 
by its own active and passive powers, generates the concept 




-266 


which represents the abstract individualized essence or quid¬ 
dity of the external material object.’’ 

Note (1).—This abstractive power of the intellect is often 
called the Light of Reason. For as light renders visible the 
color of bodies, so this power makes intelligible the abstract 
essence realized in the concrete individual object. Hence, the 
special function of this intellectual activity is described as 
Illuminatio, Depuratio, Abstractio Phantasmatis. 

(2) .—The intellectual concepts elaborated in the manner 
described above are (i) abstract, i. e., the object is represented 
apart from individuation, (ii) quidditative, i. e., the mere 
nature or essence (generic or specific) of the object is repre¬ 
sented, (iii) universal , i. e., one nature is represented which is 
capable of being realized in and univocally predicated of in¬ 
numerable dicerent individuals. That we have such concepts 
of material objects has been shown in logic. 

Now, such concepts are wholly beyond the power of or¬ 
ganic faculties. For an organic faculty represents an object ac¬ 
cording to the impression which the latter makes upon the liv¬ 
ing organ, and as all objects in nature are individual they can 
only produce impressions of themselves as such, e. g., a circle of 
an inch in diameter cannot produce in matter, whether living or 
not, an impression that will represent every possible circle. On 
the other hand, it would be as impossible to re-present a uni¬ 
versal concept in a material faculty as it would be to draw a 
universal circle on a blackboard. The human intellect, there¬ 
fore, which, as a matter of fact, is capable of forming universal 
ideas, is necessarily a supra-organic , or spiritual faculty. 

(3) .—The more perfectly the individual material object 
is represented by the sensuous phantasm the more perfect and 
comprehensive, ceteris paribus, will the intellectual concept be. 
Hence, as our first sense-perception of an object is generally 




-267-i 

very imperfect and incomplete, so our earliest intellectual con¬ 
cept of it is generally indistinct and represents it only under 
some transcendental or broad generic aspect, e. g., as * a being, ’ 
‘a corporeal substance,’ ‘an animal,’ etc. 

(4).—The account of the origin of our universal ideas 
given above (i) supplies all the elements of the act of cogni¬ 
tion, (ii) harmonizes with the actual state of man in which the 
soul is united to the body for the advantage of both, (iii) ac¬ 
cords with experience which proves that the action of the imag 
ination must precede and accompany the action of the intellect, 
and that sound senses and a sound brain are conditions of nor¬ 
mal thought, (iv) and finally safeguards the objectivity of 
science by tracing back the origin of our intellectual concepts to 
actual existing things. 

8. Self-consciousness. When once aroused to action in 
the manner described in the preceding paragraph, the intellect 
not only apprehends the quiddity of the external object, but at 
the same time becomes aware of its own act of cognition and of 
itself as the agent eliciting the act. 

This self-consciousness may be more or less explicit. It 
may be a mere spontaneous concomitant of the act by which the 
external object is apprehended, or it may be a deliberately 
reflex operation in which the cognitive energy is directed 
rather upon itself and its own action than upon the external 
object with which it is engaged. In the former case it is called 
direct or concomitant consciousness; in the latter it is called 
reflex consciousness. 

That the mind, in most of its intellectual operations, is 
concomitantly conscious of its action and of itself is a matter 
of ordinary experience. In our normal intellectual operations 
—perceptions, judgments, reasonings, etc.—independently of 
any deliberate reflexive effort, the mind is usually conscious of 




-- 268 - 

itself and of its action, or, in other words, of itself as acting, or 
of its action as its own. 

But it is in the deliberately reflex act of self-consciousness 
that itself and its operations, and the distinction between itself 
and its operations, are most distinctly apprehended by the 
intellect. While I am thinking, e. g., what course I shall take 
in regard to some serious matter proposed to me, I am spon¬ 
taneously, and without any deliberate introspective effort, 
aware that 1 am thinking about the matter, but I do not attend 
to the exact course of my thoughts or explicitly distinguish 
between my thought and my thinking self. By an effort of at¬ 
tention, however, I can watch closely the progress of my think¬ 
ing and notice with what degree of clearness and distinctness I 
apprehend the question before me, the relative force of the 
various reasons pro and con, etc. In this case I clearly dis¬ 
tinguish between the process of thought and the thinking mind. 
The former is seen to be a series of passing acts: the latter, an 
abiding principle of action. 

In this reflex act, therefore, (i) the distinction between 
the permanent thinking mind and its transient states , or acts 
of thought, is vividly brought home to us; (ii) we have as full a 
certainty of the existence of this permanent thinking mind as 
we have of the existence of its transient acts, or states; (iii) 
Finally, we clearly apprehend the perfect identity between the 
mind reflecting and the mind reflected upon. 

Now, a self-perceptive power which can set itself and its 
own present action before itself, as an immediate object of cog¬ 
nition, cannot be an organic power. An organic power is one 
into which matter enters as an essential element, i. e., it is 
the compound of matter and soul that perceives, feels, etc. But 
no material faculty can double back, or reflect upon its whole 
self and its action, e. g., ‘the eye cannot see itself and its own 
act of vision’; ‘the tip of a finger cannot touch itself and its 
own sensation of touch,’ etc. Only a simple energy which sub- 




269 


sists in itself and acts by itself independently of matter, can 
thus apprehend itself and its own action. This wonderful 
power of self-consciousness is, therefore, an evident proof of 
the spirituality of the human sonl. 

Note (1) —To those (e. g., Taine) that deny that we have 
this power of self-consciousness the only answer is “solvitur 
leflectendo.” The same answer must be given to those (Sully, 
etc.) who say that “all introspection is retrospection.” To 
those (Spencer) who hold that our consciousness of a perma¬ 
nent mind within us, distinct from its transient state and acts, 
is merely ‘ ‘ an inevitable illusion, ’ ’ we can only say that it is a 
doubtful philosophy which accounts for evident facts by deny¬ 
ing them. A child ‘ ‘ examining his conscience ’ ’ is one of those 
stubborn facts that no eloquence of denial can explain away. 

(2) .—As to the objects immediately perceived by the self- 
conscious mind: (i) Self-consciousness immediately perceives 
only the acts of the soul, not its inner nature or essence, which 
is known only by a more or less elaborate process of reasoning, 
(ii) The primary object of self-consciousness is the intellectual 
act and, hence, intellectual agent; but, as this simple intel¬ 
lectual agent is also endowed with other powers (which are 
simultaneously occupied with the same material object as the 
intellect), its consciousness of itself makes it aware of its vari¬ 
ous cognitive and appetitive operations, and of the body which 
it informs and which co-operates in some of these operations, 
and finally, of the individuating notes of the object whose 
abstract quiddity alone is directly apprehended by the intel¬ 
lect. (iii) Self-consciousness, therefore, apprehends the Ego , 
or complete human person, as a compound soul and body with 
various perceptive and appetitive powers, some of which are 
intellectual and spiritual, while others are sensuous and or¬ 
ganic. 

(3) .—Self-consciousness aided by memory clearly per¬ 
ceives the abiding identity of the person who is self-conscious, 




-270- 

but this perception does not constitute personal identity, any 
more than seeing a house makes the house; and just as the 
house continues to exist when we cease to look at it, so a sleep¬ 
ing man is a person, though he is unconscious of himself. (Gen. 
Metaphys. n. 48.) 

(4).—When a man says, e. g., ‘I am not myself to-day,’ 
the word self is clearly used in a loose sense to express the 
state of the real substantial self. He means simply my present 
state is not my normal state, indicating at the same time the 
identity of the Ego and the diversity between its normal and 
its present state. This loose use of the word Self has given rise 
to the inaccurate and mischievous expression, * ‘ Double or Mul¬ 
tiple Personality.” The change in his subjective moods and 
states, resulting from certain morbid nervous conditions, may 
indeed sometimes induce in the sufferer himself the illusion 
that he is different persons at different times; but we may not 
take insanity to illustrate normal mental life. 

9. Positively immaterial or purely spiritual objects. That 
man is capable of forming ideas of such objects is a fact mani¬ 
fested universally in human speech and actions, and clear to 
each one from the testimony of consciousness. Even those who 
deny the existence of such objects clearly show that they have 
some sort of ideas of them. 

Now the question is, (i) how do we form clear ideas of 
such objects, and (ii) how do we come to know that there are 
objective realities corresponding to these ideas? 

As to the first question: Given, on the one hand, the ab¬ 
stract ideas of external objects and the perceptions of con¬ 
sciousness, spoken of in the preceding paragraphs, and, on the 
other, the analytic and synthetic power of the intellect, we can 
form concepts which clearly represent purely spiritual objects. 
Thus, from our intellectual perception of external material 
objects and of the facts of consciousness, we can form the gen. 




271 


era! ideas of ‘being,’ ‘substance,’ ‘cause,’ ‘power,’ ‘intelli¬ 
gence,’ ‘free volition,’ etc. We also know immediately what a 
‘limit,’ e. g., of power, is, what ‘extension’ is, etc. We know, 
too, what a ‘negation,’ or ‘absence,’ means. Now we can unite 
these various positive and negative notes in one concept, and 
form the idea of an unextended substantial being, unlimited in 
power, intelligence , etc., uncaused, incapable of change, unend¬ 
ing, etc. This is a clear and proper conception of an infinite 
spirit, i. e., it represents such a being and no other, i. e., no 
material or finite object. It is called an analogical concept, in¬ 
asmuch as the various abstract notes elaborated and combined 
to form it were originally apprehended in finite objects. 

As to the second question— Direct intuition gives us 
knowledge only of external material objects: Reflex intuition 
reveals to us the existence of a substance endowed with the 
power of intelligence and free will, but not the inner nature of 
that substance. We have, therefore, no intuitive or immediate 
knowledge of purely spiritual objects as such. Our knowledge, 
therefore, of the existence of such objects is acquired either by 
reasoning or from authoritative testimony. 

Note.— The fact that the human mind can and does form 
ideas of such purely spiritual objects is the strongest proof of 
its own spirituality. An organic faculty, as we have said be¬ 
fore, can only give a concrete representation of an individual 
material object proportionate to the impression produced in 
the living organ by the object. 

ii. Judgment and Reasoning. 

10. There is nothing special to add here to what has 
already been said in Logic about the nature of these mental 
acts, except briefly to call attention to the supra-sensuous or 
spiritual character of the judicial act in general. 

Now to form the simplest particular judgment, e. g., ‘this 
iron is hot,’ the mind must apprehend the predicate as an 




-272- 

abstract de-individualized note, before it can intelligently af¬ 
firm that it belongs to the subject. In common judgments, e. g., 
‘gold is a metal,’ both subject and predicate are apprehended 
as universal. Hence, to say nothing of the act of comparison 
and the perception of the relation between the two terms, the 
apprehension of the universal , implied in every judgment 
clearly shows that it cannot be a sensuous act. 

But it is in what are called necessary judgments that the 
supra-organic character of the judicial act is most strikingly 
manifested. Thus in the axioms of geometry, metaphysics, 
ethics, etc., e. g., ‘things which are equal to the same thing are 
equal to each other’; ‘A thing cannot at the same time and 
not be’; ‘Ingratitude is wrong’—in all these cases the mind 
clearly perceives and affirms that these truths hold and must 
hold universally and forever, always and everywhere, and this 
not through any blind instinct, but from an intelligent insight 
into the nature of the two terms compared and united by the 
judicial .act. Now, this everlasting necessity and universality 
cannot be apprehended by sense which reaches only the indi¬ 
vidual, contingent, mutable fact. 

If, finally, we consider the power of the mind to link to¬ 
gether intelligently long series of such judgments, grasping the 
connection and relations between them and moving forward 
with the security of perfect insight from the known to the un¬ 
known in regard to the most abstract and immaterial objects 
of knowledge, e. g., mathematics or metaphysics,—such a 
power most evidently demonstrates the spirituality of the in¬ 
tellect. To deny this would be to deny the foundtion of all 
science, i. e., the principle “agere sequitur esse”—“the nature 
of a being is revealed by its actions. ’ ’ 

Note.— It is necessary to insist strongly on the fact evi¬ 
dent to us from consciousness, that in our intellectual judg¬ 
ments, it is not a question of one idea “inevitably recalling” 
another, but a question of the mind holding two terms dis- 




-273- 

tinctly before it and seeing a valid motive which justifies it in 
affirming a relation of agreement or disagreement between 
them. 

It is true, indeed, that the perception of an object may 
recall the image of another associated with it in past experi¬ 
ence. Thus, e. g., a street dog seeing a small boy pick up a 
stone barks an expression of pain and runs away. Here the 
sight of the boy stooping for a stone recalls the memory of 
other facts connected with it in past experience, e. g., of a stone 
thrown, a pain felt, etc. But this power of recalling associated 
experiences is not what we mean by the intelligent judicial act 
which consciousness testifies, a man is capable of. The asso¬ 
ciated images come up spontaneously and automatically from 
the first fact of the series to the last without any insight into 
the relations between the terms. Not so in our judgments and 
reasonings. Here, the terms are united not blindly and auto¬ 
matically, but on account of sufficient evidence (intrinsic or 
extrinsic) of the relations existing between them. 

1. So far then, we have seen that the intellectual acts 
enumerated above are essentially distinct from those of organic 
faculties and require a supra-organic or spiritual power in the 
being who is capable of eliciting them. In maintaining that the 
intellect is a spiritual faculty we do not, however, imply that it 
is in no way dependent on the organism. In our present state 
in which the soul is united to the body, the action of the imagin¬ 
ation which is an organic faculty must precede and accompany 
the action of the intellect; and hence, we admit an intrinsic de¬ 
pendence of the intellect upon the organism. But it would be 
just as reasonable to conclude that, because the eye needs an 
object in order to see it, therefore, the object is the the eye; as 
to argue that because the intellect needs the presence of phan¬ 
tasms in the imagination, in order to elaborate its spiritual 
concepts, therefore, the imagination is the intellect. Healthy 




-274- 

cerebral action (like sound external senses) is a condition , not 
an efficient or coefficient cause of thought. 

St. Thomas thus sums up the fundamental difference be¬ 
tween sense and intellect. 

(a) Sense perceives only the individual; the intellect con¬ 
ceives the universal. 

(b) Sense perception is limited to the corporeal: intel¬ 
lectual knowledge embraces the immaterial and spiritual. 

(c) Sense cannot reflect upon itself and its own action: 
intellect can. 

Note. — (a) The Hypothesis of Innate Ideas. A com¬ 
mon characteristic of all those philosophers who have adopted 
in one form or another the hypothesis of innate ideas, is an 
extremely keen appreciation of the vital difference between sen¬ 
sation and thought. Supra-sensuous mental products, such as 
the ideas of being, unity, the true, the good, necessary truths, 
and the like, cannot, these philosophers maintain, in any way 
have been derived from sensuous experience. They must, 
consequently, have been innate or inborn in the mind from the 
beginning. Such in a word, is the case for this theory. 

There are numerous fatal objections to it. (i) It may be 
rejected as a gratuitous hypothesis. Man’s intellectual knowl¬ 
edge can be satisfactorily accounted for by the combined action 
of sense and intellect; hence, the assumption of innate ideas is 
unwarranted, (ii) There is no evidence of the existence of any 
of our ideas antecedent to experience, (iii) All our earliest 
ideas are of objects known by sensible experience, and to these 
we always turn to illustrate our loftiest and most abstract con¬ 
ceptions. But these facts are obviously in conflict with the sup¬ 
position of a supply of ready made cognitions from the be¬ 
ginning. 

(b) Empiricism. The Sensationist, or Empiricist theory 
of knowledge stands in the completest opposition to the views 




275 


of the supporters of innate ideas. Starting from the assump¬ 
tion that sensuous and intellectual activity are essentially the 
same in kind, its aim is to make it appear that universal and 
abstract concepts, necessary judgments, self-consciousness and 
all our higher spiritual cognitions are merely more complex or 
refined products of sense. Universal concepts are either con¬ 
fused with the concrete phantasms of the imagination, or their 
existence is boldly denied. All our cognitions, in fact, are 
declared to be merely more or less elaborate sense impressions. 
This indeed is the fundamental defect of empiricism. It ignores 
the active energy of intellect with which the mind is endowed, 
and, consequently, it can give no adequate account of our 
higher intellectual operations. Hence, it denies their existence 
against the testimony of our consciousness. 

(c) Ontologism. This theory holds that we have an 
immediate knowledge of God and of His divine ideas, and from 
this intuition of the divine ideas, we acquire our intellectual 
knowledge of the essences of things and of necessary truths. 

(i) Now, this is a purely fanciful and gratuitous hypothesis. 

(ii) It is, moreover, a pernicious hypothesis, as attributing to 
our natural powers what is the very climax of supernatural 
power, i. e., the intuitive vision of God. (iii) Finally, it is 
against the evident testimony of our consciousness which 
clearly denies the existence in us of any such direct and intui¬ 
tive knowledge of God or of the divine ideas. 

Article II.— The Will. 

(i ). Will in General. 

Will or rational appetite is the power of loving, 
desiring, enjoying that which is apprehended by the intellect 
as good. The range of this rational power of desire and enjoy¬ 
ment is, therefore, co-extensive with that of the intellect. Now, 




-276 


the intellect as it apprehends being in general, so it apprehends 
the good in general. The formal and adequate object of 
the Will is, therefore, the good as apprehended by the intellect. 

Hence, an object which would embrace in itself all good , 
if presented to the Will as such, would satisfy all its capacities 
and be necessarily loved and desired by it. On the other hand, 
an object however perfect in itself, if presented to the Will as 
lacking in anything of the absolute good apprehended by the 
mind, will not satisfy all the Will’s capacities, and hence, can¬ 
not necessitate its love or desire. 

The Will, therefore, can embrace all the good presented 
to it as such by the intellect, whether material or immaterial, 
whether of ourselves immediately or of those whom we should 
love, unlimited in extent, endless and unfailing in duration. 

That we have within us such a power of longing for, striv¬ 
ing after ideals of, e. g., ‘knowledge,’ ‘power,’ ‘peace,’ ‘moral 
goodness,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘wealth,’ etc., which no sense-representa¬ 
tion can picture, is the testimony of each one’s consciousness. 
Man ‘ ‘ looks before and after and pines for what is not ” to be 
found in any accumulation of material or finite objects. He 
can, moreover, and he frequently does reject objects the most 
attractive to sensuous desire, for the sake of immaterial spirit¬ 
ual good, e. g., ‘virtue,’ ‘duty,’ ‘the honor of God,’ etc., which 
can be apprehended only by the intellect. 

This power of desiring the unlimited , the everlasting , in 
every order of good , is at once the cause of man’s unrest, the 
stimulus of his progress, and the simplest proof that there is 
in him a source of supra-organic spiritual energy. 

(ii) Free Will. 

13. “We have now arrived at that fundamental and far- 
reaching truth the freedom of the Will. This great philo¬ 
sophical truth, the physical liberty of man, branches out into 
all departments of Philosophy and determines the whole theory 




-277-- 

of human life and morality, which is the practical outcome of 
speculation. If a man does not possess Free Will, if he cannot 
by his own inherent personal energy oppose himself to the 
current of influences which bear upon him, whether in the 
form of inherited character, or early training, or of present 
motives, then he is really nothing more than irresponsible 
machine. The mechanism may be most ingenious, the agencies 
at work innumerable; but if his conduct is always the inevi¬ 
table resultant of the forces playing upon him, there is no 
essential difference in kind between the acts deliberately willed 
by him and the movements of the madman, the brute or the 
rain cloud. 

14. “By free will, or physical liberty, or the control of 
the Will over its own actions is meant that endowment by 
which an agent, in regard to certain objects presented by the 
intellect, when all the conditions requisite to elicit a volition are 
present, is able either to put forth or abstain from that volition. 
Liberty, thus, implies that volitions are freely elicited by the 
Ego or Person and are not the necessary outcome of his nature 
plus the attractions of the moment. 

“Now, many of man’s acts are not free. Control over 
our thoughts ceases during sleep; and even when awake, inde¬ 
pendently of automatic movements, such as breathing, winking, 
etc. we perform many acts not clearly realized in consciousness. 
A long train of thought may thus have passed through our 
mind before we, by an act of self-consciousness, advert to the 
fact, and become aware that, although hitherto it has been inde¬ 
liberate, henceforth it is free, and we are responsible for it. 

The question at issue, then, is not whether every action 
of man is free, but whether any is so. Or, to put it otherwise, 
Is the consenting act of the Will always completely determined 
by the pre-requisites for a volition except the Will itself? Does 
that act necessarily follow? Determinists or Necessarians 




--—278- 

answer in the affirmative: Libertarians or Indeterminists say, 
No. 

“We allow most readily, first, that a great part of man’s 
daily action is indeliberate; secondly, that when he acts deliber¬ 
ately and exercises his power of free choice, he is greatly in¬ 
fluenced by the weight of the motives attracting him to either 
side; and finally as a consequence of this, we allow that a 
being possessed of a perfect knowledge of all the forces operat¬ 
ing on a man would be able to prophesy with the greatest prob¬ 
ability what course that man will take. But on the other hand, 
we assert emphatically that there are many acts of man which 
are not simply the resultant of the influences working upon 
him; that he can, and sometimes does, set himself against the 
balance of aggregate motive, natural disposition, acquired 
habit; and that, consequently, prediction with absolute cer¬ 
tainty as regards the future free conduct of man is impossible 
from mere knowledge of character and motives. 

15. ‘ ‘ The arguments usually adduced to establish the 

Freedom of Will proceed upon three different lines, the psycho¬ 
logical, the ethical, and the metaphysical. 

(a) Psychological Argument. “The first proof is that 
from the direct testimony of consciousness. It has been justly 
asserted that consciousness is the ultimate court of appeal in 
the science of mind. Consequently, if careful and repeated 
introspection reveals to us, as the clear declaration of conscious¬ 
ness, that we are free in the exercise of volitional acts, such an 
averment must be admitted. Now, consciousness most unmis¬ 
takably affirms in the movement of deliberate decision that we 
choose freely. Therefore, we have freedom of choice, or Free 
Will. 

“If a man asserts that he is aware of no internal expe¬ 
rience of free choice, then argument with him is useless. We 
can only appeal to the impartial mind anxious to attain truth. 




■279 


If any man within his own mental life discovers no phenome¬ 
non of the kind indicated, we cannot by any logical contrivance 
introduce it thither. But, if internal observation assures him 
of the reality of this fact which we know to exist in our own 
case, and which the ethical and other judgments of mankind at 
large prove to be universal among rational men, then he may 
rest convinced on the highest evidence that may be presented to 
his intellect that he is endowed with Free-will. 

(b) Ethical Argument. “Duty, Obligation , Responsi¬ 
bility, Merit , all imply moral liberty. If we ought to abstain 
from a forbidden gratification no matter how pleasant it would 
be to us, if we are to be responsible for our deliberate consent 
to it, if we are meritorious and deserving of approval for resist¬ 
ing it, then assuredly we must be possessed of Free-will, we 
must be capable of yielding, just as well as of refusing to yield, 
and our act can not be the mere inevitable outcome of our 
circumstances, internal and external. 

‘ ‘ In other words, if Determinism be true the entire human 
race have been hitherto under a most stupendous delusion. 
For, the universal consent of mankind, as expressed in the 
languages, literature, and laws of all times, emphatically 
affirms that there is such a thing as real moral obligation, as 
accountability, as merit, and the rest. All men place a distinc¬ 
tion between certain acts done indeliberately and similar acts 
done deliberately and freely, which implies that the latter are 
free and the former are not. 

‘‘The denial, then, of Free-wfill is not merely a rejection of 
the most manifest declarations of consciousness in a question 
upon which this faculty is the highest judge, but it is a repudi¬ 
ation of the universal conviction of mankind corroborating that 
testimony. ’ ’ 

(c) Metaphysical Argument. Will is rational appe¬ 
tite; an appetite which embraces nothing of necessity, 




- 280 - 


except what is apprehended as absolutely good and desirable 
in every respect. The Rational Will can be irresistibly drawn 
only by that which reason proposes as so universally attractive 
that it contains no lack of good, no dissatisfactory feature. As 
long as the thought of an object reveals any lack of good, any 
disagreeable aspect, the Will has not that which it is naturally 
longing for, perfect good; and it is able to reject this object. 
Appetite is in truth merely tendency towards good: and an 
object which contains any deficiency is the reverse of desirable 
so far as that feature is concerned. If, then, attention is con¬ 
centrated on this point and withdrawn from those which are 
attractive, the object loses its enticing force. But, during this 
present life, no object presents itself to the intellect as attract¬ 
ive under all aspects when we advert to its value. As regards 
finite goods, it is obvious that, either in the difficulty of their 
acquisition, or the uncertainty of their possession, etc., there is 
always something on account of which they are undesirable, 
and for which man may turn away from them to seek the infi¬ 
nite good—God himself. At the same time it is equally clear 
that man is not at present drawn inevitably in this latter direc¬ 
tion. The inadequate and obscure n(Btion of God possessed in 
this life, the difficulty of duty, the conflict of man’s pride and 
sensuality with virtue, all make the pursuit of our true good 
disagreeable in many respects to human nature, so that we can 
only too easily and freely abandon it. The clear apprehension 
of an Infinite Good, such as is given in the Beatific Vision 
of the blessed in Heaven, would of course remove this free¬ 
dom. The blessed cannot help loving God above all things; 
we, however, though necessitated to seek after the good in 
general, are physically free to reject any .particular form of it 
presented to us. 

“Free-will is, therefore, a result of man’s possession of a 
spiritual faculty of cognition whose object is the universal, and 
which can conceive unlimited and unalloyed good. Conse- 




-281 


quently, where such a power does not exist* as in the case of 
brute animals, liberty is absent.’’ 

16. The Physical liberty of the Will established by the 
preceding arguments implies such a dominion of the Will over 
its own action that upon the presentation of any particular 
limited good, as such, 'by the intellect, and with all other 
requisites for action (the Divine Concurrence included) pres¬ 
ent, it can elicit or suspend its act of volition according to its 
own choice. Free-will is therefore essentially an elective 
power, an active power of self-determination. Its action is 
determined, not by any necessity of its nature, or by force of 
acquired habit or present disposition, or by the object or the 
motives presented to it by the intellect, but by itself here and 
now endowed with the power of self-control. 

Now such a power cannot belong to an organic faculty.- 
An organic faculty must receive the impression of the object 
acting upon it and must re-act in proportion to the impression 
made upon it. 

Note. — (a) The power of willing or not willing a given 
object or action is called liberty of contradiction. The power 
of choosing one or another of various eligible objects is called 
liberty of specification. The power of choosing between a 
morally good act £ind its contrary, i. e., an act of vice, is called 
liberty of contrariety. This last kind of liberty implies an 
imperfection in the intellect, which presents what is, in reality, 
wholly bad and undesirable, as under a certain aspect, good 
and eligible. 

(b) Moral liberty is freedom from obligation. Thus a 
man is not morally free to tell a lie, though he has physical 
liberty to do so. 

(c) . “A voluntary act is an act that proceeds from the 
will with a knowledge of the end to which the act tends.” The 
term voluntary has therefore a wider extension than the term 




-282- 


free. All free acts are voluntary acts, but not all voluntary 
acts are free. 

17. Notes for the solution of objections against the free¬ 
dom of the Will. 

(a) A free violation is not an Uncaused or a Motiveless 
act. The cause is the free Will: its motive , some form of good 
apprehended by the intellect and freely chosen by the Will. 

(b) Consciousness testifies not merely that our volitions 
are spontaneous and voluntary, but also that they are free. We 
are conscious that many of the acts of the will are under its 
control. 

(c) To assert that all causation is necessary is to reject 
the clear testimony of consciousness and the universal convic¬ 
tion of mankind. 

(c) The will does not create physical energy, but directs 
and applies it. 

(d) We do not consider the deliberate acts of our neigh¬ 
bors to me the inevitable outcome of their character and cir¬ 
cumstances, else the words responsibility, self-control, merit, 
etc., would have no meaning. Nor does this make it impos¬ 
sible to forecast men’s future conduct sufficiently for the pur¬ 
poses of social life and business. For, (i) many of man’s acts 
are indeliberate , and hence, the result of his character and cir¬ 
cumstances. (ii) In many of his deliberate acts he is, as a mat¬ 
ter of fact, guided, though not necessitated, by his character 
and circumstances, (iii) Men of virtuous lives habitually re¬ 
sist the temptations of pleasure, self-interest, etc., while a man 
accustomed to yield to a particular temptation will very prob- 

. ably yield again, though of course freely, when it recurs, etc. 
Hence, general uniformity in individual conduct is quite 
reconcilable with the possession of free Will. 

(e) Statistics do not show any constant proportion be¬ 
tween certain external circumstances and the commission of 




- 283 - 

certain crimes. And even if they did, it would only show that 
such circumstances were proximate occasions and strong, in¬ 
ducements to the commission of these crimes, not that they 
necessitated them. 

(f) It is most true that God knows all our free future 
actions, but He knows them just as they will be, i. e., as free 
actions of the Will. God’s knowledge of such acts no more 
necessitates them than my knowledge of what you are now 
freely doing necessitates your doing it. 

18. The Control of the Will over the other Faculties. 

(a) It can apply the intellect, the internal and external 
senses, and the motor powers to action. 

(b) In regard to the judgments of the intellect, when the 
connection between subject and predicate is not apprehended 
as evident, our Will may find some real or apparent good in 
our adopting a particular view on the question. In such a case 
it can fix the attention of the intellect on the reasons for that 
view and on the objections against any other, and compel as¬ 
sent to the proposition of its choice, as useful, prudent, pleasur¬ 
able, etc. 

(c) In regard to the sensuous appetite , the Will can con¬ 
trol it indirectly, inasmuch as it can control the application of 
the external and internal senses to such objects as would ex¬ 
cite sensuous desire or aversion. 


CHAPTER II.— Nature of the Human Soul. 

Article I.— Substantiality and Simplicity of the Human 

Soul. 

By the words Human Soul, we understand the subject of 
our mental life, the ultimate principle by which we think and 




■284- 


will. We now proceed to expound and justify our doctrine re¬ 
garding the nature of the reality corresponding to this term. 

19. The Human Soul is a Substantial Principle. 

This proposition merely asserts that the ultimate principle of 
our mental life cannot be an accident. A principle is that from 
which something proceeds. A substance we have already de¬ 
fined as a being which exists per se, which subsists in itself, in 
opposition to an accident, which is a being that cannot so sub¬ 
sist, but must inhere in another being as in a subject. Now, 
the ultimate principle of our mental life must be a substantial 
principle. States of consciousness, mental modifications neces¬ 
sarily presuppose a subject to which they belong. Ideas, judg¬ 
ments and reasonings cannot inhere in nothing. Volitions 
cannot proceed from nothing: they must have a source from 
which they flow. This ultimate substantial principle, whatever 
its nature may turn out to be, which is the subject of our con¬ 
scious states, we call the Soul. 

20. The Human Soul is a Simple Substantial Principle. 

By affirming the simplicity of the soul we deny that it is ex¬ 
tended. Our argument runs thus. Every extended substance 
consists of extraposited parts. But the subject of our con¬ 
scious acts cannot consist of such parts. Therefore, it is not 
an extended substance. The major premise is evident. The 
minor is proved by a multitude of mental facts of which we 
will indicate a few. 

(a) The Simplicity of Intellectual Ideas. Every one’s 
experience teaches him that he is capable of forming various 
abstract ideas, such as those of 'Being,’ ‘Unity,’ ‘Truth,’ ‘Vir¬ 
tue,’ and the like, which are of their nature simple and indi¬ 
visible. Now, acts of this sort cannot proceed from an ex¬ 
tended substance, for instance, ‘the brain.’ This will be seen 
by a little reflexion. In order that the indivisible idea of, say, 
‘Being,’ proceed from such an extended substance, either dif- 




-285- 


ferent parts of the idea must belong to different parts of the 
brain, or each part of the brain must be the subject of the 
whole idea, or the whole idea must pertain to a single part of 
the brain. Now, the first alternative is absurd. The act by 
which the intellect apprehends truth, being, and the like, is an 
indivisible thought. It is directly incompatible with its nature 
to be allotted or distributed over an aggregate of extraposited 
parts. The second alternative is equally impossible. If differ¬ 
ent parts of the extended substance were each the principle of 
a complete idea, we should have at the same time not one, but 
several, ideas of the subject. Our consciousness, however, 
tells us this is not the case. Lastly, if the whole idea were 
located in one part or element of the extended substance, either 
this part is itself composite or simple. If the latter, then our 
thesis—that the ultimate subject of thought is unextended—is 
established at once. If the former, then the old series of im¬ 
possible alternatives will recur again until we are finally forced 
to the same conclusion. 

(b) The Simplicity of the Intellectual Acts of Judg¬ 
ment and Inference. A similar line of reasoning applies 
here. The simplest judgment supposes the comparison of two 
distinct ideas which must be simultaneously apprehended by 
one unextended agent. Suppose the judgment, ‘science is use¬ 
ful/ to be elicited. If the subject which apprehends the two 
concepts science and useful is not unextended, then we must 
assume that one of these terms is apprehended by one part and 
the other by a second; or else that different parts of the ex¬ 
tended subject are each the subject of both ideas. In the 
former case, however, we cannot have any judgment at all. 
The part a apprehends science, the different part b conceives 
the notion useful, but the indivisible act of comparison requir¬ 
ing a single agent who combines the two ideas is wanting, and 
we can no more have the affirmative predication than if one 
man thinks science and another forms the concept useful. In the 




-286- 

second alternative, if the parts a and b each simultaneously ap¬ 
prehend both science and useful, then we should have, not one, 
but a multiplicity of judgments. 

The simplicity of the inferential act of the mind by which 
we seize the logical sequence of a conclusion from premises is 
still more irreconcilable with the hypothesis of a composite 
subject. The three judgments—every y is z: every x is y: 
therefore , every x is z —could no more constitute a syllogism 
if they proceeded from an extended substance than if each 
proposition was apprehended alone by a separate man. 

(c) The Simplicity of the Act of Volition. The same 
line of argument as in the case of judgment establishes the 
simplicity of the soul from the unity of principle manifested 
in the acts of the Will. One, indivisible, immanent act of free 
choice cannot be elicited by an extended faculty composed of 
different extraposited parts. 

(3) Memory. Through memory we are aware of our 
own abiding personal identity. We know with the most abso¬ 
lute certainty that we are the same persons who yesterday, 
last week, fifty years ago, had some vivid experience. But 
this would be impossible were the material organism the sub¬ 
stantial principle in which these states inhere. The constitu¬ 
ent elements of the latter are completely changed in a com¬ 
paratively short time; and transient mental acts which did not 
inhere in a permanent subject could no more give us memory 
than could the disconnected cognitions of successive genera¬ 
tions of men. Only a simple principle persisting unchanged 
amid successive states can afford an adequate basis for the fac¬ 
ulty of remembrance. The condition necessary for the act of 
recollection is the identity of the being whose former states 
are recalled by memory. 

21. The activities of our mental life are intelligible. 
Therefore, only by referring all our ideas, judgments, voli- 




-287- 


tions, memories of the past, etc., to one simple substantial prin¬ 
ciple as their source and center. 

We have thus demonstrated the simplicity of the substan¬ 
tial principle which is the source of mental phenomena and we 
have shown that it cannot be an extended or a composite 
reality. 


Article II.— The Spirituality of the Soul. 

22. We have proved that the human soul must be a sub¬ 
stantial principle and, moreover, that this principle must be of 
a simple and abiding nature. We now pass on to demonstrate 
that the soul is spiritual or immaterial. The attribute of 
spirituality is sometimes confounded with that of simplicity, 
but it is important to carefully distinguish these two terms. 
By saying that a substance is simple we mean that it is not 
composed of parts. By affirming that it is spiritual or imma¬ 
terial, we signify that in its existence and in some of its opera¬ 
tions it is independent of matter. The principle of life in the 
lower animals is an instance of a simple principle which is 
nevertheless not spiritual, since it is absolutely dependent upon 
the organism, or, “completely immersed” in the body. 

23. The Human Soul is a Spiritual Substance. 

The human soul is the subject of various spiritual activities. 
But the subject of spiritual activities must be itself a spiritual 
being. Therefore, the soul must be a spiritual being. The 
minor premise is merely a particular application of the axiom 
that the operation of an agent follows its nature— actio se- 
quitur esse. As this being is, so will it act. An act cannot 
transcend its cause. If, accordingly, any activities or facul¬ 
ties of the soul are spiritual, then the soul itself is spiritual. 
For the proof of our major premise—that we are endowed with 
activities of a spiritual or immaterial kind—we have only to 
refer to the conclusions established in the preceding chapter. 




- 288 - 

We will, however, here recall some of the facts which bring out 
in the clearest manner the truth of our thesis. 

(a) The Spirituality of the Faculty of Thought. We 
are capable of apprehending and representing to ourselves 
abstract and universal ideas, e. g., ‘ truth,’ ‘unity,’ ‘man,’ ‘tri¬ 
angle’; we can form ideas of purely spiritual beings, e. g., ‘of 
God ’; we can understand necessary truths; we can apprehend 
possibilities as such; we can perceive the rational relations 
between ideas, and the logical sequence of conclusions from 
premises. But we have shown that such operations as these 
are spiritual phenomena which must accordingly proceed from 
a spiritual faculty. They could not be acts of a faculty ex¬ 
erted through or intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ. A 
power of this kind, (i) can only react in response to physical 
impressions, and (ii) can only form representations of a con¬ 
crete character, depicting contingent individual facts. But 
universality, possibility, logical sequence, general relations (i) 
do not constitute such a physical stimulus, and (ii) can not 
be re-presented by an organic faculty. Accordingly, these 
higher mental functions must be admitted to be of a spiritual 
character: they thus transcend the sphere of all actions de¬ 
pending essentially or intrinsically on a material instrument. 
Since, then, our intellectual activity is of a spiritual character, 
the soul itself must, therefore, be a spiritual being. 

(b) Self-consciousness. In the act of self-consciousness 
there occurs an instance of the 'complete or perfect reflexion 
of an indivisible agent back upon itself. I recognize an abso¬ 
lute identity between myself thinking about something and 
myself reflecting on that thinking Self. The mind reflecting 
and the mind reflected upon is the same: it is at once subject 
and object. Now, an action of this sort stands in direct and 
open conflict with all the most fundamental characteristics’of 
matter. One part of a material substance may be made to act 
upon another, one atom may attract, repel or in various ways 




-289- 

influence another, but that precisely the same portion of 
matter can be agent and patient in its own case is repugnant 
to all that either common experience or physical science teaches 
us. If, then, this unity of agent and patient, of subject and 
object, is so contrary to the nature of matter, assuredly an 
activity whose action is intrinsically dependent on a corporeal 
organ cannot be capable of self-reflexion. To such an activity 
self-consciousness would be impossible. Consequently, there 
is a spiritual power within us, and the substantial principle 
from which it proceeds must be intrinsically independent of 
the body. 

(c) The Will. The argument based on voluntary action 
may start from two distinct points of view. 

(i) A merely sentient agent—one whose whole being 
is immersed in material conditions—can only desire sensuous 
good. On the other hand, to a spiritual creature which is en¬ 
dowed also with inferior faculties, both sensuous and supra- 
sensuous good is adapted. Therefore, the aspirations of the 
latter are unlimited, while those of the former are confined 
within the sphere of material well-being. But our own con¬ 
sciousness, history, biography and the existence of poetry and 
romance, all overwhelm us with evidence of the fact that man 
is moved by supra-sensible good. Love of justice, truth, virtue 
and right for its own sake are motives and impulses which have 
inspired some of the greatest and noblest works chronicled in 
the history of the human race. Consequently, there must be 
in man a principle not completely subject to material condi¬ 
tions. 

(ii) Again. We are free: we are capable of active self- 
determination and in the act of free choice we can deliberately 
reject all that is attractive and gratifying to sensuous desire, 
and can choose instead that from which the body shrinks. But 
an organic power cannot thus control and coerce the exercise 




-290-- 

of its own activity. To do so would be to act against its own 
nature. 

24. Notes for the solution of objections. 

The Materialist hypothesis as to the nature of the soul is 
expressed in different terms by different writers, e. g., 

‘‘ Thought is a secretion of the Brain. ’ ’-—Cabanis; 1 ‘ There sub¬ 
sists the same relation between thought and the brain as be¬ 
tween bile and the liver.”—Vogt; “There is every reason to 
suppose that consciousness is a function of nervous matter..’ ’— 
Huxley; “Consciousness and nervous action are subjective and 
objective faces of the same thing.”—Spencer; etc. 

There is, however, this fundamental agreement between 
all these writers, that “Soul and Body are not two distinct 
realities, but merely two ‘aspects,’ ‘sides,’ ‘faces,’ or ‘phases,’ 
of one and the same thing,” i. e., intellect and will are organic 
faculties: the human soul is not a spiritual substance distinct 
from the material organism. 

Now, it will be observed as we proceed that one radical 
vice pervades all the arguments (so far as they are arguments 
and not mere reckless assertions) adduced in favor of the ma¬ 
terialist hypothesis, i. e., the mistake of confounding conditions 
with causes. Legible print and good light are conditions 
requisite for good reading, but they are not the cause of the 
reading. In the same way, a certain state of the brain may 
very well be a condition of normal thinking and willing, but 
in no state, short of becoming an unextended immaterial fac¬ 
ulty, can the brain be the cause of our thoughts and volitions, 
as has been clearly shown in the preceding paragraphs. 

Hence, the folly of what has been called the Double- 
Aspect theory, i. e., that mind and body are not two distinct 
realities, but merely two aspects, sides, or phases of one and 
the same thing—matter in motion. Even if the reciprocal 
correspondence between every form of mental state and definite 
neural processes were established—utterly hopeless though the 




-291 


prospect of such result be—absolutely nothing would have been 
done towards reducing mental activity to a mere aspect of 
nervous changes. The two sets of facts are separated, as 
Spencer confesses, by “ a difference which transcends all other 
differences. ’ l To talk of the unextended spiritual soul and the 
material body as “subjective and objective sides of the same 
fact,” as a “two-sided cause,” or a “double-faced unity,” is 
merely a childish attempt to deceive ourselves with nonsensical 
or sophistical terms, just as it would be to talk of a “circular 
square. ’ ’ 

'Another thing that must be borne in mind in order to 
interpret aright many of the facts which are urged as ob¬ 
jections against the spirituality of the soul, is the relation of 
the human soul to the human organism. The soul is not a 
pure spirit indwelling in the brain as in a palace or a priso*n. 
It is a substantial dynamic principle united to the body as Sub¬ 
stantial Form to Matter. It is the source of various powers 
or activities some of which can only be exercised by the com¬ 
pound of soul and matter; others, by the soul alone. To the 
former class belongs the vegetative and sensitive powers of 
man; to the latter, the intellectual. Now, as in an animal, the 
vegetative powers subserve the sensitive; so in a man the vege¬ 
tative and sensitive operations subserve the intellctual activity 
of the one simple dynamic principle from which all these vari- 
ious powers proceed. The exercise, therefore, of its intellectual 
activity will naturally be more or less influenced by its vege¬ 
tative and sensitive operations, and hence organic conditions 
will indirectly and remotely influence intellectual activity. 
Philosophy, therefore, far from slighting, will gladly welcome 
every fact that helps to illustrate in detail the relation be¬ 
tween organic processes and mental states. Only let us be 
sure of our facts and gather rational conclusions from them. 

With these simple principles in mind let us consider 
briefly the chief arguments for Materialism, drawn from An¬ 
atomy, Physiology, Pathology, etc. 




- 292 '—- 

(a) Anatomy and Physiology. “Intellectual ability va¬ 
ries in proportion to the size of the braim, its weight, chemical 
composition and the complexity of its convolutions. There¬ 
fore, the intellect is the brain.’’ 

Ans. (i) T. anteced.; n. concl. The most the antecedent 
would prove, if it were true, would be the extrinsic dependence 
of the intellect on the internal and external senses, of which 
we have spoken above, n. 7. 

Ans. (ii) N. anteced. In point of absolute weight the 
brain of the elephant far exceeds that of man; and that of the 
boy that of the full grown man. In relative weight of brain 
several of the smaller birds are superior to man; and in this 
respect, too, the child is superior to the mature man. 

In regard to the proportion of phosphorus in the brain, 
fish, sheep and geese are at least man’s equal. 

Finally, as to the multiplicity, complexity, etc., of the con¬ 
volutions of the brain, the elephant, the ass, and the sheep 
would be superior to man. 

Long ago St. Thomas said that the human organism has 
the most perfect brain, but science has as yet failed to say in 
what precisely that perfection consists. 

(b) Pathology. “A power whose action can be disturbed 
and almost rendered impossible by indigestion, slight lesions 
of the brain, alcohol, opium, etc., and which can be restored 
by a dose of medicine, a surgical operation, etc., cannot be a 
spiritual power. But the intellect is such a power. There¬ 
fore, etc.” 

Ans. N. maj.: t. min.: n. concl. The intellectual activity 
of the soul is dependent on the imagination, as a reader on his 
book. Every disturbance of the brain, therefore, which is the 
organ of the imagination, will thus indirectly affect the opera¬ 
tion of the intellect. This, however, is an old-fashioned truth; 
and the most modern physiology can do little more than note 
the fact of which the oldest philosophers were well aware. 




-293- 

“Almost everything needed for an exact science of the rela¬ 
tions between changes in the brain and changes in our sensa¬ 
tions is lamentably deficient.”—Ladd. Complete insanity is 
found to co-exist with a perfectly normal condition of the 
brain, as far as science can judge; and, on the other hand, nor¬ 
mal and even brilliant intellectual activity is often manifested 
by those suffering from serious cerebral lesion. 

(c) Psychological Heredity. “The intellectual and moral 
qualities of parents are inherited by children. But only the 
material elements of man are derived from his parents. There¬ 
fore, intellectual and moral characters are merely material 
qualities.” 

Ans. D. maj., directly , i. e., as spiritual qualities, n.: in¬ 
directly , i. e., physiological qualities are inherited from which 
follow aptitudes for certain sensitive operations which in their 
turn extrinsically affect intellectual action, c. D. min., material 
elements affected by the physiological conditions of the parents, 
c.; material elements unaffected by the physiological conditions 
of the parents, n. 

Note.— Bodily conditions, as we have said, indirectly in¬ 
fluence the exercise of the soul’s spiritual activities. On the 
other hand, a man’s intellectual and moral life affects the sensi¬ 
tive and vegetative operations of the soul and in this way the 
very texture of the bodily frame. For the rest, the early teach¬ 
ing and example of parents, rather than the bodily qualities 
transmitted to their children, is the chief influence in the for¬ 
mation of the mental and moral character of the latter. 

(e) In regard to psycho-physics and cerebral physiology, 
in general, two cautions are necessary; (i) The intellect is a 
spiritual faculty, and hence, even if science should one day 
show that certain definite cerebral processes invariably pre¬ 
ceded and accompanied certain definite intellectual acts, it 
would only show that such cerebral modifications were the 
organic factors in those sensitive acts which are the extrinsic 




- 294 -- 

conditions upon which the exercise of intellectual activity, in 
our present state, depends, (ii) The sweeping assertions, so 
frequent in materialistic works on cerebral physiology, are in 
the actual state of science mere groundless conjectures. Thus 
we are told that “all mental phenomena have exact equiva¬ 
lents in specific forms of the nerve-commotion of the living 
brain.” On this Professor Ladd, one of the highest living au¬ 
thorities in this line of study, remarks: ‘ ‘ Our first impression 
on considering the foregoing # # is that of a certain 

surprising audacity. The theory, standing on a slender basis 
of real fact, makes a leap into the dark which carries it cen¬ 
turies in advance of where the light of modern research is now 
clearly shining. ’ ’ 

Every lover of knowledge will surely welcome all facts 
which help him to understand the relations between the matter 
and spirit of which he is composed. But here, as elsewhere, 
the student must be warned against mistaking any writer’s 
day-dreams and conjectures for objective facts of nature. 


Article III. —Immortality of the Soul. 

25. So far we have proved that the human soul is a 
simple, spiritual, substantial principle. These truths, though 
of interest in themselves, derive their chief importance from 
their bearing on the question of a future life. It is clearly 
perceived that if the immortality of the soul be once estab¬ 
lished a scheme of future rewards and punishments is a corol¬ 
lary which necessarily must follow. Consequently, the most 
violent Psychology and the most desperate Logic are pressed 
into the service of Materialism. The great poet of the school, 
Lucretius, openly confessed that the aim of this philosophy is 
to relieve men from anxiety regarding their condition after 
death, and the more candid of his modern disciples scarcely 
conceal their agreement with this view. 




-295 


26. Immortality of the Soul. Immortality means lit¬ 
erally freedom from death. By death is meant the cessation 
of life in living things. Such cessation of life might conceiv¬ 
ably be brought about in either of two ways: annihilation of 
the living being or corruption of its vital principle. Annihila¬ 
tion means the reduction of an object into absolute nothingness. 
A being is, strictly speaking, annihilated only when it so ceases 
to be that nothing of it remains. An object is said to be incor¬ 
ruptible when it is incapable of perishing either by dissolution 
into the constituent parts or elements which may compose it, 
or by the destruction of the subject in which it inheres or upon 
which it depends for its existence. 

Corruption from the philosophical point of view may thus 
in scholastic language be of either of two kinds— corruptio 
per se (essential corruption) or corruptio per accidens (acci¬ 
dental corruption). In corruption per se there is a dissolution 
of the being into its component principles, as in the death of a 
man or the combustion of firewood. A Being is said to suffer 
corruption per accidens when put an end to indirectly by the 
destruction of the subject on which it depends, e. g., an acci¬ 
dent perishes in this way, when the subject in which it inheres 
is broken up or changed in such a manner as to be no longer a 
fit support for it, as in the case of the disappearance of the 
shape and color from a ball of melting snow or butter. 

Now we hope to prove: (a) that the human soul is both 
per accidens and per se incorruptible; (b) that it can be anni¬ 
hilated neither by itself nor by any other creature; (c) that it 
will live at least for some time after separation from the body; 
(d) that God will never annihilate it. 

(a) The Human Soul is an Incorruptible Substance. We 
have already demonstrated (i) that the soul is a substantial 
being; (ii) that it is a simple being; (iii) that it is spiritual 
or not intrinsically dependent on the body in its action or ex¬ 
istence. But a simple substantial being is incapable of cor- 




- 296 -- 

ruption per se; for, it is not composed of component parts or 
principles into which it might be resolved; and a spiritual sub¬ 
stance is exempt from corruption per accidens, since it does 
not intrinsically depend on the body for its existence. There¬ 
fore, the human soul is incapable of corruption in either of 
these alternative ways. Incorruptibility is thus a consequent 
of spirituality. 

(b) The Human Soul cannot be Annihilated either (i) 
by Itself or (ii) by any Created Being. Annihilation is the 
reduction of something to nothing. But this result cannot 
be the effect of any positive action, for every positive action 
must terminate in a positive reality. A positive act, other than 
that of creation, can only change the state of the materials 
upon which it operates. Any action, accordingly, whether of 
the soul itself or of another creature, could at most effect 
merely a change or modification in the soul. Annihilation is 
possible only by the withdrawal of the conserving or creative 
power which sustains the being in existence. Now, as creation 
and conservation in existence pertain to God alone, He only 
can cease to preserve; and, therefore, He alone can annihilate. 

(c) The Human Soul is not Annihilated at Death. 

(i) Proof from the Moral Law and the Sanctity and 
Justice of God. God has inscribed in our rational nature His 
Moral Law, commanding us to do right and to abstain from 
wrong; and, as an infinitely wise, just and holy Legislator, He 
must have fortified this law with a perfect sanction. But there 
is not such a perfect sanction in this life. Therefore, the soul 
must exist at least for some time after death. 

Our own conscience gives us the most intimate and per¬ 
fect assurance that we are under such a Moral Law. The study 
of the laws, literatures, religions of the various nations of the 
world; investigations into the customs and moral ideas of sav¬ 
age tribes; the researches of the science of Philology, all con- 




-297 


spire to afford irresistible evidence of the universality of eth¬ 
ical conceptions which reveal the moral law. 

But without a sufficient sanction such a law would ob¬ 
viously be incomplete and inadequate, and, therefore, incom¬ 
patible with the character of a perfect, wise and just Lawgiver. 

That a sufficient sanction is not to be found in the present 
life is a fact of common observation. The goods and ills of this 
world are often distributed inversely in proportion to desert. 
Many self-sacrificing, virtuous men meet with continuous suf¬ 
fering and trial, and during the whole course of their lives, 
whilst many wicked men have enjoyed prosperity up to their 
very last moments. Now, this cannot be the final outcome of 
life. An infinitely holy and just God cannot permit this. He 
cannot allow that it be ultimately better for those who break 
His law, who violate the precepts of reason and degrade that 
nature in which they are like unto Him, than for those who 
seek to observe His commands and to conform their conduct to 
the arch-type of holiness. Therefore, there must be a future 
existence of the Soul, in which the present deficiencies of the 
practical order shall be set right. 

If there is not such a retributory state, then—there is no 
use of concealing the fact—the moral life of man, the seemingly 
grandest and sublimest reality in the universe, is founded on 
an irrational hallucination, and many of the noblest acts that 
have ever been achieved, and which all mankind conspire to 
applaud, are simply unspeakable folly. 

(2) Proof from man’s desire of perfect happiness. A 
natural and universal desire in harmony with the dictates of 
reason could not have been implanted in man’s nature by 
a perfectly wise and good God with the intention of its 
universal, necessary and final frustration. But unless the 
life of the human soul be continued after death, such is the 
case. Therefore, the soul will not perish at death. Our major 
premise is too obvious to require proof. It is inconceivable 




-298- 


that a God of infinite wisdom and goodness could have set 
in man’s nature a truly rational desire, designing it to be 
inevitably and universally rendered vain. This implicit ten¬ 
dency towards perfect beatitude, this striving after the posses¬ 
sion of an infinite good, is an intelligent yearning. It is a de¬ 
sire rooted in the rational nature of man, in that element of his 
being which makes him specifically human. It is a longing 
universal throughout the race, expanding with mental and 
moral development and attaining its grandest and noblest form 
in those men who conform their lives to the loftiest ideal of 
virtue. It would, then, have argued both folly and cruelty in 
the Author of our nature to have created this desire and pur¬ 
posed it for inevitable and universal frustration. 

The minor premise is also easy to establish. Our own . in¬ 
ternal experience, our personal observation of other men, the 
history of the human race, all bear witness to the truth that 
man’s yearning after happiness can never be satisfied in the 
present life. Health, strength, beauty, wealth, intellectual 
gifts fall to the lot of a very few, yet even where they are all 
combined we know that there may be found, not merely ab¬ 
sence of perfect happiness, but even painful discontent and 
acute misery. Anything capable of satisfying the desire of 
happiness is, in the present world, beyond the wildest hopes of 
the vast majority of the human race. Unless, then, we are pre¬ 
pared to predicate both folly and cruelty of God, we must 
maintain a future existence in which this desire can meet its 
proper object. There must be a state where this unfilled yearn¬ 
ing can be satiated. 

(3 ).—Proof from the universal judgment of mankind. A 
third argument for the reality of another life, upon which 
much stress has been always laid, is the fact that, morally 
speaking, in all times and among all nations there has been 
found a belief in a future life. Now, such a conviction in 
direct opposition to all sensible appearance must spring from 




-299- 


man’s rational nature, and must be allowed to be true, unless 
we are prepared to affirm that man’s rational nature leads him 
inevitably into error. To assert this is virtually to adopt the 
position of absolute scepticism. Consequently, we are bound 
under the penalty of intellectual suicide to admit the trust¬ 
worthiness of this universal belief. 

(d) God will not annihilate the Soul. We have now 
proved that the soul will certainly not perish at death, that it 
is of its own nature incorruptible and that it can be destroyed 
neither by itself nor by any created being: it only remains to 
be shown that God will never annihilate it. God acts with wis¬ 
dom in all His works. But there is no wisdom in making a 
Being capable and necessarily desirous of living forever and 
then annihilating it after a definite period of duration. There¬ 
fore, God has not done so. But He has made the soul innately 
and intrinsically immortal and desirous of immortality. There¬ 
fore, He will never annihilate it. We gather God’s Will from 
His works; His intentions in regard to His creatures from the 
natures He has given them. But, by its very constitution and 
nature, the human soul is fitted to live forever. Therefore, 
God will not contradict the connatural requirements of this 
Being which His wisdom planned and His power called into 
existence, but will preserve it in existence forever. 

27. Notes for the solution of objections. 

(a) “The soul is born with the body, grows with the 
body, decays with the body and therefore perishes with the 
body. 

Ans .—The soul is not derived, like the body, from the 
parents. Being a spiritual principle, it must be, as will be 
shown in a later article, immediately created by God. 

It does not grow in the sense of being quantitatively in¬ 
creased, but, extrinsically conditioned by the efficiency of the 
brain and sensory organs, it gradually unfolds its intellectual 
and moral capabilities. 




-300- 


It does not decay with bodily disease, although since its 
sensuous operations are immediately dependent on the instru¬ 
mentality of the organism, they must naturally be affected by 
the health of the latter. 

The arguments can also be inverted. In many instances 
the mind is most powerful and active in the decrepit frame of 
the old, and in spite of dreadful havoc from bodily disease. 

(b) The activity of the intellect is conditioned by that of 
the imagination and the external senses—organic faculties. 
Therefore, since the latter are extinguished at death, so must 
the former be. 

Ans .—While the soul is united to the body in the present 
life, its intellectual activity is extrinsically conditioned by the 
exercise of its sensuous powers, c.; when separated from the 
body its intellectual activity is so conditioned, n. 

Note.— The mode of action of a being is conditioned by 
its mode of existence. In the present life the spiritual soul is 
united to the body as Substantial Form to Matter; and its 
energy is distributed in various lines of action (vegetation, 
sensation, intellectual cognition and volition). The good of 
the whole being requires that there should be a hierarchical 
order among these various activities. The lower faculties must 
therefore subserve the higher, and the higher must be in some 
way dependent on the lower. As the man must pass through 
the various stages of childhood and growth, so the human spirit 
“ a little lower than the angels,” must begin its career in union 
with matter, and learn its first intellectual lessons from the 
information supplied by the senses. In the ordinary course of 
nature, however, the time must come when it is separated 
from the body, and goes forth with the knowledge acquired 
in this life and treasured up in memory into a new world and 
new conditions. The spiritual powers of knowledge and voli¬ 
tion are more intense than is possible in this life, as all the 
energy of the soul is now concentrated in these activities. The 




-301 


natural objects of its knowledge are (besides the things it 
learned while united to the body itself, its fellow-souls and 
a more perfect knowledge of pure spirits and of God than 
can be had here. These objects of knowledge, with the mind’s 
innate power of analysis, synthesis, reasoning, etc., give abun¬ 
dant scope for the exercise of intelligence and will. This im¬ 
plies nothing supernatural or preternatural: it is simply the 
soul’s connatural state in its new conditions, apart from all 
consideration of rewards and punishments. 

(c) Against the argument from the desire of happiness. 

(i) Many natural desires are vain, e. g., 'man’s longing 
for health,’ 'wealth,’ etc., 'the love of life in the brute,’ and 
the like. 

(ii) This desire will at all events be vain in lost souls. 

Ans .— (i) The desire of happiness is distinct in kind from 
the impulses with which it is here compared. It is universal 
and necessary. It is the great radical rational tendency which 
manifests the end of man as a human being. The other im¬ 
pulses that can be cited, however, are all particular appetites 
toward some special form of happiness. No one of them is 
necessary, or an inevitable outcome of man’s nature. 

As regards the instincts of the lower races of animals—in 
the first place, they do in a great part attain their end; and 
secondly they cannot properly be compared with the rational 
desire of man. The brute has not an intelligent apprehension 
of what is meant by a continued existence. Consequently, 
though it is impelled to avoid pain or destruction for the time 
being, it cannot be said to desire immortality. Brute existence 
may attain its end though all the lower animals die, whilst if 
this all-comprehensive desire in man is doomed to universal 
disappointment, it must be held that in the highest order of 
being upon the earth there is an enormous failure, anything 
like which is not to be discovered elsewhere in the universe. 




-302- 


(ii) The desire of beatitude is undoubtedly frustrated 
in the lost. This desire, absolute and radical in every human 
soul, shows indeed the natural capacity and destiny of the 
being. But the attainment of the object which shall satisfy 
it depends, as conscience testifies, on the free fulfillment of cer¬ 
tain conditions during the present life. The lost soul is, by 
its nature, capable of forever existing. It has deliberately re¬ 
fused to fulfill the conditions necessary to attain to a happy 
eternity. It justly deserves to go without the good it has thus 
wilfully rejected. Its existence in that state of privation of the 
object it necessarily longs for is an eternal affirmation of the 
sacredness of right and justice, of the foulness of moral evil 
and of the sanctity and supreme Majesty of the Divine Law¬ 
giver. 

(d) The argument from universal belief is attacked on 
the ground that some peoples and many individuals, both phi¬ 
losophers and non-philosophers, do not judge there is any 
future life. It may be observed in answer that when the proof 
from universal consent is invoked it only implies a moral uni¬ 
versality. As regards the nations or tribes who have been 
asserted not to believe in a future life, advancing knowledge 
does not confirm such a statement. The greatest care is re¬ 
quired in interrogating savages regarding their religious 
opinions. Inaccuracy in this respect has often caused the 
ascription of atheism to tribes later on proved to possess elab¬ 
orate systems of religions and hierarchies of gods. Future 
annihilation, asserted to be a cardinal doctrine of Buddhism, 
is by the vast majority of the disciples of that sect understood 
to be, not a return to absolute nothing, but an ecstatic state of 
peaceful contemplation. 

(e) It is often asserted that there is no proportion be¬ 
tween an eternal punishment and a transitory offence. 

Ans .—There is no proportion in duration between the 
offence and punishment, any more than between ten years’ 




303 


imprisonment and an attempt on a sovereign’s life, c.; there 
is no proportion in equality and fitness, n. Deliberate rebel¬ 
lion against infinite justice, goodness and holiness by a being 
bound absolutely to obedience and loyality in gratitude for 
everything which he possesses is a crime suitably atoned for 
only by such a penalty. Deliberate refusal to fulfill the con¬ 
ditions on which a certain end is appointed to be attained is 
justly punished by the privation of that end. However long or 
short, therefore, the time of probation may be, a final state of 
rebellion should mean a final state of punishment: final rejec¬ 
tion of the conditions required for the attainment of the end 
should mean final privation of the end. 

(f) A word finally in reply to certain scholastic diffi¬ 
culties. (i) “The soul,” it is said, “is the form of the body. 
But a form cannot be separated from the subject which it 
actuates.” The solution lies in the fact that the human soul 
is not a form educed from the body and intrinsically dependent 
on the latter. 

(ii) “The soul is created to inform the body; hence, the 
reason for its existence disappears with the destruction of the 
body.” The answer is that an immediate and secondary end 
of the soul’s existence is to animate the body: the primary 
end, however, is to glorify God by its intelligence and will. 

(iii) “ The soul being the form of the body, its union with 
the latter is natural; its separation would, therefore, be un¬ 
natural, and so could not endure.” We reply that the separa¬ 
tion would not be unnatural in the sense of being impossible; 
but we readily admit this state to be non-natural, in the sense 
of not being in complete harmony with the nature of the soul; 
hence, the propriety of the resurrection of the body. 

Article IV. —Unity of the Soul. 

28. Plato allotted to the human body three really distinct 
souls. Some modern authors teach that there is in man, dis* 




-304- 


tinct from the rational sentient soul, a vital principle the source 
of vegetative life. This is the theory of vitalism. Others 
make the rational soul numerically different from the common 
principle of sentient and vegetative activities. In opposition 
to these various hypotheses the scholastic doctrine holds that 
in man there is but one dynamic principle, the rational soul, 
which is, however, capable of exerting the inferior modes of 
energy exhibited in sensuous and vegetative life. 

(a) That the rational soul in man is at the same time 
the subject of his sensuous life is proved by various considera¬ 
tions. 

(i) We have the testimony of consciousness to the most 
perfect identity between the soul which feels and the soul which 
thinks. Introspection assures us that it is the same being 
which understands or reasons and which is the vital prin¬ 
ciple of our sensations. 

(ii) I can compare intellectual operations with sensi¬ 
tive .states, and affirm the former to be more painful, more 
pleasant, etc., than the latter. But this can only be effected by 
the two compared states being apprehended by one and the 
same indivisible agent. 

(iii) The intimate interdependence of thought and sen¬ 
sation is inexplicable if they are activities of diverse principles. 
In particular, no reason can be assigned why^it is of objects 
apprehended through sense that the first intellectual concepts 
are elaborated by the understanding. 

(b) —We have next to demonstrate that the principle of 
vegetative life in man is identical with the rational sentient 
soul. 

(i)—The intimate union and mutual interdependence sub¬ 
sisting between the sensuous and vegetative activities cannot 
be accounted for on the supposition that two distinct principles 
are at work. Organic changes and sensations arise simul- 




-30S 


taneously. Fear, hope, joy, anger may instantaneously and 
powerfully affect the action of the heart, stomach, liver, lungs, 
or the state of the nervous system generally; while conversely, 
the atmosphere, narcotics, the action of the stomach, of the 
liver, circulation, and indeed nearly all physiological functions 
may modify the color of our sensuous life. In a word, the two 
classes of activities condition each other. 

(ii) If the rational soul in man were a new entity in¬ 
dwelling in a living body already animated by a sentient or 
vegetative soul, man would not be a single individual. He 
would no longer be essentially one, but two beings. 

Note (1) —The solution to a difficulty often raised in 
various forms may be indicated here. It is argued that a 
corruptible principle must be really distinct from an incor¬ 
ruptible one. But sentient and vegetative souls are admittedly 
corruptible. Therefore, the rational spirit in man cannot be 
identical with the source of his inferior life; or if it is, then it 
must be mortal. To this we can answer, it is quite true that 
a soul or vital principle capable of merely sentient or vege¬ 
tative activity perishes on the destruction of the subject which 
it informs, and is accordingly corruptible, but this is not the 
case with the principle of the inferior species of life in man. 
Sentiency and vegetation are not in him activities of a merely 
sentient subject. They are, on the contrary, phenomena of a 
rational soul endowed with certain supra-sensuous powers, 
but also capable of exerting lower forms of energy. There 
can be no reason why a superior principle cannot virtually and 
superabundantly contain such inferior faculties. Scholastic 
philosophers, accordingly, have always taught that the virtue 
of exerting organic functions is inherent in the human soul, 
but that these activities are necessarily suspended whilst the 
soul is separated from the body. In the case of man, therefore, 
the active source of sentient and vegetative life is not a cor¬ 
ruptible principle. 




(2).—It is sometimes urged that the existence of a strug¬ 
gle between the rational and sensitive powers shows that both 
proceed from diverse principles. The true inference, however, 
is the very opposite. It is one indivisible soul which thinks, 
feels, desires and governs the vegetative processes of the living 
human being, and precisely because the source of these several 
activities is the same they mutually impede each other. Violent 
exercise or any kind of activity naturally diminishes the en¬ 
ergy available for another, if both activities flow from the same 
sources. If, however, the two kinds of activities flow from 
different sources, there is no reason why one should impede 
the other. 


Article V.— Union of Soul and Body. 

29. Various theories have been advanced regarding the 
nature of the union between soul and body. The most cele¬ 
brated are: (1) that of Plato, (2) Occasionalism, (3) Pre- 
established harmony, (4) the doctrine of Matter and Form. 
The first three are all forms of exaggerated Dualism: the last 
alone recognizes and accounts for the essential unity of man. 

30. Ultra-Dualistic Theories, (a) According to Plato, 
who historically comes first, the rational soul is a pure spirit 
incarcerated in the body for some crime committed during a 
former life. Its relation to the organism is analogous to that 
of the rider to his horse, or of the pilot to his ship. Since it 
is not naturally ordained to inform the body, the soul receives 
nothing but hindrance from its partner. This fanciful hypothe¬ 
sis, it is needless to say, does not receive much favor at the 
present day. (i) There is not a particle of evidence for such 
a pre-natal existence; and (ii) the doctrine would make man 
not one, hut two beings. 

(b) Occasionalism represents soul and body as two op¬ 
posed and distinct beings between which no real interaction 




-307- 


can take place. It is God alone who effects changes in either. 
On the occasion of a modification of the soul He produces an 
appropriate movement in the body; and vice versa. All our 
sensations, thoughts and volitions are produced by God Him¬ 
self ; all our actions are due, not to our own, but to the Divine 
Will. The doctrine of Occasionalism, however, is not confined 
to the interaction of soul and body. No created things have, 
in this view, any real efficiency. God is the only operative 
cause. 

(i) This theory renders purposeless the wonderful 
mechanism of the various sense-organs, (ii) It is in direct 
conflict with the testimony of consciousness to personal caus¬ 
ality in the exercise of volition and self-control, (iii) It is 
refuted by the experience of our whole life, that our sensa¬ 
tions are excited by the impressions of external objects, and 
that our volitions do really cause our physical movements, 
(iv) Finally, Occasionalism involves the gratuitous assump¬ 
tion of a continuous miracle. 

(c) The theory of Pre-established Harmony substitutes 
for the never ceasing miracles of Occasionalism a single 
miraculous act at the beginning. Soul and body do not really 
influence one another, but both proceed like two clocks started 
together in a divinely pre-arranged correspondence. 

The objections to this theory are substantially the same 
as to the last. In both, moreover, the union between mind and 
body is accidental, not essential; and we have in man really 
two beings. 

(d) Another theory,that of Physical Influx would make 
the union of soul and body consist in their mutual interaction. 
The account, however, is either merely a statement of the fact 
that they do influence each other, or an explanation which 
would dissolve the substantial union into an accidental relation 
between two juxtaposed beings. 




•308- 


31. Scholastic Doctrine. The true doctrine is the 
Peripatetic theory. This explanation was formulated by 
Aristotle, and later on adopted by St. Thomas and all the lead¬ 
ing Scholastic philosophers. The Soul is described by these 
writers as the substantial form of the body, i. e., a dynamic 
principle which, by its union with the matter that it actuates, 
constitutes a complete substance of a determinate species,—a 
human being, a man. 

Now, we have already proved that there is in man, a 
vital principle to which is due the natural unity of activity 
comprising the phenomena of his life. But, such a principle 
must be the substantial form of the living human being. For, 
since every action of an agent flows from the nature of that 
agent—the principle which is the source of the natural activity 
of a substance must be determinant of its being and nature. 
Consequently, as the soul is the source of all vital activities, 
it must be the determining or actuating principle of 
the living being. The soul is thus a substantial principle 
upon which the very being of the substance depends. In other 
words, by its union with its material co-efficient, the soul con¬ 
stitutes the complete living human being. That is, the soul or 
vital principle is the substantial form of the living body. 

Furthermore, the rational soul must also be the only sub¬ 
stantial form of man. For man is one, complete, individual 
substance; specifically distinct from all other substances. 
Were the human body, however, actuated by more than one 
substantial form, man would not be, not one, but an aggregate 
of individuals, since each substantial form would constitute 
with matter a complete substantial being of a determinate 
species. 

Note.— The chief difficulty urged against the thesis of the 
present paragraph is based on the spirituality of the human 
soul. It is said that since intellect is a supra-organic faculty 
intrinsically independent of matter, it cannot be a faculty of a 




309 


principle which is the form of a body. In reply we admit that 
intellect could not be a faculty of a form completely dependent 
on a material co-efficient. But, there is no impossibility in a 
substantial principle which, although it informs a living body, 
yet being endowed with a spiritual faculty, transcends and ex¬ 
ceeds the sphere of a merely organic form. There is no contra¬ 
diction, as we have before shown, in a spiritual principle pos¬ 
sessing capabilities of an inferior as well as of a superior order. 
Moreover, we have proved that the human soul is de facto the 
source of both classes of faculties. 

32. As to the manner in which the soul is present in the 
body, it is enough to remark that the simplicity of a spiritual 
substance, just as that of intelligence and volition, does not 
consist in the minuteness of a point. The soul is an immaterial, 
substantial source of energy which, though not constituted of 
separate extraposited parts, is yet capable of informing , and 
of exercising its virtue throughout an extended subject. Such 
a reality does not, like a material entity, occupy different parts 
of space by different parts of its own mass. In scholastic 
phraseology it is described as present throughout the body 
which in informs, not commensurably but definitely. Its pres¬ 
ence is not that of an extended object the different parts of 
which fill and are circumscribed by corresponding areas of 
space, but of an immaterial source of energy present ubiqui¬ 
tously throughout the living body. 

The soul, since it is the substantial form of the body, vivi¬ 
fying and actuating all parts of its material co-efficient so as to 
constitute with it one complete living being, must by its very 
nature be ubiquitously present in the body. For it is only 
by this immediate presence and union with matter that it can 
actuate and vitalize it. On the other hand, since the soul is an 
indivisible spirit, wherever it is present, it must be there in its 
entirety; consequently, the entire substantial soul is present in 
the whole body and in each part. Those functions of the com- 




-- 310 -- 

pound , however, which require a special organ, can only be 
exercised in that part of the body which constitutes the special 
organ, e. g., ‘eye,’ ‘ear,’ etc. This is expressed technically in the 
phrase, “The whole substance of the soul is present in every 
part of the living body, but the whole activity of the soul 
cannot be exercised in every part of the body. ’ ’ 

Note. —The higher spiritual acts of intellect, etc., are in¬ 
trinsically independent of the organism, i. e., no bodily organ 
co-operates in eliciting them; yet there is no great inaccuracy 
in saying that the soul thinks in the brain, inasmuch as the 
brain is the organ of the imagination and sensuous memory on 
whose functions the exercise of intellectual activity extrinsi- 
cally depends. 


Article YI.—Origin of the Human Soul. 

33. Mode of Origin of the Soul. Of philosophers hold¬ 
ing erroneous ideas regarding the origin of the human soul, 
some have conceived it as arising by emanation from the Divine 
substance, others as derived from the parents. The former 
theory starts from a Pantheistic conception of the universe, 
and is in conflict with the simplicity and absolute perfection of 
God. The hypothesis that the soul is transmitted to the off¬ 
spring by the parents—and hence, called Traducianism —has 
taken a variety of forms. Some writers have maintained that 
the soul of the child, like its body, proceeds from the parental 
organism; others that it it comes from the soul of the parents. 

Traducianism, whether understood of a corporeal or 
incorporeal seminal element, is an inadmissible theory. As 
regards the derivation of the rational soul of the child from the 
body of a parent, it is obvious that such a supposition is based 
on a materialistic conception of the nature of the soul. Nemo 
dat quod non habet; a spiritual substance cannot proceed from 
a corporeal principle. The derivation, however, of the rational 




311 


soul from the soul of a parent is equally absurd. Every human 
soul is a simple spiritual substance. Consequently, the hypothe¬ 
sis of any sort of seminal particle or spiritual germ being de¬ 
tached from the parental soul is absurd. Finally, if the soul of 
the child were generated or evoked out of the 'potencies of 
matter , it would not he a spiritual being endowed with intellect 
and will and intrinsically independent of matter. 

34. Opposed to these various theories stands the doctrine 
of creation, according to which ‘ ‘ each human soul is produced 
from nothing by the creative act of God. ’ ’ By creation is meant 
the calling of a being into existence from nothing, the produc¬ 
tion of an object as regards its entire substance. Now, a spirit¬ 
ual substance, if produced at all, must be produced by creation. 
But, the human soul is a spiritual substance, whilst at the same 
time it is of finite capacity, and therefore, a caused or con¬ 
tingent being. But, because of its contingent and limited nature 
it cannot be self-existing; it must, therefore, have received its 
existence from another being. On the other hand, inasmuch as 
it is a spiritual being intrinsically independent of matter, it 
cannot have arisen by any process of substantial transforma¬ 
tion ; for, if it did so arise, it would necessarily be a composite 
substance consisting of Matter and Form. Finally, since God 
alone, who exists of Himself, and who alone possesses infinite 
power, can exert the highest form of action, calling creatures 
into existence from nothing, the production of the human soul 
must be due immediately to Him. 

Note. —Objections urged against the doctrine of the cre¬ 
ation of the soul are (i) Like end must have like origin; but, 
the human soul is immortal; therefore it must never have had 
a beginning, (ii) The theory of creation involves a contin¬ 
uous exercise of miraculous power on the part of God. 

Answer (i)—We simply deny that the end of a creature 
must be like its beginning in the way asserted. God alone is 
without beginning, but He can will to exist whatever is not 




-312- 

intrinsically impossible, and He may will it to last forever. 
Consequently, there can be no absurdity in His creating from 
nothing a simple incorruptible substance which He designs 
never to perish. 

(ii)—A miracle is an interference with the laws of nature, 
but in the given case, the creation of souls, when the appro¬ 
priate conditions are posited by the creature, is a law of 
nature. 

35. Time of its Origin. When does the human soul 
begin to exist ? Plato taught that previous to its incarceration 
in the body the soul had from all eternity resided among the 
gods in an ultra-celestial sphere. In that ideal land it contem¬ 
plated Truth, Goodness and Beauty, as they are in themselves; 
and its present cognitions are merely faint cloudy reminis¬ 
cences of the knowledge it once possessed. The theory of 
Metempsychosis or Transmigration of souls, has been held un¬ 
der one shape or another by many Oriental thinkers. These doc¬ 
trines, however, in all their forms are gratuitous and absurd 
hypotheses. There is not a vestige of argument in their favor; 
no memory of any such previous existence; no knowledge of 
any kind, much less of any personal fault committed in a 
previous state. On the other hand, they misconceive soul and 
body as two complete substances mutually hostile to and inde¬ 
pendent of each other, accidentally and not substantially and 
naturally united in man. Lebnitz considered human souls along 
with all other Monads to have been created simultaneously by 
God at the beginning of the world. All souls were conserved 
in a semi-conscious condition inclosed in minute organic par¬ 
ticles ready to be evoked into rational life when the fitting con¬ 
ditions are supplied. Proof of cause is here out of the ques¬ 
tion. No sufficient end can be conceived for the sake of which 
such an unconscious life could be vouchsafed to the soul; and 
consequently, it must be rejected as a useless and incredible 
hypothesis. 




-313 


The true doctrine as to the time of the origin of the 
rational soul is that which teaches that it is created precisely 
when it is infused into the body. There are two tenable views 
as to the exact moment of this event. One holds that the 
rational soul is created and infused into the new being at the 
instant of conception; the other, supported by St. Thomas, 
assigns a somewhat later period for this occurrence. The 
advent of the rational soul occurs, St. Thomas maintains, when 
the embryo has been sufficiently developed to become the ap¬ 
propriate material constituent of the human being. 

Note.— The argument by which we have established that 
each individual rational soul owes its origin to a Divine cre¬ 
ative act, proves a fortiori that the first of such souls must have 
thus arisen. Since even the spiritual soul of a human parent 
is incapable of itself effecting a spiritual soul in its offspring, 
it is evident that the merely sentient soul of a brute could less 
still be the cause of such a result. Again, the human soul as 
we have shown possesses the spiritual faculties of Intellect and 
Will, and is, therefore, itself a spiritual principle intrinsically 
independent of matter: but, such a being could never arise 
by mere continuous modifications of a vital energy intrinsically 
dependent on matter. In a word, all the proofs by which we 
established the spirituality of the higher faculties, and of the 
soul itself, demonstrate the existence of an impassable chasm 
between it'and all non-spiritual principles, whether of the 
amoeba or the monkey. The special intervention of God must 
therefore, have been necessary to introduce into the world 
this new superior order of agent. 

Article VII. 

Unity and Antiquity of the Human Race. 

36. Unity of the Human Race. Under this head we 
have two questions, (i) as to specific unity and (ii) as to 
unity of origin. 




-314- 

(a) Specific Unity. All races of men are essentially 
similar in anatomical and physiological characters, and per¬ 
manently fruitful intermarrige can have place between indi¬ 
viduals of all the various types. Therefore, etc. All races 
of men possess intelligence, free will, the power of speech, 
the social, ethical and religious instincts, etc. Therefore, etc. 
“Dolichocephalous or brachycephalous, great or small, orthog- 
nathous or prognathous, man is always man in the full sense of 
the word. ’ ’ Quatrefages. 

Note. —The peculiarities of the different races, e. g., 
‘color,’ ‘size and shape of skull,’ ‘character of hair,’ etc., are 
merely accidental modifications resulting from ‘environment, 
climate, food,’ physical and moral conditions of life, etc., and 
transmitted by heredity. 

(b) Unity of Origin. Full certainty that all the various 
races of men are descended from the same primitive parents 
is given only by the authority of the divine revelation. How¬ 
ever, the comparative study of the traditions, customs, relig¬ 
ions, folk-lore and languages of the various races, furnishes 
a very powerful positive argument in favor of unity of origin. 

Note (1). — As to the objection that it is impossible to ac¬ 
count for the vast population which filled the earth, within 
less than a thousand years after the flood, if all were derived 
from the family of Noah, it is enough to say, “assume that 
between the age of 25 and 50, each married couple become the 
parents of four children, and a single couple propagating itself 
at this rate could in a thousand years give a population twice 
as great as there is now upon the earth.” 

(2).—“We cannot admit that the difficulties in the way of 
migration offer a valid reason for disbelieving that mankind 
originally came from one spot on the earth. These difficulties 
are nowhere greater than in the Pacific ocean, and yet the 
Pacific ocean affords abundant proof that these difficulties do 




315 


not hinder the spreading of the inhabitants from one group 
of islands to another. The great similarity in the language, 
customs, traditions and religions of Polynesia, from the Sand¬ 
wich Islands to New Zealand, will not allow us to suppose 
that these Islanders are of different races.”—Waitz. “The 
Polynesians started from the Archipelagoes on the eastern 
coast of Asia. None of the these migrations date back beyond 
historic times. The chief migrations took place a little before 
or after the Christian era. ’ ’—Quatrefages. 

37. The Antiquity of the Human Race. The Bible does 
not give any fixed date for the origin of man. Arguing from 
such data as the sacred text affords commentators have made 
various attempts to determine the age of the human race. The 
maximum assigned would be 6000 or 8000 years B. C.; the 
minimum, about 4000 B. C. The opinion commonest among 
orthodox commentators at present would place the date of 
man’s first appearance on the earth at between 8000 and 10,000 
years ago. Our natural sources of information on this sub¬ 
ject are geology and archaeology on the one hand, and history 
on the other. 

(a) As to Geology. Geologists tell us that the first cer¬ 
tain proofs we have of .the existence of man would place his 
appearance at or about the close of the glacial period. But 
how far back are we to date the close of the glacial period? 
Taking the erosion of the Niagara gorge as our chronometer 
(according to Lyell, etc.,) the maximum length of time since 
the birth of the Falls, contemporaneous with the end of the 
Ice Age, is 7000 years. This is the latest result of the careful 
calculations of C. K. Gilbert, of the U. S. Geological Survey. 
These calculations are corroborated by the observation of Win¬ 
ched, Wright and other high authorities. 

(b) As to History.— Apart from the Old Testament 
narrative the best Egyptologists place the origin of Egyptian 
history and civilization between 3000 and 4000 B. C.; Baby- 




-316- 

Ionian history dates back between 2000 and 3000 B. C.; Phoe¬ 
nician, about 1600 B. C.; Assyrian, about 1500 B. C.; Indian, 
about 1200 B. C. China has no authentic history before the 
beginning of the eighth century, B. C.; but as a matter of 
conjecture, Klaproth, Lassen, etc., place the beginning of 
Chinese history about 2000, B. C. 

From the preceding brief remarks, it is seen that neither 
geology nor history requires or permits us to assume a higher 
antiquity for man than that roughly assigned by biblical chro¬ 
nology. 

Note.— As to the primitive state of the human race, all 
historical evidence is in accord with the teaching of Genesis. 
All peoples, savage and civilized, have in their traditions some 
reminiscences of a primitive “golden age” of the human race. 
Egypt and Babylon whose authentic history antedates that of 
all other nations affords no indication of any early period of 
barbarism. “All authorities agree, that however far we go 
back, we find in Egypt no rude or uncivilized time out of which 
civilization is developed.”—G. Rawlinson. 

We may conclude this brief article with a few quotations 
from Dawson’s latest work, The Meeting Place of Geology 
and History. “The absolute date of the first appearance of 
man cannot perhaps be fixed within a few years or centuries, 
either by human chronology or by the science of the earth. 
If the earliest men were those of the river gravels and caves, 
men of the ‘mammoth age,’ or of the ‘Palaeolithic period,’ we 
can form some definite ideas of their possible antiquity. They 
colonized the Continents immediately after the elevation of 
the land from the great subsidence which closed the pleistocene 
or glacial period, in what has been called the ‘continental’ 
period of the post-glacial age. We have some measures of 
the date of this great continental elevation, and know that its 
distance from our time must fall within about eight thousand 




-317 


“There is but one species of men though many races and 
varieties; and these races and varieties seemed to have devel¬ 
oped themselves at a very early time and have shown a re¬ 
markable fixity in their later history. There is a reason to be¬ 
lieve, however, from various physiological facts, that this is a 
very general law of varietal forms which are observed to ap¬ 
pear rapidly or suddenly and then in favorable circumstances 
to be propagated continuously. * * * 

11 The precise locality of the origin of man * * # must 

have been in some fertile and salubrious region of the northern 
hemisphere; and probability as well as tradition points to 
those regions of southwestern Asia, which have been the 
earliest historical abodes of man.” 

“The man of Cro-magnon and his contemporaries are elo¬ 
quent of one great truth. They tell us that primitive man had 
the same high cerebral organization which he possesses now, 
and we may infer, the same high intellectual and moral nature, 
fitting him for communion with God and leadership over the 
lower world. They indicate also, like the mound-builders w T ho 
preceded the North American Indian, that man’s earliest state 
was the best—that he had been a high and noble creature be¬ 
fore he became a savage. It is not conceivable that their high 
development of brain and mind could have spontaneously en¬ 
grafted itself on a mere brutal and savage life. These gifts 
must be remnants of a noble organization degraded by moral 
evil. They thus justify the tradition of a Golden and Edenic 
Age, and mutely protest against the philosophy of progressive 
development as applied to man.” 









PART V 


NATURAL THEOLOGY 


1. Theology is the Science of God. Natural Theology 
is, The Science of God attainable by unaided human reason 
in man’s present state. Now, we may say in general that there 
are four ways in which one can arrive at a knowledge of any 
Being. 

(a) From the most hasty and obvious glance at an effect 
as such, we can gather the existence and some imperfect con¬ 
fused notion of the nature of the cause. 

(b) From a careful investigation of the character of the 
effect we can gain a fuller and more distinct knowledge of the 
cause; and thence, by analysis of certain prominent attributes 
which we find with certainty to belong to it, we can conclude 
to certain other less obvious attributes which it necessarily 
possesses. 

(c) We may further learn many things about the nature 
of the cause from trustworthy testimony. 

(d) Lastly, we may see the cause itself immediately and 
intuitively as it really is. 

It will suffice for our present purpose to group the various 
kinds of knowledge that we can have of God under the above 
four heads. 




-320-• 

(a) There is the concept of God which arises almost 
spontaneously in the minds of all who have attained the use 
of reason, from the most casual reflexion on themselves and 
the world around them. This idea represents God as a Mighty, 
Intelligent, Personal Being distinct from and above and be¬ 
yond the moving universe, who has made it all that it is, on 
whom it depends, who rules and controls it, to whom it be¬ 
longs, and who notes the actions of his rational creatures, and 
will one day judge them, and reward their observance and 
punish their breaches of the moral law which He has im¬ 
printed in their hearts. This is the ordinary popular idea of 
God. 

(b) There is the idea of God which the philosopher can 
attain to by careful analysis of the note of First Uncaused 
Cause of all contingent beings. Such a Being must be self- 
existent, necessarily existing, infinite, eternal, etc., etc., and 
contain in itself in a manner compatible with its character of 
self-existence, all the perfections of its effects. This may be 
called the scientific idea of God. 

(c) There is the knowledge of God which we may ac¬ 
quire through His own free supernatural revelation. 

( d ) Lastly, there is the knowledge of God which is had 
by the Blessed who see him face to face. 

The two last kinds of knowledge of God are supernatural, 
and do not come within the sphere of Natural Theology. Here 
we are concerned to know what knowledge of God man can 
acquire by the right use of his natural reason, i. e., what reason 
can demonstrate about God from the data furnished by nature. 

2. Our natural knowledge of God is derived from the 
consideration both of the external world, and of the human 
soul. The external world manifests chiefly the Wisdom, 
Power and Providence of its maker; the human soul manifests 
the inner attributes of the Divine Life The material and 




321 - 


spiritual worlds are thus as it were two mirrors in which are 
reflected, though imperfectly, the image of the Creator. Hence, 
our natural knowledge of God is mediate and analogical, not 
intuitive, nor representing the Divine Nature as it is in itself 
purely and simply. The perfections found in creatures are but 
faint images of the perfections of the Creator, yet they truly 
shadow forth the character of their Author, and from them we 
are enabled to gather a concept of God, which, however in¬ 
complete, still truly represents His Nature and Attributes as 
far as it goes. But before our concepts of the perfections found 
in nature, e. g., power, wisdom, life, liberty, etc., can be ap¬ 
plied to God, they must first be purified from all imperfections 
and enlarged and elevated so as to be in accord with the char¬ 
acter of the self-existent eternal First Cause of them. Hence 
we must distinguish three steps, as it were, in this adaptation 
of our concepts of nature’s created perfections to God: 

(a) We affirm that these created perfections image and 
shadow forth the Divine perfections of their cause; 

(b) We deny that these perfections are in God in the 
same manner as in creatures, i. e., limited and mixed with 
imperfection; 

(c) We conceive the Divine Essence as having in itself 
in a supreme unlimited degree whatever is perfect in creatures 
without any admixture of imperfection. 

In one word we may say that the whole treatise before us 
is founded on the two self-evident Principles of Causality and 
Contradiction. The First Cause must possess such and such 
perfections, because He is the ultimate adequate cause of all 
contingent Being: He cannot possess these perfections in such 
and such a way, because it would be contrary to his character 
of self-existent. 

With this brief preface as to the character of our natural 




322 


knowledge of God we go on to our subject which we shall di¬ 
vide into three Chapters, viz.: 

I. —The Existence and Nature of God. 

II. — The Life of God. 

III. — The Action of God in the Created Universe. 


CHAPTER I. 

Existence and Nature of God. 

Article I. —The Existence of God. 

3. As we shall see presently, actual existence is the very 
essence of God. The proposition “God exists” is therefore 
analytical, immediately evident in itself, just as the proposition 
“ the whole is greater than the half.” Nevertheless, since we 
have no immediate perception of the Divine Essence this 
proposition is not immediately evident to us. For us it is 
knowledge arrived at by more or less simple demonstration. 
We see God’s works and from them we reason back to His 
existence. But although we come to the knowledge of God’s 
existence by reasoning, our certitude of His existence is not 
necessarily the result of a formal scientific demonstration. A 
natural proof sufficient for perfect certitude offers itself, as it 
were, spontaneously to every human mind. “The existence of 
God,” said Cardinal Newman, “is as certain to me as the cer¬ 
tainty of my ow T n existence, though when I try to put the 
grounds of that certainty into logical shape I find a difficulty 
in doing so in mood and figure to my satisfaction.” Hence, 
process of formal demonstration, when made use of, find in 
the mind already a conviction of God’s existence, and only 
serve to set forth in detail the bases of this conviction and so 
confirm and strengthen it. 




323- 


4. The proofs of the existence of God are of two kinds 

—direct and indirect. 

The indirect proofs show that our knowledge of God’s 
existence is a necessary outcome of man’s rational nature. 
These proofs are taken from the universality and constancy of 
this knowledge, and of the moral and religious activity based 
upon it. The arguments drawn from these facts is often 
spoken of as the moral argument for the existence of God. 

The direct proofs present God to us as the only ultimate 
Sufficient Cause of the physical effects we perceive within and 
around us. In this case we may direct our attention either to 
certain evidently essential characteristics of ourselves and the 
other being around us, e. g., dependence and contingency of 
existence, and thus we have what is called the metaphysical 
argument; or we may consider merely the purpose, design, 
finality exhibited in the construction of individual things or 
in the whole cosmic order, and we have what is called the 
physical or teleological proof of the existence of God. 

Besides these there is what might be called the “histor¬ 
ical” proof, i. e., preternatural manifestations of the Divine 
power in physical and moral miracles, answers to prayer, signal 
punishment of evil and rewards of virtue, etc., witnessed to by 
the most unimpeachable human testimony. 

In the present article we shall confine ourselves to three 
simple arguments selected from the three classes of proofs— 
metaphysical, physical and moral—of which we have spoken. 

(i) Metaphysical Argument. 

5. Everywhere around us we perceive effects proceeding 
from causes, while of the causes which fall within range 
of our experience, many are evidently themselves effects of 
prior causes, i. e., we are clearly conscious of the existence of 
dependent , contingent , caused beings. But the existence of 
contingent, dependent, caused things—be they few or many— 
necessarily implies the existence of an uncaused Being (one or 




324r 


manifold) which is self-existent, and the ultimate and propor¬ 
tionate sufficient reason of all produced things. Therefore 
outside of the series however numerous of contingent things, 
an independent, self-existing Being who is the ultimate and 
proportionate sufficient reason of all caused perfections, 
whether of mind or matter —God—exists. 

The major is a matter of self-evident internal and exter¬ 
nal experience. To deny it would be to deny all change, all ac¬ 
tivity in the universe. Thus all the wonderful results of human 
intelligence, will and energy, are new things; each human soul 
is a new thing; the human race itself is a new thing; all the 
marvelous forms of plant and animal life are new things, and 
we can put our finger on the point of time where they first ap¬ 
peared; the whole present cosmic order is something new 
which science tells us began to be and will cease to be. 
Now all these new things are effects for which an ultimate pro¬ 
portionate cause must be assigned. 

The minor is hardly less evident. For, the ultimate cause 
(one or manifold) of all the new beings, substantial or acci¬ 
dental, that have come, and are constantly coming, into ex¬ 
istence around us, is either uncaused and self-existent or pro¬ 
duced by a prior cause. In the former case, the self-existent 
Being whose existence we are asserting, is conceded. If the 
latter alternative is chosen, the same question recurs as to the 
producer of this produced cause, and must inevitably recur 
until we arrive at an uncaused self-existent First Cause. In¬ 
sufficiency, adequately to account for its own existence, and 
consequently, for the existence of the effects which proceed 
from it, is an essential note of every contingent, produced 
cause; and hence, however, you multiply such causes—to in¬ 
finity even if you will—as they never lose their essential nature, 
so they never lose their radical insufficiency to account for their 
own existence or the existence of the effects to which they give 
rise. To say that if the number of caused causes were con¬ 
ceived to be infinite, they would be sufficient to account for all 




325 


existences, independently of a self-existent cause, would be— 
not to speak of other absurdities—the same as saying that an 
infinite number of zeros equal one. Insufficiency for existence 
is the very groundwork of their nature, and no sum or product 
of them can get rid of it. Hence, the truth of the old scholastic 
saying, 4 4 if a self-existent being did not exist it would be a 
metaphysical impossibility that anything should exist,”—a 
formula which expresses at once a fundamental law of being 
and a necessary law of thought. 

6. Thus then, if it be once admitted that anything exists, 
even a transient thought or feeling, there is no escaping the 
conclusion that a self-existent Being exists. But now before 
going further, let us try to get a clear idea, once for all, of 
what self-existence means. It means: 

(a) That such a being cannot, without a contradiction of 
thought, be conceived as non-existing. For, if it were so con¬ 
ceived, it would be conceived as at the same time self-existing 
and not self-existing; as receiving its existence either from 
itself as non-existent which is a manifest contradiction, or from 
some other pre-existing Being, and then it would be a produced 
Being, not a self-existent First Cause. Therefore, a self- 
existent Being is a necessary Being, i. e., one that cannot not 
exist, one that is inconceivable as non-existent (Gen. Met. 
n. 79). 

(b) The existence then, of such a Being is unreceived, 
and consequently belongs to its intrinsic nature or essence. 
Nor can its existence be conceived as an entity distinct from its 
essence. It must be conceived as the intrinsic constituent of 
its essence (Gen. Met. n. 37). Hence, actuality, existence con¬ 
stitutes the ultimate radical essence of a self-existent Being, 
and any concept that would represent its essence as a poten¬ 
tiality distinct from existence, would be self-destructive and 
contradictory. 




326 


(c) Again, since there can be no actually existing Being 
which is not this determinate, individual Being, it follows that 
all that pertains to the mode of existence of a self-existent 
Being, belongs to its essence, and is as necessary as its existence 
itself. Hence, as we cannot conceive the essence of such a 
Being a non-existent, neither can we conceive its determinate 
mode of existence as other than it is. In fact in such a Being, 
essence, mode of existence and existence are one and the same 
necessary entity, and cannot be conceived apart, and are, there¬ 
fore, equally incapable of non-existence or mutability. Hence, 
a self-existent Being is one without beginning, end, or capacity 
for change, i. e., immutable and eternal in the strict sense of 
the word. 

(d) Again, since nothing indefinite can exist, a self- 
existent Being must be either finite or infinite in actual entity 
or perfection. But such a Being cannot be conceived as finite. 
Therefore, it must be infinite in actual entity or perfection. For 
its actuality cannot be limited from without, because it is self- 
existent. On the other hand, if it were limited from within, 
then we should have to conceive its essence as limiting its 
actuality, or concrete existent reality, to a given circumscribed 
sum of notes to the exclusion of other possible perfections, 
i. e., its essence would necessarily be conceived as a receiver 
measuring and confining actuality or existence within a certain 
limited sphere of perfection. But that which limits, measures, 
confines, must be conceived as distinct from, and prior, at least 
in thought to that which it limits. Consequently, in the hy¬ 
pothesis that a self-existent Being is self-limited and finite in 
actuality, its essence must be conceived as distinct from ex¬ 
istence, as not self-existent, i. e., our ultimate concept in the 
analysis of things, would give us not existence, but mere po¬ 
tentiality, which is a contradiction (Gen. Met. n. 38-77). 

Again, it could be argued that, since self-existent Being 
is the sufficient reason of all other actual and possible Beings, 




-327-- 

it must contain in itself, in a manner in keeping with its nature, 
i. e., independently, necessarily, eternally, the perfections of all 
those Beings, else they would not be actual or possible. But 
thus to possess the perfections of all actual and possible Be¬ 
ing is to possess a perfection than which no greater is con¬ 
ceivable. Consequently, such a Being must be infinite in 
perfection. 

(e) Furthermore a first, self-existent Being cannot be a 
composite Being, i. e., made up of either quantitative or essen¬ 
tial parts. For, a compound is posterior to and dependent on 
the parts of which it is composed and the force which binds 
them together. A compound, again, is conceivable as resolved 
into its components, and therefore, as non-existent. Lastly, a 
compound, as being made up of parts , consist of a sum of 
essentially perfectible, and therefore, imperfect elements. But 
no sum of such imperfect entities will give us absolute infinite 
perfection. Now as we have just seen a self-existent Being is 
ultimate, independent, inconceivable as non-existent, absolutely 
infinite in perfection. Therefore, it cannot be compound. 
Briefly, we may say that simplicity is a pure perfection; com¬ 
position, an imperfection; therefore, the former must be 
affirmed, and the latter denied of a self-existent Being. 

Note.— From the preceding analysis it follows (i) that a 
self-existent Being must be a substance, since no accident can 
be an ultimate or independent Being, (ii) It cannot be an in¬ 
complete substance else it would not be wholly perfect in itself, 
(iii) It must be a simple spiritual substance, since all corporeal 
substances are both essentially and quantitatively composite,' 
and lack the perfections of thought and volition, (iv) It cannot 
be conceived as a subject of inherent accidents; else its sub¬ 
stantial essence would be conceived as perfectible, and lacking 
in itself the perfections which such imperfect accidents confer, 
and therefore, finite in entity and perfection. Hence, in a self- 
existent Being, its knowledge, volition, etc., cannot be conceived 




-328-- 

as they are in us, i. e., as superadded variable accidents, but as 
wholly identified with its substance. 

(f) Again, self-existent Being must be one and only one 
in number, i. e., unicity is a necessary consequence of self-ex¬ 
istence. A self-existent Being is an infinitely perfect Being. 
But a plurality of infinitely perfect Beings involves a manifest 
contradiction; for, as being self-existent, necessary, etc., their 
perfection would be univocal; while on the other hand, as being 
individually distinct, each would have a perfection of its own, 
peculiar to itself, and constituting its individuality, and there¬ 
fore not possessed by the others. But the sum of all these par¬ 
ticular and individual perfections would be greater than any of 
them singly, and consequently none of these supposed self- 
existent Beings would be infinitely perfect. Again all of them 
would have to be supposed omnipotent, yet none of them would 
be independent in its external action, or in its dominion over 
all contingent Beings, i. e., they would have to be conceived 
as omnipotent and not ominipotent at the same time. 

(g) Lastly, this one self-existent Being must contain in 
itself in a manner proportionate to its simple, infinitely perfect 
nature, all perfections of all caused Beings. They have all 
they have from it, and it can give only what it has got in an 
equivalent or a nobler degree. All caused perfections are ulti¬ 
mately the effects of its action, and the action of a Being cannot 
produce anything greater than itself, though it may, and 
usually does, and in the case of a self-existent Being, must pro¬ 
duce effects less perfect than itself. Consequently, as we find 
life, mind, free-will, and personality in the universe, the self-ex¬ 
istent Beings would be infinitely perfect. Again, all of them 
possessing eternally, necessarily, and immutably, infinite life, 
knowledge, liberty and power. 

7. Thus, then given the existence of any Being, however 
short lived and insignificant, we are inevitably led by the 




-329- 

necessary laws of thought and being, into the presence of one 
simple, self-existing, eternal, immutable, infinite, spiritual sub¬ 
stance,—a Living, Personal God. Of these and other attri¬ 
butes of the Divine Nature we shall speak in detail presently; 
here, we have been concerned merely to show that they are 
necessarily involved in the concept of self-existence, just as 
self-existence is necessary to account adequately for the ex¬ 
istence of Contingent Being. All we want to insist upon, 
however, is that, given the world we live in, a self-existent 
Being must be admitted. 

Note (1). —It is legitimate to argue from a Distributive 
to a Collective sense, i. e., to deny a given predicate of a whole 
collection, when the predicate denied is in every way, both 
wholly and partially, excluded from each and every individual 
of the collection, e. g. f neither a nor b, nor c, etc., has any 
money, therefore the whole group has no money. 

(2) —A caused Being may suffice proximately to account 
for the existence of other Beings produced by it; but not abso¬ 
lutely and ultimately , as its own existence is dependent and re¬ 
ceived. 

(3) —The Law of Causality does not mean that every 
Being must have a cause, but that every new or contingent 
Being must have a cause: nor does a self-existent Being mean 
a self-caused Being. 

(4) —Of course we cannot imagine a self-existent, eternal, 
infinite Being, nor can we form an adequate concept of such a 
Being, which represents it just as it is in itself; but we can 
form a clear and more or less distinct concept of it which suf¬ 
fices to distinguish it from the most perfect finite Being, and 
thus far, at least, it is neither unknowable nor unknown. 

(ii) Physical Argument. 

8. Self-existence is the Middle Term which the philoso¬ 
pher chiefly employs to demonstrate the conclusions which his 




-330- 

reason can reach in regard to God. Yet. though his method 
of augmentation is not very subtle or abstruse, it can hardly 
be supposed to be the one followed by the great multitude of 
men, women and children of all times, and stages of culture, 
in reaching their conviction of the existence of God. There 
is an easier and more obvious way, open to all who have the 
use of reason. The order of the physical world without and 
the moral world within man, brings home to him with almost 
immediate evidence, the existence of a Supreme Intelligence 
which disposes and controls all the activities at work in 
nature and to which man himself is accountable for his actions. 

The teleological argument may be formulated briefly thus: 
In the universe around us, on earth, in sea and sky, we find 
innumerable blind, unintelligent activities—mechanical, chem¬ 
ical, physical, and vital—co-ordinated and adjusted so as to 
work together uniformly, constantly and harmoniously for the 
attainment of definite ends, particular and universal. But the 
ultimate sufficient reason for this co-ordination and adjustment 
of such activities can only be found in a Supremely Intelligent 
Being who rules the material universe with wisdom and power. 
Therefore, above and distinct from the ordered world, there 
is a Supremely Intelligent Being who controls it, i. e., God. 

As to the major; each particular natural science bears its 
witness to the universality of law, order and purpose every¬ 
where in nature. Astronomy, chemistry, physics, anatomy, 
physiology, natural history, etc., may be called sciences of the 
order displayed in the various fields of nature. Telescope and 
microscope, the more perfect they become, reveal to us more 
fully the mathematical exactness with which order is followed 
and purpose accomplished, as well by the motions of mighty 
planets as by the functions of infinitesimal animaculae. Indeed, 
the great lesson which the advance of physical science teaches 
us, is that all natural agents known to us, and all parts of each 
work together for the good of all. Each acts blindly and by 




-331- 

a necessity of its nature; yet all these manifold unintelligent 
activities, amid unceasing changes, are so balanced and ad¬ 
justed and harmonized as to result in a cosmos , where order 
and purpose are visibly executed, however they may have 
originated. 

Minor. —To bring this result about, to originate this com¬ 
plex, constant dynamic order, the special laws which govern 
the activities of each of the innumerable unintelligent agents 
at work, must be taken into account, and so adjusted, har¬ 
monized and co-ordinated, that while the good of individuals 
is attained, this is subordinated to more universal and loftier 
ends. Now, thus to co-ordinate and harmonize the blind ac¬ 
tivities of nature, manifests an art or “knowledge of how to 
do things,” besides which the highest human art is dwarfed 
and insignificant. Hence, if it is considered a triumph of mind 
to understand even the little our greatest scientists do, of the 
order of nature, surely the Being who originated the marvel¬ 
ously complex order of the universe must be admitted to be 
intelligent. (Gen. Met. n. 82-84, also n. 71). But this intelligent 
cause of the order of the universe is either a self-existent or a 
produced Being. If the former alternative is chosen, the ex¬ 
istence of God is admitted; if the latter, the metaphysician of 
the preceding paragraph will take up the argument and carry 
it on to its conclusion. 

9. To put the same argument in another form : 

(i) The order of the inorganic world around us, e. g., 
the regular motion of the bodies of which it is composed, the 
supply and distribution of light, heat, air, water,„ soils, etc., 
upon the earth, so admirably adapted for the support of plant 
and animal life, etc.,—is a new thing, and therefore, a caused 
thing. Hence, even assuming that our system has resulted 
from the condensation and division of a primitive rotating 
nebula, “the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the 
more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrange- 




-332-- 

merit, of the which the actual phenomena are the conse¬ 
quences.”—Huxley. Or as Mill puts it, “the variety in the 
effects depends partly upon the amount of force applied, and 
partly upon the diversity of the primitive collections.'’ Sup¬ 
posing then that say twenty or thirty million years ago the 
chemical elements of the fiery cloud were so grouped with 
such a definite amount of motion in such a definite direction 
that ‘ competent physico-mathematical skill could predict ’ ’ the 
order manifested today in the inorganic world, we are led to 
ask who or what grouped those chemical particles in that won¬ 
derful ‘ ‘ primordial arrangement, ’ ’ and communicated to them 
just the proper amount of motion, and in just the proper 
direction, to give us our present solar system with all its 
mechanical, physical and chemical harmonies? 

That primitive order cannot have been the result of the 
“forces of matter” else it would not have been a “primordial 
arrangement,” but the result of a previous ordered grouping 
of the elements, whose origin would have to be accounted for. 
It cannot have been essential to matter, else it could not have 
been changed for the present arrangement. The only ex¬ 
planation, therefore, that can be accepted without doing vio¬ 
lence to reason, is to admit that the order manifested in the 
inorganic world owes its origin, whether nebular or other¬ 
wise, to an intelligent cause. 

(ii) If the mere forces of matter are inadequate to ac¬ 
count for the order of the inorganic world, much less can 
they account for the order manifested in the structure, func¬ 
tions, activities, instincts, etc., of the organic world of plant 
and animal life. See Cosmology, Chap. 3. 

(iii) Finally, Man himself is to himself the most ob¬ 
vious proof of the existence of an Intelligent Creator. En¬ 
dowed with the power of perceiving the order displayed with¬ 
in and around him, and conscious of his own powers of in¬ 
telligence and will and of the ‘ ‘ absolute validity of the law of 




-333 


causation, ’ ’ he concludes with the fullest certainty that himself 
and the universe he dwells in are the work of a Supreme In¬ 
telligence. 

Note (1). — Nature is nothing but the collection of con¬ 
tingent agencies at work in the universe; hence, it is true 
to say that nature executes the order of the universe, but not 
that it originated or designed it. In the same way the “laws 
of nature,’’ as the phrase is commonly taken, simply mean the 
uniform manner of acting of those individual agencies when 
left to themselves. Nature, then, is a sum of agents, each with 
its own laws, or constant manner of acting. Such a collection 
will never give us the ordered world in which we live with¬ 
out adjustment and co-ordination and subordination of those 
various activities for the attainment of manifold particular 
and universal ends; and for this, Mind is needed. 

(2) .—The teleological argument is not founded on anal¬ 
ogy, but on the principle of causality , i. e., The order and 
finality apparent in the inorganic and organic worlds must 
have a sufficient cause, and this sufficient cause must be an 
Intelligent Power. 

( 3 ) .—When it is objected that there is much purposeless¬ 
ness and failure in the universe, we must remind our opponent 
that he is assuming that he knows the relations of the object 
he calls purposeless, to all other creatures in the universe, 
which is certainly a large assumption for the human mind 
to make. A man need not understand the precise part each 
wheel and axle of a machine is destined to play, in order to 
be certain that it is constructed with a purpose. And as to 
failure in nature, it is well to remember the saying of Huxley, 
that to contemporaries, doubtless, in the carboniferous, the 
waste of vegetation would have appeared extravagant, while 
the ordered chemistry of nature was surely and silently form¬ 
ing the coal-beds on which so much of the material progress 
of later times depends. 




334 


(4).—We do not care to maintain that the order man¬ 
ifest in nature leads us immediately to the knowledge of an 
infinite Intelligence, though it certainly does so mediately and 
inferentially. All that we are concerned to defend here is that 
given an innumerable multitude of unconscious, necessarily- 
acting agents whose activities are yet so exquisitely balanced 
and adjusted and controlled that they all, small and great, 
uniformly and constantly, meet and fit into each other in an 
endless circle of harmony and purpose—given this fact, we 
say, which is as obvious as any physical fact in nature, a pro¬ 
portionate Intelligent and ordering Power is required to ac¬ 
count for its existence. Even Hume himself is forced to admit 
this: 4 ‘The whole frame of nature,” he says, “bespeaks an 
Intelligent Author, and no rational inquirer can, after serious 
reflection, suspend his belief for one moment with regard to 
the primary principles of theism # * # All things in the 

universe are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to 
everything. One design prevails throughout the whole. And 
this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one Author.” 
And Kant: 4 4 Roused from all mental suspense, as from a 

dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the maj¬ 
esty of the cosmos, reason soars from height to height till it 
reaches the Supreme Author of all.” 

(iii) Moral Argument. 

10. A judgment on a matter of the utmost importance 
to man, which has prevailed constantly and uniformly among 
all peoples, at all times, and in all places, which has outlasted 
all changes in human institutions, and is, as it were, a dis¬ 
tinctive characteristic of man in every condition of civilization 
or savagery, which no effort of the lower nature which it 
bridles and checks can ever wholly suppress, which is firmest 
in the highest and purest of our race, and which becomes 
clearer and more inevitable the more it is scientifically investi¬ 
gated—such a judgment must be admitted to flow spon- 




335 


taneously from our rational nature itself, and therefore can¬ 
not be erroneous. But such is the judgment of mankind as to 
the existence of a Supreme Being on whom all things depend, 
and to whom man himself is accountable for his actions. 
Therefore, this judgment must be considered as a primary 
truth of reason, and cannot be false, if we are to place any 
trust in man’s cognitive faculties. 

When we see a phenomenon occurring regularly and con¬ 
stantly we say there is a law of nature which rules it. The 
affirmation of the existence of God has all the constancy of a 
law of nature. It is, therefore, a necessary law of intellectual 
and moral gravitation in humanity towards its source and cen¬ 
tre, God. 

The minor of our argument states a fact which is testi¬ 
fied to by all competent historians and travelers, and by 
monuments, languages, customs, etc., of all nations. “Re¬ 
ligion,” says Tiele, “is a universal phenomenon of human¬ 
ity.” “There is no evidence,” says Tyler, an unwilling 
witness, “sufficient to warrant the assertion that there exists 
anj^where any race of human beings without religion.” 
“There is no necessity,” says Livingstone, speaking of the 
Bechuanas, “to tell the most degraded of these people of the 
existence of a God or of a future state, the facts being uni¬ 
versally admitted.” Of the negroes of the slave coast of 
Africa, Baudin writes: “In their religious systems the idea 
of God is fundamental; they believe in a Supreme Primordial 
Being, the Lord of the universe.” Archbishop Vaughan is 
witness that the aborigines of Australia believe in a Supreme 
Being; and among our own Indian tribes the belief in the 
Great Spirit is practically universal. But there is no need 
to multiply quotations in regard to modern races. Wherever 
civilized man meets his savage brother, and knows enough of 
his language and character to enter into easy communication 
with him, he always finds in him that “Sensus Numinis” 
which proves an intellectual and moral kinship between them. 




-336 


Hasty assertions are often made, but fuller knowledge in¬ 
variably proves them to have been unfounded. “Not many 
years ago,” says Maxmuller, “it was supposed that the Zulus 
had no religion; at present our very Bishops have been si¬ 
lenced by their theological inquiries.” A more striking in¬ 
stance still is that of the Andaman Islanders. They culti¬ 
vate no crops, raise no cattle, have no knowledge of metals, 
or even of how to make a fire. Writing is quite unknown to 
them. Their dress consists of a paste of clay, with which 
they cover their bodies, allowing it to dry and form a sort 
of carapaca. The few implements they use are of the rudest 
pattern and made of stone, shells, or wood. They were long 
thought to be completely destitute of religious or moral ideas, 
and to represent the lowest type of humanity in existence, or 
rather a sort of missing link between ape and man. Better 
knowledge of them, however, has shown that they believe in 
one God who is the Creator of the world, all powerful, full 
of pity for those who suffer, who punishes the wicked after 
death, and rewards the good with an eternal recompense. 
They believe also in the resurrection of the body, in original 
sin, etc., etc. They are strict monogamists, and most exact 
in all that regards truthfulness, honesty, fidelity, mutual re¬ 
spect, etc. 

As to the ancient nations, Plutarch tells us: “You may 
find cities without walls, or literature, or laws, or fixed habi¬ 
tations, or money. But a city destitute of temples and 
Gods, a city without prayers and oracles, and sacrifices to 
obtain good, and turn away evil, no one has ever seen.” Of 
the Chinese, De Harlez tells us: “The primitive religion nf 
the Chinese was, and continued to be, the most spiritual and 
the most perfect form of monotheism ever known through 
ancient times outside the pale of Judaism.” Of ancient 
Egypt, Chevalier says: ‘ ‘ The higher we ascend towards the 
origin of the Egyptian nation the clearer we find in their 
primitive purity the principles of the natural law; * # * 




-337- 

the adoration of the one only God, Creator of the world and 
man.” 

In the long list of the great masters of science, from 
Plato and Aristotle to Kelvin and Pasteur, it would perhaps 
be impossible to find one who did not openly confess his con¬ 
viction of the existence of God. “Many excellent people,” 
says Lord Rayleigh, “are afraid of science, as leading to¬ 
ward materialism # # * It is true that among scientific 

men, as in other classes, crude views are to be met with as to 
the deeper things of nature; but that the life-long beliefs of 
Newton, of Faraday, and of Maxwell are inconsistent with 
the scientific habit of the mind is surely a proposition which 
I need not pause to refute.” 

‘ ‘ To treat of God is a part of natural science. The whole 
variety of created things could arise only from the design and 
will of a necessarily-existing Being.”—Newton. 

“The heavens, the sun, the planets, proclaim the glory 
of God.”—Kepler. 

41 Overpowering proofs of intelligence and benevolent 
design lie around us, showing us through nature the influ¬ 
ence of a Free Will, and teaching us that all living things 
depend upon one, ever-acting Creator and Ruler.”—Kelvin. 

“We find that all knowledge must lead up to one great 
result, that of an intelligent recognition of the Creator 
through his works.”—Siemens. 

“We assume as absolutely evident the existence of a 
Deity, who is the Creator and Upholder of all things.”— 
Tait and Stewart. 

We will conclude with a quotation from the recent work 
of A. R. Wallace, who may fairly claim to be joint-author 
of the Darwinian theory: “There are at least three stages in 
the development of the organic world, when some new cause 
or power must necessarily have come into action. The first 
stage is the change from inorganic to organic, when the earli¬ 
est vegetable cell first appeared. The next stage is still more 




•338 


marvelous, still more completely beyond all probability of ex¬ 
planation by matter, its laws and forces. It is the introduc¬ 
tion of sensation. The third stage is the existence in man of 
a number of his characteristic and noblest faculties. # * * 
These three distinct stages of progress from the inorganic 
world of matter and motion up to man, point clearly to an 
unseen universe, a world of spirit, to which the world of 
matter is altogether subordinate.” 

Thus, therefore, we find everywhere, as universal in time 
and place as humanity itself, a firmly-rooted belief in the 
existence of a Supreme Personal Being, the author of the uni¬ 
verse, to whom man offers homage and feels he is respon¬ 
sible. The concept may be vague and indistinct and even 
distorted. But yet it is there, and whatever counterfeit may 
have taken the place of the Divine Reality, the very counter¬ 
feit bears witness to the spontaneity of the judgment of man¬ 
kind that above and beyond the world there reigns a Supreme 
Invisible Being on whom it depends, and who is all-powerful 
to save or to destroy. 

The universality and spontaneity of belief in a Supreme 
Lord and Master being thus established, it is easy to trace it 
back to its true origin. The cause must be as universal as 
humanity. But there is only one such case—rational nature 
itself, yielding to the evidence of objective truth. No influ¬ 
ence of disordered will or passions can account for belief in a 
Being who forbids and punishes their indulgence. Education 
will not account for it, for education is as various and change¬ 
able as the various races of men. Ignorance will not account 
for it, for ignorance is not universal; Plato, and Cicero, and 
Newton, and Clerk Maxwell, and Pasteur, for example, can 
hardly be considered ignorant men. In a word, no accidental, 
variable cause is proportionate to this universal effect. There¬ 
fore, its cause must be found in the invariable rational nature 
of man necessarily forming a judgment on a matter of utmost 
importance under the influence of objective evidence. 




-339- 

Nor are the motives of this judgment far to seek. The 
human mind, no matter how uncultivated, when confronted 
with the order of the inanimate world, with caused, con¬ 
tingent life and with caused, contingent intellect and will, 
spontaneously and necessarily infers, in virtue of the Prin¬ 
ciple of Causality, the existence of a living, intelligent First 
Cause distinct from and superior to all produced things. And 
these evidences from without derive a new force and interest 
from the natural capacity and longing for unlimited good, 
and the sense of duty, obligation, and responsibility within. 

Note (1). —What we assert in the present argument is 
that humanity is unanimous in affirming the existence of a 
Supramundane Personal Being who controls the world, and 
to whom man is accountable for his works. That their con¬ 
cept of the nature and attributes of this Being is, in many 
cases, very imperfect and even false, does not detract from 
the value of their testimony to the existence of such a Being 
as a fact. 

(2) .—The universality we claim is moral, not physical or 
metaphysical. The proposition “men hear and speak” is not 
falsified by the fact that there are some who are deaf and 
dumb. 

(3) .—Theoretical Buddhism has never been the religion 
of the people of India. 

(4) .—It is idle to seek to determine a priori what were 
the primitive beliefs of mankind. This can only be known as 
all other positive facts of history are known. Now, the re¬ 
sults of the most accurate historical investigations are thus 
summed up by Rawlinson in his “Religions of the Ancient 
World”: “The historic review which has here been made 
lends no support to the theory that there is a uniform growth 
and progress of religion from fetichism to polytheism, and 
from polytheism to monotheism. None of the religions here 
described shows any signs of having been developed out of 
fetichism. In most of them the monotheistic idea is most 




-340- 


prominent at the first, and gradually becomes obscured and 
gives way before a polytheistic corruption. ’ ’ 

Article II. —Nature and Attributes of God. 

11. Self-existence or Aseity may be said to be the fun¬ 
damental element in our concept of God; inasmuch as, (i) it 
is the first distinctive characteristic of God, absolutely incom¬ 
municable to creatures, at which we arrive in reasoning back 
from the existence of contingent Beings to their ultimate Suf¬ 
ficient Cause; and (ii) as from it, by a process of strict log¬ 
ical reasoning and analysis, we can attain to a distinct ex¬ 
plicit knowledge of all the other attributes of the Godhead, 
knowable by our natural reason in our present state. For, .it 
presents God to us as a Pure Necessary Act of Being, and 
thus at once shows us that no predicate of contingent Beings, 
however perfect they may be, can be applied univocally to 
God; since His perfection is independent and unreceived; 
theirs produced and dependent. On the other hand, as we 
have seen above, a Pure Act of Being is inconceivable as lim¬ 
ited in perfection, as composed of parts, as capable of in¬ 
trinsic change, etc.; whence, we have the attributes of In¬ 
finity, Simplicity, Immutability, etc. 

If, then, we are asked to define in our feeble human 
words what God is, we answer A Self-existent Being, A Pure 
Act of Being. All that unaided reason can know of God is 
contained implicitly in these few words, and can be gathered 
from them by analysis. 

Note. —It is needless to call attention to the difference 
between Being as a transcendental predicate of all that is, or 
can be, and Being as the definition of God. The former pre¬ 
scinds from existence, the latter is “necessary existence.” 
The former is the broadest of all predicates in extension, the 
least in comprehension: the latter is exactly the reverse. Em¬ 
brace all the pure perfection to which the transcendental 
term Being can extend, in one most simple self-existent Actu- 




-341 


ality, and you are not far from our fundamental concept of 
God. 

12. The Infinity of God.— The idea of the Infinite is the 
idea of the plentitude of all Being, of a Being who is all pure 
perfection without limit. This notion, as we have already 
said, is, as a matter of fact, conceived by us. We can form 
the concept of actual Being, of a limit, of a negation. Taking 
now the ideas Being, of limit, and of negation, we can combine 
them so as to form the complex idea Being Without Limits, 
i. e., Infinite Being. To illustrate: We are conscious of a 
power exercised by ourselves. We can conceive this power 
vastly increased. We can conceive an agent capable of mov¬ 
ing 10,000 tons as easily as we move an ounce, and yet aware 
that the power of such an agent may be as rigidly limited as 
our own. But we are not compelled to stop here. We may 
conceive power without any limits at all. Here we should 
have the concept of infinite energy. In the same way we can 
form the concept of infinite intelligence, of infinite holiness, 
etc., and then, combining all these in one simple entity, we 
can conceive it as an omnipotent, infinitely intelligent, all¬ 
holy, etc., Being. Such a concept is doubtless not as clear 
and distinct as it might be, but most certainly it is not purely 
negative. To conceive a perfection without any limits is not 
to destroy the positive perfection represented in the concept. 

When, then, we say that God is an Infinite Act of Being 
we mean that He is unlimited, absolute perfection, containing 
in Himself all pure perfections without limit, to the exclusion 
of all imperfections, i. e., all non-entity. Hence, to speak of 
God as Infinite Knowledge, Power, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, 
Holiness, Lovableness, etc., is simply to unfold the contents 
of the two words, Infinite Being. 

Note (1).—All pure perfections (Gen. Met. 7. Note) 
found in creatures, e. g., Life, Knowledge, Will, etc., are for 
mally in God, i. e., He has, or rather is, all that these words 
stand for, apart from imperfection, or limitation, or depend- 




--342- 

ence. The mixed perfections (ib.) of creatures are eminently 
and virtually in God, i. e., He has, or rather is all they are, 
but in a nobler way; and is capable of producing them, and 
of doing all that they can do, in a more perfect manner. 

(2).—Since the perfections of contingent things are of a 
wholly different order from those of God, no addition of the 
former to the latter, so as to form a sum total of perfection 
greater than that of God, is possible; any more than it is pos¬ 
sible to increase the number of men in the world by adding to 
the actual men their photographs or shadows. Hence, God 
cannot be co-ordinated or classified with contingent Beings. 

12. The simplicity of God.—All imperfection must be 
excluded from a Pure Infinite Act of Being, and consequently 
all composition, whether it be of essence and existence, of 
parts quantitative or essential, of substance and accident, etc.; 
since, as we have seen, every compound Being is necessarily 
dependent, contingent and finite. Hence, no real distinction is 
admissible in God between the manifold perfections which we 
attribute to Him. In Him they are all identified in the One 
unspeakable Simple Act of Being which is Himself. 

Several distinct concepts of one and the same absolutely 
simple Infinite Being may and must be formed by the finite 
mind which gleans all its knowledge of such a Being from 
effects in which His perfection is variously and inadequately 
manifested. Creatures manifest partially, and, as it were, 
under various aspects, God’s simple infinite perfection. All 
that all of them have of pure perfection, and infinitely more, 
is in Him, but in His own divinely simple way, not distinct 
and dispersed as it is found in creatures. Hence, when we 
affirm of God the various pure perfections, e. g., intelligence, 
volition, power, etc., which we find manifested in creatures, 
these do not imply any real distinction or composition in Plim. 

Yet, as our powers of thought cannot so conceive any of 
these perfections, that the concept of one explicitly and for¬ 
mally expresses them all, and as God is sovereignly equivalent 




343 


to them all, we say that there is an Inadequate Virtual dis¬ 
tinction between the Divine Nature and such attributes, and 
between the attributes themselves, as conceived by us (Gen. 
Met. 15). The perfection of the object and the imperfection 
of our powers of thought are our grounds for making the dis¬ 
tinction, not any composition or real multiplicity in God. 

14. The unity of God.— In virtue of His absolute per¬ 
fection God necessarily stands alone , above and beyond all 
other Beings. The Infinity of His Essence excludes the possi¬ 
bility of its multiplication. He exhausts in Himself the plen¬ 
itude of all perfect Being, so that no Being, who is not de¬ 
pendent on Him for all it has, can be conceived. Hence, the 
concept of a plurality of Gods is self-destructive, for none of 
them would be infinite in Being, Power, Dominion, etc., and 
consequently none of them would be God. Again, in the hy¬ 
pothesis of many Gods, the Divine Nature would have to be 
considered as a universal, determinable by various individua¬ 
tions, and therefore as a potentiality. 

Note (1).—Polytheism, as we have seen above, has never 
been a common belief of mankind. Even in the vast majority 
of the polytheistic systems known to us, One Being above the 
multitude of so-called Gods and superior to them all, was 
clearly recognized, e. g., Ammon Ra among the Egyptians, 
Brahma among the people of India, Ormuzd among the Per¬ 
sians, Zeus among the Greeks, Jupiter among the Romans, 
etc. 

(2).—God is indirectly the First Cause of the physical 
evil in the universe, (a) inasmuch as it is a consequence of 
the co-ordination and subordination of the necessarily acting 
physical activities at work in the universe, i. e., of the order 
of the universe which He directly wills and produces (Gen. 
met. 26) ; and (b) inasmuch as this physical evil is a means 
for the attainment of some higher and more universal good 
which He directly wills, e. g., patience, charity, heroism, etc., 


m man. 




-344 


As to moral evil, God is neither directly nor indirectly 
the cause of it. He indeed creates the free human will, but 
moral evil does not necessarily flow from it. The liberty by 
the exercise of which, in the few short years of mortal life, 
man determines his eternal destiny, is a grand though a dan¬ 
gerous gift. If he abuses it, he alone is the cause of the de¬ 
ordination in its physical act which constitutes sin. 

Hence, there is no need of an absurd and self-contradic¬ 
tory Supreme Principle of Evil to account for the physical 
and moral evil in the universe. 

(3).—The revealed Mystery of the Blessed Trinity does 
not contradict but asserts the unity of the Godhead. We be¬ 
lieve without understanding how that one and the same Di¬ 
vine Entity subsists in three distinct Persons (Gen. Met. 48), 
i. e., is thrice self-possessed. 

15. The Immutability of God.—All change implies com¬ 
position, potentiality and imperfection in the subject capable 
of change (Cosm. 14, d). But God is an Infinite, Necessary, 
Simple, Pure Act of Being. Hence, He is incapable of change 
in Nature, Attributes and Life. All His judgments, decrees 
and purposes executed in time are as eternal as His nature. 
His decrees and purposes are formed in eternity, by an infin¬ 
itely perfect Will in the light of infinitely perfect Intelli¬ 
gence. To suppose them ever to be changed would imply 
either error or defect of judgment, or fickleness and incon¬ 
stancy of will. The heavenly bodies are in constant motion, 
the elements are ever at work, living things come into exist¬ 
ence, increase and pass away, great men come and go, civili¬ 
zation advances and recedes, prayers are heard and answered, 
but the Divine “Fiat” which immediately co-operates in ef¬ 
fecting it all is eternal and immutable, incapable of vicissitude 
or shadow of change. The change is in the things affected, 
not in the First Cause of them. Hence, the realization in 
time of divine decrees eternally and freely made in full view 




-345- 

of all the circumstances of each particular occasion, implies 
no change in God. 

Note (1).—Capability to change a decision once freely 
taken is not essential to liberty. Freedom is not fickleness. 

(2) .—All man’s free acts, prayers, etc., are eternally be¬ 
fore the eyes of God and, as it were, condition His decrees. 

(3) .—God, in His immutable eternity, wills certain effects 
to be accomplished at certain times, and as His Will is om¬ 
nipotent His decrees are, so to say, self-executive at the 
appointed time without any change in Him. 

16. The Eternity of God.—Eternity means duration 
without possibility of beginning, end, or change (Cosm. 16). 
That it belongs to God is clear. For, beginning, end, and 
change can have place only in a produced contingent poten¬ 
tial Being. 

The duration of God is, therefore, absolutely and essen¬ 
tially indivisible: it admits of no past or future, but is a 
changeless, enduring present of all-perfect life. Hence, the 
Roman Senator defined eternity as “the possession, perfect 
and all at once, of eternal life.” Without beginning, without 
possibility of end or succession, God possesses in an ever-pres¬ 
ent Now, infinite, unchangeable perfection of life intelligence 
and volition. 

This ever-present duration of God is equivalent and more 
than equivalent to all possible successive duration or time, 
embracing in itself all the duration, without the imperfection 
of infinite time; just as the infinite simple Being of God 
embraces all the perfections without the imperfections of in¬ 
finite finite Beings. 

As the immovable centre might simultaneously corre¬ 
spond with and control every point of endlessly multiplied 
concentric circles moving around it, so God’s immutable dur¬ 
ation corresponds with, and controls, and embraces in its abid- 




--346- 

ing present every point of the successive duration of all pos¬ 
sible past and future time. 

17. The Immensity of God.— As eternity means infinite 
duration without succession, Immensity means infinite pres¬ 
ence without extension. God as being a Pure Spirit is unex¬ 
tended : as being Infinite, His presence is uncircumscribed by 
any limits of actual or possible space. Hence, God’s simple 
spiritual substance eternally is wherever anything is or can 
be. Presence is a perfection; infinite presence, an infinite 
perfection; therefore, it is an attribute of God. Again, an 
agent must be present where its immediate action is; but, the 
sphere of God’s immediate action must be unlimited, else His 
power would be finite. Hence, since God cannot change, He 
must actually be wherever anything could be created, i. e., 
everywhere. “God is present everywhere, not only by His 
Power, but also by His substance; for power cannot subsist 
without substance. ’ ’—Newton. 

Note (1).—We must be careful to correct the imagina¬ 
tion which would represent the Divine Immensity as a sort of 
infinite extension. To do this, Cardinal Franzelin suggests, 
after St. Augustine, that we conceive God’s presence every¬ 
where as we conceive, e. g., the truth, “twice two equal four” 
everywhere. This truth is independent of all limitations of 
time and space. It is whole and undivided everywhere. 
Without change it would be present to the minds of ten 
thousand new worlds, if they should be created at this 
moment. It would receive them into its presence rather than 
they it, and would be no more bounded by their limits than 
it was before. Now, in place of this abstract ideal truth, say 
the same of the concrete substantial Truth, God, and you will 
have a true concept of His immensity. 




347 


CHAPTER II. 

The Life of God. 

18. In the preceding chapter we demonstrated the exist¬ 
ence of God and studied the attributes of the Divine Nature 
which regard its own mode of existence and which are called 
the quiescent attributes of God. It remains for us to treat of 
the other attributes of God; those, namely, which refer to the 
operations of the Divine Nature; and hence are styled opera¬ 
tive. We shall first consider the operations of the divine in¬ 
telligence and will; for, immanent operations are primarily 
attributed to the nature possessed of them. Such, then, will 
be the subject matter of the present chapter which will consist 
of two articles: 

I. The Divine Intelligence. 

II. The Divine Will. 

It is to be noted, in addition, that to treat of the divine 
intelligence and will is the same as to treat of the divine life; 
for, to think and to will is the life of God (Psych., 42). 


ARTICLE I. 

The Divine Intelligence. 

19. That God has intelligence cannot be doubted. The 
visible universe with its evident order is an open book in which 
is written in characters bold and clear the sublime wisdom of 
its Maker. Besides, if man, the creature of God, is intelligent, 
what ought, then, to be affirmed of the Creator? Again, as 
knowledge and wisdom are pure perfections, and as all pure 
perfections abide in God, He must, in consequence, be pos¬ 
sessed of intelligence. 




-348- 

20. A word, now, on its chief prerogatives. And, first, 
its extreme simplicity. God, who is a Pure Act, cannot contain 
within His Being any composition whatever. In the divine 
intelligence there are not, as in the case of created intelligences, 
distinct entities, as nature, faculty and operation. In God 
these are one and undivided save by a logical distinction. 
Neither is there in the divine intellect a multitude of thoughts, 
nor a “species intelligibilis,’’ to fecundate it, as it were, and 
actuate it. Both the one and the other would give to the Being 
of God a composition most alien to its extreme simplicity. 

Its infinite perfection. Since God is perfection itself, 
whatever, then, can be thought nobly (intensively or exten¬ 
sively) of the divine intelligence must be affirmed of it with¬ 
out limit or measure. Wherefore, it is clearness and distinct¬ 
ness and evidence itself; it is absolutely certain and infallible; 
it is comprehensive of truth in all its plentitude. 

Its eternity. God, because of His eternity, excludes from 
His Being, as we have seen (16), beginning and end and 
change. Hence, God’s knowledge is immutable: it is the same 
yesterday, to-day and forever: as it was for an eternity before 
the beginning of things, so it is forever after their creation: it 
is as if nothing thus far had been created, as if everything were 
yet to be created: as the glance of an eye beholds the actually 
present, so it regards the course and periods not only of 
actual centuries but even of all possible times. 

Its immensity. This bespeaks the infinite multitude of 
objects which it covers, and signifies that there is nothing in 
any way knowable which is hidden from God. Hence, the say¬ 
ing that God is in all things by His presence. 

21. Passing from the divine intelligence considered in 
itself to its objects, we affirm that God knows and compre¬ 
hends most perfectly both Himself and all things. 

Proof of 1st Part.—A characteristic of intelligence is self- 
consciousness ; whence it was that in Rational Psychology (8) 




-349 


we argued from the fact of self-consciousness that man had a 
faculty distinct from sense, i. e., a faculty inorganic or spir¬ 
itual, an intellect. Now, God’s knowledge is evidently most 
intellectual. Hence, He is self-conscious; in other words, He 
knows Himself. Besides, this knowledge of Himself is most 
comprehensive. For God’s power of self-consciousness on the 
one hand and on the other the full cognoscibility of His Be¬ 
ing are equal; otherwise, He could not be the Pure Act that 
He is. 

Proof of 2nd Part.—St. Thomas, elegantly as he is wont 
to do, thus demonstrates it. God is the First Cause. His effi¬ 
ciency, therefore, extends to all things, i. e., there is nothing 
either actual or possible which does not depend on His agency. 
Now, whoever knows and comprehends the full virtue of an 
agent knows and comprehends all that it can effect. Since, 
therefore, God knows and comprehends His own self, and 
hence Ilis own Agency, He, in consequence, knows and compre¬ 
hends all things, however actual or possible. 

22. Does God know the evil of things? Most assuredly 
He does. Did He not, He would not know perfectly the good 
of which He is the Primary Author, for it must be held that 
whosoever knows a thing perfectly is aware of all that can 
happen to it. Now, it can well happen, as daily experience too 
plainly testifies, that what is good in things can be spoiled, nay 
even be destroyed, by what is bad in them. Whence, God 
would not know perfectly the good work of His hands were 
He not to know also what can mar it, i. e., evil. 

Note (1). —As a thing is knowable so far as it is existible, 
and as, again, evil’is but the privation of good, wherefore, from 
what God knows of goodness, He knows what is evil, just as 
from what He knows of light He knows what is darkness. 

(2)—If idea be taken either in the sense of exemplar or 
model according to which an artificer fashions his work, or in 
the sense of a principle of cognition, in neither sense is there 
in the divine intelligence the idea of evil. 




-350- 


23. To complete what has been considered in the fore¬ 
going paragraph, it must be added that the primary and im¬ 
mediate object of the divine intelligence can be only God 
Himself. 

Proof.—The quasi “ species intelligibilis ’ ’ of the divine in¬ 
telligence is the divine essence. Now, an essence leads pri¬ 
marily and immediately to no other than that of which it is 
the essence. Therefore, the divine essence leads the divine 
intelligence primarily and immediately to the cognition of no 
other being than God Himself. Wherefore, God knows Him¬ 
self primarily and immediately, and all other things second¬ 
arily and mediately. 

24. A special difficulty is attached to God’s knowledge 
of the future. At first sight, it seems to be irreconcilable with 
the freedom of human action. On this account we lay down 
the following theses. 

God knows the future free actions of His creatures. 

This is clear from God’s immutability. Whence, God knew 
yesterday what He knows to-day and will know to-morrow. 
But to-morrow He will know, e. g., what I will do freely when 
I am doing it. Wherefore, God knew yesterday and knows 
to-day what to-morrow I will do freely; and so of any free 
action, mine or another’s. 

25. Moreover, God not only knows the absolutely fu¬ 
ture free actions of His creatures, but the conditionally 
future as well. 

Note.— Future actions or events, when considered in their 
actual occurrence, are styled by many absolutely future; con¬ 
sidered not thus, but before they occur as what would occur 
amid certain given circumstances, they fall under the condi¬ 
tionally future or futuribles. For example, if Cassar had not 
died he would have assumed the royal purple is a futurible. 




-351- 

As in the present instance, the futurible oftentimes does not 
become the future, because the conditions are not actualized. 

Proof.— Who can deny that a free agent placed in such 
and such circumstances would act in one particular way or 
another? Certainly, he cannot simultaneously determine him¬ 
self to two contradictory lines of conduct. Hence, the condi¬ 
tionally future lays claim to determinate truth. But God 
knows all truth. Therefore, etc. Besides, if God did not know 
the conditionally future, He could not govern with infallible 
wisdom. He might be disappointed, taken unawares by an 
unexpected free act of man or angel. He would, thus, be not 
Infinite Wisdom. Finally, all men acknowledge the same to 
be true by the prayers they address to the Deity. For they 
pray Him to grant them this or that favor in case He foresees 
that it would be profitable to them. 

26. Lastly, God’s knowledge of the future free actions 
of His creatures is in no way derogatory to the freedom 
of their will. Truth of thought, as we have seen in Logic 
(78), consists in the conformity of thought with thing. Now, 
conformity of thought with thing neither spoils nor destroys 
the nature of the thing: a mirror does not disfigure the features 
it faithfully images. Wherefore, God’s perfectly true, and, 
therefore, infallible knowledge of the future free actions of 
His creatures neither spoils nor destroys the nature of them: 
it only faithfully mirrors them from afar, from all eternity. 

Note. —God’s knowledge, considered on the part of its 
object, is three-fold; of pure intelligence, of vision, and 
Scientia Media. His knowledge of pure intelligence embraces 
His own essence as imitable in all possible creatures: His 
knowledge of vision comprises both His own actual essence in 
itself and whatever was, is, or ever will be: His Scientia Media 
regards what any creature would do under given circumstances. 
It is so called because the objects of it hold, as it were, a po¬ 
sition between purely actual and purely possible things. 




352- 


27. Objections. 

(a) God does not see the future; otherwise, a man would 
act before he existed. 

Answer. —God does not see the future occurring from eter¬ 
nity, c.; occurring in time,n. A man, otherwise, would act 
before he existed, d.; if God saw a man existing in time and 
acting from eternity, c.; if God from eternity saw a man ex¬ 
isting and acting in time, n. Things happen as God knows 
they will happen. Hence, things that will happen in time He 
sees happening in time; still His knowledge of them is from 
eternity. 

(b) What God foresees cannot but happen. Therefore, 
a free act of man foreseen by God, happens necessarily. 

Answer .—Cannot but happen, i. e., infallibly happens, c.; 
necessarily happens, n. Hence, n. concl. God’s knowledge 
does not change the nature of a free act. The infallible divine 
foresight of a future event implies, indeed, a certain necessity; 
a logical necessity founded on the real necessity consequent to 
the most contingent occurrence, i. e., after an event occurs it 
cannot be that it did not occur. But such a necessity is not the 
antecedent necessity with which an effect is produced by a 
necessary cause. 

(c) God’s knowledge, then, is dependent on creatures. 

Answer. —D.; if creatures were the motive as well as the 

object of God’s knowledge, c.; were the object only, n. In the 
field of knowledge motives are as causes in the world of reality; 
the former produce knowledge as the latter produce things. 
Hence, knowledge depends on its motives as things on their 
causes. Now, God in no way depends on creatures. Hence, 
they can not be for Him motives of His knowledge. On the 
other hand, the object of knowledge is what is known. It is 
only ignorance, then, that is objectless. Wherefore, creatures 
are the objects of divine knowledge; else, He would be igno¬ 
rant of them. 




-353 


Note (1). — Idea has various significations. It more 
commonly signifies concept or simple apprehension, as we have 
seen (Log., 6). Taken in this sense, a multitude of divine 
ideas contradicts the divine simplicity and perfection. It con¬ 
tradicts the divine perfection, because a concept is inchoative 
knowledge (Log., 81); it contradicts the divine simplicity, be¬ 
cause God is and lives with one supremely simple act. Another 
signification is that of archetype; the intellectual model accord¬ 
ing to which a rational agent works. So taken, a multitude of 
ideas does not contradict the divine simplicity and perfection. 
Not the divine perfection, since it implies that the agent intel¬ 
ligently produces many things, which certainly is a perfection. 
Not the divine simplicity, since multitude does not here refer 
to the act, but to the objects of God’s practical intelligence. 

(2).—It is often said that nothing happens without the 
knowledge of God. This must not be taken as meaning that 
the divine knowledge of itself is the cause of things, but that 
it is so conjointly with the divine will. However, the same 
is not to be affirmed of the divine knowledge styled Vision. 
For, an event will happen, not because God sees it, but con- 
trarily. 


ARTICLE II. 

The Divine Will. 

28. There is a divine will because there is a divine in¬ 
telligence. The one necessarily follows the other. It is im¬ 
possible that God, comprehending His own infinite goodness 
and sanctity, would not rejoice with an infinitely great joy in 
the blissful possession of attributes so divinely lovable. Now, 
what else is joy in the possession of a good, if not an act of a 
will ? There is in God, then, a divine will. Again, is there not 
a human free will? A fortiori , there is a divine will; other¬ 
wise, the creature would be nobler than the Creator. 




-354 


29. Much of what has been affirmed of the nature of the 
divine intelligence is, mutatis mutandis, to be affirmed of the 
nature of the divine will. Wherefore, God’s will is not as ours, 
a mere faculty. Iiis will is an ever-enduring act. The divine 
immutability vindicates for Him this high prerogative. 
Neither is there in Him a distinction of reality between the di¬ 
vine nature and will nor between the divine will and its opera¬ 
tions. Both distinctions are repugnant to the divine simplicity. 
On this same account, the divine will is not exercised through 
a multitude of acts. Moreover, a multitude of successive acts 
would contravene the divine eternity. Hence, what God wills 
to be in time He willed from all eternity. Still, notwithstand¬ 
ing the simplicity and immutability of the divine will, human 
speech is not at fault when it speaks of the acts of the divine 
will as if they were many, e. g., its liberality, its justice, and 
its mercy. For, as a strong man at one time can carry away 
as much as others at several, so the one eternal act of the divine 
will is equivalently many, efficaciously accomplishing more than 
all human and angelic wills could effect in common. Besides 
the transcendant perfection of the act of the divine will (for¬ 
mally one yet equivalently many) another ground for the dis¬ 
tinctions given to it by the human mind is the diversity and 
the multiplicity of its objects. 

30. Whence, theologians distinguish between God’s an¬ 
tecedent and His consequent will. The antecedent will sup¬ 
poses no condition. The consequent will regards certain con¬ 
ditions to be fulfilled by creatures. Thus, God wishes all to be 
saved and he damns many. He wishes, indeed, all to be 
saved and for that reason places at their disposal all necessary 
means. He does not intend, however, to confer on them the 
fruits of salvation, unless they on their part comply with pre¬ 
scribed conditions. 

31. To speak becomingly of the emotions and feelings 
of the Deity, one ought to remember that nothing imperfect 




355- 


is predicable of God. Now, we have seen (Cosmo. 75), that 
there are concupiscible and irascible appetitions. The latter 
are hope and despair, courage and fear and anger. In their 
concept, these clearly involve imperfection, since the object of 
the irascible appetite is the difficulty to be overcome in attain¬ 
ing the good or avoiding the evil. Hence, they cannot with 
strict propriety of speech be affirmed of God. They are in God 
not formally, but eminently and virtually (12, Note 1). The 
same is to be said of sorrow. Besides sorrow, the concupis¬ 
cible appetitions are love and hatred, desire, aversion and joy. 
These five abide in God formally for the contrary reason; all 
of them are predicable of the divine will in its relations to crea¬ 
tures, but only love and joy, in its reference to the Creator. 
Care, however, should be taken that they be affirmed of Him 
not after the manner in which they are ordinarily used in 
human speech. 

32. To conclude what we have to say on the nature of 
the divine will, we shall speak briefly on moral attributes 
so far as they are predicable of God. Ethics teaches that the 
human will is made perfect through moral virtue. Now, cer¬ 
tain moral virtues, e. g., ‘liberality,’ ‘mercy,’ do not imply in 
their concept any imperfection. Whence, like all other pure 
perfections, they are affirmed of God, not indeed precisely as 
habits, i. e. additional perfections, but substantially and inim¬ 
itably. 

33. Will, since it is intellectual appetite, is the power of 
loving, desiring and enjoying what is known by the intellect 
as good. This is its object (Psych. 12). Wherefore, the ob¬ 
ject of the divine will is whatever is known by the divine in¬ 
telligence to be good. Now, Ontology teaches (22) that every 
being (Creator and creature) is good. Whence, God Himself 
and all other things are the objects of the divine will; but they 
are not so coordinately. 




-356 


34. God himself, i. e., Goodness Itself, is the primary 
object of the divine will: all others are its secondary 
objects. 

Note.— By the primary object of a will is meant what is 
loved, or desired or rejoiced in for its own self and in reference 
to which all others are loved or desired or taken pleasure in. 
These others are the will’s secondary objects. 

Proof.— It is thus given by St. Thomas. All things about 
us in Nature have, as experience teaches, the inborn tendency 
not only to seek after what is good for them if they lack it, 
and to rest in the enjoyment of it if they possess it, but also 
to communicate it to others on attaining it. Man, naturally, 
not only seeks after knowledge, and is pleased on acquiring it, 
but having it, would share it with others who are without it. 
Now, if creatures are diffusive of the good they enjoy, how 
more so is the Creator who is Goodness Itself and whose per¬ 
fections are but dimly shadowed forth and faintly imaged in 
the actions of His creatures. Wherefore, God Himself and 
all other things are objects of the divine will after this order: 
God Himself, Goodness Itself, is its final, i. e., its primary 
object; all others are its secondary objects, i. e., they are objects 
in reference to God inasmuch as it nobly becomes the Divine 
Goodness to bestow itself on others as far and as much as is 
possible. 

35. But here arises a special question. Can evil be the 
object of the divine will? and how? It must be remembered, 
first, that there is physical and moral evil. Physical evil, as 
we have seen (Ontol., 24), is the privation, or that which ef¬ 
fects the privation of some physical good, e. g., ‘blindness,’ 
‘sickness.’ It mars or destroys the good only of a creature, a 
finite good. Moral evil, on the contrary, militates against the 
Infinite Goodness. It is the privation or that which effects the 
privation of some moral good, i. e., the due rectitude which 




357- 


ought to obtain between the free act of an intelligent agent and 
its right reason; and hence ultimately, which ought to obtain 
between its free act and the God of right reason. 

Secondly, a will may regard its object in one of thrae 
ways. The object may be loved or desired on its own account 
i. e., for itself—health. Thus regarded, it is an end. The ob¬ 
ject, again, may be desired not on its own account but on ac¬ 
count of something else towards the attainment of which it is 
a help—medicine for the sake of health. Thus desired, it is a 
means. Thirdly, it may not be cared for at all, neither as an 
end nor as a means: it is only suffered, i. e., permitted. Strictly 
speaking, it is not the object of a will: it is involuntary. More¬ 
over, that such permission be faultless two conditions are re¬ 
quired: (1) what is permitted ought not to be the necessary 
consequence of that which is intended; (2) neither ought there 
to be any obligation to withstand it. Thus a man acts blame¬ 
lessly when he does good to others, though he knows full surely 
that some ingrates among them will abuse his beneficence. 

Now, God in no way wills moral evil: He permits it. 
He, however, wills physical evil not for itself, but in refer¬ 
ence to some good connected with it. 

Proof. —No evil, not even physical, is in itself desirable. 
Only the good is desirable, and evil is the privation of good. 
Still, physical evil may be desirable on account of some good 
connected with it. That, in truth, some good may be con¬ 
nected with it follows from its finiteness. Physical evil does 
not vitiate the whole field, as it were, of goodness. Thus, a 
surgeon would amputate the arm or the leg of a patient, if 
thereby he could save the life of the sufferer. Similarly, God 
often wills physical evil for the good connected with it. He 
punishes a sinner severely for the vindication of the moral or¬ 
der : He wills the death of a horse killed by a falling tree on 
account of the greater physical good, the conservation of the 




-358- 


laws of gravity so widely beneficial. Pope puts this latter point 
forcibly in his Essay on Man when he asks the question, 

“When the loose mountain trembles from on high, 
Shall gravitation cease when you pass by?” 

Moral evil, on the other hand, is in no way desired by 
God. It militates, as we concluded above, against Infinite 
Goodness and God will never take up arms against Himself. 
Hence, since for a fact moral evil does exist, God merely per¬ 
mits it, and properly. It is not the necessary consequence of 
what he intends. It is the consequence of His gift of 
free will to an intelligent creature; a consequence which might 
have been avoided had it so pleased him who committed it. 
Again, God does not owe it to Himself to prevent it. He does 
not owe it to His sanctity; for He hates sin and forbids it. He 
does not owe it to His goodness; for He is not bound to effect 
the greater good. He does not owe it to His wisdom; because 
He knows how to draw good from evil. He can thus try man’s 
virtue, make known His divine patience and mercy, and man¬ 
ifest His divine justice. Of course, the manifestation of His 
divine virtues are not the reason why God permits evil. To 
think so is to think Calvanistically. But moral evil committed, 
in consequence of it He intends such a manifestation. This 
entire paragraph renders groundless Manicheism, which con¬ 
tends that there are two First Causes, one of good, the other 
of evil. 

36. Notes for the solution of objections. 

The existence of evil is doubtless a mystery. It is im¬ 
possible to offer a solution which completely clears up every 
difficulty attached to it. Let us, then, be resigned to remain 
with many of our Whys unanswered and be satisfied to show 
that in the world as we have it there is nothing demonstrably 
incompatible with belief in the power of goodness of its Maker. 

The order which pervade the universe is as stern a fact 
as the existence of physical and moral evil. The former, in- 





-—359— _ ■ 

deed, is the predominant fact of the two, the latter being to 
it merely as a partial defect in a structure. 

To allow one’s eyes to rest on evil alone is pessimism. 

The sum-total of the world’s pain and suffering is after 
all not proportionately large, compared with the world’s con¬ 
tentment and pleasure. Schopenhauer, it is true, pronounced 
the fact to be otherwise * but he did so falsely. A sound test 
for deciding this point is to interrogate the ‘will to live.’ Even 
Schopenhauer allowed this universality and persistency of the 
‘will to live,’ but he declared.it to be an infatuation implanted 
in us by the malevolence of Nature. 

Were there no death to carry off the earlier generations, 
later generations for want of room could not experience the 
joy of living. 

Death, again, is an intrinsic necessity. 

Pain and suffering are not pure evils. Pain warns one 
of danger and stimulates to action. “I fail to see,” justly re¬ 
marks Professor Flint, ‘ ‘ that the nearest approximation to the 
ideal of blissful life is the existence of a well fed hog which 
does not need to exert itself, and is not destined for the 
slaughter.” See (Month; July, 1905; pgs. 1-19). 

37. God, then, has a free-will, the sphere of which, its 
adequate object,, is as wide as that of His operation ‘ad extra.’ 
It cannot be doubted that the divine will is not vitiated with 
the liberty of contrariety (Psych, No. 16, Note a) ; for God is 
Holiness Itself, and such vitiation is not essential to liberty; 
rather it flows from the weakness of the finite will. 

38. Here speaking of the free will of God, we meet with 
one of the greatest difficulties in all Theology, the 
seeming opposition between the freedom of the divine will 
and the immutability of the divine being. In a matter so far 
above human intelligence, we shall outline cautiously what may 
be given for its solution. 




-360 


As the way in which God exists differs essentially from 
that in which we exist, so also the manner in which God acts, 
differs from that in which we act. “Agere sequitur esse.” In 
this life, therefore, we cannot have a proper (in opposition to 
an analogical) knowledge of the one and the other divine ob¬ 
ject. For, in this life the proportionate objects of our knowl¬ 
edge are the nature of material things, their mode of existing 
and acting. (Psych., 4 and 5). Our knowledge, then, of di¬ 
vine things must perforce be analogical. From the faint shad¬ 
ow and the obscure image of the Creator in the creature, we 
rise to our knowledge of God, purifying created perfections 
of all potentiality and imperfection, and attributing them so 
negatively purified to the Creator. 

Thus, we come to know first, that God’s will must be free; 
for, freedom bespeaks mastery and independence. Again, that 
it must be free in reference to all without Him; otherwise, God 
would not be the sole Master of the Universe, the one supreme 
Lord of heaven and earth. Now, freedom of will implies in¬ 
difference , i. e., the absence of determination or fixation to one 
thing: the former is inconceivable without the latter. But in 
the instance of the divine freedom of will, the aforesaid in¬ 
difference cannot be that of fact , i. e., the indifference of a fac¬ 
ulty which may or may not be in a state of activity, which 
may be acting now one way, now another. Indifference 
like this includes imperfection, and consequently, cannot be 
affirmed of the divine will. The indifference, then, of the di¬ 
vine free will is that of term or object. In other words, the 
divine will though ever enduring in one and the same act, may 
or may not regard this or that object. Carefully note that the 
perfection of power and independence involved in the concept 
of one infinite act accomplishing more than can be accom¬ 
plished by a midtitude of finite acts and accomplishing it all 
freely, is God’s intrinsically; whereas the imperfection of 
mutability contained in the concept of an existing thing that 
once was not, is the creature’s intrinsically. 




361 


CHAPTER III. 

Action of God in the Universe. 

39. Certain attributes of God are styled relative. They 
are those that refer to existent things, e. g., ‘Creator/ ‘Lord/ 
‘Ruler/ etc. Such attributes are affirmed of God not abso¬ 
lutely but hypothetically. Thus, God is said absolutely to be 
wise and good, because He is so apart from all supposition 
of a created being, but He is said hypothetically to be Creator, 
if there exist a creature. Moreover, these attributes import no 
change in God, since the change they imply in their concept is 
not in God but in the creature. Whence, the relations which 
arise from God’s action in the Universe are real not on the side 
of God, but on that of the creature. They are non-mutual. 
(Ontol., 56). Whence again, the relative attributes of the 
Deity are affirmed of Him not from all eternity but in time; 
for it is in time that their foundations are put. 

40. Now, three things can be chiefly considered in every 
existent creature: 1 its existence, 2 its activities or operations, 
and 3 its purposes or ends. In this chapter then, we 
shall consider the divine attributes that refer to these three 
main features of a created being. And as God acts in the 
Universe, giving existence to it and all it contains, through 
the divine operation of creation and conservation , and as he 
acts with its powers and agents for the production of their 
every effect through the divine concurrence, and finally, as He 
leads all tilings to their appointed ends through His divine 
Providence over all, the present chapter will consist of the fol¬ 
lowing three articles:— 

I. —The divine creation and conservation; 

II. —The divine concurrence; 

III. —The divine providence. 




362- 


41. We shall first, however, refute the false and impious 
hypothesis of certain philosophers who stupidly confound 
the material Universe of sight and touch with the invisible 
and spiritual God, and thus destroy all concept of divine cre¬ 
ation, conservation and providence. These philosophers are 
called Pantheists, because they teach all things to be God. 
Pythagoras before Christ and Scotus Erigena in the Middle 
Ages taught that the Universe has come forth from the Divine 
Substance by an outward emanation, by an out-pouring or out- 
putting of the Divinity. The Jewish philosopher Spinoza held 
that there exists only one substance, infinite, eternal, and en¬ 
dowed with extension and thought. Both extension and 
thought, moreover, are according to him necessarily in constant 
activity, the evolution of the former producing material bodies, 
and the development of the latter begetting human intelli¬ 
gences. This system of Pantheism is known as internal emana¬ 
tion. Akin to it are the vagaries of the Pantheistic Idealists, of 
a Fichte, a Schelling, and a Hegel. With all three a material 
universe is unreal, bodies with their varied mechanical, physi¬ 
cal, chemical and vital energies being ever-changing phantasms 
like those of a sick man’s dream, erroneously supposed by sim¬ 
ple-minded people to be objective realities. Fichte, in place of 
the one infinite, eternal and indeterminate substance of Spinoza 
assumes at first one eternal indefinite cogitative subject which 
he styles TO EGO. This EGO is not the personal I of ordinary 
speech; it is individual in general. Since it is indeterminate in 
being, and has no limits to its activity, it determines itself by 
conceiving and knowing its objects; for, it so thinks of its 
objects that it constitutes and places itself in diverse and defi¬ 
nite states and positions. Schelling advancing farther along 
the line of abstraction begun by Fichte, prescinds from all that 
differentiates TO EGO from TO NON-EGO (the subject 
thinking from the object thought) and reaches what he names 
the indifference of differences. With this he begins as the 
ABSOLUTE, the eternal and infinite reality. This reality pre- 




—-363-- 

supposed, all other realities follow as the transformations and 
the phenomena with which the ABSOLUTE whether under 
the form of object or that of subject extrinsically manifests it¬ 
self. Hegel finally, attains the limit of German idealistic ab¬ 
straction in the IDEA. Conceive Schelling’s idea of the 
ABSOLUTE, cut out of it all that it represents and in the re¬ 
maining empty logical framework you have Hegel’s IDEA. 
He, too, calls his beginning of things absolute which evolves 
itself in the triple order 1) of the intelligible w T orld of essences, 
2) of the sensile world of bodies, and 3) of the internal world 
of mind. Hence, notions, nature and spirit. Pantheism, if not 
openly taught, is covertly conveyed in the speculations of many 
infidels of our day. Agnosticism, for instance, holds that for 
all we know to the contrary, the world’s phenomena may be 
the sum total of actual being, the existence of God distinct from 
phenomena being classed among the unknowables. 

42. Now, Pantheism and Agnosticism are systems sub¬ 
versive of religion, of morality, and of society. For, as Fr. 
Coppens clearly and sufficiently expresses it, 4 4 If Pantheism and 
Agnosticism were true, each of us would be, or at least 
might be for all we know, a part of the infinite substance in 
fact, the worst men of the world would or might be self-ex¬ 
istent, and therefore, independent of a Maker and Supreme 
Master. If so, no one could or should worship a Superior 
Being; hence, no religion; no one need obey a higher law¬ 
giver ; hence, no morality; without morality no restraint on 
man’s selfishness, a mere struggle of might; whence, would 
soon result a mere state of barbarism, the destruction of 
society. ’ ’ 

ARTICLE I. 

The Divine Creation and Conservation. 

A word first on divine power whence,flow, creation, con¬ 
servation and the other divine actions. 



364- 


i. Divine Power . 

43. That God is powerful cannot be denied. Active 
power, for in no other sense can we speak of divine power, is 
an effective principle, i. e., a principle capable of producing 
something distinct from itself. Now to be possessed of such 
a principle is evidently to be possessed of a perfection. There¬ 
fore its possession is worthy of God. Following St. Thomas, 
we may define the power of God; either as a principle exe¬ 
cuting what the divine will decrees and the divine intelligence 
directs to be done, or as the very decree of the divine wisdom 
and good pleasure in so far as it is effective ‘ad extra.’ Its 
adequate object is everything besides God, which involves no 
contradiction. Wherefore, God is all powerful or omnipotent. 
That, what involves contradiction, e. g., ‘a square circle,’ ‘two 
mountains without a valley between,’ does not lie within the 
field of divine omnipotence, is due to no impotence on the part 
of God’s power, but to the nothingness of a verbal fiction. 
Wherefore speaking exactly, we ought not to say that God can 
not make a square circle, but rather that a square circle can 
not be made. 

Note (1). —The active power of a creature is a quality, i. 
e., an accidental form distinct from its substance, and more¬ 
over, it is not in constant operation. Hence, in a creature all 
three (nature, power, and operation) are really distinct from 
one another. On the contrary, in God all three are one. 

(2).—Since every created agent effects its like it follows 
that there corresponds to the productive power of a creature 
a term or object of a determinate kind or particular species. 
Hence, active powers of a creature are limited or finite. It is 
not so with regard to the power of the Creator. Founded as 
it is on the infinite being of God, it too is infinite; and hence, 
it can effect whatever is existible. 




365 


(3).—A trite distinction is that of God’s absolute and 
ordered power. This must not be taken in the false sense that 
God’s absolute power signifies what He can do, His wisdom, 
goodness and other perfections not considered; whilst God’s 
ordered power is what He can do, taken in conjunction with 
His perfections and tempered by them. For what God can 
do is the possible, and the possible is God’s imitability ‘ad ex¬ 
tra’ which is in no way discordant with His attributes. The 
true sense of the distinction is two fold. (1) God’s absolute 
power is the divine power considered in itself , i. e., by a logical 
antecedence, considered previously to the decree of the divine 
will predefining from eternity one order rather than another. 
In keeping with this, God’s ordered power is the divine power 
considered as carrying out the decree of the divine will. (2). 
God’s absolute power is what God can do over and above the 
common laws of grace and nature, as in the case of miracles; 
whereas God’s ordered, or more correctly ordinary, power is 
what God does according to the usual courses of grace and 
nature. 


ii. Creation. 

44. We have demonstrated in a preceding paragraph that 
there is power in God, that this divine power is identified with 
its own act and the divine essence, and that in consequence it 
is infinite. Now an infinite power founded on the Self-Existent 
Being, and identified with its own action, is evidently inde¬ 
pendent of all out of itself. Wherefore, the characteristic or 
special mark of its activity is to presuppose nothing of what 
its effects, i. e., its activity is creative; for, creation is the pro¬ 
duction of something out of nothing. 

45. Let us dwell a little on this divine operation. We 
have described it above as the production of something out of 
nothing. Now, the meaning of this is not, that nothing is made 
something, but that what is created is not created out of any 




-366- 

pre-existing material; or again, that what is created had noth¬ 
ing of itself existing previously to its creation. 

46. Creation, therefore, is not strictly a change; for, the 
concept of change involves three elements: 1) a term from 
which, 2) a term to which, and 3) a subject which passes from 
the one to the other. But in creation there is neither the term 
from which nor the subject. Thus far we have described 
creation with respect to its term from which. As is plain, it 
may be defined with regard to its term to which and the mode 
of its efficiency. In the former case creation is the production 
of a thing in its entirety; in the later case it is the production 
of a being, as such. 

47. Creation can be considered either on the part of God 
alone or on the part of the creature alone. Creation, then, 
is either active or passive. Active creation is, as we have just 
seen, the activity with which-God gives being to a creature, i. e., 
the divine action which is one with the divine essence in rela¬ 
tion to creatures. To apprehend this distinctly, it must be re¬ 
membered that there is immanent action, and there is transitive 
action. Immanent action abides in and perfects the agent , e. g., 
1 feeling and thinking: transitive action passes over to and per¬ 
fects the production , e. g., 'building a house.’ Now, in God 
there is both immanent and transitive action. He thinks and 
wills, and He created the Universe. But with respect to the 
divine transitive action, it must be added that action predicated 
of the Creator and the creature is done so analogically; and 
hence, what is said of the operations and creatures and implies, 
imperfection cannot be affirmed formally of the divine opera¬ 
tions which are in no way imperfect. Now the transitive action 
of finite agents is specified by what they effect; for, omne 
agens agit sibi simile. But external specification argues the 
imperfection of a sort of dependence. Therefore, transitive 
action as such, i. e., formally, cannot be affirmed of God. Cre¬ 
ation, then, is formally immament but virtually transitive; in- 




-367- 

asmuch as, like the transitive action of finite agents it produces 
things distinct from itself though in a much nobler way. 

48. God alone can create; for, creation is the efficiency 
of infinite power and all creatures have only finite powers. 

Finally, the term of creative action is a subsistent 
thing, since existence the formal object of such efficiency, be¬ 
longs precisely to subsistent things. Hence, matter and form, 
accidents and such like are rather concreated than created. 

49. Passive creation, i. e., creation considered on the 
part of the creature alone, is a relation of the creature to the 
Creator through the beginning of its existence. Since creation 
is not change in the strict sense of the word, it follows that 
it does not come under the category of passion but that of 
relation. Moreover, it is, as has been said, a non-mutual rela¬ 
tion, because it is real in the creature but logical in the Creator. 
The creature really depends on the Creator; but the Creator is 
not on an equal footing with the creature; much less is He 
dependent upon the creature. 

50. Having premised these notions on creation, we af¬ 
firm that the Universe and the matter of which it is com¬ 
posed have been created by God. 

Proof.— Either Creation, or Pantheism, or Dualism, or 
Atheism must be admitted. Either there is no necessary and 
infinite being—and we have Atheism; or, if this being exists, 
it is either really identical with or distinct from the Universe. 
If identical, we have Pantheism. If distinct, either the Uni¬ 
verse is from itself from the necessary and infinite Being. 
If from itself, then we have Dualism which admits the multi¬ 
plication of the self-existent being. If the Universe is from 
the Infinite and necessary Being it is so either by emanation 
or by production. If the former, we again have Pantheism. 
If the latter, either the Infinite Being produces the Universe 
in its entirety, even the matter of which it is composed, or 




-368- 

something real is presupposed to its production and out of 
which it is made. If the latter, we have Dualism a second time. 
If the former, we have Creation. The demonstration of crea¬ 
tion in truth completes the demonstration of God’s existence. 
There is no God unless there is a Being who is distinct from 
all other beings and upon whom all other beings wholly depend. 

Note (1). —Hence Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus 
erred in conceiving the Universe to have been evolved out of 
eternal, immutable, atomic matter. Hence, too, Plato and 
Anaxagoras erred in supposing the matter of the Universe 
to be self-existent, its form and order alone to be given by God. 

(2).—God in creating the Universe did not act necessarily, 
since, as we have seen above, God is free in regard to all 
things about Him. Whether God has created the Universe 
from all eternity or in time is a question that cannot be solved 
on purely rational grounds. God, undoubtedly, has created the 
Universe in time but we know this from divine revelation. 
Could God if it had so pleased Him create from all eternity 
has been answered diversely by diverse writers. Some contend 
that He could not, because eternal creation is a manifest ab¬ 
surdity; others hold that He could, since creation passively 
considered demands only intrinsic possibility and actively con¬ 
sidered is the divine power which is always in act. St. Thomas 
teaches that both sides are probable. 

Hi. God , the Exemplary Cause of the Universe. 

51. The creation of the heavens and the earth and all 
that they contain calls for a divine exemplar. An exemplar, 
is a pattern or model which exists in the mind of an artificer 
and in accordance with which he fashions his work. It has 
the character of a cause inasmuch as the existence of the work 
depends on it; had the intelligent agent no knowledge of his 
work, he could not produce it. Hence, it is styled exemplary 
cause. Its action is as follows; the will commands the hands 
of the worker and the intellect guides them, presenting a model 




-369 


intellectually expressive of the work intended. Now, God 
created the Universe in accordance with a divine model of it. 
For every effect that is neither the happening of chance nor 
the result of necessity, but the work of intelligence, calls for 
a model or pattern. But the creation of the Universe is the 
work of divine intelligence. Therefore, the creation of the 
Universe, of the heavens and the earth and all that they con¬ 
tain, calls for a divine model or exemplar. 

52. This exemplar may be either proximate or remote. 
The proximate is the very idea which God had conceived of 
creation before He gave it being; the remote is the source , 
i. e., the divine essence whence God intellectually drew the 
divine concept of creation. That there is a remote exemplar 
as well as a proximate rests on the truth that the order of in¬ 
telligence is ultimately founded on the order of reality: and 
that the divine remote exemplar is the divine essence is the 
consequence of the primary objectiveness of this essence for 
the divine intelligence. 

53. Only intelligent creatures are made according to 
the image of God. This proposition states a difference worthy 
of note between non-intelligent and intelligent creatures with 
respect to their resemblance to the Deity. All creatures in 
some way bear in themselves a resemblance to the Divine 
Being , but rational creatures alone rise to the dignity of His 
image. For, an image, argues St. Thomas, is a resemblance 
either in specific likeness or in the likeness at least of an acci¬ 
dental form indicative of what is specific, and chiefly, there¬ 
fore, in the likeness of shape or figure, e. g., ‘the image of the 
Goddess of Liberty on a silver coin.’ Now it is clear, that a 
specific similitude is had according to the ultimate difference 
of the species. 

Whence, as intelligent creatures alone enjoy a re¬ 
semblance to God so close that there cannot be a closer , it 
follows that they alone differ the least from God, and there- 




--370- 

fore, they alone are made to His image. That intelligent 
creatures resemble God far closer than all others do, is seen 
from this that non-living creatures resemble Him in having 
only existence; living, in having life and existence but intelli¬ 
gent in having intelligence and will as well as life and exist¬ 
ence. 

iv. God , the Final Cause of the Universe. 

54. God in virtue of His power is the effective principle 
of the Universe; and by reason of His wisdom is its Exemplar. 
On account of His goodness, it is to be added, He is also its 
last end. This triple relation of the Creator to His creatures, 
complete their dependence on Him. It likewise expresses the 
admirable cycle according to which all things come firstly from 
God and lastly return to Him. We have spoken of God as the 
First of efficient and exemplary causes: we shall now speak of 
Him as the Last of final causes. 

55. At last end is simply and absolutely so, when all 
others are ordained to it, and itself is ordained to none. Where¬ 
fore, it is final not alone in one order of being, e. g., ‘ ‘ as heaven 
is man’s last end,” but in every order of being; it is the ulti¬ 
mate end of the universal order of creation. 

56. When it is said that one acts for an end, the term 
“for” can be used to signify either a cause or a sufficient 
reason. Now, nothing can be a cause with respect to the divine 
will. Hence, it ought never to be said that God acts for an end 
in the sense of His having a final cause for His action. It is 
equally true, on the other hand, that God always acts for a suf¬ 
ficient reason, since He always acts most wisely. Wherefore 
it is always to be said that God acts for an end, in this other 
sense of the term. 

57. A will intent on some end looks both to the good it 
wishes and to the recipient of the good. Both objects taken 
together make one adequate end. 




371 


58. Goodness, as the saying goes, is; diffusive of itself. 
Whence it happens, that a noble and liberal soul conscious to 
itself of the possession of some great good, longs to have and 
make others partakers in it. In such instances of beneficence, 
he who would do good to another, regards himself as the source 
of good. He is an object of his own will because he is good. 
But he who has good done him by another is regarded by his 
benefactor as the recipient of good. He is an object to the will 
of his benefactor in order that he may participate in good. 
Whence, it is plainly seen, that the motive for the love of be¬ 
nevolence is not any good to be found in the beneficiary; nay, 
more, such love is purest, when it does good to another in 
whom there is nothing save demerit. This of goodness in 
general. 

59. The divine goodness is the absolutely final end of 
the Universe, not for the realization or enhancement of the 
divine goodness but in order that creatures may participate in 
it, each in its own measure. That there is a final end for the 
divine work of creation, is plain enough. God does not; God 
can not work purposelessly. That this final end is the divine 
goodness itself, flows from the principle so often repeated in 
this treatise; all perfections belong to God. Now, to be the 
First of causes, whether efficient, exemplary or final, is a 
perfection. Moreover, in the hierarchy of causality, the final 
cause enjoys the primacy, since it is the final cause that renders 
the others, causes in act . Therefore, God, i. e., the Divine 
Goodness Itself is the final end of the Universe. Not in truth 
because the divine goodness is as yet to be realized or enhanced 
by means of creatures. For, argues the Angelic Doctor, God, 
who is the First of agents, does not act as if He had anything to 
gain, but only to bestow gifts on others. He who is Pure Act 
is in potency to nothing but is the fountain of actuality for 
everything. Add to this that omne recipitur secundum modum 
recipientis and the thesis given at the beginning of this para¬ 
graph is made good in all its details. 




■372 


Note (1).—Whence follows the nobler way in which 
intelligent creatures are ordained to fulfill the high purpose of 
the Universe. For, as intelligent creatures alone are made to 
the image of God in having intelligence and will, so they alone 
participate in the divine beatitude which consists in the knowl¬ 
edge and the love of the Supreme Good. 

(2).—As every creature partakes in the divine goodness, 
each in its own measure, it follows that every creature mani¬ 
fests the same in like manner. Still such manifestations is com¬ 
pleted only through the intelligent creature. For it is the in¬ 
tellect alone that can perceive the divine perfections reflected in 
the creature. Wherefore, man has been made the ‘ ‘ Lord of Cre¬ 
ation. ” “ And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, 
and the birds of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, 
and every creeping creature that moveth on the earth.'’ (Gene¬ 
sis; I, 10). For, (1) they are all useful to him in forwarding 
his perfection; (2) he alone is capable of dominion, since he 
alone has intelligence and will; and (3) right order demands 
that the lower be subject to the higher. 

60. The Universe has been created for the Glory 
of God. For what else is the glory of one save the knowledge 
the praise of his great and good qualities,— <( clara cum laude 
notitia.” But, as has been said, the Universe has been created 
to manifest the divine goodness, intelligent creatures effecting 
the same of themselves by means of the non-intelligent. 

61. There is a distinction of the divine glory which 
ought not to be omitted. The divine glory is either intrinsic or 
extrinsic. The intrinsic glory of God is God’s own knowledge 
and praise of the divine goodness, a knowledge and a praise 
worthy of it. The extrinsic glory of God is the creature’s 
knowledge and praise of the divine goodness. It is formally 
given by the intelligent creature, but instrument ally procured 
through the non-intelligent. 




373 


Now, God’s intrinsic glory is certainly the ultimate pur¬ 
pose of creation according to the manner set forth above. His 
extrinsic glory is the very participation in the divine goodness 
which He bestows on every creature, each participating in it 
in its own measure. From this, is easily seen the wide differ¬ 
ence in meaning between the expression that God acts for His 
glory and the expression that He acts for Himself. God does 
not act as a rich lord would, who clothes his servants in the 
richest attire not for their interest and advantage, but in order 
to draw the admiration of all to himself. 

62. This world can not be said to be the best in an abso¬ 
lute sense , i. e., as if there could not be a better. Liebnitz made 
this mistake. For, the divine goodness is inexhaustible, and 
consequently, no creation could participate in it to such a de¬ 
gree as to render a higher degree impossible. However, it can 
be said to be the best in a relative, i. e., in a restricted sense; in¬ 
asmuch as it is wholly capable of giving that degree of ex¬ 
trinsic glory which God has created the world to give. As to 
why, He has preferred this degree of glory to another, I answer 
with St. Augustin, “because it had so pleased Him.” 

v. Divine Conservation. 

63. It was said in the beginning of this article that the 
divine operation of conservation as well as that of creation 
refer to finite existence. The truth is that conservation is but 
continued creation. To apprehend this distinctly, the differ¬ 
ence between direct and indirect conservation must be noted. 
Indirect conservation safeguards the creature against what is 
harmful to its existence, or procures for it what is beneficial. 
It does not, therefore, immediately regard existence, and hence, 
it is styled indirect. Some have thought that it is only by in¬ 
direct conservation that God keeps His creatures in being. As 
we shall see farther on, this is false. Direct conservation, on the 
contrary, concerns itself immediately with existence. It pre- 




374 


serves in duration the existence which the creature received 
through creation. Hence, it is said to be continued creation. 
As duration is the continuation of existence, so is conservation 
with respect to creation. How ridiculous, then, the conception 
of divine conservation by a certain thinker who imagined that 
it was a constant re-creation , the creature at every previous 
instant having been annihilated. The true conception is that as 
the creature needed God’s action to come into being , so it con¬ 
tinues to need God’s action to remain in being . Wherefore, 
creation and conservation actively considered are one and the 
same divine action: passively considered, they differ in concept, 
inasmuch as the concept of creation contains the note, begin¬ 
ning of existence , not contained in that of conservation. 

64. That every creature needs the divine operation of 
direct conservation to remain in being is plainly evident. 

There is the same need of the divine action that a creature re¬ 
main in being as there is that it come into being. For, the 
creature is not changed in nature on coming into being; whilst 
existing, it is as contingent as before existing. Hence, it ever 
lacks the sufficient reason of its existence. Wherefore, it can 
not keep itself in existence; it needs the divine support of con¬ 
servation. 

Note.— This truth does not contradict that of the immor¬ 
tality of the soul. Spiritual beings are, indeed, immortal by 
nature. But this does not mean that they are not also con¬ 
tingent by nature. Being immortal by nature, they are so con¬ 
tingent as ever to call for God’s conservation. 


ARTICLE II. 

The Divine Concurrence. 

65. Creatures, as we have seen, have received existence 
from the Creator in order to participate in the divine goodness 




375- 


and thus give testimony to it. Now, creatures resemble the 
divine goodness in two respects: 1) they are good in them¬ 
selves, i. e., absolutely good, and 2) they are good for others , 
i. e., relatively good (OntoL, 222). Wherefore, 1) there is the 
divine action of creation and conservation which gives to crea¬ 
tures the good that is theirs and constantly preserves them in 
it, i. e., it creates them in existence and conserves them in it. 
2) There is the divine action of concurrence which constantly 
operates with them in the good they do others, i. e., it operates 
with them in their activities. We have just considered the di¬ 
vine action of conservation; it remains, then, to consider that 
of concurrence. 

66. This divine action has been variously termed by St. 
Thomas, e. g., ‘the divine influence,’ ‘the action of God,’ ‘the 
divine motion,’ ‘the operation of God in the works of a crea¬ 
ture.’ Most modern writers style it, ‘the divine concurrence.’ 
The difference is, certainly, one of nomenclature. Still, it is 
worthy of note, that concurrence taken literally, conveys the 
idea of agents acting coordinately and having a part share in 
an effect, e. g., two horses together pulling a wagon which 
neither could pull, if alone. Now, as is plain, the concurrence 
of God with the action of a creature can not be such as that; 
and no scholastic writer thinks so. Everything not God is 
subordinated to God. Hence, in the case of divine concurrence 
the finite action of the creature is subordinated to the infinite 
action of the Creator. Moreover and in consequence, the Cre¬ 
ator and the creature can not be said to be part sharers in the 
production of any thing. The truth is, that both the uncreated 
and the created agent, each in its own sphere produce the entire 
effect: the uncreated agent effecting it in the order of Uni¬ 
versal Cause; the created, in the order of particular causes. 
We can borrow an illustration from Logic. The concept of a 
particular thing depends both on the transcendental notion of 
thing in general and the categorical notion of this thing in 




-376- 

particular. Without the former notion, the concept would be of 
nothing at all; without the latter it would be of everything in 
general but of nothing in particular. 

67. The commonly accepted use, then, of the term 
‘divine concurrence’ is that God also effects what the creature 
effects: 1) not, however, by doing part of the work, the creature 
doing the other part, but producing with the creature the 
entire effect; 2) and this is so effected by God on the one 
hand acting as the Universal Cause; the creature on the other, 
as a particular cause; 3) and moreover, as is seen from the 
illustration given above, the formal object of the divine activ¬ 
ity being existence and entity, and the formal object of the 
created activity being that particular phase of existence and 
activity specifically corresponding to the nature of the created 
activity. Remark finally, that this last note of divine concur¬ 
rence must not be conceived as signifying that God could not 
of Himself produce what the creature effects with His divine 
help. Herein the illustration and the illustrated part company. 
For the abstract concept of Being in general, prescinding as it 
does from every determination of Being can not give of itself 
the notion of Being in particular. On the contrary, the con¬ 
crete reality of Infinite Being containing within Itself either 
formally or eminently every reality of finite beings, can do of 
Itself whatever can be done by finite agencies. To repeat what 
has been said more than once, God bestows faculties and ener¬ 
gies on His creatures and operates with them in their activities 
not because He stands in need of anything but for the benefi¬ 
cent reason that He would have them participants in His 
infinite goodness, each in its own measure. 

68. Since then, God operates in the work of His creatures 
as above stated, it follows that His concurrence is immediate as 
well as mediate. The divine concurrence is mediate because 
God gives existence to and conserves in being the creature’s 




377 


nature with its faculties and energies, the effective principles 
of its operations. It is also immediate, since God as well as the 
creature is the immediate effective principle of the creature’s 
action and effect. 

67. Lastly, the divine concurrence is turned by many gen¬ 
eral and for three reasons: 1) it extends to every natural opera¬ 
tion of all creatures; 2) it does not include the special concur¬ 
rence of God with some of His creatures operating in the super¬ 
natural order; 3) it does not exclude the determination and the 
specification proceeding from the operation of the particular 
cause; for, as has been said, God in His divine concurrence acts 
as the Universal Cause, and produces the effect under the 
formal aspect of existence and entity. “It must be said,” 
writes St. Thomas , i ‘ that although the First Cause inflows into 
the effect (as well as the secondary cause), still Its influence 
is determined and specified by the proximate cause.” Hence, 
whatever there is of deficiency physical or moral in the act of 
the secondary agent, it must be attributed to the particular, 
and not to the Universal cause. 

69. Having explained the notes of divine concurrence, we 
shall now prove that God concurs immediately with the effi¬ 
ciency of every finite agent. Every existent thing save God, 
whether an agent, or an act of an agent, or an effect, is con¬ 
tingent, and therefore, has not in itself the sufficiency of its 
existence. Wherefore, every act or effect of an agent save God, 
as well as the agent itself must have its inherent insufficiency 
for its existence made good by the action of God. Moreover, 
such insufficiency on the part of the effect or the act of the 
agent .cannot be made good by the mediate action of God, i. e., 
through the medium of the agent by God merely giving exist¬ 
ence to the agent and its energies, and conserving both the one 
and the other in existence. For, the agent not having in itself 
the sufficiency of its own existence, cannot be the sufficient 




-378- 


reason for the existence of anything else. Nemo dat quod non 
habet. For the same reason, nay a fortiori, the act of the agent 
can not be the sufficient reason for the existence of the effect. 
Hence, every act or effect of an agent save God as well as the 
agent itself must have its inherent insufficiency of its existence 
made good by the immediate action of God, i. e., God concurs 
immediately with the efficiency of every finite agent. 

70. The immediate divine concurrence with the free 
act of an agent does not destroy freedom of will. 

For God thus operates as a universal cause, leaving the 
determination and the specification of the act, to the particular 
agent. Wherefore, if the act of the agent be naturally free, 
He allows it to be freely put. As Fr. Coppens vividly illus¬ 
trates the truth, “the free act is man’s and it is God’s, but with 
a difference: as a boat is supported by the water, propelled and 
directed by the efforts of man, but by means of the water; so 
human actions proceed truly from man, but with the concur¬ 
rence of God.” Thus far all scholastic writers are unanimous 
save Durandus, who held that the divine concurrence was only 
mediate. They are not in such perfect agreement in their subtle 
discussions concerning the intimate nature of the divine con¬ 
currence. 


ARTICLE III. 

The Divine Providence. 

71. Speaking of the ultimate purpose of God’s creation 
of the Universe, we have seen that it is His divine glory. For 
this, He has created the Universe, giving existence to the 
heavens and the earth and all they contain; for this, He con¬ 
serves all creatures in the existence He bestowed on them; for 
this, He concurs with every created activity, thus “leading 
them to their appointed ends (common and particular) the 




-379 


lowest by the middlemost and the middlemost by the highest,” 
(St. Ignatius). The divine action by which the Supreme 
Ruler of the Universe thus works out His purpose for creating 
it, is divine government, or as it is more commonly termed 

divine providence. 

This will be the subject matter of the present article which 
will consist of two sections: one on the ordinary effects of 
divine providence and the other on its extraordinary effects or 
on miracles. 

i. Divine Providence and Its Ordinary Effects. 

72. It is to be remarked first, that the providence and 
the government of God taken strictly differ : the former is the 
divine plan according to which the Universe is to be led to the 
end for which it has been created— ratio ordinandorum ad 
finern; the latter is the execution of the plan. The one, there¬ 
fore, is an act of the intelligence conceiving the end and the 
proportionate means of attaining it; the other, an act of the 
mill putting it all into execution. For, providence (procul 
videntia), is literally seeing afar, i. e., looking ahead. It is, says 
St. Thomas, “the principal part of prudence to which the two 
others are ordained, viz., the memory of the past and the intel¬ 
ligence of the present; inasmuch as, from what we remember of 
the past and what we understand of the present, we conjecture 
how we are to provide for the future. But it is the part of pru¬ 
dence to order things to an end, either for one’s own interest as 
when it is said that he is a prudent man who orders his own 
actions in keeping with the purpose of his life; or in the interest 
of others subject to him in a family, or a city, or a nation * # # 
and it is only in this latter instance that prudence or providence 
is predicable of God. For, there is nothing in God to be or¬ 
dered to an end, since He Himself is the Ultimate End.” 
Wherefore providence, strictly speaking, is an act of the intel¬ 
ligence, as prudence is of which it is a part. Of course, it pre- 




■380- 


supposes the wish to accomplish some end, and for this reason 
it is often attributed to the will. However, as commonly used, 
providence has a much wider signification, signifying both the 
plan and the execution. This is the sense in which it is used 
in the present article. 

73. The object, then, of divine Providence is twofold: 1) 
to determine the end of creatures, 2) to afford the means for 
its attainment. Now, these means are of two kinds. They may 
be either intrinsic, e. g., 1 inherent energies or faculties, ’ or they 
may be extrinsic, e. g., ‘opportunities and helps from without.’ 
The end also may be twofold; either universal and common to 
all, or particular to and proper of each. The latter is subor¬ 
dinated to the former, as right order demands. We know (59), 
that the end common to all things is the Glory of God. We 
know too (60) that this end is principally obtained through in¬ 
telligent creatures and instrument ally through non-intelligent 
creatures. The end peculiar to each and every creature is not 
always known to us; an ignorance which evidently is no ground 
for the denial of such an end. 

74. God’s providence extends to each and every crea¬ 
ture and embraces each and every occurrence. God, as He 
is infinitely wise, does nothing purposelessly. Now, whosoever 
wills the end wills also the means without which the end can¬ 
not be obtained. Therefore, God is provident in whatever He 
does. But God has created the Universe, conserves in being 
every creature in it, and concurs with every act performed in 
it. Therefore, God’s providence extends to each and every 
creature, and embraces each and very occurrence. To an ob¬ 
server this providence becomes in great part palpably evident 
from the admirable order manifested in the world. The same 
is also a matter of observation in the conduct of men who pray 
to God for favors, and reverence Him as the rewarder of virtue 
and the avenger of vice. 




381 


74. Divine providence regards man with a special care. 

For, divine providence, since it is most orderly, cares for each 
creature according to the nobility of its nature and the dignity 
of its particular end. Now, man excels in nature all the other 
creatures in the visible world and is for them their proximate 
end, since they were all created for him, i. e., as means, to 
enable him to know, love and serve God in this world and thus 
attain his eternal beatitude in the next. Therefore, divine 
providence regards man with a special care. Again, divine 
providence regards with greater care a creature who is more 
liable to fail in the attainment of the particular end for which 
it has been created. But such is man gifted as he is with the 
power of free will. 

Note.— With respect to God, there are no such things as 
chance, fortune and fate. Chance and fortune are said of what 
occurs as no one expected it would occur; they differ in this 
that the former is an unexpected event in the physical order, 
whilst the latter is unlooked for among what is done with a 
purpose, i. e., chance happens among physical agents; fortune, 
among intelligent. Now, nothing is unforeseen by God; nothing 
can take Him by surprise. He not only foresees, hut foreplans 
all. Fate can be used in a true and a false sense. As Boethius 
has said, fate has a true sense, if used to signify the immutable 
disposition which God has made of His mutable creatures, and 
according to which He holds them together, each in its proper 
sphere. It has a false sense if used to signify an insuperable 
necessity controlling all things, even the power of God. 

75. Divine providence so far as it regards the ordination 
of things is God’s alone, but the order having been estab¬ 
lished it is not executed without the agency of secondary 
causes. The reason of the latter is plain. God not only bestows 
on a creature, a participation in His divine being but also in 
His divine causality. It would be foolish, then, to expect 
God’s help, were we to make no effort on our part. 




—-382- 

76. We have already seen that the existence of evil in 
this world is not incompatible with the divine goodness. We 
shall now see that the distribution which God makes of the 
goods of this life and of its evils in no way militates against 
His divine providence. A word first on the state of the ques¬ 
tion. With regard to the aforesaid distribution, we ought not 
to concede it to be such that the virtuous are always deprived 
of the good things of this life and the vicious alone are enjoy¬ 
ing them. For, not to speak of a good conscience which alone 
makes a man truly happy here below and of a bad conscience 
which renders him really miserable, it is not true that the vir¬ 
tuous are perpetually struggling with adverse fortune and the 
vicious are meeting with uninterrupted success. This is not 
the testimony of experience. Experience testifies simply to 
this that the good many times meet with misfortune and the 
wicked with prosperity. Now, there are some who seem to have 
remembrance only for such instances. They never take notice 
of the misfortune which the wicked often fall into and the suc¬ 
cess which the good not seldom enjoy; for things then happen 
as they appear to be merited. But if the facts be broadly con¬ 
sidered it will be seen that the good and the wicked are indis¬ 
criminately subjected to the ups and downs of life. These few 
remarks having been premised, we shall now establish our 
thesis. And first it is to be noted that the goods of this life 
and its evils are rewards and punishments only secondarily; 
primarily , they are means for the attainment of the ultimate 
purpose of creation. Wherefore, if the distribution which God 
makes of them is not incompatible with the divine wisdom and 
goodness, they in no wise militate against divine providence. 
But the aforesaid distribution is not incompatible with the 
divine wisdom and goodness; for, through it both the moral 
order is advanced and the order of nature is conserved. There¬ 
fore, etc. Certainly, the moral order is advanced, since the 
human soul is thus lifted above this life and its perishable 
goods; since too it is thus urged to the constant practice of vir- 




- 383 - 

tue; the good are enabled to expiate their past offenses and 
their present faults into which even the very best often fall, and 
the wicked are drawn away from their evil ways. The physical 
order is also conserved; for this order requires that Nature be 
ruled by constant laws. Now, the laws of nature would not be 
constant, if for each and every offense punishment was given 
and for every act of virtue a reward was offered. Good and 
bad deeds are the acts of an ever changing human will. The 
order of the Universe would, therefore, be in continual fluctua¬ 
tion if a due sanction were to be given on each and every occa¬ 
sion. Besides free-will would lose much of its zest, since human 
prosperity and success depend not a little on human will. 
Finally if to these be added the teachings of revealed religion 
it will become more and more evidence that thQ Supreme Ruler 
is not only wise and good in his providence, but most loving. 


ii. Miracles. 

77. The notion of a miracle has been mistaken by many. 

Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke held that the marvellousness of a 
miracle was due only to human ignorance. Their view has 
been well met by St. Thomas, who wrote centuries before them, 
'‘that which nature does through agencies unknown to man¬ 
kind are not miracles, but wondrous works of nature. ’ ’ IToute- 
ville contended that a miracle was indeed an uncommon phe¬ 
nomenon but still effected through the very same natural laws 
which effect the ordinary phenomena of the Universe. Bon- 
nety taught that there were two series of natural laws framed 
by God; one according to which the ordinary phenomena were 
produced, the other according to which miracles were effected. 
It is evident that both hypotheses are gratuitous and moreover 
they destroy the very notion of all supernatural work. Clark 
imagined that the laws and the forces of nature are nothing 
but the will of God, which at one time wills what is common 




-384- 

and ordinary, at another what is uncommon and extraordinary. 
Such a position is nothing but Occasionalism. 

78. A miracle is what is effected out of and beyond the 
order of nature under which order lies every created agent. 
It has in it these four elements: (1) It must be a phenome¬ 
non of sense, otherwise it would fail of its end, which is to 
lead men unto the knowledge of the supernatural. (2) It 
must have reference to the natural order. Wherefore, crea¬ 
tion and the justification of the wicked, although they are 
effected by God alone, are not miracles. (3) It cannot be 
produced by natural causes. This inefficiency on the part of 
natural causes may regard not only the very fact in itself, 
but also the order and the manner in which it is produced. 
(4) There should not exist any natural exigency for which 
God works it. Hence, the creation of a soul is not a miracle. 

79. The division of miracles is two-fold. The first is 
the division into miracles (1) as to substance, (2) as to subject, 
(3) and as to mode. A miracle as to substance, i. e., with re¬ 
spect to the very thing effected, is such, as from the very nature 
of it, can not be effected in any way by a natural agent, e. g., 
‘the compenetration of bodies.’ A miracle as to subject, i. e., 
with respect to that in which it is effected, is such as to exceed 
any natural agency on account of the condition of the subject 
in which it is worked, e. g., ‘raising the dead to life.’ A 
miracle as to mode, i. e., with respect to the way in which it is 
effected, is such, as to baffle all natural powers not with regard 
to the very thing effected, nor the subject in which it is pro¬ 
duced, but the way in which it is done, e. g., ‘a sick man cured 
instantly.’ Another division is that of miracles (1) above 
nature, (2) contrary to nature, (3) and not in line with nature. 
Those miracles are above nature which nature can in no way 
effect. They are contrary to nature if there be in nature dis¬ 
positions contrary to what is miraculously produced. They 




-385- 


are, finally, not in line with nature when nature can produce 
the effect itself, though not in the manner in which it has been 
effected. 

80. It cannot be denied that miracles are possible. 

For if any impossibility existed, it should be either on the part 
of God or on the part of what is effected. But on neither hand 
can there be such an impossibility. Therefore, etc. The minor 
is thus proved, (a) There is no impossibility on the part of 
God. (1) For God is omnipotent and acts not necessarily, 
but freely. (2) His immutability is not thus called into ques¬ 
tion, since God has so established the order of nature as to 
reserve to Himself occasions wherein He Himself will work 
otherwise than the created agent. (3) Neither does any con¬ 
sequence follow contrary to His wisdom. God does not thus 
correct His work of creation. ‘'The divine art of God/’ writes 
St. Thomas, “is not fully unfolded by what God has accom¬ 
plished in the natural order. Hence, He can work otherwise 
than the course of nature. Hence again, it does not follow 
that if God act contrary to the course of nature He thus acts 
contrary to His own divine art.” (b) There exists no im¬ 
possibility on the part of what is miraculously effected. This 
is clear from what we have said of the contingency of the 
laws of Nature, (Cosmo., 23). 

81. Some writers, as Rousseau, concede the possibility of 
miracles, but deny that they can be known when they are 
effected. Whence the following proposition: Miracles can be 
recognized for certain. It must be noted first, that there 
are wondrous works which, if they are regarded absolutely , 
i. e., as they are in themselves, they are not beyond angelic 
powers; but if they are regarded, as they ought to be, relatively, 
i. e., in relation to the order of the Universe, they cannot be 
effected by any agent placed under that order, An angel can 
make the earth stand still, and the devil might do so, were he 




-386 


not held in check by the power of God. It must be noted also 
that the end for which God acts miraculously is not the com¬ 
pleting of the physical order. The physical order is in itself 
complete, and moreover were a miracle its complement, a 
miracle would not be a work beyond nature. Therefore, a 
miracle regards the higher order of Providence. What this 
higher order may be, is made evident a posteriori. “God,” 
teaches St. Thomas, “works miracles for man’s sake; either to 
confirm some truth, or to demonstrate the sanctity of a person 
whom He would propose as an example of virtue. ’ ’ A miracle 
has then been fitly likened by the same holy doctor to the royal 
seal which has been impressed on the message of a king. 
Wherefore, since miracles are for a testimony of divine truth 
or virtue, they are in no way connected with diabolic agency. 
Having premised these few remarks on the purpose of a 
miracle, we shall now prove our proposition thus: That a 
miracle be recognized to be such, it is sufficient to know the 
fact and the nature of the fact, i. e., the work and its super- 
naturalitv. Now, both can be known for certain. Therefore, 
etc., And first as to the fact. It can be known for certain, since 
it is a phenomenon of sense, and hence, can be known for cer¬ 
tain by those who properly use their senses, (Log. 108, 109). 
Secondly, as to the nature of the fact, it, too, can be 
known for certain. This is clear in the cases of miracles above 
and contrary to nature, since they argue a cause that excels 
all natural powers. It is clear also with regard to miracles 
which are above nature with respect to the way in which the 
work has been effected. For he alone can change a law who 
made it. But (lod made the physical laws of nature. There¬ 
fore, He alone, etc. But as the devil can most deftly, cun¬ 
ningly and hiddenly manipulate the forces of nature, there 
seems to be some difficulty in distinguishing his preternatural 
deeds from some miracles of the above third class. Still sup¬ 
posing divine providence, the distinction can be certainly made. 
For God will not permit the devil to act save in those circum- 




-387- 


stances from which it can be easily seen 'which is the true and 
which is the false miracle. Especially is this the case with 
respect to the end for which the work has been accomplished. 
The works of God are for the advancement of what is virtuous, 
and those of the devil for the destruction of the same. The 
ivay also in which the work has been carried on will clearly 
serve to mark the true from the false miracle. With these 
brief remarks on what has been termed the link between the 
natural and the supernatural orders, we shall bring to a close 
this little treatise on God to whom be glory for ever and ever. 






- 389 - 

INDEX 


I, II, etc., refer to the parts; 1, 2, 3, etc., to the paragraphs. 

Absolute, term I, 17; evil II, 26. 

Abstract ideas I, 11. 

Abstraction I, 9. 

Accident, one of the predicates I, 11; opposed to substance II, 49. 
Accidental object of sense I, 107. 

Act, pure II, 34; V, 12; as distinguished from potentiality II, 28, etc. 
Action II, 50, 65. 

Actual being II, 5, 27. 

Adversative proposition I, 35. 

Agnosticism I, 91; V, 42. 

Amphibology I, 72. 

Analogical term I, 16; II, 6. 

Analogy as an argument I, 67. 

Analysis I, 25; method of I, 74; chemical III, 34. 

Analytic judgments I, 28, 122; reasoning I, 45; principle of causality II, 
67; of contradiction I, 39, 93, 122; some principles I, 122; II, 8, 36. 
Anatomy III, 94. 

Answering objections I, 83. 

Antiquity of the human race IV, 37. 

Apparent conflict between reason and revelation I, 138. 

Appetite, in general II, 19; sensuous III, 73, 74, 75; rational IV, 12. 
Apprehension, simple I, 6, 80, 82; comparative I, 82. 

Argumentation, its definition I, 46; species 47, 62-67. 

Aristotle II, 50; III, 15, 27; IV, 31. 

Atomic theory III, 27-34. 

Attention I, 9; want of 82. 

Attribute, as a predicable I, 11; of being II, 9-26; of God V, 11 et seq. 
Authority I, 127 et seq., 144. 

Beauty II, 85, 86. 

Begging the Question I, 72. 

Being, what it means II, 5; real, logical, 5; as a note and as a term, 6; 
its essence 7; attributes 9-26; actual 27-39; possible 40-43; simple and 
compound 74, 75, 76; finite 77; infinite 6, 77, 78; V, 11; self-existing 
II, 79; V, 11; contingent and necessary II, 80, 81; mutable III, 14. 





390 


Belief I, 86, 127. 

Berkeley I, 105. 

Brute animals III, 59-76; 
Buddhism V, 10. 


nature of their soul, 77-82. 


Categorical proposition I, 33; syllogism 47; reduction to 61. 

Categories II, 44-58; III, 2-17, 21. 

Causal proposition I, 35. 

Causality II, 61; of matter and form, 64; of the efficient cause 65; of the 
end, 68; of the exemplar, 72; principle of, 67, I. 66; V, 7. 

Cause II, 61, 62; material and formal 61, 62; III, 36-40; 43-53; 77; IV, 18 
et seq.; the efficient II, 61, 65-67; V, 3-8, 45 et seq.; the final or end, 
II, 61; 68-70; III, 93; V, 8, 9, 54-61; the exemplar, II, 61, 72; distin¬ 
guished from condition and occasion, II, 61. First cause, 37. 

Certitude, its nature I, 87; kinds 88; existence 89-97; intrinsic means for 
attaining it 100-124; its objective motives 125; extrinsic motives 
126-142; ultimate motive 141-153. 

Chance II, 67; V, 74. 

Change II, 50; substantial 62, III, 18, 36, and accidental II, 50. 62; its 
definition III, 14; quantitative 19; qualitative 21. 

Chemistry I, 71; III, 18, 21, 25, 29, 33-35. 

Circle, exercise of I, 72. 

Clear idea I, 12; not the ultimate motive of certitude, 146. 

Cognition, sensitive I, 104 et seq.; Ill, 60 et seq.; intellectual I, 6; 77-81, 
113 et seq.; IV, 2 et seq. 

Cognoscitive powers I, 100-125; III, 59-72; 77-81; IV, 2-8. 

Common objects of sense perception I, 107. 

Common sense I, 136, 137. 

Composition II, 76; and division I, 72. 

Compound, being II, 74; propositions I, 35, 36; not the self-existing, V, 6. 

Comprehension of ideas I, 9, 11, 17; of the predicate in a judgment, 119 

Concept, I, 6; its divisions, 10 et seq. 

Coneeptualists I, 116. 

Conclusion I, 44, 48, 49, 50. 

Concrete, ideas I, 11; terms, 17; number II, 14. 

Concurrence with second causes II, 66. 

Condition II, 61. 

Conditional, proposition I, 33; syllogism 5?; knowledge of Cod V, 25. 




391 


Consciousness IV, 8; its trustworthiness I, 102; as testifying to the exist¬ 
ence of the intellect, 113; of one substanee in man II, 45; of free will 
in man IV, 15; to the spirituality of the intellect, 23. 

Consequence I, 44, 48. 

Conservation of the soul of man IV, 26; of all V, 63. 

Contingent being II, 80; as a proof of God’s existence, V, 5. 
Contradictories I, 13, 38. 

Contradiction, the principle of II, 8. 

Copula I, 29. 

Copulative, proposition I, 35; syllogism 59, 61. 

Cosmology III, 1-94. 

Creation V, 44; last end of, 54 et seq.; of the soul of man IV, 33 et seq. 
Criterion, ultimate of certitude I, 146. 

Criticism, new I, 134. 

Critics I, 2; 76-153. 

Darwinian theory III, 83, 90, 91, 92. 

Death, what is it IV, 26. 

Definition I, 23. 

Descartes, methodic doubt of I, 93; clear ideas, 146. 

Determinations of being II, 6. 

Dialectics I, 3-75. 

Difference, specific I. 11. 

Dilemma I, 65. 

Disjunctive, proposition I, 36; syllogism, 60, 61. 

Distant action III, 9. 

Distinction II, 15; of sciences I, 70. 

Distributed middle I, 50. 

Distributive supposition I, 19, 31. 

Division I, 20; of quantity III, 4. 

Doubt I, 86; methodic 93. 

Dream III, 68. 

Dualistic theories on the union of soul and body in man IV, 29-31. 
Duration III, 16; of God V, 16; of eternal punishment IV, 27. 

Dynamic theory III, 6; 35 et seq. 

Effect, defined II, 61; of matter and form 62; of the agent 65, 67; of the 
end 68. 

Efficient cause, defined II, 65; its divisions, 66, and objective reality 67. 

God, 67; V, 44 et seq. 

Elements of certitude I, 87, 96. 




- 392 


Embryology III, 94. 

Empiricism IV, 11. 

End (see Final cause); of creation V, 55. 

Enthymeme I, 62. 

Epiclierema I, 63. 

Equivocal term I, 16. 

Equivocation I, 72. 

Error I, 84 (see Falsity). 

Essence, as a predicable I, 11; as a reality II, 7, 32; distinguished from 
existence in finite things 39. Essence of bodies in general III, 24-40; 
of God II, 34; V, 11; of life in general III, 41. 

Estimative, IV, 71. 

Eternity III, 16; of punishment IV, 27; of God V, 16. 

Eucharist Holy I, 112; II, 52; III, 12. 

Evading the question I, 72. 

Evidence, described I, 141; divided, 142, 143; as the infallible motive of 
certitude 145; as the ultimate end and fundamental motive 146 et seq. 

Evil II, 23 et seq. God’s knowledge of, V, 22, indirect wish of the physical 
and permission of moral evil, 35, 36. 

Evolution, in what sense true III, 86; in what sense false, 29. The mon¬ 
istic, 88; the Darwinian, 90, 91; and two other kinds, 92, 93, with 
objections answered, 94. 

Exemplary cause II, 72. 

Exercise in reasoning I, 72. 

Existence II, 5; really distinguished in creatures from essence, 39; self, 
45; V, 11, 79; of God proved V, 1-10. 

Excluded middle, the principle of, II, 8. 

Extension, of ideas I, 11; of terms, 18; of the predicate 31; of the subject 
32; of a proposition 32; of the terms in a syllogism, 50; of bodies, 
III, 2 et seq. 


Faith, in general I, 127; divine, 138 et seq. 

Fallacies I, 72. 

False II, 18; judgment, I, 82. 

Falsity I, 82. 

Fichte V, 54. 

Figure II, 50, 52. 

Final cause, its effects, causality II, 68, divisions 68, and its objective 
reality 69. 

Finite beings II, 77; act 67, for an end 70. 



- 393 - 


First fact, principle and condition of certain knowledge I, 93; principles, 
ibid; II, 8, 36; cause is not made, 37, and is infinite, 38.—See Cause. 

Foreknowledge of God V, 24-27. 

Formal, object of Philosophy I, intr.; of science, 70; of sense III, 64; 
truth I, 81; act of divine faith, 139; cause II, 62; object of a judgment 
I, 27; of a cognitive faculty IV, 4; sign I, 14. 

Form, of a proposition II, 64; of a syllogism I, 48; as a cause II, 62; 
substantial form 64; of bodies III, 39; of plants 51, 52, 53; of animals 
77, 78, 79; of man IV, 31; metaphorically taken II, 64; accidental II, 
49, 50. 

Free-will, defined IV, 14; it exists in man 15-17; and it controls the other 
faculties, 18. As a source of error I, 82; and as proof of the spirituality 
of the soul IV, 23. It exists in God V, 37, 38, 15. 


Generation II, 48; not spontaneous, 54; it transmits organic life, 55 et seq. 

Genus, as a predicable I, 11; being not a genus II, 6. 

Geology on the origin of Life III, 54; on the origin of species, 91, 94; on 
the antiquity of man IV, 37. 

Glory V, 60, 61. 

God, our knowledge of V, 1, 2; His existence, 3, proved 4-10; His nature 
11, II, 34, and quiescent attributes, i. e., infinity II, 6, 77; V, 12, sim¬ 
plicity II, 34; V, 12; unity, 14; immutability, 15; eternity, 16 immen¬ 
sity 17, and infinite goodness II, 22, which is the final end of the uni¬ 
verse V, 59. His operative attributes 18 are intelligence 19-27, 51, 52; 
II, 43; and will V, 28, which is free 37, 15, 50. His relative attributes 
39, 40 are infinite power 43, creation 44; II, 66, conservation V, 63; 
concurrence 65-70; providence 71 in its ordinary effects, 72-76, and 
miracles 77 ec seq. 

Goodness, described II, 19; absolute and relative of finite things 20; use¬ 
ful, pleasurable, and befitting 21. Every being is good, 22. Of God, 
20, 22; V, 59. 

Growth III, 47. 


Habit II, 50. 

Hallucination III, 69. 

History, as a means of acquiring knowledge I, 129 et seq.; on the antiq¬ 
uity of man, IV, 37; on God’s existence V, 10. 

Hymnosis III, 69. 

Hylomorphism III, 36-40. 



394 


Hypothesis I, 71. 

Hypothetic, proposition I, 33; syllogism, 59; reduced to the categorical, 61. 
Ideas I, 6; their objects 7, 8; comprehension and extension, 9; classified 
according to their origin, 10; to their objects represented, 11, and the 
various degrees of perfection of these objects, 12; or in regard to their 
relation to one another, 13. The two id. in a judgment 27. Their 
objective reality 115. False theories of 117; true theory 118. Their 
origin IV, 6 et seq. Innate 11; Idea of God V, 1. 

Idealism I, 105; III, 27; V, 41. 

Identity II, 13; the principle of, 8; of two things I, 44; II, 13. 

Ignorance I, 85. 

Ignoratio elenchi I, 72. 

Image of God only intelligent creatures V, 53. 

Imagination III, 66, 68; the causes that make it act 69. 

Immanent action II, 65. 

Immensity of God V, 17. 

Immortality of the human soul IV, 25 et seq. 

Immutability of God, V, 15, 38, 80 
Impenetrability III, 10. 

Indirect reasoning I. 69. 

Individuality of every being, II, 12; of a substance, 48. 

Induction I, 66. 

Infinite being II, 6, 17, 22, 38, 43, 77; V, 6, 12; how conceived, V, 12. 
Inhesion II, 44, or inexistence peculiar to accidents, 49. 

Instinct III, 71. 

Instrumental sign, I, 14; cause, II, 66. 

Intellect of man, its existence I, 113, 102, 128, primary functions, 114, or 
actions 102, 115, 120, 123; IV, 2-11; their simplicity, 20, 21; its spirit¬ 
uality, 23. Active and passive, 7. God’s intellect, V, 19-27. 
Intellectual memory I, 123. 

Intelligence not in brutes, III, 71, 80, 81. 

Internal senses III, 66 et seq. 

Intuitions I, 10, 93, 122. 


Judgment, its definition I, 27, and spirituality IV, 10; analytical and syn¬ 
thetical I, 28, 120 et seq. For other divisions see ‘Proposition.’ When 
false, 28, 111. Reliability of the immediate, 120, 121, 122. Those of 
common sense 136, 137. 




395 


Kant’s synth. judgments a priori I, 28; critics on reason, 93; on space 
III, 11; on God’s existence, V, 9. 

Kinetic theory III, 28. 

Knowledge of God V, 19-27, of the possibles II, 40 et seq. The reason 
why things are true I, 77; II, 16. Of man concerning essences, 7; 
God, V, 2 et seq. See ‘Cognition.’ 


Laws, of opposition I, 39 et seq.; of the syllogism 44, 50; of nature III, 23; 
V, 10; not against miracles, V, 80. 

Liberty, physical, defined IV, 14, proved, 15; divided 16; moral 16. Ob¬ 
jections 17. Of God V, 28 et seq. 

Life, according to atomism III, 29 and hylomorphism, 39; its definition 
and division, 41. Organic, 45-58; sensitive, 59-63, 66 et seq.; intel¬ 
lectual in man IV, 2 et seq. See apprehension, judgment, reasoning 
intellect, liberty, free-wfill; in God V, 18 et seq. 

Local motion III, 20; spontaneous, ib., and 76. 

Locomotion III, 76. 

Logic, its definition I, 1; division, 2; into Dialectics, 3-75, and critics, 
76-153. 

Logical, supposition I, 19; division and definition 20 et seq.; truth 77 et 
seq.; falsity, 82; idea, 119; being, II, 5; distinction, 15; relation, 57. 


Major term and premise I, 43, 53. 

Material cause II, 62. 

Materialism III, 29. 

Materialists on the soul IV, 24. 

Matter II, 62; III, 36; of a proposition I, 30. 

Memory, intellectual I, 123; sensitive, III, 70. 

Metaphysical, universality I, 32; truth, 77; certitude, 88; evidence, 142; 

compound, II, 75; argument on free-will IV, 15; on God’s existence V, 5. 
Metaphysics, its definitions and division, see introd. to part I and II; 

general, II, 4-85. 

Metempsychosis IV, 35. 

Method 1, 73; of analysis and synthesis, 74; of discussion, 75. 

Methodical doubt I, 93. 

Middle term I, 44, 50. 

Minor term and proposition I, 44, 50, 53. 

Miracle V, 77. 

Modal proposition I, 36; accident II, 49, 50. 

Moods of the syllogism I, 53. 




396 


Moral philosophy. See introd. to part I; truth, 77; certitude, 88; laws, 
128; good II, 21; evil, 26; cause, 66; liberty IV, 16; argument on God’s 
existence V, 10. 

Motion III, 15; local 20; of atomists 30; as indicating life 41; of animals 76. 
Motive of certitude I, 87, 125 et seq. 


Nature, of a being II, 45; the laws of, III, 23; of bodies, 24 et seq.; ot 
the animal soul 77 et seq.; of the human soul IV, 19 et seq.; of God 
V, 3 et seq.; as the sum of all things, V, 9. 

Natural appetite III, 73; theology V. 

Necessai'y, cause II, 66; being, 80, 81; V, 5. 

Negative proposition I, 31; conclusion, 50. 

Nominalism I, 117. 

Nothing II, 5. 

Notion I, 6. 

Number II, 14. 

Objections against conceptual truth I, 83; of sceptics I, 97; against testi¬ 
mony 131; of Darwinists III, 94; against the spirituality of the soul 

IV, 24, its immortality 27, and creation 34; against God’s knowledge 

V, 27 and will, 36. 

Objector I, 72. 

Objects of science I, 70; of the senses 107 et seq.; of the intellect IV, 4. 
Occasion II, 61. 

Occasionalism IV, 30; V, 77. 

Oneness II, 10. 

Ontologists IV, 7, 11. 

Ontology II. 

Operative attributes of God V, 18 et seq. 

Opinion I, 98. 

Order II, 82 et seq.; as an argument on God’s existence V, 8 et seq. 
Organic life III, 41 et seq. 

Organicism III, 49. 

Organs of sense I, 106. See Organic Life. 

Oiigin, of ideas IV, t ; of the soul 33; of the world V, 50; of species III, 
83 et seq. 


Paleontology on the origin of species III, 94. 

Pantheism III, 27; V, 41, 42, 50. 

Particular idea I, 11; term, 18; proposition 30, 32; in a syllogism 50. ’ 




397 


Passion II, 50. 

Perfection II, 7; of being 73 et seq.; of God V, 12. 

Person II, 48. 

Phantasms III, 69; IV, 7. 

Philosophy defined. See introd. to part I. 

Physical, certitude I, 88; evil II, 26; V, 35; possibility II. 41: cause. 66. 
Place III, 12. 

Plants III, 50 et seq. 

Plato on hylomorphism III, 27. 

Polytheism V, 14. 

Possible being II, 50; 40 et seq. 

Possibility, intrinsic and extrinsic, II, 40 et seq. 

Posture II, 50. 

Potentiality II, 29 et seq. 

Power II, 28; divine V, 43 et seq. 

Predicables I, 11. 

Predicate I, 29; in affirmative and negative propositions, 31. 
Pre-established harmony IV, 30. 

Prejudices I, 82. 

Premises I, 44. 

Preservation V, 63. 

Primordial matter II, 63, 64; III, 18 et seq. 

Principal cause II, 66. 

Principiate II, 60. 

Principles II, 60; of reasoning I, 44; implied in every judgment, 93; of 
identity I, 44; II, 8;. of contradiction I, 37, 122; II, 8; of excluded 
middle II, 8; on act and potency, 36; on the first cause, 37 et seq.; 
of causality, 67. 

Probable reasoning I, 71. 

Proper objects of the senses I, 107. 

Property I, 11. 

Propositions I, 29; their division according to quality 31, quantity 32, 
and matter 33; opposition, equivalence and conversion of 37; as form¬ 
ing a syllogism 46. 

Providence of God V, 71 et seq. 

Psychology. See introd. to Metaphysics, and IV. 

Pure act II, 34. 

Purpose II, 68. See End. 


Quality of propositions I, 30, 31; as an accident II, 50. 




398 


Qualitative change III, 21. 

Quantitative change III, 19. 

Quantity, of propositions I, 30, 32; in the Eucharist 112; III. 13; of bodies 
II, 50; III, 2-10. 

Rational, Psychology IV; appetite IV, 12. 

Real, being II, 5; distinction, 15; relation 55, 56. 

Realism, exaggei’ated I, 117 and moderate, 118; of Spencer, 105. 

Reality, of substance II, 45; of accidents 50; of cause and effect 67; of the 
final cause 70. 

Reason, the light of IV, 7. 

Reasoning, in general I, 43; its principles 44. division 45, and verbal ex¬ 
pression 46; as a means of acquiring truth 123. See also IV, 10. 
Reflex universal I, 11, 118, 119. 

Reflexion I, 9. 

Relation II, 50, 53 et seq. 

Retort I, 65. 

Rules of the syllogism I, 50. 

Sameness I, 13. 

Scepticism, its definition I, 86; division, 89, and refutation, 90, 91, 97. 
Science, its definition and objects I, 70. 

Self existing being, II, 34, 79; V, 6, 11. 

Sensation I, 106; not found in plants III, 50; how effected, 60. 

Senses, external I, 104; III, 63; as reliable I, 109 et seq.; internal III, 
66 et seq. 

Sensitive cognition III, 60; memory, 70. 

Sensuous appetites III, 73 et seq. 

Sign I, 14, 15. 

Simple apprehension I, 6; truth of, 80. 

Simple being, II, 11, 74, 75. 

Simplicity II, 76; of the human soul IV, 19; of God V, 12. 

Singular ideas I, 11; proposition, 32. 

Sleep III, 69. 

Somnambulism III, 69. 

Sophisms I, 72. 

Sorites I, 64. 

Soul, its definition, III, 52; of plants, III, 53; of animals, 81; of man, IV, 
19, is a simple substance, ib., spiritual 22, immortal 25 et seq., the 
substantial form of the body, 29 et seq., and created, 33 et seq. 

Space III, 11. 




- 399 - 


Species as a predicable I, 11; their fixity in plants and animals III, 83 
et seq.; impressed and expressed in sensitive cognition, 61. 
Spontaneous motion III, 20, 76; generation 54. 

Substance II, 44-48; the human soul IV, 19. 

Substantial cause II, 64; change III, 18; principles of bodies, 36 et seq. 
Supposition I, 19. 

Suppositum II, 48. 

Syllogism I, 46-49; its laws, 50; figures, 51, 52; moods, 53-58; and "division 
59. Other forms of argumentation reducible to it, 62-65. 

Synthesis I, 74. 

Synthetical judgment I, 28, 122. 


'I erms, their definition, I, 15, and division according to their perfection 
and signs, 16, comprehension of the idea signified 17, and extension 18; 
their supposition or use 19; in a proposition 31, in a syllogism 44, 50; 
in relation II, 56. 

Testimony, its definition I, 127; principles on which it is based 128; human, 
129, 130; objections against 131; its division, 132-137; divine, 138-140. 

Thomas St. on the distinction between sense and intellect IV, 11; on 
man’s brain, 24; on the union of the soul and body, 31; on the origin 
of the soul, 35. 

3 

Time, III, 16. 

Tradition I, 132. 

Traducianism IV, 33. 

Transcendental idea I, 11; note II, 6. 

Transitive action II, 65. 

Trinity, the Holy II, 48; V, 14. 

Truth I, 77; conceptual, where found, 78-83; states of the mind in regard 
to it, 84-99; means for acquiring it, 100 et seq. Ontological, II, 16, 
17, 18. 


Ultimate criterion of certitude I, 146, 147. 

Unity, II, 9; kinds, 10; of the vital principle in plants III, 53; in animals, 
77-82; in man IV, 28, 31; of God V, 14. 

Universal, ideas, I, 11; direct I, 10; their objective reality 119; reflex, I, 
11; are logical, 119; proposition, I, 30, 32; major, 50 et seq.; testimony, 
136, 137; cause, II, 66. 

Universe, its creation, V, 50, for the glory of God. 60; its conservation 
63-70; and its being provided for, 71 et seq. 

Univocal term, I, 16; being is not such II, 6. 




400 


Vacuum III, 13. 

Valid syllogism, I, 48. 

Vegetative life, its definition, III, 45, and functions of nutrition, 46, 
growth, 47, and generation 48. What it requires, 49. 

Virtual cause V, 12. 

Vital principle, in plants, III, 51-54; in animals, 77 et seq.; in man, IV, 19 
et seq. 

Volume, its variability III, 9. 

Will, human, IV, 12; its freedom, 13, 14; proved, 15; it controls its own 
action, 16, and the other faculties 18; and it shows the spirituality of 
the soul, 23. Divine, V, 28, 29; antecedent and consequent, 30; its 
object, 33, 34, 35. Solution of objections, 36, 37, 38. 

Wisdom, of God V, 19. See also the ‘Physical argument,’ 8, and ‘Divine 
providence,’ 71. 

Words, I, 15, 77. 

World. See Universe. 




















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